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ABSTRACT 
 
The background of this research is the fall of the New Order Regime which 
occurred in 1998, followed closely behind by the creation of local autonomy policy. 
This policy was issued based on Law Number 22/1999 (Local Government) and Law 
Number 25/1999 (Intergovernmental Finance). Both laws have changed the local 
public administration from a centralized into a decentralized system and also caused 
reform in some components such as planning, organization, personnel, and finance. 
Even though Law Number 22/1999 had been implemented for four years, the reform 
seemed very tardy. In fact, several regions showed a progress tendency that was the 
reverse of the expectation. For this reason, the question that will be formulated in this 
research is “Why was there a different level of performance of local public 
administration reform after the local autonomy implementation in Indonesia?”  
The conceptual framework of this research is outlined as follows: it is 
presumed that the performance of Local Public Administration Reform is determined 
by two major independent variables that are interrelated. These are the Central 
Government Role Variable and the Response of Local Government and its 
Environment towards the Reform. The Central Government Role consists of two 
variables Decentralization as an Architecture Reform Variable and the Policy Reform 
Variable. Both major variables interrelate with some variables at the local level such as 
the Mayor/Regent’s Role, the Response of Bureaucrats and Politicians to Local Public 
Administration Reform, and the Response of Civil Society to the Reform.  
This research is the qualitative because it tries to observe intensively several 
unique cases that occurred in the local public administration reform. Data collection 
was conducted through in-depth interviews and field observations as well as 
administrative documents, news and some previous research related to local public 
administration reform. The technique of data analysis in this research is a qualitative 
analyzing technique. A number of cases in six research districts were analyzed in the 
Giri the Regency, the Prajan Municipality, the Kulon Regency, the Anom Regency, the 
Alit Municipality, and the Wetan Regency). This analysis also used data which came 
from statistics data processing primarily from GDS I (2002) and GDS I+ (2005). 
In general, there were some differences in the performance of local public 
administration reform in the regions studied, whether in the organization, personnel, 
finance, or planning methods. Some of them were successful and others failed. Here, it 
was also indicated that there was no specific public administration reform model at the 
local level (or even at the national level) that was being applied in Indonesia during the 
local autonomy implementation. This was a combination of the market approach and 
the modernizing management and participatory approaches as well as a tightening up 
of budgets and financial management. It then became unclear to what the direction and 
policy (incremental policy) of the public administration reform was in the regions. 
However, some local governments succeeded in carrying out some reform components 
of the public administration reform. If the objective of public administration reform is 
to create competency and good governance, various strategies that had been carried out 
so far were relevant to the achievement of this purpose. The strategy basically on one 
hand improved the quality of the bureaucratic management by altering several tools so 
that they were more modern, and on the other hand, was in line with the efforts of 
democracy to welcome public participation in the administration processes. This study 
 xix
also proves that under the conditions where bureaucracy is considered as the main 
agent in social change, the local public administration reform performance is 
determined by the convergence of administrative reform and policy reform (Thesis I).  
The success of some regions in performing reform, among other reasons, was 
caused by their courage in not always depending on the Central Government. It was 
also indicated that variables which may have had an impact on performing the reform 
came from the region itself. The main variable was the Mayor/Regent’s role. The role 
in fact became very apparent when, on one hand, the Central Government was unable 
to create clear policy and certainty in the administrative or substantial policy reform. 
On the other hand, political actors (the DPRD) did not have the ability to supervise the 
bureaucracy effectively (Thesis II). Politicians were getting less committed to reform 
because they were not interested in placing local public administration reform on their 
political agenda (Thesis III). They seemed to collaborated with the bureaucrats, but 
this was only artificial because what really occurred was that they exploited each other 
to maintain their own interests. In this collaboration, the bureaucrats were more 
cunning than the politicians in avoiding detection which could lead to them being 
punished (Thesis IV). In addition, civil society’s access to the policy related to the 
public administration reform was limited. Both bureaucracy and the politicians often 
used civil society, especially the NGOs, pressure each other when the conflict of 
interest between them worsened (Thesis V). In that happened, the role of the head of 
the region (Mayor/Regent) was the most dominant role in determining the success of 
the public administration reform. 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Background and Research Question 
 
For almost the last three decades most governments in the world have 
attempted to change their administration systems. The progress in public 
administration practices during the 1980s and 1990s has been the ‘golden age’ of 
administrative reform throughout the Western world (Wright: 1994, as quoted by 
Kickert, 1997:17). Wright (1997: 7) said that the reform of public administration has 
been placed on the policy agenda of almost every European government—whatever 
their political complexion—although the timing, pace, extent, nature, reasons and 
impact vary greatly across European countries.  
Some writers (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Kickert, 1997) have argued that 
the reforms are obviously necessary for financial-economic reasons. The economic 
recession after the oil crisis of the 1970s resulted in enormous deficits in the public 
budgets, and the Western welfare state proved to be unaffordable. The need to cut back 
in the public sector and especially the enormous size of the inevitable retrenchments, 
formed the major reason for the necessity of drastic reforms in the structure and 
function of Western governments and administrations. According to Osborne and 
Gaebler, there are three ways of dealing with deficits: first, expenditure can be limited 
and public tasks can be terminated; second, revenue, such as taxes, can be raised; third, 
public tasks can be performed with less money (work better and cost less). The third 
way logically forces the public sector to move towards public management because it 
emphasizes an increasing of productivity, greater efficiency, better value for money, 
and so on. All of these issues are believed to play a central role in thinking about 
management concepts. Therefore, the golden age of administrative reforms specifically 
resulted in managerial reforms being a dominant trend in the Western world. 
Kickert (1997) argues that these reforms tend to be more or less managerial 
reforms. The characteristics of these reforms are the adoption of business management 
techniques, a greater service and client orientation, the introduction of market 
mechanisms and competition in public administration. Kickert considers these 
characteristics to be the introduction of ideas, models and techniques of public 
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management. Even though there are many differences in the nature, size, and approach 
to reforms, it is concluded that a common agenda has developed. This is ‘a new 
paradigm for public management that has emerged, aiming at fostering a performance-
oriented culture in a less centralized public sector’. 
Similar to the administration reform in European countries, in Asia-Pacific 
regions the objective of the administrative reform was to promote productivity in 
bureaucratic performance (Guzman & Reforma, 1992). Guzman and Reforma still use 
the concept of administrative reform rather than management reform, however these 
concepts are almost the same in practices. Guzman and Reforma wrote that 
administrative reform in the Asia-Pacific region is divided into three stages:  
The early stage of administrative reform in Asian Pacific countries has its 
ideological roots in the concept of ‘Weberian bureaucracy’-the lawful state. The law 
governs, and public authorities and public servants act, according to the administrative 
reform efforts. These efforts are focused on building a complex machinery of rules 
applied in a multi-layer hierarchy with stable and clear roles in each layer. The 
development of civil service charters clearly has its origin in the lawful state.  
The second stage of administrative reform may be characterized as the 
democratic stage. In this stage the law becomes a less stable phenomenon, and an 
instrument of reform. The ever-changing political will of the citizens, as seen and 
interpreted by the representatives in different decision making bodies, is the norm that 
regulates the activities of the administration. A great expansion of government 
services, budgets, payrolls and influence on daily life is a characteristic of this stage.  
The third stage reflects a shift to a market-oriented public administration. The 
demands of the public become more differentiated. It becomes increasingly difficult to 
meet this differentiated demand by using a simple majority decision—typical of the 
welfare state. The market-oriented administrative reform efforts do not imply a turn-
away from democracy, but the moment every citizen wants his/her particular blend of 
service, majority decisions regarding policy output become increasingly difficult. If 
differentiated services are to be accepted as a political goal, public administration must 
treat the citizen as a consumer--free to choose what he/she can pay for and can pay 
with taxes, with deflated fees or with production cost derived fees. A market oriented 
administrative reform effort does not mean that equalization goals have to be 
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abandoned. Instead new methods have to be used to reach traditional goals of a fairly 
even distribution of public services (Guzman & Reforma, 1992). 
What occurred in countries in the Asia-Pacific region, as mentioned above, is 
not far from the public administration reform, including bureaucracy reform, in 
Indonesia. The difference in Indonesia is that it took a very long time to progress 
through the stages. For example, to achieve the second stage, the democracy stage, the 
required time was about 50 years since Indonesian independence in year 1945. This 
time constraint was related to the New Order regime under the leadership of Soeharto 
who was very authoritarian. This oppressive regime almost never gave full/freedom of 
speech to the people, particularly the bureaucracy. In the era of the New Order regime, 
the bureaucracy definitely became the instrument of the ruling government. 
Bureaucratic reform which was implemented in that time was merely to satisfy the 
interests of the regime, i.e. through a number of technical changes within the employed 
system and procedure. Coinciding with the increase of democratic prosecution, 
attempts to change the bureaucracy were not only made with regards to the technical 
aspects, but also through opening the bureaucracy to be responsive to the external 
environment by creating transparency, participation and accountability. 
The concept of market orientation for public administration reform in Indonesia 
is still new. The barrier is that most politicians and public administrators (bureaucrats) 
understand “market orientation” as being “privatization”, that is, selling ownership of 
public resources such as state enterprises to the private sector. Right now, privatization 
is a more political issue than managerial issues, especially at the central government 
level. At the local government level (Municipality/Regency), local government 
enterprises are hardly ever sold to the private sector.  
Even though reformation of numerous political and economical aspects in 
Indonesia had been implemented for about five years, this condition has motivated the 
acceleration of reformation in the public administration. While at the onset, the aim 
was just to open up the public administration to be more transparent, participatory, and 
accountable, in practice it has actually been mixed up with market ideas that were 
carried out through the new public management approach. In other words, the second 
and third stages of public administration reform, as described above by Guzman & 
Reforma, have been mixed up to become one stage in the context of  Indonesia. The 
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market ideas which were integrated into public administration reform in Indonesia 
have stuck together with the pressure of the unfinished economic and political crises 
since 1997. These crises have decreased the ability of the government to finance the 
public sector, forcing the government to unite with the private sector in public service 
delivery. In addition, the strategy of reformation in the public service tries to adopt the 
private sector approach by placing society as a consumer. While the output of this 
public administration reform is not yet clear, a variety of dynamics that have occurred 
in the government bodies itself, civil society and other stakeholders as a result of this 
reformation is interesting enough to become the topic of this research. 
Local Public Administration reform in Indonesia has existed since 1974. It was 
this year that the Law Number 5, 1974, on Local Government was implemented. At 
that time, the administration system was centralized under the authoritarian New Order 
regime. The law regulated the sharing of finances and authority between central and 
local governments. However, the implementation of this law was practically 
dominated by a top down perspective, so that the role of the local government tended 
to be ignored. The local government had to fully follow the central government 
instructions in policy implementation and its daily management. The resulted in some 
policies is being ineffective and unsustainable. In other words, the public 
administration reform was carried out slowly and uncertainly because those policies 
were not suited to the local areas. The consequence of this was that the bureaucracy 
tended to get too large and was a burden an the local budget, the capacity of the local 
government officials was low, the local budget allocation was not transparent, and the 
system raised economic disparity between rural and urban areas or between the island 
of Java and non Java island. 
After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, the spirit of change the 
government system strongly increased. Change in various governance sectors was 
conducted by the government through regulations. One of the elementary changes in 
government organization was the implementation of Law Number 22, 1999, on Local 
Government and Law Number 25, 1999, on Finance Balancing between the Central 
and Local Governments. These laws have changed the system of local government 
from a centralized into a decentralized one. The heart of the local autonomy was 
concentrated in the regency/municipality. The central government remained 
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responsible for national defense, security, international political relations, justice, 
religion, and monetary and fiscal policies. Through these authorities, the central 
government is still allowed to maintain organizational branches in local areas. The 
Regency/municipality has authority over health, education, public works, the 
environment, communications, agriculture, industry and trade, capital investment, 
land, cooperatives, manpower and infrastructure services. 
This situation has altered a number of elementary dimensions in the 
management of local government for example the central–local government 
relationship, the election of a local head by the Local House of Representative 
(DPRD), local government (executive) relations with the DPRD, the management of 
local public finance including the collection of local taxes and levies, the management 
of local public servants, the development of organization structure of local 
government, the management of public services, and a number of other systems and 
procedures of local government management. To strengthen those changes, the central 
government issued some government rules. Those rules are expected to be able to alter 
the mindset of all local government officials. These rules, at least, can be categorized 
as: 
a)  Planning Methods: bottom-up planning, public participation; 
b) Personnel: transfer of civil servants from central government to local 
government, developing skills and education, developing personnel 
management systems (recruitment and positioning); 
c) Organization: simplicity of organization a structure (number and size), 
decrease in number of structural positions (echelon), decrease in number of 
Deconcentrated Government Offices (Kanwil and Kandep), transfer of central 
government assets to local government; 
d) Finance: developing system of Performance Budget, General Grant (DAU) 
system. 
Basically, the changes appear as an unsatisfied reaction to the irresponsive 
attitude of local government in anticipating problems that occur in society at a local, 
national, and even international level. This problem requires highly accurate and 
immediate handling by the government. On the other hand, the old system was too 
centralized. The centralized system has been proven to produce a number of problems 
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with regards to political and social-economic aspects. For example, interregional social 
and economic disparity which is progressively mounting, the increase of unsatisfactory 
reactions in a number of regions which have marginal development, and the failure of 
local governments in fulfilling the needs of society in their own areas because most 
decisions are made by the central government. Besides this, the globalization issue, 
such as free trade area which has spread widely in all areas, needs to be addressed 
immediately by local governments. If this issue is not addressed, local governments 
will only become consumers of goods and services from the international market. 
Even though Law Number 22, 1999, has been implemented for five years, the 
reform seems to be very tardy. In fact, several regions show progress that is a reverse 
of the expected tendency. Data from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank’s 
2005 Investment Climate and Productivity Study (ICPS), explicitly explains the impact 
of decentralization on key aspects of governance and the investment climate. Firms 
perceived decentralization as having a negative impact in four areas: labor regulations, 
licenses, policy uncertainty, and corruption. Nearly 50 percent felt that policy 
uncertainty and corruption—two broad indicators of accountability—have worsened, 
while just under 30 percent of the firms felt that decentralization has made licensing 
and labor regulations worse. (See Graphic 1.1). 
Graphic 1.1:   The Negative Impacts of Decentralization,  
As cited by Firms in Indonesia 
 
Note: The ICPS was carried out through a survey of 713 firms in 11 provinces and in 10 sub sectors of 
manufacturing 
Source: Investment, Climate and Productivity Study (ADB and World Bank, 2005) 
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Data from the research, which was carried out through the Governance and 
Decentralization Survey (GDS), 2002, in 150 regencies/municipalities (53 percent of 
the regencies/municipalities in Indonesia) from 20 provinces (77 percent of all 
provinces) in Indonesia, showed unexpected findings in local government management 
in Indonesia. The findings are believed to be connected to the high amount of collusion 
and corruption, lack of local budget transparency, and the local government 
commitment to increase the public service quality. 
GDS I, 2002, found that the budgeting process has not been able to show a high 
enough transparency level. Data from GDS I show in detail the low level of 
transparency of the Local Budget allocation nationally. There is no a significant 
difference between regency and municipality, or between West and East Indonesia. It 
is interesting that almost 30% of the Bureaucratic Apparatus admitted the level of 
transparency of local budget allocation as being low. Their confession, as they are 
from the inner circle of bureaucracy, proves that there is something wrong in the 
budgeting process. 
Local government commitment to increase public services especially health 
and education service seems to also be low. This is indicated by the low percentage of 
the budget allocated to health service, which is equal to 1.8 percent of the total APBD 
nationally. For education, the allocated budget is equal to 2.8 percent of the total 
national APBD. The data shows that the local government’s commitment to realizing 
education and health service management seems progressively far from what is 
expected. 
 Even though in most regencies/municipalities the growth of governance reform 
has not yet shown significant change, in several regions it has expanded quite fast, 
especially as a response to economic growth. One example of this is the lessening of 
the number of local regulations which could become an obstacle to the growth. Several 
regions have had the courage to oppose a number of regulations specified by the 
central government, for example, regulations about land management authority. 
Governmental Regulations still places the land management authority with the central 
government, but several regions claim that this is part of regional authority. As the 
consequence, these regions have formed special departments to manage this. 
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Besides reform fail, GDS I 2002 include interesting data that shows successful 
reform. This was the community assessment of the public service quality before and 
after local autonomy (sees Table 1.1). Around 52% of the community said that the 
quality of schools before and after local autonomy is still the same. This is also the 
case with the Public Health Center (Puskesmas) which 53,9% of the community 
assessed as having no change in the quality of health services before and after local 
autonomy. Even with regards to the Head of Villages Office, Sub District Offices and 
Regents/Mayors Office services, approximately 59% of the community assessed them 
as being the same before and after local autonomy.  Interestingly, however, the 
government’s financial crisis did not reduce the quality of some public services. They 
are still in the same condition as they were after local autonomy implementation. 
 
Table 1.1: Community Assessment of Public Service Quality Before and After Local Autonomy 
Community assessment on public service 
quality comparing before and after local 
autonomy (%) 
 
Type of service 
Worse (%) Same (%) Better (%) 
School (primary, junior and senior high school) 6.6 52.3 41,1 
Community Health Center (puskesmas) 3.6 53.9 42.5 
Head of Village Office 3.1 57.2 39.7 
Sub District Office (kecamatan) 2.0 61.7 36.3 
Regents/Mayors Office 3.1 59.9 37.0 
Note: N= 9.000 households 
Source: Primary Data, GDS 2002 
 
Other innovation in the public service is shown by the number of regions 
having large education budget allocation. This is allocated for the human resource 
development in the governmental apparatus and also society through a scholarship 
program. This change is quite impressive compared to the era of the New Order 
Regime, which was kept busy by internal business in its own bureaucracy. Another 
kind of innovation in public services has also been implemented by creating a multi 
stakeholders’ forum whose duty is to make a “Citizens’ Charter” that contains a 
number of agreements between the users, service providers, and other stakeholders in 
public service delivery. In other regions, there are also those who utilize information 
technology systems, for instance by constructing local TV station or by making use of 
the internet, to create transparency and accountability in the public service.  Moreover, 
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the transparency is carried out by employing either local or national newspapers as a 
media of public debate for local governments to learn of people’s aspirations.  
There is also an impressive change in public administration reform. The local 
government has tried to make more participative policies. This has been done by 
forming a number of inter-stakeholder forums or by letting groups in society conduct 
initiatives to influence the policy intake in the region. For example, a number of local 
governments allow society to make a contribution to the formulation of the local 
budget (APBD) by applying the Performance Budgeting model. This budget 
arrangement obliges transparency in the course of its formulation and its substance is 
based on functions run by each governmental institution. Change in this budget 
formulation model is dramatic because the model and process of the budget 
formulation during the New Order regime was closed to the possibility of proposals 
from society. 
Other dramatic reform in some regions is the reformulation of local 
government organizational structure, from too hierarchic with number of instances one 
into the slimmer (flat) structure. This kind of reform is quite dramatic because it 
deletes a number of official positions in the organization. Previously there were more 
or less 1.600 types of positions, while after the institution reform there were only about 
600 types. This change caused even greater “clicks” to form among local politicians 
and bureaucrats as a direct result of the decreasing amount of position available.  
This is precisely the opposite of those regions which reduced their number of 
institutions. However, some other regions still kept the same number of institutions, 
and even set up additional institution after the local autonomy implementation (see 
Table 1.2). For example, the Minahasa Regency added 14 institutions, Gorontalo 12 
institutions etc. Conversely, the Simalungun Regency took drastic action by reducing 
the number of institutions from 39 to 28. 
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Table 1.2: The Number of Institutions in Some Districts before and after Local 
Autonomy 
Regency/Municipality Before the law After the law Change 
Minahasa 20 34 +14 
Bolaang Mongondow 16 25 +9 
Gorontalo 13 25 +12 
Banjarmasin 25 33 +8 
Sanggau 18 25 +7 
Magetan 22 26 +4 
Kudus 16 16 0 
Karo 15 19 +4 
Simalungun 39 28 -11 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
The speed differences in conducting the reform have a consequence, brought 
different results to various regions. Among the lack of public administration reform in 
Indonesia, there is a small number of regions that have been innovative in order to 
fulfill the reformation process. A small number of regions have been fast in conducting 
reform, but there are still many regions which are left far behind. Therefore, there is 
almost no difference in the conditions before and after the reform era. 
Society expects reform to bring benefits. The GDS I, 2002 data indicated that a 
lot of societies are pessimistic that the reform will bring the number of changes they 
hope it will. For example, in the case of public service quality, the GDS I, 2002 data  
concludes that according to most respondents, there were no significant changes in 
public service quality after the implementation of Local Autonomy in Indonesia. In 
other words, the conditions of the public service in Indonesia are the same as the 
conditions before the implementation of Local Autonomy. Many society members 
assumed that Local Autonomy would shift certain Corruption, Collusion, and 
Nepotism (CCN) practices from the central government to the local area. Therefore, 
local autonomy only benefits the political elite and certain bureaucrats in the region. 
The strength of civil society at the local level is also presumed to determine the 
motivating capacity and the direction of change of public administration reform. Clear 
evidence has shown in a number of regions that when the civil society had an active 
involvement in the public service reform process at the local level, there was a 
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tendency that the local governments would formulate their policies in a more careful 
manner. They would also make an effort to correct their public service systems in 
order to be more responsive, transparent and accountable to the public. There was also 
evidence from GDS I, 2002 that a very strong civil society will not encourage a more 
meaningful public service reform. Their presence would have actually created a 
resistance in the local government, either at the legislative or the executive side. The 
desired process of reformation will then fall into a chaotic state because each party 
holds opposite positions.  
There is a presupposition that the intensity of involvement of the central 
government, local government and civil society at a local level brings about different 
consequences with regards to the form of desired local government reformation. For 
this reason, based on the variety of the data mentioned above, the question that will be 
put forward in this research is “Why are there different levels of performance of local 
public administration reform after the local autonomy implementation in Indonesia?”  
The research question will be elaborated into a number of core questions: 
a) What is the extent of local public administration reform performance after local 
autonomy implementation? 
b) What causes the success and the failure of the performance of local public 
administration reform? 
c) Who is the key actor who can influence the success or failure of local public 
administration reform performance? 
 
B. Research Objectives:  
 
a) To describe the performance of local public administration reform after the 
local autonomy implementation. 
b) To describe the correlation between  the performance of the local public 
administration reforms and the factors of the Central Government Role, which 
consist of the Decentralization Model as an Architecture Reform and the Policy 
Change, the Role of the Regent/Mayor, the Response of Bureaucrats and 
Politicians, and the Response of Civil Society   
c) To identify the key factors that determine the performance of local public 
administration reforms 
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C. Research Originality and Benefit 
These research questions are important issues to study, considering that there 
was a long, uneasy public administration reform in Indonesia, especially at the local 
level from 1974 until 2004. Some studies on the process of reform in the public sector 
show the importance of the agents of change. The agents of change could be from the 
central and local government level, as well as from inside and outside the organization. 
Ideally, there is collaboration between the agents from the central and local 
government levels, either from inside or outside the organization, which will 
strengthen the quality of change.  
Numerous studies on public administration reform in Indonesia have been 
done, but there are few studies that look at it from the local government level. No 
study has been done on public administration reform based on Law No. 22/1999 and 
Law No.25/1999. Those laws, however, have changed the local government system 
from a centralized into a decentralized system. Now is the first time in the history of 
Indonesia that the local government has had true administrational autonomy. The 
assumption of this change is that more autonomy means more creativity, especially 
when the local government wants to set up the ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ of its 
institutions. 
In addition to this, no study has been done to date on public administration 
reform in Indonesia that views it from the perspective of collaboration between state 
and civil society. Most studies have merely analyzed it from the state perspective and 
tended to ignore the non state (civil society) perspective. Meanwhile, it has been 
realized that non state bodies, especially civil society, are increasingly interested in 
areas of governance.   
This study is expected to put forward a number of valuable theories and 
concepts, which might explain why this has occurred.  It will, therefore be useful, in 
the future to correct the pace of reformation of the whole public administration. 
Besides this, the finding of this study could answer the question as to how far the non-
state role in public sector reform in Indonesia is. Some people, including academics 
doubt the non state role in the reformation process because it tends to make the public 
sector instable and therefore disadvantages the state and people. 
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D. Thesis Outline  
The objective of this study is to explain the causal relationship between the 
performance of local public administration reform and the variables that may influence 
the success or failure of that reform. This objective will be explained in the theoretical 
framework in Chapter II. The theoretical background of this study will be divided into 
four major parts, two of which will be causality. The first part explains the general 
theories and concepts that are related with the Public Administration. The second part 
explores the concepts of Public Administration Reform as dependent variables that are 
at the center of this study, including an explanation of the concept of The New Public 
Management as the most popular recent model of public administration reform. The 
third part provides several theories and concepts to explain and clarify some 
independent variables, i.e. the Central Government’s Role (Decentralization as the 
Architecture of Reform and Policy Reform), the Mayor/Regent’s Role, the 
Collaboration and Conflict between Bureaucrats and Politicians (DPRD), and the 
Dynamics of Civil Society towards Bureaucratic Reform that elucidates the dependent 
variables. The fourth part explains several controlling variables: the Size (number) of 
Local Civil Servants, the Size of Local Government Organizations, the Financial 
Resources of the Local Government, and the Local Environment (political, economic, 
and cultural) that will be employed as the control variable. A detailed explanation of 
this last part is presented in Chapter III. 
Chapter IV tries to exemplify the national data of the public administration 
reform performance at the level of city and regency (dependent variables). The 
national data, which comes from statistical analysis (GDS), will be compared with 
the qualitative data from the research regions, in order to find out exactly what 
happened in those regions. Before this comparison, this analysis will start with the 
reform strategy from a regional perspective, to describe how each local government 
defines and formulates their strategies. 
Chapter V presents one independent variable which influenced the local public 
administration reform at that time. The independent variable here is the position of 
some actors and interaction among them with regards to the public administration 
reform process. Before explaining in detail what each actors´ role is, their position 
when they influence public administration reform will be generally described. The 
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independent variable is the central government’s role. The local administration 
structure according to the law will be explained, as well as the background of the 
decentralization policy, and the way the central government plays its role in this 
model. Influence towards public administration reform will also be explained.   
Chapter VI explains several Independent Variables and will start with one of 
the main variables at the local level, the Regent/Mayor’s role in determining the 
success of public administration reform during the implementation of UU No. 
22/1999. The next variable is the reaction of the bureaucrats (civil servants) and 
politicians (DPRD) to the public administration reform. The last variable that will be 
discussed is the dynamics of civil society in relation to the problems concerning public 
administration reform. 
Chapter VII sums up the thesis and discusses some policy implications both 
theoretically, for theory building, and practically to make successful local public 
administrational reform.  
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The theoretical background of this study will be divided into six major parts, 
two of which will be causality. The first part explains the theories and concepts that 
are related to the Public Administration. It includes an explanation of the definition of 
the public administration and bureaucracy. In this part the characteristics and culture of 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy are explained, especially in the context of the New Order 
Regime. The researcher’s position towards the theories and concepts used will also be 
put forward (in this part). The second part explores the concepts of Public 
Administration Reform as the dependent variable that forms the center of this study. 
Also included is an explanation of the concept of the New Public Management (NPM) 
as the most popular recent model of public administration reform. The models of NPM 
will then be described, as well as an explanation as to what kind model is suitable for 
analyzing Indonesia’s public administration reform. Finally, this part identifies some 
components of public administration reform as well as indicators of the public 
administration reform performance. The third part provides several theories and 
concepts to explain and clarify some independent variables such as the Central 
Government Role (Decentralization as the Architecture of Reform and Policy Reform), 
the Mayor/Regent’s Role, the Collaboration and Conflict between Bureaucrats and 
Politicians (DPRD), and the Dynamics of Civil Society to Bureaucratic Reform that 
elucidates the dependent variables. The fourth part explains several controlling 
variables: the Size of Local Civil Servants, the Size (number) of Local Government 
Organizations, the Financial Resources of the Local Governments, and the Local 
Environment (political, economic, and cultural) that will be employed as the control 
variable. The fifth part is a summary in the form of a conceptual framework. This part 
also presents five theses that will be verified in this research. Finally, the sixth part 
describes the research method that is applied in this study. 
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A. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
1. Understanding of Public Administration  
The history of public administration as an academic field is needed when we 
want to know in depth what a public administration is. Henry (1989) has characterized 
each phase of history using locus or focus (paradigm). Locus is the institutional 
“where” of the field and focus is the specialized “what” of the field. In short, the first 
paradigm is the dichotomy of politics and administration (1900-1926). The emphasis 
of this paradigm was on the locus of public administration that should center on the 
government’s bureaucracy. The second paradigm was the principles of the 
administration (1927-1937) which had an emphasis on focus—its essential expertise in 
the form of administrative principles such as Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, 
Coordinating, Reporting, Budgeting (POSDCoRB) by Gullick and Urwick. The third 
paradigm is public administration as a political science (1950-1970). This paradigm 
renewed the definition of the locus—the governmental bureaucracy because it leaped 
back into the mother discipline of political science. This resulted in a corresponding 
loss of focus. The fourth paradigm is public administration as management (1956-
1970). The management provides a focus but not a locus. This change is partly because 
of public administration was put in a second-class citizenship in a number of political 
science departments. After this, some public administrationists began searching for an 
alternative management field in which to operate. The fifth paradigm is public 
administration as public administration (1970-?). In this paradigm, public 
administration is increasingly recognized as a separate, “self-aware”, field of study, 
although there is not yet a focus for the field in the form of a “pure science of 
administration”. There has been, perhaps, less movement toward delineating a locus 
for the field. Nevertheless, public administration emphasizes such areas as state and 
local government, executive management, administrative ethics and all those questions 
that seek to explain what “the public interest” is in a techno-bureaucratic “Big 
Democracy” (Henry, 1989:45). 
Public administration is the academic field of study of the making and 
execution of decisions in public institutions. The making and execution of decisions is 
in terms of the public interest that comes from different groups in a plural society. This 
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means that various public activities occur and be financed by the government budget. 
Therefore, administration and politics can not be separated. 
 According to this understanding, the concept of public administration 
emphasizes the locus that is the public institution as an organizer to determine and 
execute of public interest which are part of the public sector1. Then, the public interests 
determined and executed by the public administration are financed by the government 
budget. In practice, making or implementing of policies by the public administration is 
executed by the public bureaucracy. Therefore, the concept of public administration is 
closely related in meaning with the concept of public bureaucracy. Some public 
administration experts do not differentiate between the concepts of administration and 
bureaucracy because bureaucracy has administrative value and also runs it in practice. 
Similarly, Farazmand (1997:12) said that bureaucracy is often used as a synonym for 
public administration, including both the function of implementing government 
policies and the organizations responsible for these activities. In the Indonesian 
political system, the role of the public administration as a policy implementer and 
policy maker has no clear boundaries, and hence dominates the Indonesian 
governmental system. 
 
 
2. Public Administration as a Bureaucracy (a positive and negative vision) 
To further understand what bureaucracy means, an explanation on the position 
of bureaucracy in the government (public administration) is first needed. Government 
organizations are here defined as “ formal administrative structures established by the 
Law or public laws, headed by officials elected by citizens or appointed by elected 
officials and/or principally financed by taxation or owned by the state” (Rose, 
1984:13). The definition of ‘government’ used by Rose is actually slightly similar to 
the definition of ‘bureaucracy’. This is so because the definition is used to clarify the 
importance of the Law as a foundation that forms the formal administrative structure 
of the bureaucratic organization, the existence of the career rank (appointed) and 
political rank (elected) systems, and the financing received from taxes. Nonetheless, it 
                                                 
1 For a political scientist, the concept of the public sector includes both what kind of activities public 
institutions carry out and how decisions are made and implemented by these institutions. According to 
Lane, the public sector is fundamentally a set of institutions that coordinate the interests of different 
groups that ask in various ways for public activities of different kinds.  
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needs to be explained that a bureaucracy is a government tool used to implement the 
policy that is mandated by the Law. 
Theoretically, a bureaucracy is a form of organization. Its meaning is related to 
its base word, Bureau. According to Chester L Barnard, an organization is a system of 
consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons explicitly created 
to achieve a specific end. Based on this kind of understanding, Down (1967) then 
defines a Bureaucracy as having a similar concept to a Bureau, which refers to an 
institution or specific institutional level.  Furthermore, in his second definition on 
bureaucracy, Down states that a bureaucracy is a certain method used to allocate 
resources in an organization on a large scale. The third definition of bureaucracy is the 
bureauness or quality that distinguishes bureaus from other types of organizations. 
The last definition is related to the quality of the bureaucratic product. It is also 
important to highlight the word “public” in the definition of bureaucracy to 
differentiate it from the private sector. Based on this public concept, the existence of a 
bureaucracy is acknowledged by the law that is produced through political decision. 
The life of bureaucracy is also guaranteed by political decision.  
It is very often the case that there is a significant difference between the 
normative bureaucratic theory and what actually happens in practice. To help 
understand this disparity, several experts propose ways of seeing a bureaucracy 
(vision). One way is proposed by Jenkins and Page (2004) in the introduction of their 
book, which shows two extreme perspectives on bureaucracy: 
“The first is a vision of bureaucracy as a major foundation of modern 
civilization. It brings harmony, justice and progress. The second vision 
sees bureaucracy as the enemy of civilization” 
 
In other words, the first vision tends to view bureaucracy positively, while the second 
vision, on the contrary, views in negatively. 
  In the first vision, which is often associated with the term “guardian class” 
from Plato’s Republic model, a bureaucracy has the positive function of managing a 
fair State and providing ethical foundations to manage the relationship between the 
State and its society. It is worth noting that an effort to understand this vision is found 
in the bureaucracy models proposed by Weber and Hegel. In the development of the 
history of bureaucracy, Weber and Hegel’s model of bureaucracy are considered as 
 19
the foundation for the development of modern bureaucracy, though there are many 
who consider their bureaucratic model as being an ideal model that is difficult to 
implement in real life. Some even feel that Weber’s bureaucracy model would only 
succeed in guiding the industrialization process in Europe in the Middle Age. 
 Weber proposed his bureaucracy model argument based on the rationalism of 
political leadership in the bureaucratic system. The two central features of Weber’s 
concept of bureaucracy, identified by Martin Albrow (Jackson 2004), are that the 
individual bureaucrat has duties to perform, and that the resources employed in the 
performance of those duties are not the property of the official. Weber explored 
bureaucratic criteria in detail. The criteria are impersonal authority structure, 
hierarchy of offices in a career system of specified spheres of competence, free 
selection based on achievements in accordance with clear rules, discipline and control 
in the conduct of office (Lane, 1987:4). Other criteria added by Jackson (2004:12) are 
salary paid, office main occupation, office not owned, centralization, personal 
freedom of incumbent, contractual appointment, and duties specified 
 On the basis of the ideal typical characteristics of bureaucratic rule, Jackson 
identifies the danger that a government may become dominated by bureaucrats and a 
bureaucratic ethos. While Jackson is not as fatalistic about this as is often alleged, the 
nature of the ideal type of bureaucracy contains this tendency (Page, 1987:232). 
Though the model is considered as ideal, Weber’s bureaucracy model is at the very 
least, able to show the implications of the characteristics toward the convergence 
between bureaucrats and politicians, especially in decision making that is related to 
public interest. This can be seen, for example, in how politicians try to interfere with 
the decision making process through various appointed officials based on a certain 
hierarchy.  Another example is in the fact that strategic positions within the 
bureaucracy are filled by bureaucrats that are closely related to politicians regardless 
of competency.  On the other hand, bureaucrats in certain positions are able to 
cunningly perform their roles and trick politicians that are not very smart into 
responding to certain policies.  
  The internal situation of the bureaucracy itself is interesting to study using 
Weber’s characteristics, for example how certain intrigues are created by high 
officials to drive out the elected officials who lead the bureaucracy. Another 
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interesting example is how merit recruitment is often ignored because certain cultural 
values are more concerned with seniority promotion. The “adherence to the rules” of 
Weber’s basic model has changed its function from a mere tool to become the purpose 
itself. The most apparent effect is felt when a bureaucracy has to provide public 
services, since there is much red tape which in the end tempts the public service 
management to implement rules in such a way that they themselves benefit. Many 
forms of bribery are examples of this.  
  In his analysis, Weber states that cohesiveness between the bureaucratic elite 
has created official domination. When organizational sectoring and differentiation are 
carried out/implemented, it is difficult to control these sectors, although this prevents 
elite domination. Weber gives an example that occurred in Russia and Germany 
Emporium that demonstrated that a bureaucracy is able to limit political leadership by 
creating differentiation (Page, 1987:234).  
  Another ideal model is the Hegel’s bureaucracy model. Although he did not 
use the term “bureaucracy”, his writing on the theory of state politics has indirectly 
placed the bureaucracy in an important position in the relationship between state 
politics and society. His work has made an important contribution in showing how 
bureaucratic values are supposed to be applied in political relationship. Jackson 
(2004:3) argues that Hegel’s theory of bureaucracy has a normative dimension. In 
other words, Hegel is one of the people who made foundations for bureaucratic ethics, 
encompassing how positive a bureaucracy should positively function in the state 
management politics.  
  An important point in the theory of bureaucracy role proposed by Hegel is the 
existence of general interest (universal class) and special interest (civil society). In 
order to perform this normative role, a bureaucracy is supposed to be neutral. It should 
be able to act as an intermediary between general interest and special interest. Hegel 
frequently called the executive (government) the universal class, indicating that the 
prime duty of the government lies in the universal interest of the polity. The purpose 
of the bureaucratic executive is to apply the universal concepts of the rational state to 
particular cases. Specifically, the governing bureaucracy must see the universal 
interest involved in particular problems and then act on behalf of the universal 
(Jackson, 2004:10).  
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  There are similarities and differences between the bureaucracy models 
developed by Weber and Hegel. The following table (2.1) will compare these two 
models based on the bureaucracy characteristics that they have used so far: 
Table 2.1: The Criteria of Bureaucracy  
No The Criteria of Bureaucracy Weber Hegel 
1 Hierarchy of offices Yes Yes 
2 Merit recruitment Yes Yes 
3 Salary paid Yes Yes 
4 Office main occupation Yes Yes 
5 Office not owned Yes Yes 
6 Centralization Yes Yes 
7 Personal freedom of incumbent Yes Yes 
8 Duties specified Yes No 
9 Seniority promotion  Yes No 
10 Contractual appointment Yes No 
Source: quoted from Jackson, 2004:12 
 
The two last points, where both have differing visions, are interesting. Weber agrees 
with promoting employees based on seniority, while Hegel does not give his opinion 
on this matter. This difference is probably caused by the different underlying 
assumptions in their theories. Weber bases his assumptions on the rational that 
bureaucratic organization is a machine which, in its operation relies on an order and 
value that have been approved collectively. Hegel, however, realizes that the State’s 
political life, including bureaucracy as its supporting system, enables a political bias 
to occur in staff promotions, which would affect the quality of the bureaucracy. 
  More importantly, Hegel did not limit public services to the terms specified in 
a contrast. He did of course, stress that the performance of duties is to be assigned to 
individuals, but the assigned duties do not exhaust the obligations of the civil servant. 
The obligations of civil servants are not only functional but also moral. It is Hegel’s 
universal class that perceives and applies the universal interests, and not the monarch 
or parliament. In contrast, Weber apportioned no such moral responsibility to the 
bureaucracy (Jackson, 2004:12-13). 
  Weber’s attitude is based on the theoretical assumption, that politics should be 
detached from the administration. An administration or bureaucracy is a mechanical 
body that implementers political decisions. Thus, moral responsibility is held by those 
that make the decisions, and not those that implement them. This politics-
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administration dichotomy has in some ways neglected the bureaucracy’s 
characteristics. A bureaucracy is described as a creature that has its own interests, this 
being one of the weaknesses of Weber’s bureaucracy characteristics. Nonetheless, 
Mommsen (Jackson, 2004) explains that Weber feared, bureaucracy has a way of 
exceeding its writ. To overcome this problem, Hegel argued that control must come 
from within the bureaucracy and ultimately from within each bureaucrat.  
  The second vision is the pathologic bureaucracy vision that views bureaucracy 
negatively. Harold Laski (Hill, 1992:2) once put forward a negative view on 
bureaucratic authority. 
“Bureaucracy is the term usually applied to a system of government the 
control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power 
jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens” 
 
Laski seems to fully realize that a bureaucracy has a large amount of political power 
which might threaten the bureaucracy with its practices.  This political factor 
contained within a bureaucracy is used by Hill to differentiate a bureaucracy from the 
concept of “administration” which, in his opinion, has a relatively neutral value (Hill, 
1992:3:3). Hill apparently uses an institutional approach to differentiate between 
bureaucratic and administrational concepts. However, if a bureaucracy is seen as a 
system, the processes that it performs are also administrative processes. In other 
words, an administration cannot actually be detached from politics. The difference in 
the two occurs when a bureaucracy is seen institutionally as a public or private 
organization. In this matter, it is obvious that a public bureaucracy cannot be 
separated from the political values where that bureaucracy exists. When relative 
political systems do not support democracy, it is almost certain that the values and 
practices of the bureaucracy are also in opposition to the democracy. 
  Lane (1987) gives another opinion by classifying some negative views on 
bureaucracy that are proposed by the experts: a) Bureaucracy as rationality; b) 
Bureaucracy as rigidity; c) Bureaucracy as ‘Beamtenherrschaft’; d) Bureaucracy as 
chaos; e) Bureaucracy as oversupply; f) Bureaucracy as size maximization; g) 
Bureaucracy as uncontrolled; h) Bureaucracy as private choice; i) Bureaucracy as 
waste. Each of these will not be discussed, only quoted generally as required for this 
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dissertation. Even though they are negative views, Lane admitted that not all of them 
could describe the reality of bureaucracy. 
  Rationality is often understood as being efficiency, which means that a 
bureaucracy would be efficient if it performed rationally. The basic idea that results in 
this kind of understanding comes from impersonal relationship criteria that occur in 
the office (Lane, 1987: 5). The assumption is that if those that worked in an office 
dedicated themselves entirely to the office work, this would then create efficiency (the 
ethic of Beruf).  However, it is not that simple in practice, because bureaucrats are 
also motivated to pursue their own interests. The unclear distinction between means 
and end in bureaucratic works is often questioned. Lane (1987:6) in his writing states 
that: 
“From the beginning the bureau was a means to promote external social 
ends, but as a result of organizational inertia the interest of the bureau 
itself tends to replace the basic function to promote external goals. The 
bureau itself becomes the end for which it operates”. 
  
  Bureaucratic stiffness often becomes pathologic since public services that are 
supposed to be the main task of the bureaucracy are neglected, and bureaucrats focus 
more on the formal procedures that have been determined. There are many public 
services matters that require flexibility and speed of action. However, the obligations 
of the bureaucrats to follow the rules forces the customer to waste time, energy, and 
even a considerable amount of money to receive services from the bureaucracy. 
Fairchild (Lane, 1987) states his opinion as follows: 
“Bureaucratism is usually characterized by adherence to routine, more or 
less inflexible rules, red tape, procrastination, unwillingness to assume 
responsibility and refusal to experiment”. 
 
The term “bureaucraticism” as proposed by Fairchild above refers to bureaucratic 
behavior patterns of authorities that intentionally or unintentionally neglect the 
societies that they are supposed to be serving.  Instead of being a servant, in the 
context of bureaucraticism, a bureaucracy demands the service of the society. This 
kind of progress is certainly unhealthy in regards to the effort to develop democracy, 
because the bureaucracy has acted beyond the ethical boundaries of Hegel’s neutral 
bureaucracy concept. A powerful bureaucracy is indeed needed in order to support 
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democratic improvement. However, it is important to note that this power is supposed 
to be used to serve and not suppress the society.  
  A bureaucracy that has the tendency to rule is also known as a 
‘Beamtenherrschaft’. Max Weber has previously reminded us about the dangers of the 
drive of a bureaucracy to become its own master. Peters (1987:257) states: 
“On the one hand, we are recognizing quite explicitly that administration 
is not merely the execution of policies decided upon by political officials. 
Indeed, administration officials are deeply involved in policy-making and 
fight for their own positions and for their own conceptions of ‘good 
policies’. But, on the other hand, although they are both engaged in policy 
making, political and administrative leaders play very different roles in the 
policy process.” 
 
Administrator intervention in policy-making matters is due to the functional skill and 
experience advantages that the administrators have compared to the politicians. Based 
on this, Peters once again reminds us that conflict between politicians and bureaucrats 
is very likely to occur in today’s’ modern bureaucracy.  The power of information and 
technology is often able to defeat political power and in the end it is the bureaucracy 
that rules.  
  Bureaucracies also have a tendency to maximize budgets (Bureaucracy as 
oversupply) that are allocated for institutions and activities. William Niskanen (1971) 
states:”the hypothesis that bureaucrats maximize their budgets is intended as a 
fundamental characterization of bureaucratic behaviour” (Lane, 1987:13).  
  This behavior is most apparent in a yearly budget composition. Every 
government institution competes to raise budget allocation for its office and projects. 
Sometimes, the amount raised reaches a hundred percent over the real allocation 
needs. Unfortunately, almost all government offices do not compose their budgets 
based on the needs of the main duties and functions, but on the intuition and political 
interest of the elite bureaucrats. It is very often the case that budget composition of an 
institution is the result of a conspiracy between bureaucratic elites and political elites.  
  Bureaucracies only try to increase their budget supply, but also try to 
continuously increase their size. Lane (1987:16) quotes the definitions of bureaucracy 
in the Webster’s Dictionary. Two of them point to the understanding of a large 
organization:    
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“Bureaucracy: (1a) the whole body of non-elective government officials. 
(b) the administrative policy-making group in any large organization”. 
 
In many cases, efforts to increase the size of the organization are carried out by 
increasing the number of units development in the organization and spreading them 
over a number of districts. Consequently, this will increase the need for employees to 
operate each unit with each various function. 
  The next characteristic of a modern bureaucracy proposed by Lane is its 
tendency to centralize its power. This can be seen in the hierarchic arrangement of 
several organizations that have central headquarters or an inherent autonomy of an 
internal institution. Gordon Tullock (Lane, 1987:18) stated that bureau autonomy is a 
special characteristic of modern bureaucratic behavior and the outcomes for this kind 
of ‘bureaucratic free enterprise’ are usually inefficiency, irresponsibility, and waste. 
An extensive centralization with autonomy might encourage the creation of an 
uncontrolled bureaucracy. A bureaucracy can possibly become uncontrolled if the 
discretion of the bureaucracy officials is too large, or the officials possess 
informational and functional skills so that the bureaucracy holds more power than the 
politicians. 
A bureaucracy, as a public institution that has a mandate to fulfill public needs, 
cannot in practice be separated from the behavior of its personnel who have private 
interests (Bureaucracy as private choice). These private interests, such as prestige, 
power, income, security, and so on, often take priority over public interests so that they 
disturb the performance of the bureaucracy. This kind of behavior is very apparent 
when the local culture still holds bureaucratic officials in a high social status. This can 
be made even worse if the private sector has not been able to employ a work force, so 
that public organizations become a favorite place to find employment. The following 
section is a short preview of bureaucratic characteristics (public administration) in 
Indonesia, especially during the New Order Regime, that are acknowledged as a main 
contributors in the bureaucracy building to the present day. 
 
3. The Characteristics and the Culture of Indonesia New Order Bureaucracy 
Indonesia essentially tries to adopt the ideal bureaucracy characteristics 
demonstrated by Max Weber. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to fully adopt the ideal 
bureaucracy, and there are some characteristics that have deviated from the ideal 
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bureaucracy. The example is the inability of the officials to separate public and private 
role and ownership, which often result in the abuse of power, for example corruption 
and collusion. In addition, expertise creation as a direct result of specialization seldom 
happens because of the inappropriate recruitment patterns and human resource 
development. 
The failure to apply Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy model in Indonesia has 
caused the development model to attain a pathologic characteristic2. Based on the 
model used by Fatah (1998), with several adaptations, three bureaucracy models can 
be used to describe the development of Indonesian bureaucracy (see Table 2.2): 
Table 2.2: The achievement level of the bureaucracy model in Indonesia during 1949-
1997 
Periods Model Objectives 
1949-1959 1959-1967 1967-1997 
Parkinson Proliferation of 
structure and 
bureaucracy personnel  
low low High 
Orwell Bureaucracy as a state 
political instrument and 
political controlling 
device 
 
average 
 
average 
 
High 
Jackson Authority 
accumulation through 
the bureaucracy and 
public alienation of the 
decision making 
low 
 
average 
average 
 
high 
High 
 
High 
Source: Adapted from Fatah (1998) 
The above table shows that Parkinson’s model developed most under the New 
Order regime. The reason is simple: the regime needed a bureaucracy as a device to 
maintain its authority. To be able to do so, the bureaucracy was developed through 
widening the organizational structure and strengthening the hierarchy by creating as 
many organization units as possible. The bureaucracy then recruited as many 
personnel as possible to be placed inside the newly created units. This problem was not 
found under the Old Order regime, for at that time the regime was busy keeping the 
state unified in the face of the threats of many rebellions. The next model, the Orwell 
model, was applicable to both regimes, especially the New Order regime. In the New 
Order period, besides the military and Golongan Karya, the bureaucracy was one of 
the effective authority devices that was used to recruit people who supported the ruling 
                                                 
2 Pathologic in this case means a form of deviations from Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy characteristics that tends 
to serve the state authority and ignore the public’s interests. 
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government, and at the same time was used to control the people3. The next model, the 
Jackson model, shows several similarities with the Orwell model. The main difference 
between the two models lies is Jackson’s identification of the ability of the 
bureaucracy to alienate the public from the decision making process. In other words, 
the bureaucracy becomes an organization that is immune to the public’s demands and 
needs. The last two models demonstrate that a bureaucracy cannot be detached from 
the political system which it supports.  
 Other models used to analyze the development of the bureaucracy in Indonesia 
are using the cultural and structural approaches. The cultural approach sees the 
bureaucracy in Indonesia as a patrimonial one, because the structure of bureaucratic 
ranks activity are deeply influenced by a patron-client relationship (Hadna, 1998). This 
pattern has actually been transferred from the pre-colonial period, and strengthened 
under colonialism through its feudalist concepts. The similarity of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy with the colonial bureaucratic pattern is found by Ruth T Mc. Vey (1982). 
This colonial form of bureaucracy is called Beambtenstaat. It was known of in the 
1930’s, when the Dutch colonial administration emphasized the principles of 
modernity, efficiency, and development governance. In those times, the bureaucratic 
power was enormous. Kuntowijoyo (1994) concurs with this, and says that the 
bureaucratic culture and the phenomenon of bureaucraticism have positioned the 
government and its officials to become more authoritative in the structure of people’s 
live. 
 Another cultural analysis is the Bureaucratic Capitalism model by Richard 
Robinson (1986) as quoted by Evers and Schiel (1992), which Kunio Yoshihara (1998) 
considered as being Ersatz Capitalism. Bureaucratic Capitalism occurs when there is 
no distinction between public and private interests. In order to increase its capitalistic 
characteristics, according to Evers and Schiel (1992), a bureaucracy uses a 
combination of bureaucratic ranking and personal economic activities, and indirectly 
uses some people inside the organization as its puppets. In Robinson’s view, it is not 
                                                 
3 In the New Order period, there was an abbreviation that was very famous, ABG. It was an abbreviation from 
ABRI (the military), Golongan Karya (the political party), and Bureaucracy. The ABG way was a favorite route for 
anyone or any group that wanted to enter the circle of authority. These three organizations became an effective 
means for the New Order to build its power. This is proven by the extensive period of the New Order regime 
authority, which lasted for more than 32 years (1966-1998). 
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only the military officers and civil officials, but also their family members, who build 
corporations or own shares. 
 Both Robinson and Yoshihara agree that several powerful countries are deeply 
involved in the capitalism in third world countries. There has been strong cooperation 
between the businessman and the ruler. The success of a businessperson in a third 
world capitalist country is not determined by his/her ability to compete in the free 
market, but by his/her level of intimacy with highly ranking officials and privileges 
owned (Budiman, 1996). Many businesspersons try to pursue the gain that is created 
by the government through the privileges giving. The privilege, based on the main 
argument of Patrimonial model, is a means to distribute the financial benefits to the 
elite members so that the authority possessed could still be owned.  
 Another cultural analysis that is very controversial was proposed by Karl D. 
Jackson (1978). He suggested relating the Indonesian political culture with the 
domination of the Javanese culture4. His opinion is as follows: 
“Variabel-variabel kultural termasuk konsep-konsep kebudayaan Jawa 
tentang diri pribadi, perilaku sosial yang ideal, patronase, dan 
kekuasaan mempengaruhi politik Indonesia modern pada saat ini” 
(Cultural variables including Javanese cultural concepts about one’s self, 
ideal social behavior, patronage and power influence contemporary 
Indonesian politics)  
 
In Javanese culture, authority is taken as being the freedom to perform changes in the 
wider society that in practice need trained personnel authority in certain fields to 
perform. According to this belief, there will always be a chance for someone to have 
authority, so one does not always have to hold the power in making formal decisions. 
To retain the chance, the authority should be concentrated in one place rather than 
spread over different areas.  
 Jackson also infers that the number of people with authority in Javanese culture 
is always even and static. This viewpoint gives the idea that removing or relocating the 
authority a political actor is the only way to increase the authority of a political figure. 
The concept of limited people with authority is, in part, able to explain why the elite 
rulers are reluctant to mobilize their own voters through a single or multiple party 
                                                 
4 The Javanese ethnic group is the largest ethnic group in Indonesia in terms of number and influence over political 
and administrational systems. Of the five former presidents of Indonesia, only one was not Javanese. This was 
Habibie, who is from South Sulawesi. 
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system. The reason for this is that authority is inherited by the macro cosmos by ruler 
and cannot be expanded by public participation. Meanwhile, the reason that a portion 
of the ruler’s authority is given to other political actors is to maintain loyalty and 
respect. Thus, in the Javanese tradition, the concept of increasing the authority through 
increasing public participation is not familiar (Jackson, 1978). 
 Jackson’s bureaucracy model that is a representation of the political system,  is 
included in a model called the Bureaucracy Polity. This model assumes that the 
highest level of civil and military bureaucracy groups monopolize the political power 
and participation. Politics only runs in the small group of key-decision makers that is 
only concerned, though not exclusively, with the values and the interests of a small 
group of urban elite. As its name suggests the model tends to create internal rivalry 
inside the bureaucracy rather than to respond to the movements of the people that are 
moved by ideology, class, or other primordial sentiments. Most of the critics of the 
Bureaucratic Polity are followers of structuralism. They disagree that the Javanese 
culture variable influences the Indonesian bureaucracy. The Javanese culture variable 
cannot explain some phenomena that according to the structuralism view, also happens 
in other places in the world. Examples of these phenomena are the tendency of a 
bureaucracy to be very hierarchic and not transparent, the tendency to prefer stability 
rather than conflict, and the inadequateness of the official’s work ethic.  
 Differing from cultural analysis, structural analysis is based on an external 
variable, the involvement of a country in the international market. The structural 
approach believes that there is a bond between the forms of the third world 
bureaucracy and the economic relationship patterns. In addition, Budiman (1996) 
indicated that several social factors—the combination and participation of existing 
social power in a society—are influencing the formation of a certain political regime. 
The interaction between the economic and the social variables will develop a structural 
perspective that is useful to analyze the Indonesian bureaucracy. 
 One of the structural models that is famous is the Bureaucratic Authoritarian 
Regime developed by Dwight Y. King (1982). According to King, as quoted by 
Tjokrowinoto (1996), the model postulates a political domination, which is distinct, 
modern, and relatively stable, that occurs in the historical and political configuration 
framework. The domination has the ability to defend its authority and to eliminate the 
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instability that emerges in the modernization process as a result of its own structure 
and process. The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime model nurtures a pluralistic 
legitimate foundation that is an estimated combination of different characteristics such 
as traditional principles, charisma, legality, rational-substantive, and technique 
efficiency. 
 As stated by Tjokrowinoto (1996), the traditional and charismatic 
characteristics of the model can be seen in the relationship between the state and the 
society, that appears as a patron-client relationship. The society, based on the model, is 
divided into two levels, the elite and the masses. The elite is a group of people that is 
considered to have the ability to support the capital accumulating effort. The group is 
also considered to have the opportunity, given by the state, to influence the making of 
public policy. In contrast, the masses are considered to be a group of people that have 
the potential to disturb the planned social-change process, and should therefore be 
demobilized. This effort requires the military to play a dominant role. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the military has a great amount of influence over every decision and 
move made by the bureaucracy. Besides the military, another involved party is the 
technocrat. Etzioni-Halevy (1985) states that, in a country, administrative and 
economic technocrats have a great amount of influence over the political system. 
 Most of critics tossed by the structuralism approach are ideological. They 
accuse the approach of containing communist-socialist ideological interests. Moreover, 
it is difficult to see the real picture of a state’s dependency as outlined in the 
dependency theory proposed by this approach. The reason for this is that globalization 
is filled with interrelations and interdependency between countries, including 
developed countries. 
 This dissertation balances the two major approaches to analyze the bureaucracy 
in Indonesia. A characteristic of the Indonesian bureaucracy is the acculturation of a 
patron-client political culture and an ambivalent economic system—a welfare state and 
pure capitalism.  The patron-client political culture at the level of the organization, 
appears not only in the relationship between the state and the people, but also in the 
relationship between the center and the region. The center protects the region, and it is 
an obligation for the region to implement the center’s decisions (centralized). This 
kind of relational pattern means that the bureaucracy tends to wait for the policy of the 
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center and depends completely on the formal systems and procedures determined by 
the center. This pattern at the organizational level is strengthened at the personal level. 
At the personal level, the bureaucracy often places the superior official as someone 
who needs to be served more than the community. The mechanism authority of that is 
constructed by the superiors for the subordinates are legally formal, for it is 
legitimated in several formal rules. An example is the evaluation of the personnel’s 
working performance using the Personnel’s Achievement Evaluation List. The 
evaluation is performed directly by the superior without any distinct basic indicators.  
 The characteristics of pure capitalism mixed with a welfare state also generates 
the indistinct policy made by the bureaucracy—to serve the public interests or fulfill 
the social obligations mandated by the Law. This is clearly seen in the public service 
that is provided by the government bureaucracy. The bureaucracy only provides a 
weak qualified service. In the health sector, for example, the service is still provided 
using a traditional administrational approach. There is a low level of professionalism 
and limited technology used. Because of the fast development of the health technology 
and the slow response of the management, there are many complaints directed to the 
public service institution that provides health services. The indistinctness is more 
apparent in the management of the State and Region Enterprise sector. As a 
corporation, despite the fact that it is owned by the government and has a social 
function, the State and Region Enterprise is supposed to have a spirit of 
entrepreneurship, just as the private sector management models have. 
 Thus, the main characteristic of the bureaucracy in the New Order era was the 
intense penetration of the governmental bureaucracy, as a representation of the state’s 
existence, into people’s lives. The governmental bureaucracy, in doing its duty, was 
fully supported by the military bureaucratic network5. Besides this, the bureaucracy 
under the New Order regime created a state corporatism strategy, which was to support 
the government’s penetration into society, in order to fully control it. These 
characteristics have not yet changed, although some public administrational reform 
policies have been implemented.  
                                                 
5 To this day, the military still preserve the concept of territory defense that is manifested in the presence of the 
military in every level of civil government administrational territory. Because of this, the military have a 
bureaucratic hierarchy that works parallel with the hierarchy of the civil government bureaucracy, from the central 
level where this presence is in the form of the Security and Orderliness Command (Kopkamtib—Komando 
Keamanan dan Ketertiban) to the residential level with the Military District Command (Koramil—Komando Rayon 
Militer), at the village level there are the Village-Building Soldiers (Babinsa—Bintara Pembina Desa). 
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4. Conclusion 
According to the comparative explanation above, between the positive vision 
(the ideal type of bureaucracy) and the negative vision (pathological bureaucracy), we 
can conclude that the ideal type of bureaucracy is difficult to implement in real life. It 
is very often the case that there is a significant difference between the normative 
bureaucratic theory and what actually happens in practice. Most of the governments’ 
bureaucratic practices in the world are pathological bureaucracy because, as a result of 
organizational inertia, the interests of the bureau itself tend to replace the basic 
function, which is to promote external goals. The bureau itself becomes the end for 
which it operates. Indonesian’s bureaucracy is one example of pathological 
bureaucracy. Structurally, this condition is a result of the New Order political system 
that placed the bureaucracy as more of a political instrument of the ruling power than a 
public service instrument 6 . Culturally, this condition was mostly caused by the 
feudalistic-paternalistic culture that is rooted in the history of the Indonesian 
bureaucracy. In this case, the bureaucracy plays a strategic political role as the 
regulator, policy formulator, policy executor, while at the same time evaluating the 
policies that itself were had formulated and executed. For these reasons it can be seen 
that public administration reform can not be easily implemented, because it is always 
challenged by bureaucrats, politicians, and others who misuse the bureaucracy their 
interest. However, it is necessary to reform the public administration, especially at a 
local level, in order to support the implementation of local autonomy. 
 
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Public Administration Reform 
a. Definition   
 Many concepts and models to reform the public administration were proposed 
by some public administration scholars.  The following are the definitions of 
Administrative Reform by some experts, quoted by Guzman & Reforma (1992:3): 
Administrative reform has been described as an artificial inducement of 
administrative transformation against resistance (Caiden,1969); an effort 
to apply new ideas and combination of ideas to improving the system for 
                                                 
6 Agus Dwiyanto, et. al., op cit., p. 98, 100 
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positive goals of national developments (Lee and Samonte, 1970); a 
deliberate use of authority and influence to apply new measures to an 
administrative system so as to change its goals, structure or procedures 
with a view to improving it for developmental purposes (UN DTCD, 
1983): the changes or innovations which are deliberately conceived and 
adopted to make the administrative system a more effective agent for 
social change; a better instrument to bring about political equality, social 
justice and economic growth—all essential in the process of accelerated 
nation building and development (Samonte, 1970); those efforts which call 
for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country 
intended to transform the existing and established practices, behaviours 
and structures within it (Khan, 1981:7); a deliberate process to change 
both the structures and procedures of the public bureaucracy and the 
attitudes and behaviour of the public bureaucrats involved in order to 
promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development 
goals (Quah, 1976:58). 
 
In their conclusion, Guzman & Reforma (1992:3) state that administrative reform is 
always synonymous with the words change, innovation, systemic and wide ranging 
changes and such changes must be brought about in a deliberate and planned manner.  
The development in the Public Administration study shows that the traditional 
model in this study receives much criticism from the Public Administration expert 
since its focus is oriented more on the internal matter of its own public organization. 
For decades, study of Public Administration has been more interested in the effort of 
improving the organization through organizational structure development, system and 
management procedures development through the creation of working operational 
technical manuals, personnel resource management development, the provision of a 
budget model and budget, the provision of working infrastructure and tools, and so on.  
The public organization orientation to fulfill its own internal needs is normal. 
However, when this orientation is over-abundant, the genuine function of the public 
organization, which is to provide services to society or to carry out the development 
task as a whole, will be neglected.  
As the result of the over-abundant orientation of a public organization to fulfill 
its own needs, it tends to become more involved in boring routine tasks. The routine is 
created by management that has a short term perspective.  Short term considerations 
cause the public administration to be often unable to anticipate changes that occur 
rapidly in its environment. Meanwhile, different types of environmental variable mix 
into one, and their limits are often difficult to identify. It is very likely that things that 
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happen in the political sector will affect the economic sector. Society’s social and 
cultural aspects may even be affected. The opposite of this can also occur. A good 
example of this can be seen when there was a political leadership change in this 
country. This change strongly affected the economic sector, such as the amount of 
foreign investment in Indonesia, the Rupiah exchange, etc. On the other hand, the 
seemingly endless monetary crisis that started in 1997 also became one of the factors 
that hastened the fall of the New Order regime. These economic and political changes 
in the end affected societal relationship patterns, such as the increase of social 
groupings based on political parties and ethnic group. 
 At a local level, for example, the regional government is often unable to 
respond quickly to natural disasters. Experience has shown that natural disaster 
management has proven to be poor by some regional governments. Things lacking 
include early warning systems, knowledge of action to take when disasters happen, and 
knowledge of action to take after the disaster. As a result, the societies who experience 
the disasters suffer. Due to the same lack of foresight, riots in some regions are caused 
by the inability of the local government to identify potential conflict, and the conflict 
spreads rapidly and becomes difficult to deal with. 
The case mentioned above teach us two things: First, the relationship between 
environmental variables, both internal and external, of an organization, often cannot be 
clearly separated because there is very high level of interaction and interdependency 
between them. Second, as the result of a strong connection between environmental 
variables, complexity in predicting environmental changes increases.  Environment in 
strategic management is considered to be uncertain (chaos). No any economist, for 
example, was able to foresee that Indonesia, which before 1997 was predicted to 
become one of the future tiger economies, could turn into a poor country as the result 
of the economic and monetary crisis. There are also many politicians that were 
surprised by the fall of Soeharto’s authority which ended the glorious 32 year period of 
the New Order regime. 
Both events are beyond the scope of a conventional public administration 
study. As a result of the inability to predict these events, conventional management 
does not have a plain strategy. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) once reminded us that the 
central failure of government at presence is one of means, not ends. They therefore 
 35
believed that the government needed to be reinvented. The concept of “means” in this 
matter can be understood as the strategy that has to be chosen. A lack of strategy 
would result in the organization having an uncertain direction. It is therefore 
acceptable that public bureaucracy is often late or unable to anticipate various 
problems or crises that occur suddenly. A lack of precision and quick response to the 
environment could result in a lower level of trust of the society towards the public 
administration. 
It is these managerial weaknesses in the public administration that reveals the 
necessity of a management model that is more responsive towards various internal or 
external environmental changes and is also able to predict, far in advance many issues 
that might arise and be faced by the organization. On one hand, the organization is 
enlarged and complex. However, on the other hand, the environment is also uncertain. 
Osborne and Gaebler argue that the bureaucratic model may have been appropriate in a 
past slowly-changing age of hierarchy and mass markets but it is no longer appropriate 
in the fast moving global marketplace and information society. It is argued that in the 
post-industrial era institutions need to be more flexible and more responsive to 
consumer demands, leading by persuasion and incentives rather than by command, 
empowering citizens rather than simply serving them (Bailey, 1999:261). 
Public administration reform has a correlation with the political system. Both 
Caiden (1969) and Montgomery (1967) state that public administration is power 
politics in action (process); it contains ideological rationalizations, fights for control of 
areas, services, people, political participants and institutions, power drives, campaign 
strategies and obstructive tactics, compromises and concessions. It also adjusts the 
relationship between a bureaucracy and other elements in a society, or within the 
bureaucracy itself. Hence, it is not really an easy action because it has a correlation 
with the political system which has value loaded and political friction among actors. 
 One of the public administration reform models that has become a favorite in 
many countries is the New Public Management (NPM). Some of the NPM principles 
are often applied in the public administration reform in Indonesia, especially after the 
implementation of Law No. 22/1999. 
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b. New Public Management as a Public Administration Reform Model 
In most countries, the effort to carry out administrative reform in the public 
sector occurred as a reaction to the failure of the traditional model of the Public 
Administration in anticipating several public problems, especially in response to the 
economic and financial pressure. In order to respond to these problems, the techniques 
and the models of the private sector management are supposed to be implemented. 
Henceforth, the NPM concept was introduced as a new paradigm in the management of 
the public sector. As its early development was closely related to the development of 
the private sector management, the form and the model of the NPM were often 
influenced by the theory and practice of the private sector management.  
 Nevertheless, the birth of NPM was not solely due to the better quality of the 
private sector management, but also the political-economic issues that escalated in the 
early 80’s, namely the review of the Public Administration principles, in particular the 
state’s role in providing public services and goods. Several principles from the earlier 
Public Administration that had previously been considered as everlasting and 
fundamental, as stated by Hughes (1998:1), started to be questioned. Those questioned 
principles are as follows: first, the government obligation to organize itself with the 
hierarchic principle as proposed by Max Weber. Second is the government 
involvement in providing the public services and goods through its bureaucratic role. 
Third, the separation of the administration from the politics in guaranteeing 
accountability—administration is to perform the policy that has been resolved by the 
politics. Fourth is the necessity for the professional bureaucracy to be able to serve the 
political authorities equally. 
 To Hughes (1998: 1-2), bureaucracy is not the only public goods and services 
provider, since the private sector also plays a role. In this matter, the government plays 
an indirect role by giving subsidies and making certain rules or contracts. Politics and 
administration, to a certain extent, are in practice hardly separated. Accountability can 
only be achieved if the public retains control of the implementation of the public 
services provided by the public bureaucracy. The employee conditions in the public 
sector also weaken, for the organizational structure and system is very different 
compared to the private sector. Due to these limitations, NPM has often been used as a 
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paradigm by policy makers in several countries to reform their bureaucracies since the 
early 90’s 7. 
 The New Public Management is interrelated with its basic concept, the public 
Administration. Perry and Kraemer, 1983, stated that public management is a merger 
of the normative orientation of traditional public administration and the instrumental 
orientation of general management (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004: 8-9). Pollitt and 
Bouckaert also gave several affirmations on the public management and public 
administration concept. The first affirmation is that public management is used with at 
least three different meanings, the activity of the public servants and the politicians, 
the structure and the process of the executive government, and the systematic study of 
activity. The second affirmation is that public management is considered as a symptom 
of modernization—a dynamic force for change that is often opposed to the static 
public administration. The third is that the relationship between public management 
and generic management is still debatable, for there is an attempt to borrow 
extensively some ideas and techniques that come from the private sector management. 
However, their utility for the management in the public sector is sometimes still 
questioned. Some suggest that the borrowing of the ideas and techniques from the 
private sector can be only applied at the micro level. In truth, the genuine characteristic 
is still applicable at the macro level. For Pollitt and Bouckaert, the question not regards 
the micro or macro level, but also the technical and political characteristics. The fourth 
affirmation is that management is not neutral. Besides the technical process, 
management contains much politics, law, and ideological values. 
 Further explanation on the differences between the administrative paradigm 
and the managerial paradigm is given by Werner Jann (1997: 93) in the following 
Table (2.3): 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Many Public Administration experts explain the term “New Public Management” differently. Pollitt (1993), for 
example, uses ‘managerialism’; Lan, Zhiyong, and Rosenbloom (1992) use ‘market-based public administration’; 
Barzelay (1992) uses ‘the post bureaucratic paradigm’; Osborne and Gaebler (1992) use ‘entrepreneurial 
government’; in Germany the term ‘Neues Streuerungsmodell’ is used; and in Great Britain it is known as ‘3Es’, 
which is an abbreviation of ‘economy, efficiency, and effectiveness’ (see Hughes, 1998:52). 
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Table 2.3: The Administrative and Managerial Paradigm 
The Administrative or public law paradigm The Managerial or entrepreneurial paradigm 
Adherence to formalized rules and procedures Use of resources to achieve results 
Democratic control Property rights 
Hierarchy Market 
Rule of law Rule of owner 
Public welfare Welfare of the firm 
Legality Private gain 
Accountability Autonomy 
Legitimacy Secrecy 
Rules Results 
Collective action Competition 
Equity of need Equity of market 
Citizenship Customer sovereignty 
Authority (Behoerde) Firm 
Risk avoidance Risk-taking 
Neutral expertise Interest-orientation 
Stability Change 
Tradition Renewal 
Voice Exit 
Source: Werner Jann.1997. Public Management Reform in Germany: A Revolution without a Theory. In 
the book “Public Management and Administrative Reform in Western Europe”. Walter J.M.Kickert 
(ed.). 1997 
 
The change from an administrative paradigm into a management paradigm is 
related to the public sector. As we know, the basic goal of the public sector in 
developed countries has changed from social equity into allocative efficiency. Social 
equity is a consequence of the role’s state in the welfare state system that was 
characterized by the expansive redistributive role of the state by means of public 
transfers and taxation. This role has declined, because allocative efficiency as a basic 
goal of the public sector is in accordance with the tighter budget constraints that have 
determined the course of the public sector during the last two decades (Harrinvirta, 
2000:39). There is a re-evaluation of the government function, as stated by Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) as a ‘separation of steering from rowing’. The last is that there is a 
tendency to reduce the government’s functions through privatization and other forms 
of marketing. 
 
c. The NPM Models 
In general, NPM models are divided into two major paradigms. The first is the 
Anglo-saxon paradigm, which is implemented in countries such as Great Britain, the 
USA, Australia, and New Zealands. The second is the European Continental paradigm 
which is implemented in countries such as France, Germany, Sweden and Italy while 
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the Anglo-Saxon paradigm puts stress on public interest values, especially interest in 
issues of privatization, the European Continental paradigm focuses on the 
Rechstsstaat, and is especially interested in issues of welfare state which is intensified 
by governance issues such as participation, accountability, and decentralization. The 
following models of Ferlie, Ashbuner, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996:11-15) depict 
how each paradigm have been suitable for conditions at various time. 
a. NPM Model 1: The Efficiency Drive 
From the early mid 80’s, this model was considered to be the earliest and the 
most dominant model. Through the concept of efficiency, the public sector 
management was about to come under the management of the business sector. The 
prime themes that occurred in this first model were an increased in attention to 
financial control, management by hierarchy; a ’command and control’ mode of 
working; an extension of audit, both financial and professional; increased stress on 
provider responsiveness to the consumer; a greater role for non public sector providers; 
more market-mindedness and customer orientation; deregulation of the labor-market 
and an increase in the pace of work; a much higher turnover at the senior management 
level within the public sector; some empowerment of less bureaucratic and more 
entrepreneurial management, but still with tight retrospective accountability 
requirements upwards. Many people responded cautiously to this model because not 
every private sector management model is suitable for the public sector, considering 
the different complexities faced. 
b. NPM Model 2: Downsizing and Decentralization 
The second model appeared in response to the weaknesses in the first model. This 
model, in general, is an advance in organizational development. The late 70’s were, as 
Ferlie and colleagues said, marked by the change to flexibility and the unbundling of 
vertically integrated forms of organization. Large organizations typically downsized, 
contracted functions out, and split up internally into more autonomous business units. 
This can be seen from the prime indicators of the model such as: an extension of the 
early stress on market-mindedness to more elaborate and developed quasi-markets; a 
move from management by hierarchy to management by contract; de-layering and 
downsizing; a drastic reduction in the payrolls of public sector organizations; moves 
towards flatter organizational structures; staff reductions in the higher tiers as well as 
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lower down in the organization; an increased role for network forms of the 
organization. 
c. NPM Model 3: In search of excellence 
This model concentrates more on the human relations in the public services. 
Therefore, this model uses the organizational culture parameter as its focus. The 
followers of this model resist the rationalistic approach and, in contrast, support 
values, culture, rites and symbols in shaping how people actually behave at the work. 
This model is divided into two approaches, bottom-up and top-down, each indicated by 
its own characteristics. In the bottom-up approach there is an emphasis on 
organizational development and learning; a recognition of organizational culture as a 
form of glue; a top-down backing for bottom-up product champions; and a radical 
decentralization with performance judged by results. Meanwhile, in the top-down 
form: explicit attempts to secure culture change; projection of a top-down vision; 
managed culture change programs; stress on charismatic forms of top-down 
leadership; identification of charismatic private sector role models for the new-style 
public sector; more intensive corporate training programs; the growth of corporate 
logos, mission statements and uniforms; an explicit communications strategy; and a 
more assertive and strategic human resource management function. 
d. NPM Model 4: Public Service Orientation 
This model is a fusion of the private and the public sector management ideas. The 
model encourages the manager of the public sector to be more oriented to the public 
service achievement mission. The prime indicators that can be used to describe this 
model are a major concern with service quality (e.g. the use of quality initiatives; the 
reflections of the user (rather than the customer) concerning the values in the 
management process; a concept of citizenship; a desire to shift power back from the 
appointed to the elected local bodies; skepticism as to the role of markets in public 
services; a stress on securing participation and accountability as legitimate concerns of 
management in the public sector. 
As model explained above, the next model also attempts to divide the NPM 
based on developmental issues, and does not intend to be a proponent of one paradigm 
in the NPM. The model was developed by Peter (1996), who attempted to identify four 
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main vision groups in public management reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:135-
136). These are: 
a. The Market model. This group, known as ‘the NPM group’, focus on the 
private role and decreasing the role of the public organization. 
b. The participatory state. The main vision of this group is to put the basics of 
empowerment and participation of citizens in the running of the administration 
c. Flexible government. This group is opposed to the rigidities and conservatism 
of the government both at the organizational and individual levels, which can 
be treated as ‘a temporary state’ and used as a remedy to overcome those 
problems. 
d. Deregulated government. This group assumes that public service organizations 
are full of creative ideas, experience, and well-motivated people. Therefore, 
they must be released from the heavy constraints of bureaucratic regulations. 
 
d. Conclusion 
 
 In developing countries such as Indonesia, the development of the NPM only 
started in the early 90’s. There are at least two things that can be noted as to the reason 
for the increase of the NPM paradigm distribution inside the government. The first 
reason is that the financial burden of the government in financing all of the public 
sectors has been increased as the result of the chronic economic crisis that happened 
since 1997. The second is that the political crisis that resulted in the overthrowing of 
the authoritarian regime increased the critical judgment of the people towards any 
government actions. These two reasons prompted a new requirement to improve the 
public sector management that was considered to be in effective, inefficient, and 
unaccountable to public. Since then, to accompany the political and economic reform, 
a reform of the public management sector is also being carried out. 
 It seems difficult to use only one NPM model to analyze NPM practices in 
Indonesia. The problem is that the public sector management is more occupied with 
itself because several formal procedures and rules that the managers have to abide by 
in practice. This system is actually almost the same as the Continental system that 
holds tightly to the principles of the Rechtsstaat. Since Indonesia used to be colonized 
by the Netherlands, a country in Europe that follows the Rechtsstaat, there are many 
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laws and rules that were inherited from the Netherlands, including the improvement of 
the culture of the officials and the structure of the administration. Many government 
institutions formed do not have specific functions other than to serve the states’ 
interest—especially to empower the ruling government. This kind of public 
management model flourishes even more when the political system that rules is an 
authoritarian regime8. It causes public bureaucracy reform to become more difficult, 
for the structure and the culture that are built to empower the ruling government are 
still significant. 
It has been stated that the theory developed in this research model is based 
mostly on the Rechstsstaat paradigm the NPM model that comes from European 
Continental thought. The Anglo-Saxon paradigm model tends to view privatization as 
one of the best ways to manage the problems that are faced by the public management 
sector. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, there is not yet the strong law enforcement that is 
needed in order to apply privatization. The ability of the private sector to replace the 
public sector services is still questioned. The reason for this is that, besides it’s limited 
capabilities, the private sector seems to have a tendency of avoiding business ventures 
that are unprofitable. Moreover, the privatization issue is not a beneficial issue for the 
ruling parties since the public still considers privatization as an attempt to restore the 
conglomerates 9 that once ruled under the New Order regime. Though the use of the 
Anglo-Saxon paradigm to analyze the NPM practice in Indonesia may be flawed, it 
does not mean that this model should be altogether. Some practices contained in this 
model are related to the NPM practices in Indonesia, such as the programs that are 
customer-oriented, and the deregulation to empower the private sector growth. 
                                                 
8 The political system in Indonesia has experienced three different phases. The first phase is called the Old Order 
regime, under the authority of the first Indonesian president, Sukarno. This regime is the regime that founded the 
Republic of Indonesia. As a founding regime, it built a political system that tried to unify all of the groups that 
existed in the early period of the Indonesian independence (Nationalist, Communist, and Religious). The difficulty 
of unifying these groups later became the reason for the fall of the regime. The second phase is known as the New 
Order Regime. This regime replaced the older one through a sympathetic coup d’etat in 1965. It was controlled by 
Suharto who came from a military background. This regime is famous as the Development Regime for its 
Development Trilogy: stability, growth, and equality. Those principles are indeed what caused this political regime 
to be built in a very authoritarian and centralized manner. Despite the criticism that is often given to this regime, it 
actually succeeded in turning Indonesia from an under developed country into a developing country.  The third 
phase was marked by the fall of Suharto in 1998 that ended the New Order Regime. This phase for many people is 
known as the Reform Order or the Transitional Order, and is still running today. In this period, many reform have 
been carried out, encompassing many aspects, such as the economy, politics, and the government bureaucracy.  The 
reform was carried out by following democratic principle under the boundaries of the union states. 
9 Most of the Indonesian people believe that one of the causes of the unrelenting economic crisis is the wicked 
conspiracy of the government and the conglomerates (giant corporations) in the public resource management by 
means of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Most of these conglomerates were run by people inside the Suharto’s 
circle of authority, and most of them were Chinese-Indonesian people. 
 43
Therefore, the model developed in this research will be focused on the Rechstsstaat 
paradigm, while using the Anglo-Saxon model to identify several variables that 
influence the local bureaucratic reform in Indonesia. 
 This dissertation agrees with Pollitt and Bouckaert’s opinion (2004) that not all 
of the NPM models can be applied in every country. The application of the model 
requires a specific design that is accustomed to the economic and the political 
conditions, including the administration systems, and the socio-cultural conditions of 
the country. This study will combine the Rechstsstaat and Anglo Saxon NPM models 
to analyze the local public administration reform in Indonesia. 
 
2. Performance of Local Public Administration Reform 
 This section will explain the dependent variable of this research, the 
Performance of Local Public Administration Reform. Before this section explains this 
variable any further, it first needs to be confirmed as the subject of this research. This 
level of administration was chosen because it considers the fact that in 1999, the Law 
22/1999 on the Local Government and the Law 25/1999 on the Balance of the Central 
and Local Finance, which marked a great change in the Indonesian local 
administration system, were authorized. This significant change was the end of the 
previous regional administration regulation that, though it regulated local autonomy, 
was still centralistic. This decentralized era was then followed up with several rules to 
elucidate both Laws. Almost all of the following rules have a reformative value toward 
the existence of the bureaucracy in the region, encompassing such matters as 
personnel, finance, organizational structure, systems and procedures, working-
performance measurement, supervising systems, public participation in the decision 
making, and public service quality improvement. Now, after eight years, it is still a big 
question for us as to how far the reform has worked successful. 
 In this research, ‘Performance’ is defined as the maximum ability of an 
organization, program, or policy in achieving its goal. This research works within the 
boundary that performance is not an analysis of the impact, but of the outputs of the 
public administration reform policy at the local level. Outputs are defined as every 
move made by a public organization in the form of policy, programs, or activities. 
Based on these definitions, the indicator that has been developed to measure the 
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variables of the Performance of the Local Public Administration is the level of output 
of the policy. 
 
a. Components of Local Public Administration Reform 
Before further discussing the indicators of the variable, this section will first 
explain the components of local public administration reform. Based on the opinion of 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), the four major components of local public administration 
reform are as followings: 
a. Finance: budget, accounts, audits 
b. Personnel: recruitment, posting, remuneration, security of employment, etc 
c. Organization: specialization, coordination, scale, (de)centralization 
d. Performance Measurement Systems: content, organization, use 
For the purpose of this research, the last component, the performance measurement 
system, is not used because there is no real practice of it in local governments. This 
research will however examine the planning system, which is useful to find out the 
effectiveness of the planning model and its impact on community participation. 
Finance Reform. According to the Pollitt and Bouckaert, there are two things 
that cause budget reform. The first is the obstruction of economic growth (for 
macroeconomic reasons). The second is the pressure for the public sector to improve 
its efficiency, effectiveness and quality. A policy that can be included in the category 
of budget reform is the cutback programs. By means of this policy, the programs that 
are unpopular and over spend the budget will be curtailed or if possible, erased by 
reevaluating the budget. The success of this policy is heavily relied upon by the 
government because it can cause issues that could damage the government’s 
reputation. Another policy included in the budget reform is what is known as the use of 
frame or block-budgeting. This policy is usually used as a consequence of 
decentralization in the financial sector, in which the central government gives a certain 
amount of funding to the lower-level government based on a certain formula, and gives 
the local government the full authority to use that funding. 
 The assessment of this budget reform commonly focuses more on the 
performance than on the amount of savings. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 69) explain 
the steps that can be used to assess the performance of the budget reform as the 
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following: first, publicizing the performance of the budget every year; second, 
changing the format and the content of the budget, focusing on shifting them from the 
line item-budgeting towards a more performance-sensitive type of categorization, or 
by trying to link up budgeting with new processes of strategic planning; third, 
changing the budgeting procedure, by changing the incentives for the major budget 
actors or by fundamentally changing the structure or the time frame of the budget and 
even changing the role of the legislative institution in the process of budgeting if 
possible.  
 Besides the budget, another policy that is still included in the category of 
financial reform is the accounting system. This system can be traditional, cash-based, 
double-entry bookkeeping, and actual-accounting. In Indonesia, this accounting system 
change is introduced by means of the Performance Budgeting policy that has been 
implemented since the 2003 budgetary year. 
 The last form of the financial reform policy is the Auditing. The problem 
occurring with this policy was related to the question of who would perform the local 
government financial audit, since the evaluation needed to be independent. In the 
Indonesian context, an independent evaluation is not commonly available. This is so 
because most of the evaluation, whether central or regional are carried out by 
government institution itself. Independent institutions are still very rare, and mostly 
founded by the NGO’s. 
Personnel Reform. In general, personnel management includes the process of 
recruitment, placement, human resource improvement, promotion, evaluation, and 
retirement. The recruitment process looks for educated and skilled personnel through a 
selection process. After the personnel are chosen, the next process is to place them 
according to the skills or knowledge possessed. The improvement of the human 
resources is aimed at improving knowledge and skills that can be useful for the 
personnel in carrying out their duties, according to their positions. This human 
resource improvement is generally carried out in two ways: through formal education, 
which offers a degree, and the skills program. The promotion is related to the 
continuity of a personnel’s career to reach a higher rank. The purpose of a promotion is 
to refresh and to rotate the existing duties, as well as to guarantee the security of the 
personnel’s career. A promotion is usually awarded based on the seniority and the 
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competency of the personnel. In the meantime, a salary is a form of service repayment 
from the government to the personnel who have given their time and energy to run the 
public organization. Besides providing a living for the personnel and their families, a 
salary is intended to ensure the binding of the personnel to the public organization. 
Retirement is based on age or other reasons that are justified by the laws. The purpose 
of this is to give an assurance to the personnel and their families for their futures.  
 In Indonesia, the personnel management reform has been carried out several 
times, whether by changing the laws that regulate employment or its rules of 
execution. At the local level, these reforms have also received a response from the 
regional government, which responded in many ways with different results. 
Nevertheless, the effort is commonly partial—each step in the personnel management 
is carried out separately—considering one of the unsolvable problems that is often 
debated in relation to employment in Indonesia: a sufficient salary. 
Organization. Pollit and Bouckaert (2004: 81) stress four important aspects of 
organizational reform: specialization, coordination, centralization or decentralization, 
and scale. The main issue of the specialization is whether a public organization should 
be ‘single-purpose’ or ‘multi-purpose’. Specialization requires the public organization 
to concentrate on a specific field or on several fields that are mandated by the law. The 
consequence of this choice affects the efficiency of the resources that are allocated to 
run the organization, and possibly also affects the simplicity of the coordinating. The 
problem is finding an effective way to secure the coordination. Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004: 83), in finding the answer, identified three types of coordination. First, the 
coordination in the old hierarchic system is guaranteed by an authority that comes 
from the upper level of the hierarchy. The authority is enforced at the lower level of 
the hierarchy to avoid the possibility of contradiction in performing each duty. Another 
way that could also guarantee the performance of the coordination, as mentioned by 
Pollitt (2003), is voluntary cooperation within a network. This form appears to be very 
formal, especially for the public organization, but it could be reached if the 
achievement of the purpose is evenly spread among the network members. In addition, 
this form allows easy communication, and has a simple scale out execution. The third 
model of coordination uses the market mechanism, by means of the supply and 
demand principle. 
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 In connection with decentralization, organizational reform in this research is 
understood as the giving of authority to make and to apply a decision. This authority is 
given by the highest local authority (Regent/Mayor) to the lower level administration. 
The context of decentralization at this local level is important because, in public 
administration, decentralization only occurs when the decision-making is equally 
divided through to the lowest level, even to the street level bureaucracy, based on each 
authority portion. The decision to decentralize would at least reduce time-consuming 
decision-making, which the government units at the local level often face when 
performing public services.  
Meanwhile, scale is interrelated with the previous three aspects: specialization, 
coordination, and decentralization. When these three aspects are accomplished, the 
organization scale experiences something that is mentioned in the NPM and 
‘reinventing government’ as an organization that is ‘flat, flexible, specialized 
(focused), and decentralized and therefore very probably quite small’ (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004: 89). 
Planning Methods. In addition to the four components, stated by Pollit and 
Bouckaert (2004), there is another main component that is appropriate to use to 
understand the practice of the local public administration reform in Indonesia: the 
Planning Methods. This component is significant because of the shifting of the 
political system in Indonesia from a centralized into a decentralized one has had 
important implications for the change of the planning methods in the region. 
Conceptually, when the authority has been decentralized to the regional level, the 
region, as an autonomous region, has the full authority to manage itself for the benefit 
of the own region. However, in practice, despite the decentralized political system in 
Indonesia, the intervention of the central and provincial government is still very strong, 
especially concerning the control of budget sources that are used to finance the 
authority. In these kinds of conditions, the region often feels trapped between the wish 
to express its freedom in designing policy and program at the local level, and the 
interests of the higher level administration that has power over the budget sources of 
the policy and program.  
 Another problem is that while planning requires sufficient knowledge, the 
region still has to face many basic problems, such as the availability of personnel that 
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possess adequate skills and satisfactory technological support. Based on this, the 
creativity of a region in handling all of these weaknesses in order to fulfill the need for 
qualified planning is very important to study. 
 The quality of planning is not only measured by the knowledge of the authority, 
i.e. the fulfillment of scientific conditions, but also by the democratic authority in 
which the planning process involves other actors besides the state actors (participatory 
planning) and is for the benefit of the public. For this reason, this research includes the 
stages of the planning process and how they are carried out. 
  
This research will observe how the four components of reform—planning 
methods, finance, personnel, and organization, are carried out in some regions of 
Indonesia. These components were chosen because they are the main foundation for a 
public administration to carry out its duties—thus, a public management reform would 
consist of at least those four components. In addition, they are also issues that are often 
raised when public administration reform is carried out at the local level, particularly 
in Indonesia. The observation the components is based on the NPM models that lean 
more toward the Continental European model than the Anglo-Saxon model used in the 
UK, USA and Australia. The Continental model, as is used in Indonesia, is related to 
the Rechtsstaat basic principles. The reform component developed in Indonesia is 
therefore more often characterized by managerial reform than by privatization in order 
to encourage the private into the public sector. In other words, public management 
reform in Indonesia has not aimed fully change the public service 
ownership/management from a public organization into a private one. However, the 
public administration in Indonesia still uses several principles that are contained in 
privatization, such as customer service and user charges. The principles, in some ways, 
are applied in public administration reform at the local level.  
 
b. Variable Indicators of the Performance of Local Public Administration Reform 
 Massey states the purposes of the management reform, as being: a) to reduce 
the role and extent of the ‘state’ in order to enhance that of the private sector; b) to de-
politicize many (mainly economic) policy decisions and their being entrusted to 
professional experts, rather than the whim of politicians and bureaucrats perceived to 
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be in the thrall of self-serving interest groups; c) to inculcate public sector 
organizations with the best techniques of private sector practice in order to bring the 
discipline and inherent efficiencies of the marketplace to the activities of the state 
(Hughes, 1998:61). 
Though these measurements are macro and more suitable to measuring the 
success of public management of Margaret Thatcher’s administration (UK), at least 
they contain the principles that a reform basically wants to achieve. It is important to 
note that a public management reform is considered as a success when the country 
does not measure the success of its public services using its own indicators, but by 
considering the satisfaction of other actors outside the government, such as civil 
society and the private sector. Moreover, the model of public management 
development is not supposed to be dominated only by the model that comes from the 
internal concept of the bureaucracy itself, but also by other models, such as the private 
sector, that could act as a comparison. Thus, the measurement of the success of public 
management should also consider the measurements of success used by the private 
sector, such as efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. 
 According to Hood (Hughes, 1998:61-62), the analysis that aims at internal 
changes are: 
a. Hands-on professional management in the public sector. This means letting the 
managers manage, or as Hood puts it ‘active, visible, discretionary control of 
organizations from named persons at the top’. The typical justifications for this 
is that ‘accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action’; 
b. Explicit standards and measurements of performance. This requires goals to be 
defined and performance targets to be set, and is justified by proponents as 
‘accountability requires [a] clear statement of goals; efficiency requires a 
“hard look” at objectives; 
c. Greater emphasis on output controls. Resources are directed to areas 
according to measurement of performance, because of the ‘need to stress 
results rather than procedures’; 
d. A shift to desegregation of units in the public sector. This involves the breaking 
up of large entities into ‘corporative units around products’, funded separately 
and ‘dealing with one another on an “arm’s-length” basis’. This is justified by 
the need to create manageable units and ‘to gain the efficiency advantages of 
franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public sector’; 
e. A shift to greater competition in [the] public sector. This involves ‘the move to 
term contracts and public tendering procedures’ and is justified as using 
‘rivalry as the key to lower cost and better standards’; 
f. A stress on private sector styles of management practice. This involves a ‘move 
away from military-style “public service ethic” and flexibility in hiring and 
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rewards’, and is justified by ‘need to use “proven” private sector management 
tools in the public sector’; 
g. A stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. Hood sees this as 
‘cutting direct costs, raising labor discipline, resisting union demands, limiting 
“compliance costs” to business’ and is typically justified by the ‘need to check 
resource demands of public sector and to “do more with less”. 
 
As seen above, Hood’s measurement of the success of a public management process is 
based on the existence of authority discretion given to the officials that face the public 
in person. Accountability is also another measurement that is created by first inventing 
the standard of performance that can be accessed transparently by the public. It is 
important to also concentrate on the quality of the result rather than only on the system 
and procedure. However, this does not mean that any efficiency in the system and 
procedures that can reduce costs should be ignored. Efficiency is valued most when the 
outcomes are equal to the standard planned result. The standard of success is reached 
when the customer is satisfied by the public organization. In other words, governance 
issues are an important topic in public administrational reform.  
The previous section explained that the performance measurement developed 
by this research focuses on the level of outputs of the local public administrative 
reform policy. In general, the measurements used to evaluate performance are 
efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity—measurements that originally came from 
the field of economic science. The public management study also uses several other 
specific measurements such as capability, equality, and other measurements that are 
affected by issues in governance, such as accountability, transparency, equity, conflict 
management, and participation. This research will also use some of those 
measurements to evaluate the achievement of public administration reform at the local 
level in Indonesia. The following list will explain in detail the variable indicators of 
Local Public Administration Reform Performance:   
a. Number of institutions and sub ordinates 
b. Congruity between the function of the institution and the need and potency of 
the region  
c. Number of structural positions (echelon) 
d. Personnel recruitment and promotion assessment: merit (competency) or spoils 
(collusion and nepotism) system 
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e. Number of regional contract employees 
f. Performance of the personnel in providing services to the society  
g. Transferring personnel systems among regions 
h. Percentage of the Local Original Income (PAD) toward the Local Budget  
i. Bribery and corruption 
j. Transparency on the Process of APBD Formulation  
k. Effectiveness of the budgeting system 
l. Steps of the local planning process and the effectiveness of proposals from 
society 
m. Public participation in local development project planning and implementation  
n. Decentralization in local development policy making  
 
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
1. The Central Government’s Role 
This major variable consists of two sub-variables: Decentralization as Architecture 
Reform and Policy Reform.  
a. Decentralization as Architecture of Reform 
 This variable is the Law that becomes the legal foundation of local autonomy 
practice. It regulates how the locality should manage itself and fulfill its obligation as 
the appointed authority, how the local is supposed to relate with the central 
government or higher-level government (vertically) and with other local governments 
(horizontally). The legal foundation of decentralization in Indonesia is Law No. 22/ 
1999 on the Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 on the Balance of Central and 
Local Finance.  
Decentralization is defined differently depending on the literature. Cheema and 
Rondinelli (1983: 18-25), for example, divide decentralization into four different 
forms: 
(i). Deconcentration 
“…is merely the shifting of workload from a central government ministry or agency 
headquarters to its own field staff located in offices outside of the national capital, 
without also transferring to them the authority to make decisions or to exercise 
discretion in carrying them out”. 
Deconcentration has becomes one of the administration principles in Indonesia that in 
practice often dominates the relationship between the local and the center. This is 
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proved by the amount of deconcentration funding that is given by the central 
government ministry to the local government which exceeds the funding that is given 
by means of the General Allocation Fund (DAU). 
(ii). Delegation to Semi-Autonomous or Parastatal Organizations 
  “..Delegation of decision making and management authority for specific functions to 
organizations that are not under the direct control of central government ministries”. 
 
This delegation of authority is generally given by the center to institutions such as state 
corporations, regional developers, or other institutions that holds certain authority. In 
Indonesia, this kind of decentralization is often given to autonomous units that are 
under direct control of the president, and to certain economic growth regions.  
(iii). Devolution 
This form is often known as the political decentralization because, the central 
government gives full authority to the local government or other lower government 
units to make its own policy and carry it out without any intervention from the center. 
The Law No. 22 Year 1999 that regulates local autonomy, in essence, follows the basic 
principle of political decentralization (devolution). This can be seen from the articles 
that provide the regions with several authorities to plan and to carry out devolution.  
(iv). Transfer of functions from Government to Non-government Institutions 
“..Decentralization takes place in many countries through the transfer of some 
planning and administrative responsibility, or of public functions, from government to 
voluntary, private, or non-government institutions. In some cases, government may 
transfer to ‘parallel organizations’—such as national industrial and trade 
associations, professional or ecclesiastical organizations, political parties, or 
cooperatives—the right to license, regulate, or supervise their members in performing 
functions that were previously controlled by the government. In other cases, 
government may decentralize by shifting responsibility for producing goods or 
supplying services to private organizations, a process often called ‘privatization”. 
 
This last form of decentralization has not been commonly implemented in Indonesia, 
particularly in terms of privatization at the local level. Nevertheless, in Indonesia, there 
is a tendency to give bigger roles to non-government institutions such as the private 
sector and NGOs that play a part in governance issues at the local level.  
 In Law No. 22/1999 there are three basic terms are used that are interrelated but 
possess different stress. The differentiation is meant to be understood in terms of what 
is meant by the law maker. The first term used is “Decentralization”, which is defined 
as the transfer of authority from the Government to the Autonomous Region in the 
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framework of the Unified Nation of Indonesian Republic (NKRI). The second term, 
“Local Autonomy”, is meant as the authority of an autonomous region to manage and 
care for the interests of its people independently based on the people’s will and 
according to the local regulation. The third term, “Autonomous Region”, which from 
now on will be called “the Local”, is a union of a legal society that has specific 
territorial borders and that has the authority to manage and to take care the interest of 
its people independently, based on the people’s will under the framework of NKRI10.  
 The above definition exemplifies that decentralization gives authority to the 
local to make and to carry out its own policies independently. In other words, based on 
Cheema and Rondinelli’s concept that was explained above, the definition of 
decentralization in the mentioned Law is supposed to be same as the definition of 
‘Devolution’. However, the word ‘decentralization” in the Law is always followed by 
the phrase “under the framework of NKRI”. By means of the phrase, it is emphasized 
that the decentralization is not to give the local excessive freedom that it is able to 
secede from the control of the central government.  The local is still obligated to obey 
the central government. In Indonesia, in accordance with local government principles, 
decentralization is also known as the deconcentration principle and the medebewind 
principle. Both principles are often believed to be indications of the existence of strong 
direct intervention by the central government, by means of its departments, towards the 
local.  
 The areas of authority that become the right of the local, as stated in Article 11 
clause (2), are as follow: public utilities, health, education and culture, agriculture, 
transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, land, cooperatives and 
labor. Meanwhile, the authorities that still belong to the central government, as stated 
in Article 7 clause (1), are the following: political foreign affairs, defense and security, 
judiciary, monetary and fiscal policy, and religion. In addition, there are still several 
authorities that belong to the central government such as policy on macro national 
planning and control of national development, financial rebalancing funding, state 
administration systems and states economic institutions, human resource improvement 
                                                 
10  The Administration system of NKRI is divided into the Central Government, Provincial, and Regency or 
municipality (district). The local are autonomous. The Province and the Regency or Municipality are not related 
hierarchically to each other. Beneath them, there are other regions that do not have autonomy, i.e. the Sub-district 
(kecamatan) and Village/Kelurahan. 
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and empowerment, natural resource and strategic high technology use, national 
conservation and standardization.  
 In this Law, there are also several articles that regulate local official, local 
personnel, and local finance. However, this Law does not, in any way, regulate the 
measurement of performance, on the level of individual or organization. The articles 
that regulate local officials contain an explanation of the structure of local 
administration, the position of officials and their function, and the implementation of 
the Law. The articles that regulate local personnel, meanwhile, regulate what has 
become the right of the central government and the right of local government. The 
articles on local finance regulate the local financial resources and their allocation. The 
four components of bureaucracy reform will be investigated, particularly how the Law 
and its implementation reform local governments. In other words, this variable will 
attempt to explore the establishment of administration (planning methods, finance, 
personnel, organization structure) that is to become the basis of authority movement 
(policy). 
The decentralization that is based on Law No. 22/1999 that can be considered 
as an early design that gives the local authority to be autonomous and also contains a 
design that arranges how the local is supposed to reform its bureaucracy. The 
construction of local bureaucracy reform that, in one way, is supposed to support the 
central government’s interest and to create efficiency is, on the other hand, accustomed 
to the conditions of the local and favors the public. This early construction will be very 
influential to bureaucracy reform performance at the local level because it will become 
the guide for the local in practicing the reform. Like a building, a construction needs to 
synchronize its design and the quality of its materials, from the foundation to the roof, 
with the purpose of making the construction suitable with its environmental conditions. 
To be able to understand the construction of local bureaucracy reform, besides 
studying the Law, one is also required to study the implementation regulations, 
whether in the form of Government Regulation, Presidential Decree, or other decisions 
at the ministry level. 
 Being part of a nation that just distances itself from a centralized system, the 
local bureaucracy in Indonesia has not been completely able to detach itself from the 
influence of the central government. The same thing also happens to the central 
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government that, with its departments, is still unwilling to give up all of its authority. 
Thus, it often results in conflict between the creativity of the local and the interest of 
the central government that can affect the quality of bureaucracy reform at the local 
level. The interests of several players from the central government in the provincial 
government frequently shape the implementation of reforms. The immense influence 
of the central government forces the local to serve the central government’s will. This 
often confuses the local for sometimes there is a contradiction between the will of the 
central government and the implementation of regulations that is caused by regulations 
changing or differences between departments. It will be important study how forceful 
the central government will be in implementing bureaucracy reform in Indonesia. It 
will also be interesting to know whether the central government model is fully applied 
or if it is adjusted to Indonesian environment conditions.  
Besides, the patrimonial bureaucratic culture of Indonesia often encourages the 
elites not to perform the reform that is beneficial for the public. This is worsened by 
the non-existence of a reward and punishment mechanism that could encourage 
reform. Based on the above, the aspects that are to be studied to measure the variable 
of Decentralization as an Architecture Reform are as follow: 
a. Conflict among national political elites that follows the formulation and 
implementation of decentralization laws 
b. Contradictions among the law of autonomy and other laws and government 
regulations  
c. Clarity of authority division between the central government and the provinces 
on one side and the regencies/municipalities on the other 
d. Financial authority: sources of local income mostly coming from the central 
government 
e. Interference in local planning processes (policy substance) 
 
b. Policy Reform 
The policies referred to in this research are the policies that are issued by the 
central government through its technical department and are related with a certain 
(sector of) authority that has been given to the regions. The fast development of social, 
economic, and political life has often forced existing policy to be changed because it is 
considered to be no longer suitable with the conditions that have to be faced. 
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Therefore, the Policy Change variable in this research refers to the existence of 
substantial policy changes by the central government in certain (sectors of education 
and health) authority that has to be carried out by the regions and is intended to give 
better results than the previous one. Education and health sectors are part of national 
development priorities, so that some policies are still under the control the central 
government through ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Health. 
Differing from the Decentralization variable that emphasizes the study of 
administrative reform design that will influence the performance of Local Bureaucracy 
Reform, the Policy Reform variable tries to reveal how a certain policy, in areas such 
as education and health, can affect the performance of Local Bureaucracy Reform. 
Nonetheless, as shown in the theoretical framework diagram above, both variables are 
actually interrelated. The interrelationship is supposed to be on the appropriateness 
between the purpose of a certain policy that is supposed to be changed and the place in 
which the policy will be implemented as in the decentralization design. The 
performance quality of Local Bureaucracy Reform is presumed to be influenced by 
these main variables, whether by a combination of both or individually. The increase 
on the interrelationship between both variables, as shown by the appropriateness of the 
policy and the operational place, is predicted to cause a better quality of performance 
than the influence of only one variable.  
Each of the policies contains the elements of purpose, scope of change, 
implementer, target group, and resources that are included to implement the policy. 
Hence, policy change obviously includes changes to those elements. 
A distinct purpose within a policy is a main condition to achieve an effective 
policy change. However, sometimes the purpose is made indistinct intentionally 
because there has not been any agreement between the policy makers on the desired 
change. Such indistinct purposes sometimes aid certain political intentions since they 
enable anyone who has an interest on the issue of the policy to achieve that interest. 
However, it is important to clarify the purpose of a policy because it will make the 
implementation of the policy by any person or any organization easier. Through a 
distinct purpose of a policy, the institutions at the local level will find it easier to 
interpret a policy according to the bureaucracy design as mandated in the constitution 
that arranges decentralization. 
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It is also the same with the proposed scope of change: the wider the scope of 
change, the harder it is to achieve the proposed purpose. The reason is that the width of 
the change will affect the number of the resources needed to make the change happen. 
The resources include finance, personnel, related institutions, and methods and 
technology used. The government commonly faces a very complex problem that often 
forces them to make policies that could at a single time resolve the whole problem, and 
that eventually enlarge the scope of the change. This kind of policy design will 
complicate the task of the regional government in implementing it. 
The question of who the target group of the policy change will be is also 
related to the scope of change. It is very important to clarify the question because 
ambiguity over the target group will result in failure to achieve the planned purpose 
and the wasting of resources. Therefore, it is important to recognize the target group 
because it will also have implications on choosing the right actor to implement the 
policy. Since every government institution has its own specialization, not every 
government institution is appropriate to implement a policy. It can happen that the 
regional government is not appropriate at all to implement the policy and that it 
outside-government institutions, such as the private sector or NGO’s, are needed to 
implement the policy. 
All of the policy elements mentioned above, as mandated by Law No. 22/ 
1999, need to be in accordance with the design of government administration system. 
This accordance is required for example, on the planning method to interpret policy, 
the financial system and the funding needed, the number and the qualification of 
personnel, and the organizational structure. 
Besides the elements mentioned above, it is also important to study the 
intervention of the central government through its technical departments in enforcing 
policy implementation in the regions. The central government is often found to be 
inconsistent by forcing the implementation of policy without giving sufficient 
resources, in funding and technological support especially, to perform it while there 
are many regencies/municipalities in Indonesia that do not have sufficient capabilities. 
It also happens sometimes that the policy change is so fundamental and done in a very 
short period that it confuses the regional government, for the region has to redesign an 
appropriate system to implement the policy. 
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Another thing that also needs to be recognized is the groups that will be 
affected by the policy change, whether positively or negatively. The effect is positive 
when the group receives the resource distribution that is required to sustain the policy 
change. The effect is negative when the group loses the resources that they have 
previously controlled. Politically, resource controlling means possessing authority over 
resources that are necessary to make a policy effective. 
Based on the conceptual argument mentioned above, the aspects that are to be 
studied in this Policy Change variable are as follows: 
a. Existence of substantial policies on health and education which are still held by 
the central government even though the autonomy law has decentralized them to 
local government. This can be seen through the correlation between the 
existences of organization structures in ministry offices with organization 
structures in local government institutions. 
b. Central government interference in local development of education and health  
c. Comparison between de-concentration funds and local government funds in 
education and health project implementation 
d. Policy design: the purpose and the interest, the proposed scope of change and its 
correspondence with the locals’ needs and problems. How effective are these 
policies? 
 
2. Role of Mayor/Regent 
a. Leadership in Public Administration 
It seems that there is a difference in definition between management and 
leadership although it is difficult to separate them in daily conversations. 
Golembiewski and Gibson (1983) define management, to include those processes, both 
mental and physical, which result in other people executing prescribed formal duties 
for organizational goal attainment. Management deals mainly with planning, 
organizing, and controlling the work of other people to achieve organizational goals. 
Both of them agree that this definition usually includes those aspects of managers’ job, 
such as monitoring and controlling resources, which are sometimes ignored in current 
conceptualizations of leadership. According to their opinion, leadership is a more 
restricted type of managerial activity, focusing on the interpersonal interactions 
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between a leader and one or more subordinates, with the purpose of increasing 
organizational effectiveness. In this view, leadership is a socially influential process in 
which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of subordinates in an effort to reach 
organizational objectives (Golembiewski and Gibson ,1983: 108). 
There are many theories of leadership that range from traditional perspectives 
to transformational perspectives. Leadership, traditionally, has been seen as a form of 
activity that is expressed in terms of relationship---that between the leader and the led. 
Through such a relationship arise the characteristics of the leader. Even some people 
believe that a leader is born and not made. The following theories state that individuals 
possess certain characteristics so that they are considered as leaders: 
(i). Trait Theory   
This theory reappeared in a new guise in the 1980s in the form of “upper 
echelons” theory. The theory relates the demographic characteristics of top 
management team members to variables such as consensus and performance. The 
focus is on a leadership group rather than an individual leader. Another feature is 
leadership as the capacity to relate an organization to its environment (so-called 
“strategic leadership”) rather than the more internally oriented focus associated with 
earlier work (Denis, Langley, Rouleau , 2005) . 
A workshop on leadership skills in local government produced a list of ten key 
skills (Lawton and Rose, 1991): 
• Vision—creating a sense of what the organization is about and where it is going; 
• Prioritizing—the ability to distinguish between, for example, the urgent and the 
merely important; 
• Motivation—through recognizing achievements and rewarding staff; 
• Inter-personal skills—such as listening, suggesting, being positive; 
• Political sensitivity-to the needs of councilors and to organizational power; 
• Resilience—to remain steadfast in the face of adversity; 
• Charisma—difficult to define but it attracts others; 
• Risk-taking—in areas such as delegating work to other staff; 
• Flexibility—to respond to new ideas and practices; 
• Decisiveness—when the situation demands it. 
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(ii). Style theory 
The trait theory does not take into account the relationship between the leader 
and the followers (behaviour leaders in collective settings). If we recall that leader 
definition emphasizes the relationship, then what results is generally known as Style 
theory. This theory identifies several leadership styles: 
• Autocratic—identified with a strong domineering leader where power and control 
are centralized; 
• Participative—the leader gives up some power and authority to subordinates; 
• Laissez-faire—the absence of direct leadership. The leader may believe that the most 
important role for them to play is that of a coordinator (Lawton and Rose, 1991). 
(iii). Contingency theory 
If both theories above are critiqued primarily methodologically, then what 
arises is the contingency approach.  This theory suggests that leadership will be a 
combination of different factors, depending upon the situation. Different leaders will 
choose different approaches, depending upon the context. It depends upon what ‘best 
fits’ the situation. Fiedler (1967) identified two leadership behaviour types: a 
relationship-oriented type and a task-oriented type. He suggested that the elements of a 
leadership situation are three fold: 
• Leader-member relations and the extent to which there is support for the leader; 
• The task itself; is it simple or complex; 
• Position power; to what extent does the leader have the power to reward or punish 
other members of the organization?  (Lawton and Rose, 1991). 
(iv). Developmental approach 
This theory emphasises not just the relationship between the leader and others 
but also stresses the changing nature of this relationship. It also stresses the fact that as 
individuals ‘mature’ in an organization then the leader should take account of this and 
allows the relationship to develop as a consequence. Thus we might expect to move 
gradually to a more participative or laissez-faire approach. According to Banner and 
Blasingame, there are nine stages in this development (Lawton and Rose, 1991): 
• Attention—leaders initially pay attention and give time to subordinates; 
• Support—help the employees in their work; 
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• Feedback/information sharing—show how the employee’s work fits into the wider 
scheme of things; 
• Nurturing—move towards the sharing of ideas; 
• Emerging autonomy—the employees begin to define their own role but still need 
guidance; 
• Setting limits—autonomy plus limits determined by the leader; 
• Personal competence—employees are highly ‘mature’, i.e. they are high achievers 
who take responsibility for results; 
• Independent personal and professional growth—employees begin to lead themselves; 
• Loyalty and commitment—the leader and the organization are now seen as ‘family’ 
by the individual. 
 
Meanwhile, leadership in public administration is always connected with public 
organization. As we know, public organization is increasingly becoming involved in a 
complex network. This situation can increase new problems for would be leaders, 
especially by increasing the pluralism of society. So the question is can a leader 
intervene proactively or not in public organization? Jean-Louis Denis, Ann Langley 
and Linda Rouleau (2005) expressed two contrasting views of leadership: one is an 
entrepreneurial view (Osborne and Gaebler) and a stewardship view (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson 1997). Both views hold different assumptions about the 
legitimacy of administrative discretion in public administration. 
The entrepreneurial view focuses on the innovative behaviours of leaders in 
public sector organization and also emphasizes the increased attention by leaders to the 
demands of the environment and to the preferences of various stakeholder groups. 
Therefore, the achievement of more effective public service would be dependent on the 
creativity and dynamism of a strong leader who does not feel constrained by the 
weight of tradition or formal rules.  
If the entrepreneurial view is influenced by private organization perspectives, 
the stewardship view is influenced more by issues of democracy. However, the 
stewardship view takes a more or less conservative stance on the role of public leaders 
who are seen as the guardians of public goods and values. As part of a democratic 
system, legitimacy of public leaders derives from their conformity to the wishes of 
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democratically elected politicians. The parliament decides policies and the leaders 
execute these policies. This view focuses on public service values. However, it seeks 
to encourage a balance between accountability to political authority and sensitivity to 
citizens’ expectations. In this context, public leaders are necessarily involved in 
bargaining and transactions with various stakeholders groups (Denis, Langley, 
Rouleau , 2005) . 
On one hand, according to Denis, Langley, Rouleau (2005) proponents of the 
entrepreneurial model insist that public leaders not only can but should be encouraged 
to intervene dynamically to transform their organizations using conceptions of 
strategic leadership derived from the private sector. Bass (1996) explained it as 
transformational leadership which is based on four main attributes: idealized influence 
or charisma, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized 
consideration. On the other hand, proponents of the stewardship model remain 
preoccupied with issues of democratic accountability. A realistic picture of leadership 
in public organizations probably falls somewhere between these two poles. In public 
organization, values and normative pressure play a critical role in the assessment of the 
legitimacy of decisions and actions, and intense political pressures and autonomous 
professional groups place leaders in a situation of constant negotiations. 
 
b. Role of Mayor/Regent Indicators 
 The patrimonial culture of the Indonesian bureaucracy causes the existence of a 
strong patron-client relationship. In the bureaucracy leadership hierarchy, the 
Mayor/Regent is a single player that very dominantly influences the bureaucracy. The 
decisions made sometimes ignore the democratic process. The Mayor/Regent does not 
involve the subordinate in the process of decision making, but using his/her authority 
forces the decision to be obeyed by the subordinate. Sometimes, in the local where the 
Mayor/Regent retains a strong charisma, the Mayor/Regent can even influence DPRD 
to support his/her wishes. However, there are also many Mayor/Regents who possess 
democratic attitudes and do not force their authority arbitrarily. 
 In Law No. 22/1999 Article 32 Clause (3), it is clearly stated that in fulfilling 
his/her duty and authority as the Head of Region, the Mayor/Regent is responsible to 
the DPRD. This article emphasizes the position of a Mayor/Regent that is under the 
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DPRD as the people’s representative institution in the region. This situation occurs 
because the Mayor/Regent is elected by the DPRD. This position under the DPRD is 
completely different from the one in the previous Law that places the Mayor/Regent at 
a position equal to the DPRD11. The political practice of this Law results in a new 
different political situation compared to what existed previously. In previous times, the 
DPRD was always under the control of Mayor/ Regent. However, nowadays there are 
more Mayors/ Regents that are under the DPRD’s control. 
 The position of Mayor/Regent toward the DPRD strongly influences the 
performance of the policy implementation, including the policy that concerns 
bureaucracy reform. Even though this reform policy comes from the central 
government, it is very likely that in practice there is a conflict of authority between the 
local and the central government, since bureaucracy reform, directly or indirectly, is 
related to the position and the authority of each in the allocation of local resources. 
Therefore, it would be very interesting to study this conflict of authority between both 
in the bureaucracy reform practice, especially the political role of a Mayor/Regent in 
responding to the problem. The study can be done by observing the local regulation of 
the policy that is produced through joint decisions. 
 This political role can also be seen in the response of a Mayor/ Regent in to 
policy instructions that come from the central government and are related with 
bureaucracy reform. Experience has proved that there are, in fact, fast and forced 
changes on bureaucracy reform policy from the central government. The changes often 
confuse the bureaucrats and the DPRD in the local. When they just finish deciding a 
new reform policy design, the central government has already made a new policy. 
Therefore, the Head of Local’s role in responding to constantly changing instructions 
from the central government is very important.  
 It is also important to observe the style of a Mayor/ Regent in making a 
decision that is related to bureaucracy reform. Theoretically, there are two different 
styles of leadership in making decisions: democratic and authoritarian. It is democratic 
when the Mayor/ Regent involves his/her subordinate or other actors from outside of 
his/her administration in making decisions that are related to bureaucracy reform. On 
                                                 
11 In that time a revision toward the Law No. 22 Year 1999 was still in process. From 2005, the Mayor/Regent is 
going to be elected directly by the people and therefore is responsible to the people. The DPRD will become an 
institution that has the right to decide the legitimate candidate of Major/Regent, since the nomination mechanism 
will be done by the party.  
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the contrary, it is authoritarian when the decision-making is done solely by the Mayor/ 
Regent. The benefits and the costs of these techniques depend on the situation and 
condition faced. By understanding these concepts, this research will try to comprehend 
the way the Mayor/ Regent make his/her decisions: whether they use the democratic 
technique or whether they use the authoritarian. It will also be questioned whether 
different techniques produce different result or not. All of these questions are 
important in understanding the role of a Mayor/ Regent as a policy maker. 
 The role of a Mayor/ Regent in the bureaucracy reform process is determined 
by his/her understanding and knowledge of the reform process. This understanding and 
knowledge is determined by his/her economic background, education, and political 
views. Since Law No. 22/1999 was legalized, the background of elected Mayors/ 
Regents has varied greatly. This condition is extremely different from the conditions 
that existed when the New Order regime still ruled. In that time, most of the Mayors/ 
Regents came from the ABG (Military, Bureaucracy, and Golkar/Political Party). 
There were almost no Mayors/ Regents that came from outside of those three groups. 
Because of this common background, the policies made by each region were always 
the same. Furthermore, the political and administrative system in that time was still 
centralized. Nowadays, the conditions are different. Candidates for Mayor/ Regent 
who come from outside those three groups do have the possibility of being elected. In 
fact, most of the Mayors/Regents nowadays come from different backgrounds: 
elementary school teachers, merchants, lecturers, businessmen, bureaucrats, 
politicians, religious leaders, doctors, etc. These different backgrounds result in 
different policies in responding to bureaucracy reform in each region. The simplest 
assumption is that the design of a policy is related with the ability of the person who 
determines the policy. 
 The complexity of bureaucracy reform often results in a conflict between the 
government units in the local. The reason is that the reform proposed to create 
efficiency and effectiveness may result in reducing the existing resources of 
government units. The conflict can sometimes even happen between personnel in a 
certain government unit. Friction and tension happen because the opportunity to 
receive certain higher ranks is getting smaller. These conflicts happen mostly in the 
early phase of reform. It often creates an un-conductive working atmosphere. To be 
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able to solve the problem, the role of a Mayor/Regent as both a leader and as a 
mediator becomes very important. The role to resolve this conflict will be very 
influential on the success of bureaucracy reform. Based on the above, the aspects that 
will be studied to explain the role of the Mayor/Regent variable are as follows: 
a. Social, economical and political background of the Mayor/Regent; 
b. Leadership and management style: networking ability with politicians, 
businessmen and community, policy innovation, decision making style, 
division of authority, and conflict management; 
c. Response of the Mayor/Regent to the Central Government’s rules which to 
local bureaucracy reform; 
d. Supporting governance: fighting corruption and budget transparency. 
 
3. Response of Bureaucrats and Politicians to Local Public Administration 
Reform  
a. Relationships between Bureaucrats and Politicians  
 Peters and Pierre (2001), in their book “Politicians, Bureaucrats and 
Administrative Reform”, state that in the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s politicians 
identified the civil service as a major part of the problem, rather than as a part of the 
solution. For much of the last century administrative reform has implied building a 
better and more professional public service. 
 On the other hand, especially in the Indonesia case, more bureaucrats considered 
politicians to have no ability, yet enough knowledge of management to somehow 
implement good policy. In term of information, the bureaucracy is more powerful 
because they have held their positions for long time. Peters (1987:258-278) classified 
interaction between politicians and bureaucrats into five models: 
(i). The Formal Model 
 In this model, the policy making role of the civil servant is reduced to saying 
‘Yes, Minister’. The model is described as having a rather smooth or integrated 
pattern of interaction, with conflicts being resolved almost automatically through law 
and hierarchical command—‘Yes, Minister’ is the accepted form of conflict 
resolution. The style of interaction is determined on the basis of authority. The impact 
of the policies adopted by government is dependent on the political system. 
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(ii). The Village Life Model 
 This model describes how senior civil servants and political executives are 
conceptualized as having relatively similar values and goals, with the most important 
perhaps being the maintenance of the government and the smooth functioning of the 
executive branch. Like the first model, the interaction is also integrative. However 
two elites (bureaucrats and politicians) coalesce at the expense of other elites (against 
legislators and other groups in the society in order to maintain their privileged 
position in government). In this model, conflict resolution is conducted through 
bargaining. The acceptance of their mutual elite status, and the ability to use that 
status and the associated personal and professional contacts, gives the residents of the 
village great power over any potential competitors. This model can be expected to be 
associated with policy stability, although much of the concern of the participants in 
such an arrangement would be for systematic management rather than on altering the 
details of operating policies. 
(iii). The Functional Village Life Model 
 The model posits an integration of elites along functional lines. Like the Village 
Life Model, this model is also integrative among the participants. Two elites, in this 
model, coalesce at the expense of other elites. However, the functional model would 
allow for more openness to societal influences than would the Village Life model. 
There is still an attempt to partition one portion of government off from another. The 
resolution of conflict is also through bargaining.  This interaction occurs on the basis 
of expertise, the most important attribute being the possession of expert knowledge in 
the policy area. The policy adopted should have a greater impact on the connections to 
groups with in society. 
(iv). The Adversarial Model 
 The model assumes that the political executive and the senior civil servant are to 
be competitors for power and control over policy. In this model the civil servant 
frequently is cast in the position of saying ‘No, Minister’, or more commonly saying 
nothing at all then proceeding to do whatever he think is best. The tone in this model 
is much sharper and combative. The participants can be expected to display some 
suspicion and difficulties in their working relationship. The model would not predict 
any particular winner in all cases. Instead, winners and losers would be determined by 
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the specific set of issues and conditions existing at the time. The resolution of conflict 
is conducted through power. Then, either power or the ability to muster whatever 
weapons are available—including such things as formal position and policy 
expertise—is the medium of exchange in this model. The effects on policy are quite 
variable. The model allows one of the two sets of contending elites to win on different 
issues at different times, so variability in policies is expected. Variability in political 
party control is what determines policies. 
(v). The Administrative State Model 
 This model reflects an increasingly common perception that the decision making 
of government is dominated by bureaucracy. Like other models, except the 
Adversarial Model, the tone of this model is integrative. This model would have the 
bureaucrats as the real decision makers and implementers of policy, while politicians 
would be useful primarily in the legitimating of their actions, rather than acting as 
decision makers. Conflict is resolved or avoided through the virtual abdication of 
policy making responsibilities by elected or appointed political executives in favour of 
public bureaucracy. Like in the Functional Village Life model, the interaction in this 
model occurs on the basis of expertise. This expertise is used to counteract the formal, 
legal powers of their political masters. Finally, in contrast with the Formal Model, the 
policies emerging from the Administrative State model should be more stable. The 
permanent civil service would be in charge and would tend to preserve much of the 
status quo despite the attempts of political executives to produce change. Table 2.4 
will describe different characteristics of these five models. 
Table 2.4: Characteristics of the politicians and bureaucrats relationship models 
 Tone Winners Conflict 
Resolution 
Style Impacts 
Formal-Legal Integrative Politicians Command Authority Variability 
Village Life Integrative Both Bargaining Mutuality Management 
Functional 
Village Life 
Integrative Both Bargaining Expertise Interest 
dominance 
Adversarial Adversarial Variable Power Conflict Variability 
Administrative 
State 
Integrative Civil 
Service 
Abdication Expertise Stability 
Source: B.Guy Peters.1987. Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Politics of Policy-Making. In the Book 
Bureaucracy and Public Choice. Jan Erik Lane.1987 
 
  As Peters (1987:268) said, in the real world it may be difficult to distinguish 
neatly and clearly any one of these patterns of interaction from another, especially 
 68
without empirical research directly related to the topic. Hence, in the Indonesian case, 
this study would not strictly use one model and disregard other models, but the study 
would consider all models. 
 
b. Response Indicators of Bureaucrats and Politicians to Public Administration 
Reform  
 
 Conceptually, there are three kinds of strategy that act as the response of a 
government unit toward a policy that comes from higher-level government. The three 
strategies are as follows: to accept completely the policy model that is given; to accept 
with several revisions; or to reject and to change it with its own policy. Those three 
kinds of response are used to observe the region in applying strategies to reform public 
administration.  
 The means used by the local government to achieve public administration 
reform policy, that have been determined before by considering internal and external 
conditions is the strategy referred to in this research. The strategy becomes very 
important because the implementation of a policy often becomes a complex problem 
that needs careful understanding and proper techniques to solve it. There are many 
problems and some come from the inside, as a reflection of the weakness and the 
strength of the organization, and some from the outside, as a reflection of opportunity 
and risk. Together these influence the performance of a policy. Furthermore, in 
Indonesian history, the policy that concerns public administration always places an 
important role on political, economic, and even social development. 
 The complexity of the problems occurring between local governments is also 
different. It results in the possibility of a local having a different strategy in performing 
public administration reform. This is possible because Law No. 22/1999 provides an 
opportunity for the local to develop its own concepts that are suitable with the interests 
and the needs of its own region, as long as it is still under the framework of the Unitary 
Nation of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). 
 Above, it has been explained that the strategy is interrelated with the internal 
condition. One condition that needs to be observed is the way the elites (policy 
makers) of the bureaucracy that design the public administration reform must have 
sufficient knowledge on the implementation of the reform. Moreover, the performance 
of the reform is also influenced by the interest of the elites in designing the reform. 
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The interest is presumed to have a relation with the existence of their position in the 
bureaucracy structure and the control of resources. One of the examples of this is the 
choice of the structure of an organization and the number of positions. Because the 
characteristic of the bureaucracy in Indonesia is more pathologic12 than rational13, it is 
possible that financial interests dominate more than public interests. This research will 
try to compare the components of public administration reform to find which 
component is more sensitive to public interests. It is presumed that sensitivity, as a 
representation of the interest of the elite, will also influence the performance of reform. 
 The following Figure 2.1 (conceptual framework) demonstrates that this 
variable has close correlation with the variable of the Mayor/Regent’s Role. It is 
related to government hierarchy structure which places the Local Heads as the top 
leaders. This structure will influence strategies that are made by the local government. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate interactions between them. 
Another actor in the local administration system that also needs to be 
considered in the reform process is the DPRD as a group of politicians. This research 
will also observe the involvement of the DPRD in reform that can be seen in the 
political support given in the form of local regulations and decisions. The DPRD holds 
a great interest in the reform process because ideally the DPRD wants the political 
decisions made to be implemented well by a professional bureaucracy. Furthermore, 
the bureaucracy system that is built is also important for the DPRD because it, 
indirectly, will influence the existence and the continuity of the function of DPRD. 
Similar to the bureaucrats, the politicians who sit in the DPRD are also often motivated 
by financial interests in allocating the local budget (APBD). One example of this is the 
choice of the budget system. Thus, this research will also analyze the perspective of 
the DPRD in performing reforms and the support given.  
 The interest of the bureaucrats and the DPRD in the reform process can be 
understand more through the resources allocation done to finance the reforms. There is 
a possibility that the amount of the resources (funding, personnel, organizations 
involved, technology and science) will provide indications on the seriousness of the 
local government in performing the reforms.  
                                                 
12 The examples of pathologic characteristic are the model bureaucracy of Orwell, Jackson, Parkinson, Bureaucracy 
Polity, and Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime 
13 A rational bureaucracy is the bureaucracy that refers to the bureaucracy characteristic of Max Weber 
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 Another problem that always occurs in the public administration in Indonesia is 
the weak coordination between the actors involved. This weakness results directly a 
development model in Indonesia that tends to be sectional—a main characteristic of 
the New Order regime. The model encourages each sector to plan and to carry out its 
own function without sufficient coordination. This weak coordination remains a 
concern today, particularly in the coordination of public administration reform. 
Therefore, it is very important for this research to analyze each region in applying a 
coordinative strategy. 
1. Bureaucrats Attitudes: 
a. Comparing attitudes towards superiors and customers 
b. How to serve  mayors/regents and politicians (post-duty fund)  
c. How to maintain positions in bureaucracy (original people issue, maintaining 
the existence of institutions, seniority versus competency/senior versus younger 
officials) 
d. How to manage local government finance (creating local taxes and levies, 
budget allocation among institutions) 
2. Politicians Attitudes: 
a. Bureaucracy reform in the local politics agenda 
b. Relationships with mayors/regents 
c. How to allocate local budget for executive and legislative purposes (hidden 
budget) 
d. Interference in personnel promotion 
e. Political support for public services (health and education) 
 
 
4. Response of Civil Society to Public Administration Reform  
Reform of public administration does not only focus on the government side of 
the governance equation. It also seeks to balance reform between governments 
(executive and legislative) as agents and citizens as principals and between 
bureaucracies as delivery agents and citizenry as clients. It means that public 
administration reform should consider democratic issues such as participation, 
accountability, and transparency, which are embedded in governance concepts. 
Through this concept, government does not stand alone, but requires other actors, who 
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come from non-state bodies such as civil society as partners in making and 
implementing public policies. 
Governance issues could be implemented easily if there was a route which 
shortened the link between policy makers on the one hand and citizens and public 
service providers on the other. One such shortening route is decentralization, either 
politically or administratively. Theoretically, decentralization facilitates participation 
through local population. Decentralization also brings politicians closer to the people, 
by giving them better information about constituents’ demands and making it easier for 
constituents to control politicians’ performance and behavior. However, 
decentralization does not take place in a vacuum. It occurs in value loaded 
environment that is heavily influenced by political, economical, social, cultural and 
historical aspects.   
One of the greatest problems in implementing decentralization is state capture. 
Campos and Hellman (2005) said that at every level of government, state capture may 
distort political accountability between citizens and policy makers. State capture refers 
to “actions of individuals, groups, or firms either in the public and/or private sectors to 
influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to 
their advantage through the illicit and nontransparent provision of private benefits to 
politicians and/or civil servants” (World Bank, 2000). 
According to Campos and Hellman (World Bank, 2005) the limited empirical 
studies that have already been conducted inferred that local governments are more 
susceptible to state capture than their national counterparts. Firstly, state capture 
thrives in an environment where highly concentrated interest groups---especially 
powerful firms and families—dominate the market for political influence, and where 
political competition is weak. Local economies tend to be more homogeneous, more 
concentrated, and less competitive than the national economy, creating fertile ground 
for dominant economic actors to engage in state capture. Secondly, many of the 
institutions normally expected to serve as checks on state capture are weaker at the 
local level than at the national level, especially in developing countries. Local 
legislature in most East Asian countries typically does not yet serve as a significant 
countervailing force on the executive. Even more than their national counterparts, 
these legislature lack technical and support staff, resources, experience, and training. 
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Thirdly, countervailing powers representing a broader range of public interest, such as 
the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are generally less developed in 
local jurisdictions. Even in large, geographically and linguistically diverse countries 
such as Indonesia, the main media outlets are highly concentrated in the capital city. At 
best, an emerging but still loose network of local newspapers and television stations 
resorts to “selling news for cash” to survive, regardless of its veracity. 
One actor within civil society who has big influence in governance is NGOs. 
There are three types of NGOs in Indonesia (Asian Development Bank, 1999): 
a. National-level cooperation/grassroots development 
NGOs in this category are concerned with delivering developmental and welfare 
benefits to their clientele. They do not have an interest in changing or intervening in 
the political process, although they advocate need of the government to allow people to 
participate more directly in the processes of development. 
b. National-level politics/grass roots development 
This category consists of NGOs who are explicitly critical of the government’s 
development philosophy and practices. Further more, this NGO category advocates 
both the need to raise community consciousness and the capacity for self-management 
among particular groups of people. These NGOs seek legal status and protection for 
their clientele through interaction with government officials. 
c. Empowerment from below 
NGOs in this category are focused at the local level rather than at the national level. 
Emphasis is more toward building awareness of rights among people than efforts to 
change policy. 
 There are three main causes of conflicts between governments and NGOs in 
Indonesia: Firstly, a complete difference in opinion often exists. Several major 
questions were begged and each side had a dramatically different answer. For instance: 
Who was to implement the country’s development and what was the meaning of 
participation? Secondly, the government’s unwillingness to recognize NGOs as 
partners in development created much friction. Thirdly, development projects planned 
and implemented by NGOs sometimes promised greater and more immediate success 
than those planned and implemented by government agencies. This can create 
uneasiness towards NGOs among government officials. Government officials may 
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consider an NGO as a competitor, and may have difficulty accepting them as partners 
(Asian Development Bank, 1999). 
 A similar relationship exists between the government and journalists. Journalist 
may act as watch-dogs or guards of government policies. When they are watch-dogs, 
journalists may be critical of government policies. In other words, journalists have a 
role as controllers. When journalists become guards of government policies, their 
critical function becomes weak.  
When there is a conflict on one side, on the other side there may arise 
cooperation. This applies not only to NGOs and the media but also to civil society in 
general. A policy could cause confrontation between government and civil society. 
However, it could also cause cooperation between them. Concerning this relationship, 
this study will categorize three kinds of civil society responses to public administration 
reform. These are critical responses, cooperative responses, and passive responses. 
Critical responses may occur when civil society takes the opposite view to the 
government and sometimes it is expressed through protests and critiques. Conversely, 
cooperative responses may occur when civil society is ready to cooperate with 
government in areas such as providing resources or implementing projects. 
Meanwhile, passive responses may occur when civil society does not respond at all to 
whatever the government is doing. 
According to the World Bank Development Report 2004, there exists an 
accountability triangle to identify aspects of local governance that impact service 
delivery. These include client power (relationships between households and service 
delivery facilities), compact/management (relationships between policy makers, 
sectoral service delivery agencies, and facilities), and voice (relationships between 
households and policy makers and politicians). This study focuses here on the client 
power and voice relationships. Client power usually occurs at the point of service 
delivery, when clients express their demand for services and in theory can monitor 
both providers and the supply of services, thus ensuring regular service provision. 
Voice relationship occurs whenever citizens can hold politicians accountable for their 
actions and, most importantly, their promises. Using this model, this study will 
concentrate on how civil society especially citizens, influence public administrative 
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reform on aspects of governance such as transparency, accountability and 
participation. 
Transparency refers to the citizens’ ability to obtain relevant information about 
the political process correctly and at low costs (e.g. regional regulations, budget 
decisions), and to able to identify correctly the responsible decision-makers and their 
role in the decision-making process. Participation describes the citizens’ ability to 
influence the political decision-making process through various channels. Participation 
mechanisms include, among other things, the citizens’ ability to effectively voice their 
opinions. Accountability refers to the notion that citizens are able to sanction 
effectively actions of political and bureaucratic decision-makers, either directly 
through mass-protest or using mass media and law suits, or indirectly through free 
elections, and bringing them to the court (juridical system). 
From the beginning it has been said that public administration reform should 
not only attempt to reform the internal conditions of public administration. The 
reforms must also pay attention to the other side, which is external conditions—how 
public organizations relate to other actors from outside. From a principal-agent 
approach, public organizations are agents who have a mandate from the principal to 
deliver what the principal needs. The principal is, here, the owner of the mandate or 
the people who receive public services from public organizations. They may be 
influenced by government policies. Therefore, it is important to consider the 
relationship between government and civil society in public administration reform.  
The external conditions in which a policy will be implemented is also an 
important factor. The important thing that needs to be understood is the reception of 
the local government toward suggestions or involvement of actors that come from the 
outside (community, NGOs, journalists) in performing public administration reform. 
There is still a dominant opinion among the bureaucrats that public administration is 
an internal affair of the bureaucracy, and not to be interfered with by outsiders. This 
opinion is related to Indonesian heritage and its concept of bureaucracy that emphasize 
the bureaucrats as ruler (pangreh) rather than as servants (pamong). Nevertheless, 
since the 1998 reforms, there has been a tendency for several regions to welcome 
suggestions and even involvement from outside actors in performing public 
administration reform. This actually rarely happens in the bureaucracy of Indonesia 
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and therefore is interesting in terms of analysis. The question that needs to be 
answered is whether the involvement of the outside actors will influence the 
performance of public administration reform or not. Evidence from several regions 
shows that when public administration reform is done solely by the bureaucracy, there 
is a tendency for the result to be worse than when the process involves outside actors.  
Based on all of the above, therefore, the aspects of the Response of Civil Society that 
will be analyzed are as follows: 
a. Accessibility to the community of planning processes 
b. Contribution to project implementation (participation or mobilization) 
c. Involvement in local political issues i.e corruption, collusion and nepotism 
 
D. CONTROLLING VARIABLES 
 The causal relationship of the independent variables with the dependent 
variables above will be controlled by several variables: the size of local civil services, 
the size of Local Government organizations, the financial resources of Local 
Government, and the Local Government environment (economic and political). The 
purpose of using these controlling variables is to verify the purity of the causal 
relationship pattern that occurs in several regions used as samples in this research. 
Since the regional autonomy that is based on Law No. 22/1999 was implemented, 
there has been significant variation between regions on the number of local civil 
servants, the size of Local Government organizations, the financial resources of Local 
Government, and the Local Government environment (economic and political). These 
variations are supposed to influence how the independent and dependent variables 
work.  
1. Size (number) of local civil services.  
This variable explains the total number of the civil servants possessed by the 
regional government, before and after the implementation of regional autonomy. The 
data shows that there has been an extreme increase in the number of civil servants after 
their status is changed from central employees into regional employees. This increase 
adds to regions’ responsibilities, especially in the function division and in finance—
though the salary has been distributed through DAU. This data does not include the 
number of the employees who work by contract and have not been promoted as civil 
servants that add to the region’s costs. The excessive number of employees is also 
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estimated to be disproportional, based on the owned-skill aspect, as there is over 
employment in certain sectors and a lack of employment in other sectors. Therefore, 
the aspects that will be studied in this variable are as follows: 
(i) The number of regional employees before and after autonomy and its 
distribution among institutions 
(ii) The number of the employees who work by contract 
(iii) The characteristics of the employees seen from the educational, age, and 
hierarchical grade (golongan) background 
2. Size of local government organizations.  
Autonomy gives the region freedom to create its own government units that are 
appropriate with its needs. Since there is a limitation on the number of bureaus, each 
region tends to have variations in the types of bureaus. The problem that occurs is 
whether these types of bureau are in accordance with the function and needs of the 
region. Another thing is that there are still too many types of positions in the hierarchic 
structure of regional government bureaucracies. Nonetheless, the number of employees 
that are still waiting to be placed at a structural position is still in abundance. All of 
these area burdens on government finance. Therefore, the aspects that are to be 
observed in this variable are the follows: 
(i) The number of local government institution, in the form of Agency, 
Board, and Office 
(ii) The function of the institutions and their appropriateness with the 
region’s needs 
(iii) The number of structural positions (echelons), those filled and those 
vacant 
(iv) The number of official candidates that are still on the waiting list to 
be placed in a structural position 
3. Financial Resources of Local Government.  
This variable tries to identify of a region’s financial capability, based on the 
total budget in the last five years and its income sources. The sources of local budget 
are the Region’s Own Income (PAD), the Rebalancing Fund that is derived from the 
General Allocation Fund (DAU), and the Special Allocation Fund (DAK). The source 
of PAD will also be identified in order to understand the sources of one local 
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government’s finance. Another source of funding is the De-concentration Fund that 
comes from the central department and is distributed through the provinces. The 
aspects that will be studied from this variable are as follows: 
(i) The total local budget (2000-2004) 
(ii) The total self incomes (2000-2004)  
(iii) The total of DAU and DAK (2000-2004) 
(iv) The dominant source of PAD 
(v) The De-concentration Fund (2000-2004) 
4. Local Government Environment (economic and political). 
This variable tries to identify the economic and political conditions of each region 
which varies greatly. The economic conditions of a region that need to be observed are 
the sources that supporter the regional economy and their changes. Meanwhile, the 
political condition that is worth noticing is the political party situation and the 
participation of civil society, whether the public, NGO’s, or local media, and the 
collaboration of them. Thus, the aspects that are to be seen in this variable are the 
following: 
(i) The sources of the regional economy and its changes 
(ii) The political party situation 
 
E. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework that is utilized in this research is outlined as the 
following: it is presumed that the performance of Local Public Administration Reform 
is determined by two major independent variables that are interrelated, i.e. the Central 
Government Role Variable and the Response of Local Government and its 
Environment towards the Reform. The Central Government Role consists of two 
variables i.e. the Decentralization as an Architecture Reform Variable and the Policy 
Reform Variable. Those two variables do not influence the performance of Local 
Public Administration Reform directly, but will interrelate with some variables i.e. the 
Mayor/Regent’s Role, the variable of Response of Bureaucrats and Politicians to Local 
Public Administration Reform: Conflict and Collaboration, and the variable of 
Response of Civil Society to the Reform. 
 78
The research model can be described in Figure 2.1. The performance of the 
Local Public Administration Reform Variable is settled by two main variables on the 
macro level (national): the Decentralization as Architecture Reform variable and the 
Policy Reform Variable. Both variables are supposed to affect performance because, 
despite the fact that the administration system of Indonesia has already been de-
centralized to the region, there are still many policies that are made by the central 
government. In this concern, decentralization emphases the administrative reform 
aspect that changes the basic pattern of how a regional administration system should 
be managed, including its relationship with the central government. Meanwhile, the 
Policy Reform Variable focuses on the substantial policy change, in terms of the 
special authority that has been given to the regions, which at the national level allows 
the central government the right to dictate a certain policy framework that has to be 
followed by the regions. The Decentralization Variable and the Policy Reform variable 
are expected to have a strong relationship that will reduce the incongruity between 
administration design and the substance of policy that will be implemented. 
Both macro variables do not influence the reform performance directly, but by 
means of variables at the micro level (local), such as the Mayor/Regent’s Role. This is 
possible because the decentralization concept provides the authority to the region to 
manage its own internal affairs. The Role of Mayor/Regent is a variable that needs to 
be noticed because the patrimonial bureaucracy system of Indonesia places the head of 
region as a leader that always needs to be obeyed. The other variable is Conflict and 
Collaboration between Politicians and Bureaucrats. This variable recognizes how the 
regional administration as a political body (DPRD) and as an administrative institution 
(Bureaucrats) responds to the policies that come from the central government. Both the 
Mayor/Regent’s Role variable and the Response of Politicians and Bureaucrats 
variable posses a strong cohesiveness according to the command hierarchy of the 
administration structure. The last variable is the Response of Civil Society to Local 
Public Administration Reform, which has the objective of understanding interaction 
between the local government actors and stakeholders in the reform process. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
                      Central Government 
 
 
     Decentralization       Policy Reform 
 
Administrative Reform              Substantial  
         Reform 
     Mayor/Regent 
 
 
 
 
                Local Public Administration Reform= 
                                                      Competency & Governance 
 
 
 
 Bureaucrats                                          Politicians/DPRD 
 
 
 
 
        Community/NGO 
 
 
 
Thesis: 
a. In conditions where bureaucracy is considered as the main agent in social change, 
local public administration reform performance is determined by the convergence 
between administrative reform and policy reform. 
b. The performance of local public administration reform depends mostly on the role 
of the Regent/Mayor. The role in fact becomes very apparent when, on one hand, 
the Central Government is unable to create policy clarity and certainty in 
administrative or substantial policy reform. On the other hand, political actors 
(DPRD) lack the ability to supervise bureaucracy effectively. 
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c. There is not any evidence that proves that the success of local public 
administration reform is supported by the local politicians since they are not 
interested in placing local public administration reform in their political agenda. 
d. Collaboration that happens between the bureaucrats and politicians (DPRD) is only 
artificial because in reality they are exploiting each other to maintain their own 
interests. In this collaboration, the bureaucrats are more cunning than the 
politicians in avoiding political tricks in public policy that could result authority 
misuse. 
e. Civil society’s access to public administration reform policies is limited. Both the 
bureaucracy and the politicians often use the existence of civil society, especially 
the NGOs, to give pressure to each other when the conflict of interest between 
them worsens. 
 
F. RESEARCH METHOD  
This research takes the form of qualitative research and is conducted both as an 
experiment and as an exploration toward some cases that have occurred in public 
administration reform at the local level in Indonesia. It is an experiment because it tries 
to apply some theories that have been used to analyze public administration reforms in 
other places. It is also an exploration because it tries to observe intensively several 
unique cases that can be used as fresh material in developing new theories.  
The qualitative research method is useful in getting closer to the reality of the 
complexity of public administration reform. The research, however, does not avoid 
data which came from statistics data processing such as data from the Governance and 
Decentralization Survey (GDS) I, 2002 and GDS I+, 2005.  The objective of utilizing 
this statistic is to strengthen qualitative data analysis.  
Data was collected falls into two categories; primary data and secondary data. 
Primary data was collected through in-depth interviews and field observations. Hence, 
respondents who are from local (district) level are: Mayors/Regents, City Managers, 
The Head of Local Parliament and its members, The Head of the Regional Personnel 
Board, The Head of the Regional Financial Board, The Head of the Regional Planning 
Board, The Head of the Organizational Division, The Head of the Development 
Administration Office, The Head of the Unity for Nation and Safety for Community 
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Office, The Head of the Health Office, The Head of the Education Office, The Head of 
the Health Community Center, The Head of the Population Affairs Office,  the 
community, and NGOs. In addition to the local level, the research also traces data from 
the central government. Some central government respondents are officials from The 
Director of Local Autonomy Affairs of The Ministry of Home Affairs Republic of 
Indonesia and also and The Head of Personnel Sub Directorate of the State Personnel 
Empowerment State Ministerial.  
Other primary data comes from previous research includes GDS I (2002) and 
GDS I+ (2005), Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal I-IV 2001-2004 (IRDA) 
and Citizens’ Charter Project. Some data for this research primarily uses data findings 
from GDS I that was carried out in 150 regencies/municipalities, including 6 research 
districts that have been selected for this dissertation, from 20 provinces in Indonesia 
and was started in 2002. Meanwhile, GDS I+ was started in 200514. The author use 
GDS data as primary source because the author was a member of the GDS I, 2002 
team and was responsible to make some questionnaires for different respondents, to 
supervise data collecting and processing. The author and the member of the team also 
have responsible to write books and policy briefs which were published from the GDS 
I data. Those books that have been published are: the first is “Reformasi Tata 
Pemerintahan dan Otonomi Daerah”, and second is “Teladan dan Pantangan Dalam 
Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah”.  In GDS I+, 2005, the author also gave contribution in 
making questionnaires design. Other research source was Indonesian Rapid 
Decentralization Appraisal (IRDA I-IV) during 2001-2004 which was funded by The 
Asia Foundation (TAF). The author was a member of the team that was responsible to 
collect data and make research report primarily for Kulon Regency and some other 
                                                 
14 GDS was designed as part of a bigger project namely Indonesian Decentralization Empirical Analysis (IDEA). As 
all parties are committed, the survey is also designed as a panel survey using the 2002 GDS as a base line survey.  
These provinces were purposively selected out of 26 provinces; while selection of these regencies/municipalities 
was conducted by simple random sampling (53 percent from the whole regencies/municipalities). There are two 
types of respondent, household and non-household. The total household respondent is 60 people which are 
randomly selected based on multi stage sampling with the smallest cluster is village/kelurahan. The non-household 
respondents consist of 36 people, which are purposively selected representing 21 different types of institutions.  
They are bureaucrats (District Head/Mayor and its deputy and also the apparatus), local parliament (legislative), 
NGOs, journalists, judges and attorneys, and businessmen. Data in this research is divided into two groups namely 
the implementation of decentralization policy data (perception, capacity, commitment, organizational structure, 
personnel, fiscal, public service, alleviation, and environment) and local governance data (participation, 
transparency, accountability, rule of law, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, conflict management). This research 
was conducted by Centre for Policy and Population Studies (CPPS) University of Gadjah Mada, funded by World 
Bank and Partnership for Economic Growth (PEG) USAID. 
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areas. The Citizens’ Charter Project (2002-2004)15 also contributes some data in this 
dissertation because the author was a member of the team which has responsibility as 
project designer and supervisor in Prajan Municipality and Alit Municipality. 
The secondary data gathering is based on administrative documents, news and 
some previous research related to local public administration reform such as Indonesia 
Family Life Survey 2002 (IFLS), research results from Master of Public Policy and 
Administration UGM, The Indonesia Public Administration Institution (LAN), Social 
Monitoring and Early Response Unit (SMERU) Indonesia and other research results 
from World Bank and UNDP as well as other previous research. 
The research also intends to choose a number of regencies/municipalities to be 
explored more in order to answer the research question proposed. The 
regency/municipality selection criteria is based on the natural resource possessed, the 
level of resident socio-economic advancement that is observed from the level of 
education, political dynamics seen from party conflict and participation of civil 
society, and Regent/Mayor status (social and economical background) before being 
elected. The important thing is that those regions are also GDS I regions, hence the 
results analysis from GDS I will strengthen analysis from in-depth interview results. 
These selected regencies/municipalities are the following: 
Table 2.5: Research Districts 
Type of Districts Provinces 
Municipality Regency 
Prajan Prajan Giri 
Central Java -- Kulon, Anom 
East Java Alit Wetan 
 
Besides those districts, the research quotes some cases in other districts which have 
similarity to cases in six districts. The purpose is to strengthen data analysis with the 
result that data description is more valid. 
                                                 
15 The Citizens’ Charter Project was a pilot project to implement the concept of citizens’ charter in public services 
primarily in health and civil registration services (identity card and birth certificate). This project was conducted by 
Centre for Policy and Population Studies (CPPS) University of Gadjah Mada during 2002-2004 and funded by The 
Ford Foundation in three regions Prajan Municipality, Alit Municipality and one region in Central Java Province. 
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Technique of data analysis is a qualitative analysis. First, the analysis uses 
nationally data results which come from statistics data processing primarily from GDS 
I (2002) and GDS I+ (2005). In addition, data from other research (World Bank and 
UNDP) is used to strengthen GDS data finding, as comparison available international 
cases are included. Based on the GDS data, the author analyze data to describe the 
contemporary conditions resulting from the degree and extent of local public 
administration reform conducted in Indonesia, which has resulted from Law Number 
22/1999 and Law Number 25/1999 that initiated local public administration reform in 
Indonesia. The nationally data, then, is generated into local level which intend to know 
“what was happening” in local public administration reform. This step pass through 
analysis of the number of cases occurring in research districts location by using in-
depth interview results and qualitative data from previous research, IRDA I-IV and 
Citizens’ Charter. Finally, it can be concluded explanation for each variables and 
relationship between Independent Variables and Dependent Variable are or 
relationship among independent variables. 
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CHAPTER III 
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH REGIONS 
 
 The description of the research area in this chapter is also a description of the 
Control Variables used in this research. The Control Variables used include the Size of 
the Civil Service, the Size of Local Government Organizations, Local Government 
Financial Capacity, and Local Government Environment (Economic Potency and 
Political Dynamics). 
 
A. Local Government 
1. Civil Service 
 The amount of civil servants in the Giri Regency in December 2004 was 
13,017 people with various educational backgrounds. The amount has increased 
approximately 45% from the previous number before the local autonomy was 
implemented, i.e. 9,322 people based on the January 1999 data. The December 2004 
data shows that approximately 35% of the civil servants in the Giri Regency have at 
best completed a high school diploma while the other 65% have completed a 
university degree, be it a three-year Diploma, a Bachelor, or a Masters. Most of the 
civil servants that are working after the implementation of local autonomy are working 
as teachers. Thus it is expected that, based on the institutional distribution, most of the 
civil servants (65%) are in the Education Agency. 
 Differing from the situation in the Giri Regency, the amount of civil servants in 
the Prajan Municipality in December 2003 was 8,417 people. Based on the education 
level, approximately 55% of the civil servants have at best high school diplomas, and 
the other 45% possess three year Diploma, Bachelor, or Masters degree. Most of the 
civil servants in Prajan work as teachers that are structurally under the Education 
Agency.  
 Compared to the two Locals above, the amount of civil servants in the Anom 
Regency is bigger: 16,811 people in December 2004. The amount has drastically 
increased from the amount before the implementation of the local autonomy in 2000, 
i.e. 3,685 people. The increase is caused by the reassignment of approximately 12,000 
teachers that used to work for the Central Government to work for the autonomous 
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Local. Therefore, it is likely that the amount of the civil servants that work for the 
Education and Culture Agency in Anom is the greatest compared to the amount of 
servants in other agencies. On average, both before and after the implementation of the 
local autonomy, the civil servants possessed high school diplomas (approximately 
40%). 
 The Kulon Regency also experienced the same drastic increase. In 1999, before 
the implementation of the local autonomy, the amount of the civil servants was 4,573 
people; in 2004, after the implementation, the amount increased to 13,560 people. 
However, the increase in the amount of civil servants unfortunately was not followed 
by an increase in the educational standard. This is proved by the fact that most of the 
civil servants have at best high school diplomas. Approximately 80% of the transferred 
civil servants work as teachers. 
 Among the Locals that are the object of this research, Alit Municipality is the 
Local with the narrowest territory. However, from 1999 to 2004, the amount of civil 
servants tripled. By the end of 1999, the amount of the civil servants was 1,193 people; 
by 2004, the amount had increased to 3,143 people. Most of the civil servants work as 
teachers. Based on the education level, until 2000, the composition of the civil servants 
was still dominated by high school graduates (approximately 50%). However, since 
2001, in line with the Municipality Government policy to improve the quality of 
human resources by offering the civil servants a chance to obtain a higher education, 
the amount of civil servants that has Bachelor and Masters Degrees increased almost 
30%.  Nonetheless, based on the real number, civil servants that have those degrees 
place the highest position.  
 The amount of the civil servants in the Wetan Regency also increased 
drastically after the local autonomy was implemented. In 1999, the amount was only 
3,705 people; but by 2004 it quadrupled to 12,699 people. According to the latest 
number, approximately 40% of them still have at best high school diplomas; 30% have 
three year Diploma degrees; and the rest have at least Bachelor degrees. The amount of 
civil servants that have Masters degrees is only 1%. As in the other Locals, the 
composition of the civil service is still dominated by those who work as teachers 
(67%).  
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2. Local Government Organization Structure 
 Before the implementation of the local autonomy, the organization structure of 
the Giri Regency was the following: 
(1).  Municipality Manager Office that includes a Municipality Manager, three 
Assistants (Government, Development Administration, Administration), and 
four-teen Divisions (Government Administration, Village Administration, 
Social Order, Law, Economy, Program Arrangement, Social, Living 
Environment, Employment, Finance, Organization, Public Relations, 
Equipment) 
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Agencies: Public Works, Health, Education, Forestry, Plantations, Farming, 
Husbandry, Local Income, Industry and Trade, Labor Force, and Mining 
(4). Board: Local Development Planning Board 
(5). 17 Districts 
(6). Local-Owned Corporations: Market Bank, Local Water Supply Corporation 
(7). Offices: Education and Culture; Traffic and Land Transportation; Irrigation; 
Social,  
The arrangement of organization has undergone several changes. In 2003, the latest 
form of organization was as follows: 
(1).  Municipality Manager Office that includes a Municipality Manager , three 
Assistants (Government, Development, Administration), nine Divisions 
(Government Administration, Village Administration, Law, Economy, 
Development Administration, Public Welfare, Organization, General, and 
Public Relations) 
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Agencies: Settlement, Local Infrastructure, and Transportation Agency; 
Irrigation, Mining, and Natural Disaster Prevention Agency; Farming and 
Forestry Agency; Commerce, Industry, Cooperation, and Investment 
Agency; Health Agency; Education Agency; Social, Labor Force, and Family 
Planning Agency; Civil Service Police and Public Order Agency; Culture and 
Tourism Agency 
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(4). Boards: Local Development Planning Board, Local Controlling Board, Local 
Finance and Wealth Management Board, Local Land Control Board, Local 
Personnel Board and Local Public Hospital  
(5).  Office: Local Library and Archive Office, Telecommunication and 
Information Technology Office, Environmental Impact Control Office, 
Market Management Office, Citizen Registration and Legal Certificate 
Application Office, and Work-Training Office 
(6). Seventeen Sub-Districts (Kecamatan) 
(7). Local-Owned Corporations: Market Bank, Local Water Supply Corporation 
(8). Thirty one Local Technical Operation Units 
 
Meanwhile, in the Prajan Municipality, since the implementation of local autonomy, 
the arrangement of the Local Government organization has not really changed. The 
organization of local personnel that has been used since 2000 is as follows:  
(1). Municipality Manager Office that includes a Municipality Manager , three 
Assistants (Government and Development, Law and Organization, 
Administration), Finance Division, Employment Division, Government 
Administration Division, Development Division, Economy Division, Law 
Division, General and Equipments Division, and Public Relations Division) 
(2). Local House of Representative Secretariat 
(3). Agencies: Farming and Animal; Economy; Market Management; Art and 
Culture Tourism; Labor Force and Transmigration; Health; Education and 
Teaching; Social Welfare and Community Empowerment; Land; 
Municipality Planning and Development; Municipality Infrastructure; 
Sanitation, Gardening, and Funeral; Transportation; Social Order; Population 
and Civil Registration 
(4). Boards: Internal Controlling Board, Local Development Planning Board, 
Local Personnel Board, Local Finance Management Board, Local Public 
Hospital  
(5). Offices: Fire Office, Environment Impact Management Office, Public Safety 
and National Unity Office, Archive and Electronic Data Processing Office, 
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Local Tax Services Offices, Sports Youth and Women’s Empowerment 
Office, and Public Relations Office 
(6). Fourteen Sub Districts 
(7). Forty five Village 
(8). Local-Owned Corporations: Market Bank, Local Water Supply Corporation 
The structure of organization listed above was still in place at the end of 2004, though 
there has been a change in Government Regulations, i.e. Government Regulation No. 
84/2003 was replaced with Government Regulation No. 8/2003. Both regulations 
govern the organization of local personnel. 
  
Before the implementation of local autonomy, the structure of organization in the 
Anom Regency was as follows:  
(1). Municipality Manager Office that includes a Municipality Manager, four 
Assistants; Finance Division, Employment Division, Government 
Administration Division, Development Division, Economy Division, Village 
Administration Division, Law Division, General and Equipments Division 
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Regent’s Assistant 
(4). Local Development Planning Board 
(5). Agencies: Local Income Agency; Health Agency; Fishery Agency; Tourism 
Agency; Husbandry Agency; Public Works Agency; Market Management 
Agency; Sanitation and Gardening Agency; Farming and Food Agency; 
Plantation Agency; Education and Culture Agency; Traffic and Land 
Transportation Agency; Forestry and Land Conservation Agency 
(6). Sub-Agencies in the Sub-districts 
(7). Local-owned corporations 
(8). Anom Administrative Municipality 
(9). Sub districts 
(10). Villages 
After Law Number 22/1999 was issued, the structure of organization was altered to 
become the following: 
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(1). Municipality Manager Office: Municipality Manager , three Assistants, 
Government Division, Organization Division, Equipments Division, 
Development Administration Division, Law Division, Economy Division, 
Social Division, General Division 
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Agencies: Public Works Agency; Education and Culture Agency; Farming 
and Population Agency; Transmigration and Work-Force Agency; 
Cooperation, Commerce, Industry, and Community Empowerment Agency; 
Local Income Agency; Social Welfare and Health Agency 
(4). Boards: Local Development Planning Board; Local Controlling Board; Local 
Personnel Board; Local Financial Management Board 
(5). Offices: Public Relation and Information Office; Library and Archive Office; 
Living Environment Office; Civil Services Police Office; Transportation 
Office; Market Management Office; Population and Civil Registration 
Office; Family Planning Office 
(6). 26 Sub-districts 
(7).  Villages 
(8). Local-Owned Corporations: pharmacies, Local Water Supply Corporation    
 
In the Kulon Regency, before the implementation of local autonomy, the 
structure of organization was almost the same as in the other locals: 
(1). Municipality Manager Office: Municipality Manager ; three assistants; 
Finance Division; Employment Division; Government Administration 
Division; Program Arrangement Division; Economy Division; Village 
Administration Division; Law Division; General and Equipments Division; 
Public Relation Division 
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Local Development Planning Board 
(4). Agencies: Local Income Agency; Education and Culture Agency; Tourism 
Agency; Public Works Agency; Health Agency; Fishery Agency; Husbandry 
Agency; Food Farming Agency; Sanitary and Gardening Agency; Forestry 
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and Land Conservation Agency; Plantation Agency; Market Management 
Agency; Traffic and Land Transportation Agency, Labor Force Agency 
(5). Offices: Electronic Data Processing Office, Local Treasury Office 
(6). Local Public Hospital 
(7). Sub-districts 
(8). Villages 
(9). Local-Owned Corporation: Market Bank, Pharmacies, Local Water Supply 
Corporation 
By 2004, the structure of organization changes to becomes as the following: 
(1). Municipality Manager Office: Municipality Manager ; three assistants; 
Finance Division; Government Administration Division; Development 
Administration Division; Economy Division; Village Administration 
Division; Law Division; Organization Division; General and Equipments 
Division  
(2). Local House of Representatives Secretariat 
(3). Boards: Local Development Planning Board; Local Controlling Board; 
Training, Education, and Personnel Board; Electronic Data Processing and 
Communication Information Board; Local Public Hospital Management 
Board 
(4). Agencies: Local Settlement and Infrastructure Agency; Health Agency; 
Farming Agency; Commerce, Industry and Cooperation Agency; Mining, 
Water, and Energy Resource Agency; Education Agency; Fishery, 
Husbandry, and Marine Agency; Transmigration and Labor Force Agency; 
Forestry and Environmental Impact Management Agency; Social, Public 
Safety, and National Unity Agency; Community Empowerment and Family 
Planning Agency; Transportation Agency, Art, Culture, and Tourism Agency 
(5). Offices: Local Income Office; Local Treasury Management Office; Civil 
Registration Office; Market Affairs Office 
(6). Civil Service Police Unit 
(7). Sub-districts 
(8). Villages 
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(9). Local-owned corporations: Market Bank, Pharmacies, Local Water Supply 
Corporation 
 
Meanwhile, the development of the amount of institution in Alit Municipality 
based on their type can be seen in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1: The amount of Local Institutions in Alit Municipality between 2000-2004 
Year 
No Institution 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1. Municipality Manager Office 1 1 1 1 1 
2. Local House of Representatives Secretariat 1 1 1 1 1 
3. Agencies 10 12 12 13 12 
4. Deconcentrated Government Offices 
(Branch of Ministry), equal to Agencies 
11 - - - - 
5. Boards - 4 5 5 6 
6. Department Offices (Branch of Board at 
National level), equal to Board 
3 - - - - 
7. Local Public Hospitals 1 1 - - - 
8. Offices 2 - - 2 3 
9. Local-Owned Corporation 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 30 20 20 23 24 
      Source:  Alit Municipality Local Finance Agency, 2004 
              
The table shows how the Alit Municipality Government reorganized its 
institutions. It can be said that there is not any drastic change in the amount of the 
institutions organized, especially in the amount of agencies, boards, and offices. 
According to data from 2003, the agencies that exist in this Municipality are the Health 
Agency; Education Agency; Labor Force and Social Welfare Agency; Family Planning 
and Community Empowerment Agency; Farming Agency; Public Works, Settlement, 
and Territorial Infrastructure Agency, Income Agency; Small-Middle Business 
Development and Cooperation Agency; Living Environment Agency; Transportation 
Agency; Tourism and Communication Information Agency; Population and Civil 
Registration Agency; Industry and Commerce Agency. The Offices that exist are the 
Local Treasury Office and the One Stop Services Office. Meanwhile, the boards that 
exist are the Local Controlling Board; Local Development Planning Board; Local 
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Personnel Board; National Unity, Public Safety and Civil Service Police Board; and  
Hospital Health Services Board. 
          In contrast, an increase in the amount of local institutions occurs in the Wetan 
Regency Government. Table 3.2 shows that before the implementation of local 
autonomy, the amount of local institutions was 21; it increased to 32 institutions after 
the implementation of local autonomy. This increase also happens to the amount of 
agencies, rising from 12 to 15, and to the amount of boards, rising from 1 to 7. The 
agencies that existed before the implementation of local autonomy are the Health, 
Sanitation and Gardening, Education and Culture, Farming, Plantation, Income, 
Binamarga Public Works, Husbandry, Forestry, Local Traffic and Land 
Transportation, Fishery, and Ciptakarya Public Work Agency. After the 
implementation of local autonomy, the agencies that exist are the Farming; Husbandry; 
Marine and Fishery; Territorial Infrastructure; Settlement and Living Environment; 
Forestry and Plantation; Education and Culture; Health; Income; Social Welfare; 
Mining and Energy Industry and Commerce; Labor Force and Transmigration, 
Information and Tourism; Transportation; and Cooperation and Small-Middle 
Business Agencies. The only board that existed before the implementation was the 
Local Development Planning Board; after the implementation it was added to with the 
Local Controlling Board, Local Research and Development Board, Public Information 
Board, National Unity and Public Safety Board, Public Health Implementation Board, 
and Local Personnel Board. Before the implementation of local autonomy, the offices 
that existed were the Political and Social office, Village Community Development 
office, Legal Certificate Application office, and the Regency Territory Inspectorate 
office. After the implementation, the offices that existed changed into the Civil Service 
Police Unit Office, Population and Legal Certificate Application Office, Local 
Treasury Office, Electronic Data Processing Office, Farming Instructor Information 
Office, and the Local Asset Office. 
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Table 3.2: The amount of the Local Institution in the Wetan Regency 
Year No Institution Variety 
1999 2000 
1 Municipality Manager Office 1 1 
2 Local House of Representatives Secretariat 1 1 
3 Agencies 12 15 
4 Boards 1 7 
5 Offices 4 6 
6 Local Public Hospitals 1 1 
7 Local-Owned Corporations 1 1 
 Total  21 32 
Source: Organization Division, the Wetan Regency Government, 2005 
 
3. The Local’s Financial Capacity 
         The Local’s financial ability can be measured from the percentage of the Local 
Original Income (PAD) as a percentage of the total income of the local budget 
(APBD). In the structure of the APBD in Indonesia, Local Original Income consists of 
Local Tax, Local Retribution (levies), Local Business Profit, and other Local Original 
Income. Based on this fact, the amount of Local Original Income is often used as the 
basic of the analysis of the Local’s financial ability. Considering existing Local’s 
financial abilities, to measure financial ability the following categories are used: a 
percentage below 10% is low; 11% to 20% is medium; over 20% is high. 
 In the Giri Regency, since 2000, every year the amount of PAD has always 
increased. The table shows that overall the finance sources of the Giri Regency 
Government still depend on the funding given by the central government. The amount 
of PAD that serves as the measurement of the Local Government’s financial ability 
never increases far beyond 11%. The Local Government still depends on the financial 
subsidies from the central government that is given in various forms, including 
autonomous local subsidy, DAU, profit sharing, etc. The Following table, Table 3.3, 
shows the increase: 
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Table 3.3: The Giri Regency Finance Capacity 
Year Total PAD  APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000 Rp 17.125.444.712,00 
(1.489.169 €) 
Rp 126.225.669.590,00 
(10.976.145 €) 
13% 
2000 Rp 17.889.883.435,46 
(1.555.642 €) 
Rp 128.038.616.420,94 
(11.133.792 €) 
14% 
2001 Rp 29.571.153.214,43 
(2.571.404 €) 
Rp 308.531.584.637,09 
(26.828.833 €) 
10% 
2002 Rp 36.607.798.493,10 
(3.183.286 €) 
Rp 365.491.640.738,68 
(31.881.781 €) 
10% 
2003 Rp 52.972.697.477,69 
(4.606.321 €) 
 Rp 452.878.625.018,10 
(39.380.750 €) 
11% 
2004 Rp 53.919.261.011,00 
(4.688.631 €) 
Rp 448.970.861.011,00 
(39.040.944 €) 
12% 
Source: data is processed from several sources  
  
 In the Prajan Municipality, in the last five years, the percentage of Local 
Original Income toward the APBD (income) was always higher than in Giri. Table 3.4 
below shows the financial capacity of the Prajan Municipality. 
 
Table 3.4: The Prajan  Municipality Finance Capacity 
Year Total PAD APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000 Rp 24.790.128.183,92 
(2.155.663 €) 
Rp 97.505.252.908,02 
(8.478.717 €) 
24% 
2000 Rp 22.452.952.250,89 
(1.952.430 €) 
Rp 104.476.181.815,83 
(9.084.885 €) 
21% 
2001 Rp 40.352.592.890,43 
(3.508.921 €) 
Rp 243.769.299.493,98 
(21.197.330 €) 
16% 
2002 Rp 56.377.459.398,89 
(4.902.387 €) 
Rp 303.020.070.537,68 
(26.349.571 €) 
18% 
2003 Rp 68.621.564.311,07 
(5.967.092 €) 
Rp 338.630.761.654,14 
(29.446.153 €) 
20% 
2004 Rp 80.303.501.905,99 
(6.982.913 €) 
Rp 369.649.879.034,51 
(32.143.467 €) 
22% 
Source: data is processed from several sources  
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 On average, the percentage in the Prajan Municipality annually is 20%. This is 
the highest percentage among the local government in the Special Province of Prajan. 
Based on this percentage, this Local can be categorized as a Local with a medium to 
high income level.  
 In the next table, Table 3.5, the Anom Regency shows a lower financial ability 
compared with other Locals. The table shows that the financial ability of the Anom 
Regency is lower than the financial ability of the Giri Regency and the Prajan 
Municipality. The average percentage of the PAD toward the APBD is only 4.5%, 
meaning the Anom Regency belongs to the category of Locals with a low income. 
 
Table 3.5: The Anom Regency Finance Capacity 
Year Total PAD APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000 -- --  
2000 6.598.582.386,00 
(573.789 €) 
126.579.028.742,00 
(11.006.872 €) 
4% 
2001 13.832.059.409,00 
(1.202.787 €) 
331.562.595.321,00 
(28.831.530 €) 
4% 
2002 17.519.438.716,00 
(1.523.429 €) 
387.763.520.553,00 
(33.718.567 €) 
5% 
2003 22.288.967.164,00 
(1.938.171 €) 
499.848.534.469,00 
(43.456.089 €) 
5% 
2004 27.177.367.787,00 
(2.363.249 €) 
502.035.809.731,00 
(43.655.287 €) 
5% 
Source: data is processed from several sources 
  
The Kulon Regency also experiences the same situation. This Local belongs to 
the category of Locals with a low income because the average percentage of PAD 
toward the APBD during the period is only 5.3%. The next table, Table 3.6 shows the 
situation: 
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Table 3.6: The Kulon Regency Finance Capacity 
Year Total PAD APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000 6.047.840.000,00 
(525.899 €) 
96.316.901.000,00 
(8.375.382 €) 
6% 
2000 5.554.377.000,00 
(482.989 €) 
98.678.785.000,00 
(8.580.763 €) 
5% 
2001 7.833.403.000,00 
(681.165 €) 
154.825.796.000,00 
(13.463.112 €) 
5% 
2002 13.088.070.000,00 
(1.138.093 €) 
321.918.737.000,00 
(27.992.933 €) 
4% 
2003 23.488.940.000,00 
(2.042.516 €) 
388.670.622.000,00 
(33.797.445 €) 
6% 
2004 25.628.745.000,00 
(2.228.586 €) 
417.756.799.000,00 
(36.326.678 €) 
6% 
Source: data is processed from several sources 
 The Alit Municipality, as seen in the next table (Table 3.7), has a better 
percentage of PAD toward the APBD compared to the Anom Regency and the Kulon 
Regency. In the 2001 budget, the percentage decreases. However, the decrease was 
caused by a drastic increase in the employee payment budget as a result of the transfer 
of employees from the central to the local government. Slowly, year by year, the 
amount of PAD increased so that by 2004 it reached 10% of the total income of the 
2004 APBD. 
Table 3.7: The Alit Municipality Finance Capacity 
Year Total PAD APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000 - 36.042.871.000,77 
(3.134.162 €) 
- 
2004 17.508.069.511,79 
(1.522.440 €) 
173.148.085.580,79 
(15.056.355 €) 
10% 
2003 14.659.717.019,95 
(1.274.758 €) 
163.399.781.394,95 
(14.208.676 €) 
9% 
2002 11.741.291.163,37 
(1.020.981 €) 
145.607.385.917,41 
(12.661.511 €) 
8% 
2001 5.801.695.867 
(504.495 €) 
102.168.621.427,85 
(8.884.227 €) 
6% 
2000 3.285.039.237 
(285.655 €) 
31.480.891.621,66 
(2.737.468 €) 
10% 
Source: data is processed from several sources 
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 During the same period, in contrast, the Wetan Regency has a low percentage 
of PAD toward the APBD. From 1999 to 2004, the percentage never goes above 5% of 
the total income of the APBD (see Table 3.8). In the 2004 budget, the percentage 
decreases to only 3% of the total income of the APBD. This situation occurs because 
the Local received a very high income from the DAU as a consequence of the authority 
transfer.  
Table 3.8: The percentage of the Wetan Regency PAD to APBD (Income)  
Year Total PAD APBD (Income) Percentage 
99/2000   5.274.537.000 
(458.655 €) 
  91.583.771.800 
(7.963.806 €) 
5% 
2000   5.053.679.265 
(439.450 €) 
104.192.741.852 
(9.060.238 €) 
4% 
2001   9.654.780.000 
(839.546 €) 
266.717.503.977 
(23.192.826 €) 
3% 
2002 13.402.037.653 
(1.165.394 €) 
337.115.916.577 
(29.314.427 €) 
4% 
2003 15.667.540.000 
(1.362.394 €) 
330.089.665.011 
(28.703.449 €) 
5% 
2004 20.674.787.400 
(1.797.807 €) 
397.538.287.187 
(34.568.546 €) 
5% 
Source: data is processed from several sources 
 
B. Local Relief 
1. Economic Ability: Gross Local Domestic Product (PDRB) 
 The annual average economic growth of the Giri Regency from 2000 to 2004 
was 4.29% based on the 1993 constant price. This growth was higher than the 
economic growth of the Prajan Special Local Province between 2000 and 2002 which 
was only 3.56% on average annually, and even than the national economic growth 
between 2000 and 2003 was only 3.98% on average annually. Based on the 
measurement of the percentage of change of the Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(PDRB) toward the 1993 constant price, business fields that gave large contributions to 
the increase from 1999 to 2003 are Commerce, Hotels, and Restaurants (18.30%); 
Services (17.19%); Manufacturing Industries (16.24%); and Farming (13.76%). The 
economic growth resulted in increase in the per capita income of the Giri Regency 
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people. From 2000 to 2003 per capita income increased 2.05% on average annually 
based on the constant price. Moreover, if compared to the 1999 per capita income, the 
2003 per capita income increased significantly by 8.41% based on the 1993 constant 
price. The conversion of the per capita income growth percentage into Rupiah results 
in Rp. 3.5 million (300 €) in 1999, and Rp 5.5 million (500 €) in 2003 based on the 
official conversion rate. Based on the Human Development Index measurement, Giri 
Regency experienced an increase in 1999 to 70.08 and an increase in 2002 to 73.11. 
This last number places the Giri Regency on the 27th rank from 300 regencies/cities in 
Indonesia. 
 The economic growth in the Prajan Municipality in 2003 reached 3.98%. This 
number is higher than that of 2002, which reached only 3.26%. In Rupiah, the PDRB 
of this Municipality based on the 1993 constant price was Rp. 1.309.434 (120 €) in 
1999 and Rp 1.602.184 (145 €) in 2003. The economic growth in the Prajan 
Municipality results especially from growth in the commerce, hotel, and restaurant 
sectors, and the transportation and communication sectors.  Both sectors are the main 
economic sources of the Municipality. In 2003, the first sector grew 6.43% and the 
second grew 6.55%. In 1999, based on the 1993 constant price, the per capita PDRB 
was Rp. 3.281.724 (310 €); in 2003, increasing to Rp. 4.084.714 (400 €). The Human 
Development Index (HDI) of this Municipality in 1999 was 73.4 and 75.3 in 2002. The 
HDI number places the Prajan Municipality as one of three Locals that have the 
highest HDI in Indonesia. 
The aggregate economic growth of the Anom Regency during the period 1999 
to 2003 was 3.19% on average annually, based on the 1993 constant price. This 
number was lower than the national economic growth between 2000 and 2003 that 
reached 3.98% on average annually. Measuring the PDRB growth based on the 1993 
constant price, it was found that the business sector that increased drastically was the 
farming sector. It increased from 16.47% in 1999 to 4.62% in 2003. In 1999, three 
sectors that contributed greatly to the PDRB are the Building/Construction (9,63%), 
Drinking Water and Electricity (8,23%), and Transportation and Communication 
sectors (6,92%); however, in 2003, the sectors changed to Land Digging (13,30%), 
Building/Construction (8,51%), and Drinking Water and Electricity (8,19%). In 1999, 
the Anom Regency per capita PDRB was Rp. 933.040,23 (90 €) based on the 1993 
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constant price and increased to Rp 1.053.576,55 (100 €) in 2003. In that period, the per 
capita PDRB increased 2.50% on average annually. From 2001 to 2003, the increase in 
the Anom Regency Human Development Index was not significant. It increased from 
68,29 in 2001 to 69,69 in 2003. Nonetheless, this number is still included in the 
category of upper-middle class.  
Between 2000 and 2003, the Kulon Regency’s economic growth based on the 
1993 constant price averaged a 3.12% increase annually. In 2003, the growth reached 
3.77%. However, this number was much smaller than the amount reached in 2000, i.e. 
4,67%. Three business sectors contributed most to the PDRB in 2003, based on the 
1993 constant price, are the Drinking Water and Electrics (6,43%), Building and 
Construction (5,88%), and Mining and Digging (5,28%) sectors. This situation did not 
change, including its rank, from 2002. Converted to Rupiah, the amount of per capita 
PDRB in 2003 based on the 1993 constant price was Rp. 817.251,28 (80 €). This 
number increased from 1999 only Rp. 703.724,47 (70 €) in 1999. Averaged from 1999 
to 2003, the per capita PDRB growth was 3,68% annually. The Kulon Regency is, 
Human Development Index in 2000, placed it at the 13th rank in Central Java 
Province, with 68,81%. In 2001, it decreased 64,03% and fell to the 29th rank in 
Central Java. The decreased was caused by a natural disaster that influenced the health 
level of the people in the Kulon Regency. However, until 2003, the amount of the HDI 
in the Kulon Regency was not able to return to the amount achieved in 2000, i.e. 
68,08%. 
 In 1999, the Alit Municipality’s economic growth based on the 1993 constant 
price was 0,66%. This static economic growth was resulted from the political 
conditions after the political reform of 1998 and the 1999 General Election that 
crippled the local government’s ability to pacify the social-political conflicts occurring 
in society. The low economic growth is resulted in the 1999 net per capita PDRB 
growth of 0,08%. The next year, 2000, after the political turbulence was pacified, the 
economic growth increased rapidly to 4,18% and in 2003 to 4,29%. The per capita 
PDRB growth also increased to 3.87% in 2000 and to 3.84% in 2003. The growth of 
the per capita PDRB also affected the Human Development Index. The political 
turbulence in 1998 proved to affect the amount of the HDI: in 1996, the amount was 
72,40; however, in 1999, it decreases 6,88 point to 65,52. The decrease especially 
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affected the purchasing power of the people. Thus, it can be inferred that in 1999, Alit 
Municipality belonged to the category of lower-middle class. The decrease also 
happened to the other Regency/Municipality in the East Java Province; on average, the 
decrease reached 7.24 points. Though it experienced a decrease, Alit Municipality 
ranked first in East Java. In 2004, however, it fell to second rank. Meanwhile, from the 
distribution of the PDRB percentage based on the 1993 constant price, it was found 
that in 1999, the commerce, hotel, and restaurant sectors still ranked first (19%) 
followed by the services sector (18%) and the communication and transportation 
(17%).  In 2003, the pattern changed: the communication and transportation sector was 
ranked first (20%), followed by the commerce, hotel, and restaurant sector (19%), and 
the services sector (17%). 
In 2000, the Wetan Regency which is located near to the Alit Municipality but 
with greater territory, reached 2.32% economic growth. The amount is smaller than the 
amount reached by the Alit Municipality in the same year. The economic growth of the 
regency increased to 2,87% in 2001, rose to 3,7% in 2002, and finally, reached 4,27% 
in 2003. The last number mentioned nearly equals the amount of the economic growth 
in Alit Municipality that reaches 4,29%. The instability of the economic growth was 
caused chiefly by the farming sector, which between 2000 and 2003 always was the 
biggest contributor to the Wetan Regency PDRB, i.e. approximately 47%. Other 
sectors that also contributed greatly besides the farming sector are the Commerce, 
Hotel, and Restaurant sector, Services sector, and the Gas, Drinking Water and 
Electrics. Nonetheless, the contribution of the farming sector is decreasing in time. The 
decrease in this sector was caused by national economic turbulence that was related 
with the national food price, and by the rapid reduction of farming land that was used 
for settlements, offices, and industrialization. From the measurement that was based on 
the 1993 constant price, it was found that although the Wetan Regency per capita 
PDRB did increase, it did not show any significant increase: in 2000, it reached Rp. 
1.041.877,35 (100 €); in 2001, it increased to Rp 1.209.542,74 (115 €); then in 2002, it 
became Rp 1.253.208,73 (120 €) and finally, in 2003, it reached Rp 1.305.555,24 (127 
€). Meanwhile, the Wetan Regency HDI in 1999 was 60,62. It ranked the 17th in East 
Java. However, the last HDI data from 2003 indicated a tendency for the amount to 
decrease. 
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2. Political Vivacity and Civil Society 
 The Giri Regency is a Local that is very dynamic with many famous 
universities located there. The total population is relatively high. Most of them are 
migrants, majority consisting of university students that come from different ethnic 
groups. Their existence has carried positive consequences to the native people, in both 
whether in social and economic aspects. The consequence that is often felt is the 
educational level of the population that is above the average educational level in 
Indonesia. Many social, economic, and political problems, at the local or national 
level, are often analyzed as the object of study by some groups of people in this Local. 
Thus, this critical attitude of the people in this Local often forces the local government 
institutions to act carefully in making and implementing policies. Nevertheless, the 
political climate in the Prajan Special Local Province tends to be stable16.  
 Meanwhile, political party vivacity in this Local does not differ greatly from 
the other Locals in Indonesia (see Table 3.9). As the ruling party, in the 1999 General 
Election, PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) showed its domination in 
the seat allocation for the members of the DPRD (Local Representatives Council) by 
gaining 15 seats or a third of the allocated seats, followed by PAN (National Mandate 
Party) which gained 8 seats and PKB (National Awakening Party) which gained 6 
seats. The party that had always ruled before, Golkar Party, fell to the fourth position. 
In the 2004 General Election, the amount of seats gained by PDIP decreased to 10 
seats. The decrease was caused by the emergence of several new parties that also 
lowered the credibility of the PDIP. The high number of political parties that gained 
seats in the DPRD shows the variety of interest affiliation in society.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 There have been several analyses that try to understand why the political stability in Prajan Municipality is 
relatively more controlled than in other Locals. The main factor that causes this condition is predicted to be the 
existence of the king that is still honored by the Javanese people. Furthermore, the fact that Javanese people always 
prefer to maintain harmony than to create conflict defuses the possibility for an unbeneficial social or political 
conflict to happen. Another possible explanation for the condition is the sufficient educational level of the people 
that makes the critical attitude of the people in responding to different social-political issues more mature they are 
not trapped in the political interests that lie beyond.  
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Table 3.9: Seat Distribution for Members of the Local House of Representative in the 
Giri Regency  
Seats Allocation in the General Election in No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 15 10 
2 Golkar Party 5 6 
3 PAN 8 7 
4 PKB 6 7 
5 PKS 1 6 
6 PBB 1 - 
7 TNI/Polri 5 - 
8 Democratic Party - 3 
9 PKP 1 - 
10 PPP 3 4 
11 PDS - 1 
12 PKPB - 1 
 Total 45 45 
Source: Giri Regency DPRD Secretariat, 2005 
 
Not so far different from the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality also has a 
very high social-political vivacity (see Table 3.10). This is due to the diversity of the 
population that comes from many districts in Indonesia. In this Local, there are also 
many colleges that differ in their science field specification. The number of conflicts 
between party supporters in this district is high. However, the conflict can often be 
resolved at the party elite level or mass level. The seats allocation for the members of 
the Prajan Municipality Local House of Representatives consecutively is as the 
following: PDIP gained 15 seats in the 1999 General Election and decreased to 11 
seats in the 2004; PAN gained 9 seats both in the 1999 and in the 200417; Golkar 
gained 4 seats in the 1999 and increased to 5 seats in the 2004; support for the PKS 
changed, the number of the seats increased from 1 seats in the 1999 General Election 
to 5 seats in the 2004; Another newcomer party that is closely related with the figure of 
the contemporary Indonesian President, SBY, Democratic Party, gained 4 seats.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Prajan Municipality becomes the base Local of the National Mandate Party (PAN) supporters because, 
historically, PAN was founded by Muhamadiyah figures such as Amien Rais, formerly the chief chairman of 
Muhamadiyah. 
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Table 3.10: Seat Allocation for Members of the Prajan Municipality Local House of 
Representative 
Seats Allocation in the General Election  No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 15 11 
2 Golkar Party 4 5 
3 PAN 9 9 
4 PKB 2 - 
5 PKS 1 5 
6 PBB 1 - 
7 TNI/Polri 4 - 
8 PDKB 1 - 
9 PKP 1 - 
10 PPP 2 1 
11 Democratic Party - 4 
 Total 40 35 
Source: Prajan Municipality DPRD Secretariat, 2005 
Political vivacity in the Anom Regency is also high. In the 1999 General 
Election, this district became the base Local of the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDIP)18.  This was seen in the 1999 General Election in which PDIP gained 
23 seats or 51% of the 45 seats available in DPRD (see Table 3.11). Thus, they were 
able to place their member as the elected Regent in the 2000-2005 periods. The strong 
support from this district towards PDIP is related to the district history. In the Sukarno 
era, this district was the base of the nationalist group which subsequently spread to the 
village and become the most popular party in this district. As the representation of the 
“Wong cilik” (lower class people) party, most of the members of parties with seats in 
the DPRD come from the lower class people. Unfortunately, most of them had such 
low Human Resource capabilities that they often could not carry out their functions in 
                                                 
18 PDIP is formerly known as the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP). This party is a collaboration of several 
nationalistic parties and several minor religious parties of the 70’s. As a party that is nationalistic, this party caries a 
large influence of Sukarno, the first president of the Indonesian Republic. Since the first General Election in 1971, it 
was always placed in the lowest position of seats allocation, under the GolkarParty and the United Development 
Party (PPP). After their Central Office in Jakarta was attacked by a group of people from the party that were 
considered be the supporters of the ruling government, many people, especially the lower class people, showed a 
large amount of sympathy for this party. The attack was presumably supported by the military and the government. 
After the attack happened, an internal conflict happened in the party between the people who supported and who 
rejected the leadership of Soerjadi, who was considered to be a follower of the ruling government. The group of 
people who rejected them founded a new party called the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle that was led by 
the Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, who then became the fifth president of the Indonesian Republic 
after the Consultative Assembly (MPR) issued a note of no confidence to the previous president, Abdurahman 
Wahid. 
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the DPRD.  This lack of capability, added to the awful behavior that was shown by 
those seated in the parliament, commonly made the public lower their expectations of 
this party. As a result, in the 2004 General Election, the party lost 5 of its seats and 
gained only 18 seats. Several new parties then appeared, such as the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS) and the National Mandate Party (PAN), offering solutions to sensitive 
issues such as KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism), lack of transparency, and 
lack of accountability. They gained many seats in the DPRD. Another party that still 
needs to be considered is the Golkar Party that during the New Order regime was 
always the ruling party.  Although it does not rule anymore, the Golkar party still has 
many traditional voters that are loyal to the party. The conflict that often occurred at 
that time was the conflict between the PDIP supporters and the Golkar supporters.  
 Besides the political parties, a power that needs to be considered in this Local 
is the civil society, especially the NGOs. Although they have not been well 
coordinated, many NGOs were founded after the 1998 Reform and have commonly 
fought issues that related with the implementation democracy, justice, war on KKN, 
and the empowerment of poor people. Among those NGOs, some lead people in the 
fight against the practice of KKN that occurs in the bureaucracy and parliament. In 
fact, in 2005, there was an NGO that to reported some digression practices of the 
bureaucracy to the Corruption Fighting Commission (KPK) in Jakarta. This is a 
sensitive issue and often causes conflict within the bureaucracy. 
Table 3.11: Seat Allocation for Members of the Local House of Representatives in the 
Anom Regency 
Seats Allocation in the General Election in No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 23 18 
2 Golkar Party  4 7 
3 PAN 6 7 
4 PKB 3 4 
5 PKS 1 5 
6 PBB 1 - 
7 TNI/Polri 5  
8 Democratic Party - 1 
9 Freedom Party - 1 
10 PPP 2 2 
 Total 45 45 
Source: Anom Regency DPRD Secretariat, 2005  
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Another political vivacity that is similar or probably harder than in the Anom 
Regency is the political vivacity in the Kulon Regency. However, whilst the number of 
PDIP seats decreased in the Anom Regency, in the Kulon Regency, the number of the 
PDIP seats in the DPRD increased from 16 seats in the 1999 General Election to 19 
seats in the 2004 General Election (see Table 3.12). The increase is believed to be 
caused by the ability of the Regent who is a member of PDIP to attract sympathy from 
the lower classes that live in many impoverished areas in this regency. Although there 
are many nationalist supporters in this district, the religious National Awakening Party 
(PKB) and Golkar must also be considered. These parties have sufficient members in 
the DPRD, who are frequently critical and in disagreement with the Regent or the other 
bureaucracy officials. Often, the disagreement has to be settled with bargaining or 
voting as part of the decision-making process. As conflicts of interest often occur, the 
relationship between the Regent, the bureaucracy officials and the DPRD is not very 
harmonious. 
 Besides the political parties, another power that is also growing rapidly in the 
society is NGOs. NGOs frequently encourage people to protest against the Regent and 
the bureaucracy because the executive is considered to have practiced KKN, to have 
made unfair decisions or to have ignored the village and the lower class people. This 
last issue is the most common issue supported by the NGOs with the support of village 
officials, especially those concerned with fair profit sharing between village and 
regency.  
Table 3.12: Seat Allocation for Members of the Local House of Representatives in the 
Kulon Regency  
Seats Allocation in the General Election in No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 16 19 
2 Golkar Party 5 7 
3 PAN 2 4 
4 PKB 9 7 
5 PBB 1 - 
6 TNI/Polri 5 - 
7 Democratic Party   3 
8 PPP 5 5 
9 PNU 1 - 
10 PKP 1 - 
 Total 45 45 
Source: Kulon Regency DPRD Secretariat, 2005 
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The Alit municipality has played an important role in the history of PDIP. It is 
a small Municipality, consisting only on three districts, in which Sukarno, a figure that 
is idolized by many PDIP supporters, was born and buried. Nonetheless, in the 1999 
General Election, PDIP only gained 40% of the seats in the DPRD and in the 2004, it 
decreased to 28% (see Table 3.13). The decreased is a result of, first, the internal 
conflict within the PDIP structure and, second, from the occurrence of some new 
emerging parties, such as Democratic party, PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), and PDS 
(Prosperous Peace Party). Since this Municipality is one of the important district 
within the PDIP’s history, the party’s executives have given much attention to this 
Municipality.  They placed one of their members from the academic world as the 
Mayor, and formed a coalition with PKB to have one of its members to be the Vice-
Mayor. The relationship between DPRD and the Regent with its bureaucracy officials 
in 1999 to 2004 was very harmonious and no significant political conflict occurred.  
 The conflict that occurs is often conflict between executives and a small group 
of NGOs that is always in disagreement with the Mayor. The NGOs frequently 
advocate issues to do with Local government transparency and accountability. Though 
there are some NGOs that are in disagreement with the government, a greater number 
of NGOs have become government partners in Municipality development. The success 
of the Alit Municipality Local Government in inviting the civil society group to be 
involved in the process of development has often received reward in the provincial and 
the national level.  
Table 3.13: Seat Allocation for Members of the Local House of Representatives in the 
Alit Municipality  
Seats Allocation in the General Election in No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 10 7 
2 Golkar Party  4 4 
3 PAN 1 - 
4 PKB 4 5 
5 PBB 1 - 
6 TNI/Polri 3 - 
7 Democratic Party  - 3 
8 PPP 1 3 
9 PKS - 1 
10 PKP 1 - 
11 PDS - 1 
12 PKPB - 1 
 Total 25 25 
Source: Alit Mayor LKPJ, 2005 
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As its twin brother, the Wetan Regency has the same pattern of the political 
party power as the Alit Municipality. The three major parties in this Local, both in the 
1999 and the 2004 General Election are PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle), PKB (National Awakening Party), and Golkar Party. Observing the 
supporters of two major parties, PKB and PDIP, two social groups emerge, Santri and 
Abangan, that each represents the nationalist and the religious power. Both groups are 
also represented by the Regent and the Vice-Regent who were elected in 2000. The 
critical attitude of society in responding to the executive and legislature’s policy 
appears in many forms. In several cases where corruption has infected all level of the 
bureaucracy, the critical attitude often appears from the people. The disclosure of KKN 
practice in the Local cannot be separated from the critical attitude of the officials in the 
bureaucracy.   
Table 3.14: Seat Allocation for Members of the Local House of Representatives in the 
Wetan Regency  
Seats Allocation in the General Election   No Party 
1999 2004 
1 PDIP 17 16 
2 Golkar Party 7 8 
3 PAN 1 2 
4 PKB 13 12 
5 PBB 1 - 
6 TNI/Polri 5 - 
7 Democratic Party - 5 
8 PPP 1 1 
9 PKS - 1 
 Total 45 45 
Source: Wetan Regency DPRD Secretariat, 2005  
 
 
 
 108
CHAPTER IV 
ILLUSION AND FACT WITHIN  
LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
 
This chapter will explain the national data relating to the public administration 
reform performance on the level of Municipality and regency by using the data that 
is taken from the 2002 Governance and Decentralization Survey I (GDS) research 
conducted in 150 cities/regencies in Indonesia19, and from the 2004 GDS1+ data 
conducted in 34 cities/regencies as well as data taken from other research results and 
sources. The presentation of the data will apply the descriptive technique on the 
Figures that show the frequency of the respondents’ answer in relation to five fields 
of public administration performance, namely planning, organization, financial, and 
personnel system. The nationally data, which comes from statistical analysis (GDS 
and other resources), will be compared with the qualitative data from the research 
regions to find what exactly happened in those regions. The research regions data 
will apply the descriptive technique on stories and original speaking of 
respondents/informants as well as observation results. Before this comparison, 
analysis will be started with the description of public administration reform policies 
at a national level since the New Order until the political reform period; and then the 
reform strategy from a regional perspective to describe how each local government 
has defined and formulated its own strategy. 
 
A. Public Administration Reform Policies at National Level 
1. Public Administration Reform Policies during the New Order  
 In the period of the New Order, the government had tried to perform changes in 
the public administration system through the implementation of policies. The aspect 
of the bureaucratic organization’s life that first became the target of the 
standardization political policy was the development of the corps’ spirit (esprite’ de 
corps) of the public bureaucracy officials. This principle stated that the loyalty of the 
public bureaucracy officials was for the country and the government, not for the 
political party. This bureaucratic mono-loyalty principle was mentioned in the 
                                                 
19 Those six research regions are also GDS I 2002 regions. 
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Government regulation No. 6 Year 1970. In the period of the first Development 
Cabinet, the Minister of State for the refinement and Cleansing of the Government 
Officials (Menpan—Menteri Negara Penyempurnaan dan Pembersihan Aparatur 
Negara) position was established. The Menpan’s duty was to assist the president in 
refining and cleansing the government.  
 In 1973, the word Menpan was given another meaning—the Minister of State 
for the alignment of the Government Officials (Menteri Negara Penertiban Aparatur 
Negara), and since 1974 (until 1989) the Menpan also occupied the position of the 
Vice-Head of the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS—Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional). The terms that then often used in the next 
five years were harmony, conformity, orderliness, unity, and compactness. In this 
period, since 1977 exactly, an operation was carried out (Opstib—Operasi Tertib) 
acting against those guilty of corruption—especially blackmailing and illegal fare. In 
the same way with the previous, the policy of the Menpan was concentrated on every 
aspect of administration—institution, employment, execution, and supervision. In the 
middle of the Pelita III, the Opstib was stopped because it was considered that the 
supervision by the supervising institutions had worked well.  
Since 1989, early Pelita V, MENPAN’s activity was seemingly increased. For 
the first time, the “people’s role in the development" was mentioned specifically, 
after twenty years of development activity that placed the people as an object. The 
Government tried to stabilize the bureaucratic behavior so that it could sustain more 
people’s involvement and initiation. Another important improvement was the 
introduction of the Public Administration Court. Though it was considered to be 
ineffective, in practice, this introduction increased the bargaining position of the 
people toward the arbitrary bureaucracy. In a wider perspective, this was a positive 
step toward the democratization process. On the other hand, this could be seen as a 
higher people-bureaucratic orientation, especially with the existence of the public 
services practice simplification program.  
In 1997, the program was rearranged into the followings20: local (Dati II) 
autonomy modeling, Organization condensation, Zero growth policy, Employee’s 
                                                 
20 Samudra Wibawa. 2003. Negara-Negara di Nusantara. Rajawali Press, Jakarta, p. 194 
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career management system stabilization, Public services model, and Working day 
compression. 
In its development, the New Order Administration started to use the bureaucracy 
as a mobile premium for the national development program. The bureaucratic reform 
done that time was aimed subsequently at the following:21 
1. Shifting the administrative authority to the upper echelons in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy; 
2. Making the bureaucracy more responsive to the central authority’s will; and 
3. Widening the new government’s authority to consolidate the control of the 
regions. 
That central government policy had created a centralization of the mobilization and 
allocation system of the resources that were available in the region, thus limiting the 
local administration in making policies on regional development. 
The bureaucratic rationalization policy could suppressed the growth of the state 
employees in the 1960-1970 period, which reached 2,7% per year, although it was 
only 0,1 % fewer than the previous decade. The commitment to run this 
rationalization and reduction of the state employee did not last longer. The 
complexity of the development problems that the New Order government had to face 
created a change in the bureaucratic structure that made the bureaucracy become 
fat22. In less than one decade of the New Order Administration, the number of the 
state employee increased rapidly. As comparison, in the early time of the New Order 
Administration, the number of the state employee was not more than 400,000 people. 
In 1980, the number increased drastically to 2,074,000 people; and in 1993, it was 
estimated that it reached 4,009,000 people. From those numbers, an imbalance can 
be seen between the number of central employees and the regional employees. The 
number of the state employee in the regional level was only 12,5% (this excludes the 
central employees who worked in the region), while the central employee reached 
87,5% of the total number of the state employees. 
The fantastic growth of the state employees brought important consequences. 
First, the availability of a new working field in the administration, and the services 
                                                 
21 Agus Dwiyanto, et. Al., Reformasi Birokrasi Publik di Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Pusat Studi Kebijakan dan 
Kependudukan UGM, 2002, p. 36 
22 Ibid, p. 37 
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activity by the government became a necessity. In the New Order Administration 
period, the government tried to create a working field to accommodate the excessive 
number of the state employee. The creation of many new structures in the 
governmental institution, in the center or in the region, was done very rapidly, 
ignoring the analysis of the organization’s need and the competency of the human 
resources. The employee recruitment to the public bureaucracy was done 
continuously without any consideration of the specification of the criteria, 
professionalism, or the organization’s needs so that at the end it also created 
inefficiency in the bureaucratic services practice. Secondly, as a consequence of the 
excessive number of the state employee, bureaucracy came to dominate public life. 
The bureaucracy touched almost every aspect of people’s lives.  
 
2. Public Administration Reform Policies during the Indonesian’s Reform 
Period  
 The New Order’s authoritative administration under Suharto’s power collapsed 
in May 1998 as a result of the reform movement action. The collapse influenced the 
life of the Indonesian public administration. Bureaucracy, as a representation of 
Suharto’s power, received much attention and derision at the time of the regime 
collapse. There were many governmental offices that became the target of 
demonstrations and riots enacted by the people who were suppressed during the 
Suharto period. 
 There are three things that influence many institutional changes in Indonesia. 
Those three things depict the conditions that became the background of the changes 
of the old administration (the New Order) into the new one (the Reform 
Administration). Those three things are as follows: the desire to perform democracy 
well; the change in the political system, from the single majority into the multiple 
party eras; and the development of information technology and global rivalry23.  
 The Law No. 22/1999 along with other constitutional regulations is meant by 
the government to change the orientation of the administration practice and the 
relation between the central and the local government. The paradigm change from 
centralization into de-centralization has brought a change in the structure of the local 
                                                 
23 Miftah Toha, Reformasi Birokrasi Publik Pasca Orde Baru: Perubahan Tanpa Grand Design, one of the chapters 
in the Jurnal Ilmu Sosial & Ilmu Politik UGM, Volume 4, No 1, July 2000, p. 79. 
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government organization. As a result, the government issued the Government’s 
Regulation (PP—Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 84/2000 that then was changed into the 
PP No. 8/2003, which regulates the governmental official management. 
The TAP MPR No. VI/2002 demands that the president is “to build the structure 
of the Indonesian bureaucracy that is transparent, accountable, clean, and responsible 
to the people and to become the people and state’s servant, the example and the role 
model of the people”. Building a bureaucratic culture means that the improvement of 
the working culture should be done continuously through, for example, learning by 
doing, and evenly on every professional bureaucrat individual at every career level, 
in the Center and in the region. It is also important to appreciate the officials’ high 
performance, for example by rewarding fair remuneration. The effort to achieve the 
purpose was started with the State’s Civil Employee Restructuring (PUPNS—
Penataan Ulang Pegawai Negeri Sipil) that produced the employees’ database that 
was then processed for the improvement of the employee. In the end, it supported the 
implementation of the PP No. 8/2003 on the Organizational Guidance of Regional 
Official and the PP No. 9/2003 on the Authority to install, transfer, and dismiss the 
State’s Civil Employee. Both those PP’s are the products of administration reform as 
the follow up of the Law No. 22/1999 on the local Government. 
The PP No. 8/2003 to replace PP No. 84/2000 on the Organizational Guidance 
of Regional Official was issued when almost every regional administration finished 
its governmental organization structure based on the PP No. 84/2000. By the issue of 
this PP, the central government is politically trying to limit any inappropriate form in 
the structure of the regional administration organization that is based on the PP No. 
84/2000. 
The intervention of the central government is considered by some to be return 
to centralization. Nevertheless, there are many who consider the issue of the policy 
as a necessary central government initiative. The PP No. 84 Year 2000 gives more 
freedom to the local government to form its organization’s structure in accordance 
with the vision and the mission of the region. The PP offers a principle of 
organization forming that is called structure-followed vision. The local government 
first decides its region’s vision and mission according to the power, weakness, 
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potential, and treat/challenge faced in the practice of administration, development, 
and society. 
Besides of the structure followed vision principle, the constitution also requires 
regional officials to form an organization that is based on the “flat in structure-
optimal in function” principle.  It means that the government needs to encourage the 
forming of a slender organization that has limited number of structural position and 
that is more dependent on the availability of the functional position. Therefore, the 
administration practice function, in line with the vision and the mission of the region, 
does not have to be accompanied with an excessive number of structural positions, 
but is more balanced with the functional position.24 The limited account of the local 
government should also be used maximally on the functional function instead of on 
the bureaucracy. However, the local governments seem to miss this factor. They 
cannot understand well the condition of their region that there are many visions and 
missions of the region that are not based on the strategic management principle that 
prior on the regional agenda. There are a lot of local governments that put all things 
as the main thing. Thus, observably, the regional strategic plan (renstrada—rencana 
strategis daerah) is more often formulated without any priority. 
 
B. The Public Administration Reform Strategy in Region Perspective 
a. Legal Foundation of the Reform and the Response of the Local Government 
 Law No. 22/1999 that regulates the Local Government is the highest law in 
regard to the implementation of regional autonomy. If Law No.22/1999 regulates the 
implementation in general, Law No. 25/1999 that follows the Law No.22/1999 
regulates specifically on the finance relationship between the Local and the Central 
Government. Both laws provide a big opportunity for the Region to carry out an 
arrangement in its public administration.  The operational implementation of the 
Laws is divided into several Government Regulations (PP) and Ministry Decrees. 
The arrangement is started by handing several essential authorities to the Region, 
including authorities in the fields of education, health, public work, work force, 
living environment, industry and commerce, cooperation, farming, forestry, land, and 
capital investment (see Article 10 Law No.22/1999). Those authorities are then 
                                                 
24 Suara Merdeka, Implementasi PP No. 8 Tahun 2003, Saturday, 28 February 2004 
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needed to be followed by transfer of personnel, finance, and equipment. The transfer 
is to distribute the existing resources from the Central Government to the Local 
Government. Without the transfer of those three matters, the implementation of the 
authority in each field will be useless because the Region does not have the ability to 
fulfill the need of personnel, equipment and especially finance.  
 Based on their response to the Local autonomy, the regions can be classified 
into two groups. First, the group of regions that is not happy with the autonomy 
(pessimistic) because they have to deal with many problems in their region. Second, 
the group of regions that is happy with the Local autonomy (optimistic) because with 
the autonomy they have the freedom to manage their own domestic affairs. The first 
group admitted that in the early period of the Law No.22/1999 implementation, the 
Local autonomy gave their personnel many problems. There were many Local 
Government personnel that complained because many administration and 
development matters that had been planned and usually taken care by the Central 
Government had to be handled locally. The transfer of a large number of authorities 
to the Local Government that was not matched with the availability of adequate 
Human Resources, sufficient financial support, solid and qualified organizational 
structure, makes the transferred authorities burden the region. The following is a 
statement from a second echelon official in the Kulon Regency: 
 “If at the time, we were allowed to choose, we would rather have 
the old system that is centralized. Everything has been decided by 
the Central Government; we just have to execute it”. 
 
That statement is very reasonable considering that the Kulon Regency is one of the 
poorest regencies in Central Java. Poverty is not only experienced by the community 
but also by the government bureaucracy. Judged from the educational level, the 
government Bureaucracy is deprived of Human Resources. Most of the personnel 
have only graduated from high school. Five years ago, personnel that had Bachelor 
or even Masters degree were still very rare. The condition of the local government 
personnel who were imperfect in capability and in addition had fragile coordination 
has added to the doubt of the region’s capability in managing those authorities. 
 The public administration got troubled when the civil society powers, 
especially society and NGOs, that were emerging at the time pressured the 
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government to achieve certain minimum targets. The excessive demands of the 
society was a logical consequence of the democracy euphoria that regarded the 
society as the owner of the highest authority and that obligates the government to 
become an agent to fulfill the owner’s demands. That kind of understanding is not 
wrong. However, it became biased when it was followed by wishes to revenge the 
institutions or State’s symbols that were considered to be a legacy of the corrupt and 
oppressive New Order authoritative regime. This kind of situation, in practice, had 
been used by local political elite that were trying to take advantage in the midst of 
the uncertainty of the prevailing political and legal system. The proof can be seen in 
the fact that there were many lands that were being ruled by the government for the 
public interest that were oppressively taken back by the society because they 
considered the land acquittal was carried out unjustly and with oppressiveness.  
Another proof is the illegal lodging that was intentionally done by the society to 
show their protest toward State’s domination in forest control. Many demonstrations 
in many forms were enacted to protest the bureaucracy and the ruler. This happened 
from the level of village/residential up to the province, and aimed at the 
overthrowing of legal authority. The political situation at the time burdened the 
bureaucracy with excessive demands from society and NGOs. 
 The challenge that the public administration had to face was increased when the 
Local House of Representatives (DPRD) performed very tight control to the 
executive and often made policies that were not appropriate with the condition of the 
region that time. This kind of situation was possible because based on the Law 
No.22/1999 the DPRD was in a higher position than the executive. The DPRD has 
the right to inquire within the Responsibility Report (LPJ) from the Regent/Mayor 
every year. Through this LPJ mechanism, the DPRD forced its authority to the head 
of the region. Many Regents/DPRD were involved in this kind of game which 
resulted in collusion, corruption, and nepotism (KKN) practice. The extensive 
authority that DPRD possessed frightened many bureaucracy personnel because they 
felt that what they had done was not appreciated. There were many bureaucracy 
personnel who were terrified every time the Commission I of DPRD summoned 
them. This fear had even forced some Regents to hold training for their personnel, so 
they could face DPRD. The purpose of this kind of training is to raise the courage 
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and to train technically the bureaucracy personnel on how to talk with DPRD. This 
kind of situation was completely different from the situation in the era of the 
centralistic regime. In that era, the executives had the power to dictate their will to 
DPRD.  
 The position of DPRD in that time was based on the Law No. 5/197425 together 
with the executive as is the Local Government. It means that DPRD is the working 
associate of the government. Each places an equal position and cannot overthrow the 
other. To give a short description on the relationship between the executive and the 
DPRD in that era, the following slogans can be considered: 
a. “DPRD is the policy-stamping labor of the Local Government” 
b. “DPRD is the hammer-man” 
c. “DPRD’s job is to come, sit, quietly, and receive money” 
Such critical slogans that often appeared at the time were a political reality that was 
intentionally created through the constitution to pacify the legislative power that 
functioned as people’s representative institution and an executive controller. This 
model was a replica of the national governance system. The authority control in the 
New Order Regime was in the hands of the executive; meanwhile the legislative 
functioned was only to legitimate the policy that was made by the executive of 
behave of the people.  
 The feeble position of the Local Governments that belong to the first group had 
forced them to absolutely obey many rules that were made by the Central 
Government as the operational form of the authority that was given to the region. 
The rules that were commonly in the form of Government Regulation and Ministry 
Decrees were used by the executive as weapons to repel attacks on the policy carried 
out by powers outside the government including DPRD. The executive used the rules 
as legal foundation and hid behind them. It was not surprising that the regions that 
belong to this group were often protected by the rules from the Central Government 
that were often inconsistent. The public administration in such regions faced a 
dilemma. On one hand, it was demanded that they show qualified performance; but 
on the other hand, they had to face the indistinct rules that became the legal 
foundation for their movements in performing their functions. Public administration 
                                                 
25 Law No. 5/1974 was a Law that regulated the Local Government before it was replaced by the Law No. 22/ 1999 
that now regulates the same thing. 
 117
in this kind of region in that time commonly experienced desolation, and they 
became apathetic toward the policies that they made and carried out themselves. 
Their principle was to let the public administration work as it should: not to let the 
public services stop or to let the development to undergo. However, they were not 
concerned with the quality of the policies. 
 In the group of the regions that were optimistic with Local autonomy, the 
respond of the personnel was very positive. They considered the autonomy as a 
blessing. The following is a statement from the City Manager of the Prajan 
Municipality that could represent this group: 
“Basically, we respond to the autonomy positively. We consider it 
as a sign that the Central Government has started to open 
themselves to give chance to the regions to manage and to take 
care their own domestic affairs. That is how we see it.” 
 
Although commonly they admitted that there were some flaws in the Law 
No.22/1999, especially in the conceptual framework that was not understandable, 
they also admitted that this Law was more definite in regulating the implementation 
of the Local autonomy than the previous constitutions.  
 The regions that belong to this group generally acted more bravely in 
responding to the indistinctness of the implementation of rules that were formed by 
the Central Government. Bravery was commonly showed in the form of many local 
policies that sometimes differed completely from the policy that was made by the 
Central Government. Bravery appeared in the statement stated by the Giri Regent 
when he was asked about his reaction toward the conceptual flaw in the Law 
No.22/1999: 
“I play with my feeling and knowledge! Why? Because I am the 
manager of this region.” 
 
There were many Local Regulations and Regent’s Decree Letters in this region that 
were made based more on the region’s need than on the Central Government’s 
requirement. One of the examples of the policies that are related to the public 
administration was to make land matters fall within, the region’s authority. This was 
done by making the National Land Bureau (BPN) in the regency become the Local 
Land Control Bureau that worked under the authority of the Local Government. 
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Based on the Law No.22/1999, this change is not in defiance because land matters 
had indeed been given to the region. However, the problem was that the transfer of 
this authority to the region itself is in contradiction with the Agrarian Principle Law 
that still considered this authority belong to the Central Government. In addition, the 
Central Government had also issued a Presidential Decree that emphasized that the 
authority on land matters belonged to the Central Government.   
  Another example of the bravery of this region in managing its organizational 
structure was the retaining of some of the fifth echelon position that based on the PP 
No. 84 Year 2000 had been eliminated. The regent thought that his region still 
needed the fifth echelon position, especially to be placed in the following positions: 
a. Kecamatan (Sub District) 
b. Public Health Center UPTD and Workshop UPTD 
c. Culture and Education Agency Branch 
d. Caretaker of the Junior High School and Senior High School Management. 
This fifth echelon was then changed into Coordinator Positions that were given the 
same structural allowance with the former fifth echelon positions. This was funded 
by the Local Budget (APBD) as the Central Government did not acknowledge the 
existence of this position, so that the burden had to be carried by the region.  
 Within the group of the regions that is optimistic about autonomy, the 
executive attitude toward the DPRD tends to be more sincere and brave. Though 
officially their position is under the DPRD, they were braver in proposing their 
initiatives and their arguments in debate over policies with DPRD.  This attitude had 
encouraged the forming of a political balance between both institutions, in which 
each did not feel to be ruled by the other. This harmonious and lively political 
relationship encouraged mutual understanding in performing each function, so that a 
positive partnership was formed. This positive relationship also gave a positive 
influence to the bureaucracy in performing its duty. In this region the bureaucracy 
tended to be arranged in a clearer form and with a clearer course. However, it has to 
be admitted that some of the bureaucracy arrangement had not reached the basic 
substance of the problems that occurred inside the bureaucracy. 
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b. Actions taken by the Local Government in carrying out a reform 
 Though in responding to the Local autonomy there are two different groups of 
regions, both groups have the same procedure in managing their bureaucracy. The 
procedural actions commonly completely follow the policy from the Central 
Government as follows: 
 
b.1) Handing the policy from the Central Government to the institution that is 
responsible in the policy implementation 
In the early stages, after the Local Government received the policy from the 
Central Government, the Local Government handed the responsibility fully to the 
institution that had a function corresponding with the policy. Policy concerned with 
organization and performance improvement, for example, was handed to the 
Organizational Division; policy that concerned employment was handed to the Local 
Employment Bureau; policy that concerned finance was handed to the Local Finance 
and Wealth Management Bureau; policy that concerned planning was handed to the 
Local Development Planning Bureau (BAPPEDA). Each institution works alone; but 
usually, inside the institution, the policy is given to a person that will comprehend 
and make the early design. After that, the design will be discussed with the rest of 
the team in the institution. Sometimes, the design made by a person is the one that is 
eventually used, because generally the design adopts completely the policy that is 
made by the Central Government.  
 
b.2) Discussing the design with the Local Autonomy Committee 
 Each region commonly forms a Local Autonomy Committee that works 
especially to discuss all of the plans that are related to the implementation of the 
Local autonomy policy, including the plan to rearrange public administration. The 
chair of this team is the First Assistance of the City Manager who holds authority 
over Administration Management. The other assistants, along with the head of 
Bappeda, the head of the Local Finance Bureau, the head of Local Employment 
Bureau, the head of Division and the head of sub-division of the Administration 
Management, and the head of Organization and Law division are the members of the 
team. The team is supposed to have been prepared with sufficient knowledge and 
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authority to ensure that the result of the meeting could be used as a foundation. 
However, in practice, the team functions more as a meeting between institutions to 
share the things that they have done. In addition, it seems that this team is used as a 
device for the preservation of the interests of the bureaucrat elite, who are threatened 
by the effort to manage the bureaucracy. When Local Government organizational 
structure is about to be rearranged, for example, based on the PP No. 84/2000 on the 
Local Personnel Organization, many second echelon officials secretly use the Local 
Autonomy Team to maintain their institution so that their position will not be 
eliminated. There are also many officials that try to create new institutions hoping 
that they will get a new position there. Given the many interest that are played out, 
the effectiveness of the Local Autonomy Team in performing its duty can be 
questioned. 
 
b.3) Handing the design to the City Manager to be given input 
 The design result is then handed to the City Manager as the highest manager 
beneath the head of the region. The City Manager holds a control function to 
anything that is performed by his inferior. At this point, he has every right to revise 
the design by deleting or adding to the content of the policy that has been designed 
by his inferior. If element of the design are unclear, the City Manager would usually 
summon the institution that proposed the design to discuss the problem. However, it 
is very often that the initial design is dominated by the City Manager’s subjective 
ideas. In the regions in which the Head of the Region depends completely on the 
managerial skills of the City Manager, the design of the reform will be worked by 
the City Manager while the Head of the Region will only need to put his signature on 
the finished design. The Anom Regent, for example, because of his lack of capability 
and knowledge in administration management, often gives the daily administration 
management to the City Manager, including the designing of the organizational 
structure of the government. The Regent usually gives only suggestions that will 
support his interest, whilst not containing any strong argument. Meanwhile, in the 
Kulon Regency, the situation is slightly different. The Regent often gives the daily 
administration management to the City Manager. However, this is because the 
Regent fully believes in the capability of the City Manager a senior bureaucrat in the 
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Central Java Province. Based on this reasoning, the Regent also often shares his 
duties more with the City Manager than with the Vice-Regent. The Regent 
concentrates on the relationship with the external party while the City Manager 
concentrates on the internal matter.  
 
b.4) Giving the early design to the Head of the Region for approval 
 Before the design is given to the DPRD, the preliminary design is given to the 
Head of the Region. The head of the region has the authority to completely alter the 
entire design. The Head of the Region has every right to revise the design by adding 
or even deleting existing items in the policy according to his preference. When a 
certain official has a close relationship with the head of the region, he could have the 
opportunity to influence the policy design by lobbying the head of the region. There 
was once a case in which in the early design of policy, an agency was dismissed. 
However, after the design passed the regent, it appeared again. It was suspected that 
the existence of the agency was preserved because the head of the agency had a close 
relationship with the regent.  
Several things from the design are passed according to the Regent/Mayor 
Decree Letter (SK) and the rest will become Local Regulations. Until today, there 
actually have not been distinct criteria exists to determine when a policy is supposed 
to be passed according to a Regent/Mayor Decree Letter or Regent/Mayor Decree, or 
with Local regulation. Basically, policy that directly concerned with public interest 
that will burden society or widely affect to the public and that it is a follow up of a 
higher rules, will have to be approved by the DPRD. It means that it will be passed 
as Local Regulation26. Meanwhile, any policy that regulates the internal public 
administration and that it is a follow up of the Local Regulation in detailed form is 
able to be issued as Regent Decree27. Meanwhile, a Regent/Mayor Decree Letter is 
used to regulate things that are related with the internal management of the 
bureaucracy28. 
                                                 
26 Examples: The Local Regulation on the Local Government Organizational Structure, Local Regulation on the 
Public Health Center and Hospital Retribution Fee. 
27 Examples: Regent Decree on the further arrangement of the agencies that are merged, the regent decree on the 
charging procedure of the public health service and hospital retribution  
28 Example the Regent Decree Letter on the assignment of Local autonomy committee 
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b.5) Handing the design to DPRD to be discussed and to be passed as Local 
Regulation 
 The final step is to hand the Local Regulation design to the DPRD to be passed 
as Local Regulation. After the design is received by DPRD, the evaluation of the 
design becomes very political. Frequently a design that has been composed with 
rational consideration has to be reformulated entirely after it is discussed with the 
DPRD. This kind of situation is very likely to happen in the regions in which rivalry 
between the DPRD and the Regent/Mayor is very strong. This situation once 
happened in the Kulon Regency when there was a discussion about the Local 
Government organizational structure. The Kulon Regent wanted the position of the 
Head of Communication and Information Bureau to be filled by an official from the 
Second Echelon. Meanwhile, the DPRD thought that the position only required an 
official from the Third Echelon. It took about two years to settle this conflict. After a 
long process of bargaining, the DPRD agreed to have an official from the Second 
Echelon as the Head of Communication and Information Bureau. As a repayment, 
the Regent agreed to divide the Forestry and Farming Agency into two different 
agencies as proposed by the DPRD. 
The above procedural steps that are usually similar in every region suggest that 
the initial idea in reforming the bureaucracy generally comes from the Central 
Government through the policy that is elucidated in several Government Regulations 
and Ministry Decrees. Until now, there is no evidence that a region has performed 
reform of its own initiative subsequent to the issuing of Law No.22/1999. However, 
this excludes the regions that have undergone a pilot project on the implementation 
of Local autonomy, such as the Giri Regency. Before Law No.22/1999 was enacted, 
the region had tried to reform its public administration. Nonetheless, the effort was 
still initiated by the instruction of the Internal Affairs Department. The centralized 
governmental system caused every region to depend on the initiative and the policy 
from the Central Government so that dependency from local governments to the 
central government was very understandable. In that time, it was not easy for a 
region to alter the form, the system, or the procedure of its public administration 
without the permission from the Central Government. The Central Government 
intended to retain unity in the public administration of the region so that the control 
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mechanism would be easy; and thus, the efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
implementation could be achieved.   
 The above procedural steps show that at a regional level, the process required 
to simplify the public administration is very difficult. One of the purposes of 
reforming the public administration is to a have an uncomplicated system. However, 
in enacting the reform of administration, the region is trapped in lengthy procedures. 
This process is started when the region received the instruction to perform the reform 
until the reform is performed and legalized with Local Regulation, consumes time, 
wastes energy, and consumes a massive amount of the region’s resources, especially 
the fund that is used to conduct various discussions and scientific studies that need to 
invite consultants from outside the Local Government.  
 The actors that are involved in this lengthy process can be identified in Figure 
4.1. From the picture, it can be seen that besides the formal procedures, there are also 
informal procedures that are involved in the process. These procedures are taken by 
the institutions, Agency, Bureau, or Office, that are threatened with removal.  These 
informal procedures, the lobbying to be exact, are commonly aimed at the two 
biggest actors in the region, the Regent/Mayor and the DPRD, because both could 
often determine the future of institutions.  From this lobbying, it is also found that 
there are some who use political parties as a means to influence the reform process. 
In the next section, there will be an example of cases where bureaucratic officials use 
political parties to lobby the DPRD or the Regent/Mayor. The Local Autonomy 
Team that actually has a large authority is often unable to resist the lobbying. This 
causes the team to function more as a communication forum than as an institution 
that firmly determines the public administration working form and system of the 
region.  
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Figure 4.1: Actors which involved in local public administration reform process 
 
Source: Primary Data 
 
C. Public Administration Reform Component in Various Cases 
 Conceptually, the process to rearrange public administration is started with the 
change in the organizational structure of the Local Government as the compound in 
which the system works. Along with the organization arrangement, the system and 
the procedure arrangements are also done. These arrangements include the 
arrangement of job division, working mechanisms, and coordination and 
responsibility relation. After the organization is formed, the next step is to fill it with 
personnel. This process is based on the need of the organization and the competency 
level of the personnel. Then, after the institution has been formed with all of its 
personnel, adequate finance is required to fund the system. The arrangement then 
will shift to the income and expense sources, including finding a budget model that is 
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appropriate to uphold the public administration performance. By the end, to respond 
the democratization issues, the public administration must be willing to act 
transparently in making policy. Thus, a participative planning system is a necessity 
in responding to these issues.  
 This section will try to describe how each of these reform components is 
carried out at the national as well as regional level. Generally, not all of the regions 
follow the conceptual public administration arrangement model as described above. 
In practice, each of the public administration components is usually performed at the 
same time. There is actually nothing wrong with this method. However, the problem 
occurs when performing the arrangement, because there is almost no coordination 
between each component: each of them works by itself. With these kind of 
conditions, it is very difficult to expect a good public administration system as the 
result of a thorough reform. Meanwhile, some of those reform components can be 
carried out successfully by the Local Government. Therefore, data will be described 
from two sides: successful and unsuccessful reform. 
 
1. Organization 
It is known that Central Government has issued PP No.84/2000 on the 
Organization of the Local Government. The PP allows the regions to manage their 
organization without any distinct limitations. In the PP, it is explained that the 
elements of local public organization are as the following: 
1. City Manager Office: an element of the Province, Regency/Municipality 
government that is lead by a City Manager who works under and is responsible to the 
Governor, Regent/Mayor to perform the duty of government executor, 
administration, organization, and management; and to give administrative services to 
all Province, Regency/Municipality personnel. 
2. Agency: Regency/Municipality/Province Agency is the executor element of the 
Province/Regency/Municipality government that is led by a Head of Agency that 
works under and is responsible to the Governor/Regent/Mayor through the City 
Manager. 
3. Local Technical Institution: The Province/Regency/Municipality Regional 
Technical Institution is a supporting element of the Local Government that is led by 
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an official who works under and is responsible to the Governor/Regent/Mayor 
through the City Manager. The Local Technical Institution holds the duty to assist 
the Head of the Region in performing the Local Government according to its field, in 
the form of Bureau and or Office. 
Less than four years after its implementation, PP No. 84/2000 was revised by 
PP No. 8/2003, which regulates same things. However, there are not many regions 
that apply this PP thoroughly. Therefore, the assessment will be based more on the 
previous PP, and some on the revised PP. 
 
Successful Reform 
 The results of the research from the Public Administration Institution (LAN) 
show that the freedom given to the region to manage its organization has resulted in 
many variations in region organization. On average, each regency/Municipality has 
13 units of Agency and 4 units of Local Technical Institution, whether Office or 
Board. The Table 4.1 gives the description of the average number of every 
institutional form in the Regency/Municipality, excluding hospital and Regional 
State-Owned Companies (LAN, 2003). 
Table 4.1: Total Average of local government institution 
Type of Institution Total average number of institutions in 
2003 according to Government Decree 
No. 84/2000  
Agencies 13 
Boards 4 
Offices 5 
Technical Operational Units 34 
Assistant of City Manager 3 
Divisions 9 
Total 68 
Source: quoted from LAN, 2003 
 
 Table 4.2 below explains the number and kind institutions in local government 
among the six research districts. The number of institutions hardly changes before 
and after autonomy, especially institutions which are related to the City Managers 
Office such as assistant of City Manager and its divisions. There was also little 
change in local enterprise that is owned by the local governments, which indicates 
low attention from local government towards entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, the 
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average number of boards and offices increased after autonomy because most of the 
vertical institutions (branches of central ministry in the regions) have been handed 
over to local government and then have become boards or offices. Some of them also 
have changed into agencies. However, the number of agencies decreased after 
autonomy. It is a point of success for local governments to decrease the number of 
institutions because agencies need higher budgets for implementation of their duties.  
Table 4.2: Total number of local government institutions among six districts 
Giri Prajan Anom Kulon Alit 
Municipality 
Wetan Reg. Institution 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Assist. Of 
City 
Manager 
3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Divisions  14 9 8 8 8 8 9 8 7 7 9 8 
Agencies 11 9 15 15 13 7 14 12 10 12 12 15 
Boards 1 6 5 5 1 4 1 5 4 6 1 7 
Offices 4 6 7 7 ? 8 2 4 2 3 4 6 
Local 
enterprises 
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Source: primary data, 2005 
 
GDS I research found that more than 64% of bureaucrats admit that the 
structure of the Local Government is now simpler than before the Law No. 22/1999 
was issued. By contrast, 21% of them admit that the structure of the Local 
Government is now more complex than before. This difference of opinion happens 
because there is a difference in counting the number of agencies and the function that 
exists in each agency. If the number of agencies, boards, and offices were averaged, 
the result would indeed be smaller than in the previous era. However, if more 
through study is done, it will be found that in each agency there is an increase of 
functions. This occurs because some agencies that appear to be eliminated are just 
merged or transformed into sub parts of other agencies. Therefore, if the number of 
agencies in the Local Government is counted, the total number will appear to have 
decreased. However, there is an increase in the number of functions in some 
agencies.  
 The LAN research also concludes that in determining the number of agency 
instrument units and other regional technical institutions, the consideration was 
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dominated by the availability of regional personnel resources and the wish to provide 
as many formal positions as possible to give opportunities to improve regional 
employee careers. This motive is actually considerably rational. However, it 
becomes irrational because in practice, it is done without considering the competency 
of the personnel to the prevailing requirements for the positions. There are even 
many regions that, without any reasonable excuse, use the policy on organization 
management only to provide good positions for its cronies or groups (nepotism) 
(LAN, 2003). 
  According to the policy, the promotions in rank are possible four times 
a year to echelon officials that have not fulfilled the minimum rank requirement in 
the form of a one-level increase. However, in practice, promotions are often given 
without considering the competency and the achievements of the officials. LAN 
findings (2003) show that there was a case in which the rank promotion strategy is 
done intersectingly.  An echelon IVa official with a rank category IId, for example, 
can be promoted to another position as a IIIa echelon official and raised into rank 
category IVa after only one year or even less. Then, in another year or less, he can be 
promoted again to II echelon position in other unit and raised to rank category IVb. 
  In Indonesia, the public position hierarchy recognizes the existence of 
an Echelon system. Table 4.3 is the Central Government policy in classifying the 
echelons of the officials in the regions, starting from the highest, IIa Echelon, until 
the lowest, IVb Echelon.  
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Table 4.3: Position and Echelon of Local Government Personnel 
Institution Position and its Organization  Echelon Level in Local 
Government (Municipality and 
Regency 
City Manager 
Office 
City Manager IIa 
 Assistant of City Manager IIb 
 Division IIIa 
 Sub Division IVa 
Agency Chief IIb 
 Bureau IIIa 
 Sub Bureau IVa 
 Division IIIa 
 Section IVa 
 Head of Technical Operation Unit IVa 
Board Chief IIb 
 Bureau IIIa 
 Sub Bureau IVa 
 Division IIIa 
 Sub Division IVa 
 Head of Technical Operation Unit IVa 
Office Chief IIIa 
 Sub Division IVa 
 Section IVa 
Sub District Head of Sub District (Camat) IIIa 
 Secretary IVa 
 Section IVa 
Village Head of Village (Lurah) IVa 
 Secretary IVb 
 Section IVb 
Source: quoted from State Personnel Board ( BKN)  Republic of Indonesia, 2003 
 
 According to the results of research conducted by LAN (2003), the average 
amount of public officials based on classifying echelon in the region (Municipality 
and Regency) is as follows (see Table 4.4): 
Table 4.4: Amount average of local public employee 
Echelon AverageTotal 
Employees 
II/a 1 
II/b 21 
III/a 102 
III/b 16 
IV/a 467 
IV/b 143 
Total 750 
Source: quoted from LAN, 2003 
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Based on the table, it can be estimated that every region, including the six research 
districts, has on average 750 structural positions. This number actually has decreased 
drastically because since before the regional autonomy was implemented and 
practiced with PP 84/2000, it was estimated that every region had at least 1500 
structural positions. It is an example of successful reform as for a long time, before 
the New Order regime fell down, bureaucracy had a strong position in the Indonesian 
political system. In that time, no institution, including those at ministry level could 
tinker with the number of hierarchic positions in bureaucracy, even though the 
bureaucracy was inefficient and too large. It is not easy to reform bureaucracy, 
especially by decreasing the number of structural positions.  
 
Unsuccessful Reform 
According to Article 2 of PP No. 84/2000, there are several things that need to 
be considered in forming the Local Government Organization: 
a. The governmental authority that is possessed by a region 
b. The characteristics, the potencies, and the needs of a region 
c. The financial ability of a region 
d. The availability of the personnel resources 
e. The improvement of the co-operational pattern between the regions and/or 
third parties 
Those five things above are the basic factors that need to be considered by every 
region that will arrange its organizational structure. However, in practice, there are 
some considerations that are often neglected by the region. 
The first consideration is the authority that is possessed by the regions, which 
indeed becomes the first foundation when they design their personnel organization. 
From the six regions that are the subject of this research, there is only one region, the 
Giri Regency that has the courage to revolt from the existing custom by transforming 
the National Land Bureau (BPN) of the region into an autonomous institution, the 
Local Land Control Bureau (BPPD). The idea to alter BPN into BPPD comes directly 
from the Regent of the regency. In his opinion, the Giri BPN belongs to type-A 
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(having good performance) and thus can be handed to the region29. This point of view 
is related to the land philosophy in Indonesia that tends to be socialistic. This is 
characterized by land possession by many people together whether in the form of local 
right or personal right. In the Kingdom era, this was the consequence of forest clearing 
that was ordered by the king. Land usage management, according to the Indonesian 
ancestors, was to create harmony between the inhabitants of society and the 
environment (Subiyanto, p.160; 2005)30. The Regent’s will to place land under the 
Region’s authority, as mandated by the Article 10 Law No.22/1999, is related to the 
disappointment of the Regent who is completely powerless in land usage management 
in his region. Based on its function, BPN plays following roles: 
a. The doer of land administration by giving legal certificates to land that is 
owned by persons or institutions 
b. The controller of land usage management, demonstrated by giving 
permission to use land for business interests  
c. The improver of the business of land services  
d. The doer of land surveying and mapping 
The Regent often worries about function above because it gives BPN a large authority 
in the region while the Regent as the highest leader of the region, does not have any 
power. The following expresses the irritation of one Regent: 
“The point is that the government should be the ruler of the land and the land 
usage. If I could manage the land, I am the real Regent. I do not understand 
why people who want to build factory and others have to ask permission from 
BPN. It does not make sense.” 
 
As the result of a bargaining, it was determined that land politics becomes the 
authority of the Regent, while BPN performs land administration31. However, the 
status of BPN was changed into BPPD and thus it changed into a local autonomous 
                                                 
29 There are three classification types of BPN: type A for good performance; type B for average performance; and 
type C for bad performance. 
30 In the Regent’s opinion, this land philosophy differs from the one in Europe. In Europe, land is owned by 
landlords in wide range. The possession is inherited by military power. To support this possession, the feudalism 
system that gives people a right on land possession becomes relative, especially the right to the farming land that 
until today is still protected by the valid positive law is created (Subiyanto, p.160; 2005). 
31 The instruments that are needed to perform land politic are the following: a) Detail plan of the space arrangement 
and technical plan of the space arrangement; b) The forming of Local Land Bank as the maintainer of the stability 
of the market land-price; c) The Issue of Regulations on the permit of using land with all of its system; d) 
Retribution Fee Policy toward land usage zoning, e) the forming of institutions with all of their supportive 
bureaucracy. 
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institution. The latest data from 2004 shows that land usage in Giri Regency has 
changed a lot from a primarily farming area into a residential and industrial area. The 
change is believed by some people to have diverged from the Space Management 
Detail Plan (RDTR). The deviation is suspected to have resulted from the 
implementation of the Regent’s authority toward land usage management. This is 
related to the Regent’s vision to turn the Giri Regency into become a modern 
Municipality. Though until now there have not been many complains on this matter, if 
this condition is allowed, it will change the economic pattern of the Giri Regency that 
used to depend on farming. 
 The consideration that is mostly being neglected is the need and the potency of 
the region. In forming the organizational structure, these things are often neglected, 
including problems that are faced by the region. There are two reasons for this 
situation to occur. Firstly, it is caused by the unavailability of sufficient analysis 
instruments to assess the necessity of an organization based on the need and the 
potency of the region. Secondly, the forming of the organizational structure is filled by 
various interests that try to retain the old structure or, on the contrary, to create the new 
one. The unavailability of a sufficient analysis instrument is the result of the bias that 
happens in defining the needs, the potency, and the problems of the region. Each 
region tends to define the need, the problem, and the problem of its region in a very 
loose and wide way. As a consequence, the institution that is formed grows 
uncontrollably or is merged with other institutions without good consideration. 
Generally, the discussion on this matter is done by the personnel only based on their 
intuition and ignoring scientific studies. When some problems arise, they only then 
find consultant. The analysis results show that as the result of mistakes of the Local 
Government in arranging the bureaucracy, the Local Government makes many 
mistaken policies: 
a. Incongruity between the function of the institution and the need and the 
potency of the region 
b. Inaptness in choosing the institutional form: Agency, Office, or Bureau 
c. Incompatibility in performing mergers between organizations so that it 
effects the performance of the institution 
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d. Inappropriateness in differing the function that still needs to be handled by 
the government from the function that could be performed by society 
The explanation that follows will describe some examples of many problems 
local government personnel face based on the above criteria. 
 
a. Incongruity between the function of the institution and the need and the 
potency of the region 
 Government institutions are supposed to be formed as a response to the needs 
and the problems of a region. The data shows that in the regions studied in this 
research, there still can be found government institutions that are formed without 
considering these things. An example is the Farming and Animal Agency in the Prajan 
Municipality. Geographically, this region is an urban area that does not even have 
farming land. Thus, the jobs and the functions of this agency are questionable. When 
the reason for forming this agency was asked to the officials from the agency, they 
answered that the agency does not deal with the production functions of farming 
because the region indeed does not have any farming land. However, it deals with the 
distribution function that distributes farming products to society. This reason does not 
make any sense because there is already an agency that deals with that function, i.e. 
The Economic Agency with its Industry sub-agency and Commerce sub-agency. The 
reason also did not make sense because it could be observed that the divisions inside 
the Farming and Animal Agency still perform the production functions, such as 
Farming Business and Cultivation Counseling, and Farming Technology Improvement.  
 Another example happens at the level of Division, which is a sub ordinate of 
the Local Secretariat, especially the Economic Division. This division still exists in 
many Local Secretariats. This division does not have any distinct function. This 
division is not supposed to perform any operational function because there are other 
agencies that perform these economic functions, such as the Industry and Commerce 
Agency. However, in practice, this division does perform the operational function and 
there have been many activity duplications of the technical agencies. 
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b. Inaptness in choosing the institutional form: Agency, Office, or Board 
 PP No. 8/2003 explains that an agency is the executor element of the Local 
Government that carries out the decentralization of authority. Besides Agencies, there 
are also Local Technical Institutions that consist of Boards and Offices. From the 
explanation of the PP, the Local Technical institutions can be understood as the 
region’s instruments that provide supporting services to the Local Government by 
providing the study and the input for policy making; planning and supervising local 
personnel improvement; and so on according to the needs of the region. In other 
words, theoretically, the function that is performed by the local technical institution is 
the function of staff or auxiliary (advisory services).  
 However, in practice, it is not easy to perform these functions. It often occurs 
that the function turns into an operational function, have to perform the Public or the 
Social Welfare function. Almost in every region, this function is carried out by 
forming an Agency instead of a division under the City Manager or an Office. This 
function actually does not have any special duty because there have been agencies that 
perform this function, such as the Health and the Education Agency. The Local 
Government should participate more as an advisor. The regions that have an agency 
for this function are the Prajan Municipality, the Anom Regency, the Kulon Regency, 
the Wetan Regency, and the Alit Municipality. The Giri Regency does not have 
Social/Public Welfare Agency. In this region, the function is handled by the Public 
Welfare Division that is an institution under the Local secretariat.  
 
c. Incompatibility in performing merger between organizations that affect the 
performance of institutions 
 In the early period of the local autonomy implementation, there were still many 
institutions that performed the same functions. The Family Planning program, for 
example, is carried out not only by the Family Planning Bureau but also by the Health 
Agency. In addition, this program is also often inserted in the functions of bodies that 
deal with farming or cooperation, as a requirement for a farmer or a candidate of a 
cooperation member to receive incentives from the government. 
 To avoid the duplication of activity, the Local Government executes a policy to 
merge institutions that possess functional resemblance. The examples of institutions 
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that have functional resemblance are the farming, the husbandry, the fishing, the 
plantation, and the forestry bodies. The functions of the industry, the commerce, and 
the cooperation bodies can also be merged into a single institution. There is a tendency 
that in arranging their organization, the regions panic and the merger is done without 
any strong reason. The next table 4.5 will show how organizational mergers are often 
done for the wrong reasons. 
Table 4.5: Examples of Institution mergers at the District Level 
Regency/Municipality Names of Agencies 
Giri Regency Agency of Settlement, Local Infrastructure and 
Transportation; Agency of Irrigation, Mining and Natural 
Disaster Prevention; Agency of Labor Force, Social and 
Family Planning 
Prajan Municipality Agency of Labor Force and Transmigration, Agency of 
Social Welfare and Community Empowerment 
Anom Regency Agency of Health and Social Welfare; Agency of Labor 
Force and Transmigration 
Kulon Regency Agency of Transportation and Tourism; Agency of Water 
Resources, Mining and Energy; Agency of Labor Force and 
Transmigration; Agency of Forestry and Environment Impact 
Management; Agency of Family Planning and Community 
Empowerment 
Alit Municipality Agency of Information, Comunication and Tourism; Agency 
of Social Welfare and Labor Force; Agency of Family 
Planning and Community Empowerment 
Wetan Regency Agency of Farming, Animal Husbandry, Marine and Fishery; 
Agency of Industry, Trade, Mining and Energy; Agency of 
Local Infrastructure, Settlement and Living Environment 
Source: Primary Data 
 
The Local Government cannot be considered to be fully responsible for these 
kinds of mergers because the policy to merge the institutions that have similar 
functions is based on Central Government policy that is implemented through the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of State Personnel Empowerment. Another 
model that is given by the Central Government and often copied by the regions is the 
merger of the Labor Force and Transmigration Agencies. The merger of these two 
agencies results from an understanding on the concept of transmigration as transferring 
the work force. Actually, the concept of working force should be understood in the 
context of human resources, while transmigration is a demographic matter. However, 
in practice, the merger does not cause many problems because previously the Labor 
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Force Agency only dealt with administrative matter such as recording the total number 
of the work force, and did not attempt to improve Human Resources. Thus, merging 
this agency with the transmigration agency does not cause any problems; furthermore, 
this matter does not in the main concern of the government anymore.  
 Problems indeed arise when the agencies that are merged actually do not have 
any functional resemblance, such as happened in merging the Irrigation, Mining, and 
Natural Disaster Prevention Agencies. In Indonesia, irrigation matters traditionally 
deal with water provision and irrigation maintenance in the faming sector. Mining is 
closely related with subterranean natural resources. Meanwhile, natural disaster 
prevention deals with the safety of society. These three very different matters are 
impossible to fuse into just one institution because the merger will certainly affect the 
working mechanisms and the activity coordination of the institution as a working 
unity; and eventually it will affect the performance of the institution. 
 Another case occurred in the merger of the Local Infrastructure, Settlement, 
and Living Environment Agencies. The merger of the living environment agency with 
the other two agencies makes this institution often have to deal with conflicts of 
interest. The living environment agency works on saving and preserving the 
environment while the other two agencies on the contrary, often ignore the 
environment. The idea to prevent environment destruction from settlement and 
territorial infrastructure provision in an institution is not effective because both 
agencies have different missions. The merger of these two agencies is actually aimed 
at improving determination to preserve the environment; but, in practice, the merger 
has been contra-productive. This is because the budget that is used to fund both 
agencies does not come only from the Municipality/Regency APBD. The greater part 
of the budget comes from two departments (ministerial) in the Central Government: 
the Living Environmental Ministerial and the Territorial Infrastructure and Residential 
Ministry (Kimpraswil). Because the governance system in Indonesia still tends to be 
centralized, this process, to combine two different budgets from two different sources 
in one department, can be considered as the most difficult thing to do in the history of 
Indonesian public administration. 
 These phenomena show that there has actually been no serious effort by the 
Local Government in Indonesia to reform its organization. The slogan is “flat in 
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structure but optimal in function”, actually only works in the mind of the scientists and 
not in the policy makers in the Local Government (lip service). The policy makers are 
often afraid that they will lose the support from the elites in the Local Government and 
political world if they have to eliminate an organization that has existed for long time. 
In one side, they have to deal with the pressure from the Central Government and the 
public to simplify the organizational structure; while on the other side, they have to 
maintain support from the political and bureaucratic elites. These two different 
interests are unified by merging the organizations. The concept of merger here is the 
maintenance of existing organizations by turning them into sub-agencies, for example 
the Farming, Husbandry, Marine, and Fishery Agency that contains the Faming sub 
agency, the Husbandry sub agency, the Marine sub agency, and the Fishery sub 
agency. There are at least three reasons that cause the acculturation of the departmental 
culture during the regional autonomy implementation that was based on the Law No. 
22/1999 to not run well: a) a larger amount of the budget that is used to fund the 
projects of the sub-agencies still comes from the department in the central government 
through the de-concentrated fund and not from the APBD of the 
Municipality/Regency; b) some of the personnel that are employed in the sub-agencies 
come from the Central Government departments and they still carry their own culture; 
c) some of the personnel that come from the Central Government departments still 
consider themselves better (smarter) than the regional personnel. As the result of these 
conditions, the coordination between sub-agencies or agencies becomes difficult. In 
fact, this difficulty in the merger process results directly in the overlapping or vacuums 
of activities in the department. 
 
d. Inappropriateness in differentiation between the functions that still need to be 
handled by the government and the functions that could be performed by 
society 
The concept of merger, that manifest in appearance only, as revealed in above, 
raises a question on the function of the government: does the government still have the 
same functions as in the previous period? Or in other words, is government hegemony 
still needed now? The change that occurred in society, especially in the ability of 
society to organize and to fulfill its own needs, affects the government’s functions. The 
government should not have to perform all of its functions anymore (steering rather 
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than rowing). However, in Local Government organizational reform in Indonesia, this 
has not happened at all. This is proved by the fact that the Local Government still 
retains the form of the institutions, such as agency with its sub agencies that implement 
government authority. The functions that should have been handed to society are the 
social, the communication and information, and some of the economic functions. 
 Social functions, such as social-welfare improvement and counseling, could be 
given to society because there have already been many NGOs that were able to deal 
with these things. It would be better if the government focused more on the poor 
people and the abandoned children as mandated in the 1945 Constitution. The 
communication and information functions that are fully controlled by the government 
will constrain the freedom of communication that is now growing in the society. This 
freedom is a necessity for the growth of democracy. Meanwhile, some economic 
functions that can be given to society are cooperation matters. Because the basic idea 
behind this matter comes from society’s need, it is appropriate to give the function to 
society. As for the planning function, the government needs to revaluate the function 
that becomes the main symbol of government hegemony to the people to become more 
than just the existence of a government organization (the planning function will be 
explained in the sub division of planning). 
Besides those four problems, another organizational issue that is also 
interesting is the function of the deputy Mayor/Regent in regional governance.  In the 
Indonesian bureaucracy, a deputy of the head of a region only came to exist after the 
implementation of Law No. 22/1999. This position was indeed designed for political 
purpose, to become a balancing power between the political parties in DPRD and the 
Head of the region. By installing a person from a different political party as its deputy, 
the Mayor/Regent is hoping to find support from DPRD in his/her policy. This effort is 
reasonable, considering that the head of the region is responsible to DPRD. This 
condition is different from the condition under the previous law, the Law No. 
5/1974,—the law placed the head of the region in a higher position than DPRD.  Is the 
deputy really able to perform its function in practice? All of the six regions that 
become the subject of this research admit that the deputy of the head of their region 
plays a role more as the supervisor and controller of development. Nonetheless, from 
the six regions, it is only the deputy Mayor of the Prajan Municipality that appears to 
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have performed his job successfully. The deputies in the other regions do not seem to 
undertake any important activities than other to represent the head of the region in 
official project initiation ceremony or other ceremonies activities. Most of the heads of 
the regions tend to entrust more to the City Manager (Sekda) than their deputy because 
the Sekda is considered to have more experience in government management.  Thus, it 
is reasonable that the Sekda is often more popular than the deputy of the head of the 
region.  
 The political function of a deputy also often becomes ineffective. It often 
happens that during his/her period, the deputy becomes disloyal to his party. An 
example of this is as what happened in the Kulon Regency. In this Regency, the deputy 
Regent that belonged to the National Awakening Party (PKB) often has opposed ideas 
from the members of DPRD that come from the same party. Instead of supporting 
his/her party, the deputy often backs the Regent that comes from the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). As the result, the strategy that was actually 
aimed at building an alliance between PDIP and PKB cannot work well. This 
condition often creates a deadlock in the policy making process in Kulon. This once 
happened in the process of the Regional Strategic Plan (Renstrada) composition. The 
process dragged on for three years. The cause was a principal difference between the 
Regent and DPRD in determining the region’s vision. The DPRD that was influenced 
by PKB wanted to put a religious element in the region’s vision, while the Regent did 
not consider it to be necessary. In addition, there were also some other differences in 
the accomplishment strategy.  
 Nonetheless, the organizational reform also resulted in a very positive thing the 
decrease of the number of the structural positions in every Regency/Municipality in 
Indonesia, including the six regions in this research.  Based on the national data (see 
Chapter 3, Table 3.6), on average, the decrease reached 50% of the total number of 
structural positions, from 1500 to only 750 structural positions. In the Giri Regency, 
though some of the Fifth Echelon positions are still retained, in general, the number of 
the positions also decreased. The decrease of the structural positions beneficially 
reduces the long procedures that used to be followed in the bureaucracy. It becomes 
more efficient and effective. However, the decrease does not directly influence the 
budget that is required to pay the structural position allowances. The amount of money 
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that is needed to pay the allowance does not change significantly before and after the 
decrease and even increased since Presidential Decree No.99 that regulates on echelon 
promotion for every official in the region was issued in 2000. An example of this can 
be seen in the comparison between the increase of the echelons in the Giri Regency 
and the total allowance that needs to be paid in the APBD from 2000 to 2004 (See 
Table 4.6). After the allowance was raised in 2004, the money that was needed in 
APBD increased three times compared to the money that was needed in 2000, from 
approximately 70,165,000.00 Rupiah (6500 EURO) each month to 233,250,000.00 
Rupiah (20.000 EURO) each month. This number excludes the allowance for the 
Regent/Mayor and the members of DPRD that is estimated to be twice the allowance 
of the bureaucracy officials. Fortunately, the Giri Regency is a rich region, shown by 
the total of the 2004 PAD which reached about Rp. 54 million. Compared to the PAD, 
the amount of the allowance that needs to be paid every year is not significant. But 
what about the poor regions that are the majority of the Regencies/Municipalities in 
Indonesia? The large total of the allowance that cannot be compared with the small 
amount of regional finance emphasizes the evidence that APBD is allocated more to 
bureaucratic interests than to public interest.  
Table 4.6: Total Allowance in the Giri Regency, 2000 and 2004  
 Echelon Filled Position 
(May 2000) 
Allowance (Rp) Total Amount (Rp) paid by the 
Local Government per-month 
IIb 1 200.000,00                     200.000,00 
  IIIa 31 150.000,00                  4.650.000,00 
IIIb 3 125.000,00                     375.000,00 
IVa 192 100.000,00                19.200.000,00 
IVb 30   75.000,00                  2.250.000,00 
Va 509   60.000,00                30.540.000,00 
Vb 259   50.000,00               12.950.000,00 
Total 1025      ± Rp  70.165.000,00 
Echelon Filled Position 
(December 2004) 
Allowance (Rp) Total Amount (Rp) paid by the 
Local Government per- month 
Iia 1 
Iib 18 
1.500.000,00              28.500.000,00 
IIIa 102 
IIIb 0 
   600.000,00              61.200.000,00 
Iva 400 
Ivb 0 
   240.000,00              96.000.000,00 
Coordinator 317    150.000,00             47.550.000,00 
Total 838   ±Rp  233.250.000,00 
Source: compiled from many sources of Giri’s Documents, 2005 
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Though it is not inscribed in Local Regulation, the positions below the IVa 
Echelon (V Echelon) that relate to direct services to the public are still retained and are 
called Coordinator positions. In the beginning, the Central Government did not 
acknowledge this position. However, now, the position has been acknowledged and the 
Central Government provides allowances for this position through DAU which is 
transferred to the region. The types of this coordinator positions, and its total number 
of employees can be seen in Table 4.7:  
Table 4.7: Type of Coordinator Positions in the Giri Regency 
No Position  Total 
Number 
1 Kecamatan Coordinator Position in the maximum pattern Kecamatan  99 
2 Kecamatan Coordinator Position in the minimum pattern Kecamatan  120 
3 Family Planning (KB) Program Coordinator in the KB, Social, and Work 
Force Agency 
17 
4 Kindergarten and Elementary School Coordinator in Educational 
Agency environment 
17 
5 Management Caretaker in Junior High School 54 
6 Management  Caretaker in Senior High School 24 
 Total  331 
Source: Giri Regency Local Personnel Bureau, 2005   
 
The total number of the Coordinator positions is large. However, even the Local 
Government cannot deny that these positions are still necessary and that the 
government still needs to provide allowances for these positions. This fact also shows 
that in its effort to reform its organizational structure, the Local Government is always 
faced with the paradox of fulfilling the actual needs and persisting on the idealsm to 
simplify the bureaucracy. 
 
2.  Personnel 
 Data from the 31 March 2000 BKN Quality Control and Reference Table shows 
that there are 3.927.146 civil servants in Indonesia.  Compared to the number of the 
Indonesian citizens that reaches 210.485.60032, the number of civil servants is 1:54. It 
means that for one civil servant there are 54 people to be served. The World Bank 
                                                 
32 2000 BPS Estimation Number  
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thinks that this number is not sufficient because it is only 2,2% of the number 
Indonesian citizens.  
 The early period data of the regional autonomy implementation shows that in 
2000, from the existing number of the civil servants, 94.60 % of them work around the 
Regional Government or the department offices in the regions. The rest of them, 
5.40%, work around the Central Government. The spread of the employees in the 
region is normal considering that besides the wideness of the territory and the large 
number of citizens that needs to be served, most of the civil servants work in the 
department offices that relate directly to public service, such as the National Education 
Department, Internal Affairs Department, Health Department, and Religion 
Department. Almost all of these departments own an office in the regions. Meanwhile, 
the State Ministerial Office, the Non-Department Government Institution (LPND) and 
Highest/High State Institution Secretariat only exist in the capital. Although most of 
the civil servants work in the region, according to the BKN data, there are about 88% 
of them who work as the Central Government’s Employee that are assigned to assist 
other departments or institutions (vertical Institutions), Therefore, there are only 
approximately 12% of the existing civil servants that really work as employees of the 
regions (MAP, 2005).  
 As the consequence of the implementation of Article 8 and Article 129 of the 
Law No. 22 Year 1999, civil servants that work in any vertical institution in the region 
(Province, Regency. and Municipality) are administratively transferred to become the 
employees of the Region. The number of these civil servants is approximately 2.8 
million from the total national civil servants in 2003 that is 3,648,005. Thus, it can be 
exemplified that from the total number of the civil servants, 840,007 (23%) work for 
the Central Government; 311,047 (8.5%) work for the Province Government and 
2,496,951 (68.4%) work for Regency/Municipality governments (see Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8: The Number of Indonesia Civil Servant in Each Government Level 
Government Level  Number % 
Center                          840.007            23 
Province          311.047 8,5 
Regency/Municipality       2.496.951 68,4 
Total                       3.648.005            100 
Source: Data of PUPNS per December 2003, BKN RI 
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 In Indonesia, the employment system divides employees into four rank 
category levels in which each of this level is further divided into several spaces. The 
level of rank category starts from the lowest rank, which is rank category Ia, until the 
highest, rank category IVe. 
1. Rank category I is divided into space a, b, c, and d. 
2. Rank category II is divided into space a, b, c, and d. 
3. Rank category III is divided into space a, b, c, and d. 
4. Rank category IV is divided into space a, b, c, and d. 
 
  Table 4.9: The Number of Indonesia Civil Servant Based on Rank 
Rank Number % 
 2000 2003 2000 2003 
I       277.129          88.836          7.08   2,4 
II    1.655.038      981.010        42.33 26,9 
III    1.866.551     2.129.285        47.71 58,4 
IV       112.802      448.874          2.88 12,3 
Total    3.912.520   3.648.005          100 100 
  Source: BKN, 2000 and 2003 
 
 The above national data (see Table 4.9) shows the government policy to limit 
the number of the civil servant candidates for the rank category I and II, and to raise 
the number of the civil servant candidates for the rank category III and IV. This is, on 
the offering side, caused by an increase in the number of citizens who possess a 
minimum bachelor degree; on the demand side, this is caused by an increase in the 
number of jobs that require the employee to have at least a bachelor degree33. The 
government adopts a policy not to increase the number of the civil servants because it 
is considered to burden the State finance. The policy is known as the zero-growth 
policy.  
 The rank category division also shows the working period length and 
experience of the employee: the higher category an employee has, the higher his 
seniority in the bureaucracy. The raise from one category to another is determined by 
the length of the working-period (in general, it is raised every four years) and from the 
result of the DP3 assessment (Personnel Achievement Assessment list). In the DP3, 
                                                 
33 The employees in the rank category I and II are the low level employees who at best passes own a high school 
diploma. Meanwhile, the employees in the rank category III and IV are at minimum required to have bachelor 
degree.  
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however, there are two fundamental weaknesses. First, the aspects that are being 
assessed are very abstract, such as responsibility, loyalty, and cooperative ability. Each 
aspect does not have any distinct definition or clear assessment standard. The loyalty 
aspect, for example, is supposed to be at least 91 without any comprehensible reason. 
Some people judge this loyalty aspect based on the loyalty of the employee to the State 
ideology, Pancasila, while the other judges base it on the employee’s loyalty to the 
superior. Second, subjectivity in the assessment is very high because the process is 
done thoroughly by the direct superior of the employee being assessed. This creates a 
high possibility for a “like or dislike” assessment to happen. There are some regions 
that started to use more objective assessment systems since 2004, such as the Prajan 
Municipality which uses the 360-degree assessment system.  
 The educational level of the civil servants in Indonesia at the national level, in 
2004 can be seen in the next table, table 4.10. The largest number, 38.2%, is still 
dominated by employees who own maximum a high school diploma. The number of 
employees who own bachelor to doctoral degrees relatively increases, including the 
employees with three-year diploma degrees. However, it is not true to assume that a 
high level of education shows a high level of competency. The 2003 national data 
proved that there are more civil servants in Indonesia that do not have good 
competency than those who do.  
  Table 4.10: The Number of Indonesia Civil Servant Based on Level of Education 
No. Level of Education Number % 
1 Primary School (SD)      125.584           3,4
2 Junior High School (SLTP)     103.191        2,8
3 Senior High School (SLTA)   1.394.423        38,2
4 Diploma I      56.297        1,5
5 Diploma II 586.819 16,1
6 Diploma III 288.191 7,9
7 Diploma IV 8.007 0,2
8 Bachelor (S.1) 985.427 27,0
9 Masters (S.2) 90.723 2,5
10 Doctorals (S.3) 9.343 0,3
 Total   3.648.005       100
Source: Data of PUPNS per December 2003, BKN 
 
Constitution No. 22/1999 states that the entire process of regional personnel 
management, from recruitment until retirement, is carried out by the region. This 
Constitution is actualy in contradiction with Law No. 43/1999 that regulates 
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Employment Principles and gives authority over personnel management of the civil 
services in Indonesia to the Central Government. This contradiction influences the 
practice of personnel management in the region. The region often hesitates in enacting 
the authority, especially, since not all regions possess an adequate financial ability to 
carry out the authority thoroughly. In most cases, most regions only use their authority 
in personnel placement and improvement processes. Personnel improvement, in this 
matter, involves developing the human resources competence of the personnel, for 
example by sending the personnel to higher education or regular courses, including 
those that are conducted independently by the Government. Meanwhile, personnel 
placement consist of promotion stages that are done when a candidate is officially 
accepted as a civil servant (PNS) or when personnel are going to be promoted to a 
higher positions. In the early period of local autonomy implementation, the decisions 
on rank raises and change (mutasi) processes are also included in this.   
 Other very sensitive personnel management authorities, such as the authority in 
recruitment, payment, and retirement, are still held by the Central Government. 
Recruitment policy, especially in the number and the qualification of the candidates 
and in the selection process, from registration and testing, to the results, is controlled 
by the Central Government, i.e. the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, 
and the Ministry of State Personnel Empowerment. The authority in payment is also 
completely controlled by the Central Government. However, the Central Government 
allocates this matter through the General Allocation Fund (DAU) that is transferred 
every year to the regions.  The DAU is determined by the Department of Finance with 
approval from DPR. For retirement matter, the decisions on who should be retired and 
on the amount of the pension that will be given each month are determined by the 
Central Government as well.  
 The ambivalence of this regulation creates bewilderment to the regions in 
managing their personnel. However, at the same time, this condition also results in 
employment becoming a political arena for the local bureaucrats and political elites to 
compete in putting their people in the bureaucracy. The next section will depict the 
performance of personnel reform in the regions based on the patterns of personnel 
management. Most of the national data is quoted from the 2002 GDS. It will then be 
compared with the data findings from the research regions.  
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a. Personnel Recruitment  
Unsuccessful Reform 
One important stage in employee management is recruitment and promotion. 
This stage requires competency as the basic assessment. In Graphic 4.1, there are two 
different views found concerning the process of employee recruitment, one by the 
members of DPRD and the other by NGOs. The members of DPRD believe that the 
recruitment process has always considered the capability of candidates. However, 
though some NGOs believe that it has, some think that the recruitment process has not 
considered the capability of candidates. Some NGOs suspect that the recruitment 
process still involves corruption, collusion, and nepotism. People who succeed at the 
assessment are the people who are willing to bribe or who possess personal 
connections with decision makers. There are some well known cases that where people 
who want to be a civil servant have to bribe Rp 25 million to Rp 75 million (2400 € to 
7300 €). They send the bribe to a person on the selection committee. Those who have 
connections with the committee either as family, friends or as members of the same 
ethnic group passes the selection test without considering the test results. This 
deviation clearly ignores the capacity of candidates. In many cases, this selection 
process causes turmoil in the process of employee recruitment.  
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Graphic 4.1
Considering Competency in Local Government Personnel Recruitment 
(According to Local Parliament Member and NGO Perceptions)
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Frequently exist Always exist
Source: GDS I, 2002
 
Note: N of the local house of representative members is 600 persons, and N of NGOs is 600 
organization 
  
Any local government will always say that they lack personnel. In reality, this is 
actually not the case. In practice, there are many personnel that lack a job. These 
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personnel spend their working time only reading newspapers, conversing with others, 
and even sometimes leaving the office for affairs that are not related with their work. 
Though they have been obligated to fill in the attendance list, these unproductive 
activities become habits in their daily working lives. These kinds of personnel are 
commonly the administrative personnel or common employees that do not have any 
specific technical qualifications.  
 Personnel that are actually needed by the regions are medical forces and some 
teachers-medical forces such as doctors, nurses, and paramedics; and teachers with 
specific knowledge skills such as Mathematics, English, Physics, Chemistry, and 
Biology. Nevertheless, not all of those needs can be filled by the market, considering 
that the number of candidates with those qualifications is still lacking. Peculiarly, 
instead of recruiting forces with specific skills, the Local Government still recruits a 
large number of administrative personnel or regular personnel that do not have any 
specific skills. The Giri Regency Government, for example, in 2004, recruited 1,644 
new non-teacher and non-medical forces personnel, and only 1,295 new teachers and 
medical personnel. Other research districts also recruited more or less in similar terms 
to Giri, except the Alit Municipality which recruited hundreds of new personnel, 
primarily teachers and medical personnel. 
Between Successful and Unsuccessful Reform: Regional Temporary Employees 
During the implementation of local autonomy that is based on Law No. 22/1999, 
the regions cannot officially recruit new personnel to be nominated as civil servants. 
However, because there is ambivalence in the regions authority in the Employment 
Principles that are written in Law No. 22/1999 and in Law No. 43/1999, in practice, 
the regions still recruited new personnel. The new personnel that were recruited during 
that period were categorized only as Regional contract personnel (Honda) or 
Temporary Employees (PTT). For the honorary personnel, the change of their status to 
PTT is a major increase toward the assurance of their future. Before Government Rule 
(PP) No. 31/2001 was issued, the status change was given by the head of each related 
department. The payment was given based on the capability of each department to save 
some money from its budget. Thus, it was possible for honorary personnel not to 
receive their payment for several months because their department could not afford to 
pay them. Since PP no. 31/2001 was implemented, the status change is now bestowed 
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by the Local Government through the Local Personnel Bureau and the payment of the 
personnel is financed by the APBD. In many prosperous regions, the PTT even 
receives some additional rights, such as health insurance and other incentives.  
 In the regions that become the subject of this research, based on the available 
data in the Anom Regency, the Kulon Regency, and the Wetan Regency (see Table 
4.11), the number of PTT tends to increase every year. Among the six regions, in 2004, 
the Giri Regency has the largest number of PTT, followed by the Kulon Regency and 
the Prajan Municipality.  
Table 4.11: The Number of Regional Temporary Employee in Six Districts 
Regency/Municipality 2003 2004 
Anom Regency 555 758 
Giri Regency -- 2939 
Prajan Municipality  1102 
Kulon Regency 2624 2874 
Alit Municipality 608 652 
Wetan Regency -- -- 
Source: Compiled from many sources in the Local Governments 
Note:    -- = data is not available 
 
The excessive amount of PTT is of concern to the Central Government. An 
Assistant Director that handles civil servant matters in the Ministry of State Personnel 
Empowerment stated: 
“…but the reduction is only in the formal way. In reality, they are still very 
redundant. They (regency/Municipality—red) claim that they use zero 
growth, they add new personnel based on the retirement. But actually we 
can see that the contract worker is abundant…” 
 
The tendency for the region to employ more PTT is reasonable. It is related to the 
amount of DAU that will be accepted by the regions. The salary of the PTT is taken 
from APBD while APBD still derives the majority of its funds from DAU, especially 
for payment. Thus, the more the region employs PTT, the more possibility there is for 
the Region to receive more DAU. For this reason, the Local Government never stops 
recruiting more PTT. For this reason, the reform of personnel has failed because the 
Local Government motivation is to receive more DAU regardless local needs.  
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On the other side, the reform is also a success when the Local Government 
recruits more skilled laborers such as doctors and teachers. It means that there is a 
political will from the local government to fulfill local needs, particularly in the health 
and education sectors. Both are basic needs, and some regions have not had competent 
human resources in the health and education sectors.      
 
b. Personnel Promotion: Instant Rank and Position Raise 
Another stage that is also important in employee management is promotion. 
This stage is related with the career of an employee in the career structure that includes 
the potential to produce conflict among employees. Graphic 4.2 contains the answers 
that are given by bureaucrats concerning the criteria of position promotion. Most of the 
respondents answer that the process of promotion has always been based on the 
candidate’s competency that is demonstrated by the achievements of the candidate in 
his previous position. Nonetheless, this is not the only consideration needed; there are 
many respondents who answer that the period of work for the current employee also 
becomes a consideration in the process of promotion. It means that seniority, as shown 
by how long a candidate has served as a civil servant, also becomes a consideration. 
Besides these two factors, another thing that is mentioned by the respondents is the 
loyalty of a candidate toward his/her superior. In the history of employee assessment in 
Indonesia, though it is never mentioned literally, loyalty has become an important 
factor in the Employee’s Achievement Assessment List. This is so because the 
authority to assess an employee is conceded fully to the subjectivity of the superior. 
This unofficial rule has often forced the inferiors to abide by the superior’s will to 
avoid a bad mark in their assessment. The two last factors, period of working and 
loyalty, have often de-emphasized competency requirement as the main factor in 
promotion assessment. In other words, competency has never completely become the 
base requirement in promotion. However, what real personnel promotion of regions34 
is will be explored as follows: 
                                                 
34 These regions of GDS I also included Giri Regency, Prajan Municipality, Kulon Regency, Anom Regency, Alit 
Municipality and Wetan Regency 
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 Transparency in Personnel Promotion of the Local Government
(Bureaucrats' Perception)  
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Source: GDS I, 2002
 
Note: N of bureaucrats  is 2700 persons. 
 
Successful Reform 
In the early period of local autonomy implementation, there was a tendency for 
the Local Government to inconsiderately use its authority to raise the rank of personnel 
that were going to be promoted to certain positions. At that time, there were many 
senior bureaucrats that had almost reached their retirement, while the existing junior 
bureaucrats did not have the rank requirements to place them in the positions required 
by the personnel regulations. To fulfill the rank requirements, the Local Government 
took a shortcut by raising the rank of the personnel without considering the working 
period and the achievements of the personnel. There were personnel that were raised 
from the rank category IIIc to IIId and even from IIId to IVa just to fulfill the rank 
requirements. There was even a region that raised the rank of personnel twice in a year 
just to meet the requirements.  
 There is actually no problem in the policy to raise a personnel rank earlier if the 
decision is based on a strong argument, i.e. based on the competency of the personnel. 
In Indonesia, where the bureaucracy system is still strongly characterized by 
patrimonial tradition, this kind of decision would be very good progress since it bases 
the assessment on the competency of the personnel instead of seniority. Anyone with 
good achievements, disregarding the age and working period, can be placed in a higher 
position. This competency idea is greatly influenced by private organizations that often 
recruit young workers to become organization managers. Nevertheless, usually, instant 
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rank rises can only happen to personnel when the personnel manage to demonstrate 
their achievements and attract the head of the region with these achievements. When 
the personnel manages to approach the head of the region or at least manages to find 
someone who could introduce him with the head of the region, there is a big possibility 
that he will have his rank raised earlier and be promised a certain position. This 
practice happens in almost every research district but not in the Giri Regency, since 
this regency administratively has very good career planning and there is no need to 
raise the rank of personnel early.  
 Alit Mayor stated that the senior bureaucrats in his region commonly become 
hindrance for the department to progress. He does not hope for them to be the 
motivators of the organization. Thus, there are many younger personnel in his region 
that are placed in positions that are in the same level with the head of agencies, 
bureaus, or offices. One of his actions that received a positive response from a famous 
newspaper in East Java Province and the Java Island (Jawa Post) was when he 
courageously promoted a head of a village to become Camat for his achievements. 
This move was very unlikely to be done before because a head of a village is not a 
civil servant. If he were a civil servant, to be placed in the position, he would normally 
have to experience some duty rotations in a number of regions or departments.  
 A more extreme action in managing the bureaucracy was done by the Giri 
Regent. He created Room 12, a place for senior personnel that are considered 
incompetent need have to improve their competence. In this place, the Regent gives 
them special assignments, in particular to analyze government policies. If in Room 12, 
they can show their competence again they will be given a new position. On the 
contrary, if they can not, they will be placed in Room 13 or, in other words, given an 
early retirement.  
  
Unsuccessful Reform 
These progressive actions made by the heads of the region often surprise and 
create resentment from the senior bureaucrats. They often try to make new deals to 
retain the status quo in the bureaucracy. However, the strong determination of the head 
of the region is often unstoppable. Only a weak head of region would usually finally 
obey the senior bureaucrats’ will. These senior bureaucrats are generally controlled by 
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Regional Secretary. They are usually the people who actually run daily government 
management practices. The powerful influence possessed by these senior bureaucrats 
once made them overconfident in making a policy that grants a special rank raise to 
some officials that are considered to have done merit to the regions. This happened in 
the Wetan Regency but the policy was repealed by the Central Government through 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and the State Employment Board because it was 
considered as an infringement, especially because the special rank raise was only given 
to the officials that belonged to the Regent’s clan. 
 An attempt to rule the bureaucracy at the elite level was also made by the 
Anom Regent. He employed people who were considered to be loyal to him as his 
officials. Those people were given positions that could be controlled directly by him. 
Commonly, these positions were the strategic positions such as the City Manager, the 
Head of the Revenue Agency, the Head of the Local Financial and Wealth 
Management Bureau, the Head of Bappeda (planning), the Head of the Local 
Personnel Bureau, the Head of the Territorial Infrastructure and Residential Agency, 
the Head of the Health and Public Welfare Agency, and the Head of the Education 
Agency. Those departments are strategic because they hold an important function in 
making the decisions that are related to the regional budget and projects and the 
personnel recruitment and promotion process. These three agencies mentioned above 
use a large portion of the money from the region's budget each year.  The Regent 
would usually offer strategic positions directly to the officials that he favored. The 
procedure that is formally required, through the consideration of the Rank and Position 
Advisory Bureau (Baperjakat), is neglected. The main requirement in placing a 
position is the loyalty of the personnel to the head of the region and not their 
competency35. 
 The above cases show that, at that time, not every promotion was based solely 
on Local Government interests, which were to have competent personnel, but also on 
certain political interests that influenced the process. This situation is logical 
considering that the transition period from the centralized era to the de-centralized era 
                                                 
35 The rumor that spreads among the bureaucrats and the public, and it was even admitted by member of DPRD, 
says that those positions are for sale to any candidate who could give money, millions of Rupiah, to the head of the 
region. The complete story of this rumor will be given in the chapter that will discuss about the role of the head of 
the region.  
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needs political support, whether from the political elites or, and especially, from the 
bureaucrats themselves.  
 One of the political aspects in personnel promotion is native issues. Since the 
1998 Reform, the native issue has become very popular, not only on the level of 
political positions, but also on the level of bureaucratic career positions. Regardless of 
the precise definition of “the native”, in regions where strong traditional bonds, such as 
cultural similarity, religion, or other historical aspects, still exist, the Native issue 
generally occurs on the level of political position, i.e. the Mayor/Regent. From the six 
regions that are the subject of this study, it is only the head of the region of Alit 
Municipality that is not a native. Alit Mayor managed to occupy his position because 
he gained strong support (acknowledgment) from the elites of the political party that 
ruled the Municipality at that time, PDIP. He leads the region that was the hometown 
of Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia and also the initiator of PDIP. This 
acknowledgement tradition in placing the highest position in a strategic region has 
always been a part of the Indonesian political system. Thus, a strategic position is 
usually occupied by a person that has the closest relationship with the decision maker 
and this often ignores the native issue. 
 In the other five regions, the officials who occupy the Mayor/Regent position 
are the natives of the regions. However, actually, it is only in the Kulon Regency that 
the issue exists significantly. The Kulon Regency is a regency in Central Java Province 
that posses a different dialect to the regions on its east side. The traditional bond in the 
region is to be proud as “Wong Kulon” is still strong and often affects politics, 
especially in deciding the Regent. It is a coincidence that besides being a native of the 
region, the ruling Regent also had a close relationship with the ruling president who 
was also the Leader of PDIP, Megawati Soekarnoputri. The acknowledgment tradition 
and the fact that she is a native caused her to be elected as the Kulon Regent for the 
second time.  
 Though not as significant as at the political position level, the native issue also 
exists on the level of the career positions in the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats 
themselves actually do not pay much attention to this issue since the centralized 
system during the new regime order was managed to amalgamate bureaucratic 
personnel from different cultures and regions. However, since the reform era, political 
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interests have started to enter the bureaucracy and feed the native issue. There are 
indications that some political parties that have their representatives in DPRD try to 
interfere in the process of position decision, especially the Echelon II positions, i.e. the 
City Manager and the Head of Agency or Bureau. The interference of political parties 
in the process is done directly or indirectly by trying to preserve the existence of a 
department when the regional department arrangement, which is based on the PP 
84/2000 and then on the PP 8/2003, is implemented.  
 Based on Article 61 section 4, the City Manager (Sekda) is elected by the 
Regent/Mayor from a civil servant who possesses the necessary requirements and is 
approved by DPRD. The need for the approval results in this position often infiltrated 
by political interests: a person occupies the position not purely based on his 
competence but more on his ability to be close to the head of the region and DPRD. 
Moreover, DPRD would usually base its consideration on whether the candidate is 
originally from the region or not. This is where political interest start to influence 
career positions in the practice of local level bureaucracy in Indonesia. Previously, 
based on Local Government Regulation, the Sekda was elected and employed by the 
Central Government through its Ministry of Home Affairs. The involvement of 
political interest in this matter resulted in the frictions and tension between the local 
bureaucratic elites since they were often involved in an ailing competition. There was 
even a rumor stating that with a certain amount of money, an official without sufficient 
competence and achievement could be elected to the position.  
 In all of the six regions that are the subject of this research, the ruling Sekda is 
the senior bureaucrat who has occupied the position since the previous period. Thus, in 
the early period of local autonomy implementation, no significant friction appeared. 
However, this excludes the Anom Regency which had not had any Sekda until mid-
2005 when the previous one retired. The vacuum of this position created numerous 
tensions and frictions between the bureaucrats and DPRD to occupy the position. 
Many people think that the vacuum was caused by the lengthy bargaining process 
between many parties, especially between the Regent and the candidates that were 
interested in the position. According to some NGOs, the bargaining was to find the 
candidate that could afford to buy the position with the highest price36. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
36 This information is given directly by the coordinator of Anom People Anti-Corruption Alliance (ARAK) 
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since Law No. 32/ 2004 was issued, the region’s authority, especially DPRD, in 
determining the Sekda position is annulled and handed to the Governor.  
 Interference attempts also occur at the level of head of agency or bureau. 
However, while at the Sekda level, the interference is committed using the authority 
owned by DPRD, at the level of the head of agency or bureau, it cannot be committed 
because DPRD does not have any authority in this matter. Interference is usually 
committed by political parties or individually by a member of DPRD. One examples of 
such interference once happened at the level of the head of agency in the Giri Regency. 
A source from within DPRD mentioned that he once led a meeting to discuss a 
regional regulation proposal that arranged Local Government department management. 
In the meeting, there was a political party that kept insisting to retain the existence of 
the Forestry Agency and that it is not merged with the Farming and Plantation Agency 
that actually possess a similar function. The discussion on the new structure of the 
department took a long time and was tiring. It was found out that it was the ruling head 
of the Forestry Agency that wanted to retain his position. He worried that if his 
department was merged, he would not have the position anymore. Thus, he tried to 
keep his position by using political means, through his party, to ensure that his agency 
was not merged with another agency. However, in the end, the agency was still merged 
with another agency that had a similar function. This sort of case occurred in all of the 
regions that are the subject of this research. The interference could be done personally 
by the ruling head of a department or organizationally by the department that was 
about to be merged. The interference is done by lobbying DPRD or the political party 
but still sometimes the result is not as expected.  
 Not all of the DPRD’s interferences, at the level of the Sekda position or head 
of agency/bureau, were successful in interfering with the Local Government’s 
decisions. It depended mostly on the bargaining position of the head of the region in 
facing DPRD. Commonly, the head of the region that was brave enough and had good 
skills would manage to hamper the interference and let the promotion process run in 
line with the formal applied procedures and requirements. 
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c. Ability and Attitude Assessment 
The achievement of an employee can be seen from his/her ability in serving 
society. For society, one of the services that often draw attention is health service. Data 
from GDS I 2002 shows that most of the respondents (70%) think that the medical 
personnel that serve in the government health services hold adequate skills. Thus, 
when people are going to treat an illness (curative act) that they suffer or going to 
immunize their baby, they choose to go to government health services. Even so, the 
main reason for people to go to government health services is the inexpensive fee for 
the services, which is a result of the health subsidy given by the government.  
 In the GDS I+ 2004, some bureaucrats admit, in contradiction with the previous 
GDS, that their regions do not have competent human resources in the health sector. 
This confession is surprising because it differs from the community assessment in 
2002. In 2002, people were satisfied by the skill shown by medical personnel. It is 
possible that this satisfaction resulted from low expectations of the standard of health 
services. On the other hand, the bureaucrats evaluated the services from some 
minimum standard that has not been achieved.  
 The attitude of the government personnel in performing their duty also 
becomes an indicator of the performance of the personnel in providing services to 
society. Graphic 4.3 gives a depiction of the attitude of government personnel in 
village/residential areas in performing their duty in several sectors of activity. Most of 
the people admit that for certain activities, such as development project and certain 
farm-commodity planting, activities the village personnel involved people in 
discussion. However, some people admit that for some sensitive cases, such as 
informal sector control and land acquittal, village personnel often use pressure or even 
violence to achieve their purposes. 
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Graphic 4.3
  Village Office Staff's Handling Way in Several Activities
(Community)
By Repressive/Intimidative Action By Threating People
By Persuasive Way Through Discussion/Negotiation
Source: GDS I, 2002
 
Note: N of communities is 9000 households 
 
Successful Reform 
Despite all of the flaws in employment management reform as mentioned 
above, there is some evidence that positively show an increase in the competition 
among personnel in most research districts in attaining their best performance. The 
increase started after the regions started to abandon the DP3 assessment system and 
used their own systems. The Prajan Municipality, for example, since 2004, uses the 
360-degree assessment system. With this system, personnel are allowed to assess other 
personnel, regardless of their position and rank, using a certain questionnaire that has 
been prepared for the assessment. Thus, superior, inferior, or personnel with equal 
position and rank can assess others’ working achievement. The assessment is done at 
the same time every six months without any early announcement so that there can not 
be any dishonest liaison between the personnel in the assessment. The result of the 
assessment that was done last in 2004 showed an objective evaluation since it showed 
that for more or less 80 percent of 8.374 civil servants, the performance of the local 
government personnel of the Prajan Municipality was still low.  
The competition is also felt in the Giri Regency since the region began to use 
only the DP3 but also achievement and demonstrated competency as the assessment 
factors. In addition, the Local Government also provided incentives for personnel with 
high levels of accomplishment to encourage other personnel to display high 
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performance. One of the incentives is rewarded to structural officials (echelon II to IV) 
using three assessment factors: organizational factor (60%), working performance 
factor (30%), and Regent’s prerogative factor (10%).  The amount of money received 
by each institution varies based on its echelon. For a department that has echelon II, 
the department receives 2,959,867.26 Rupiah (270 EUR) to 21,914,065.92 Rupiah 
(2000 EUR). Meanwhile for a department that has echelon III, the department receives 
1,796,105.70 Rupiah (440 EUR) to 51,132,820.48 Rupiah (5000 EUR). Totally, in 
2004, the Giri Regency Government spent 900,000,000.00 Rupiah (85 thousand EUR) 
on employee’s incentives. Additionally, the facilities in the Local Government office 
are much more modern than in other regions and this makes the working atmosphere 
and situation better. 
 Conversely, the Wetan Regency still uses DP3 as the main personnel 
assessment. Meanwhile, the Anom Regency is seeking a model for personnel 
performance assessment. In both regions, DP3 is still the tool used by top managers to 
evaluate the performance of subordinates and even to decide whether they could 
achieve higher rank or not in their personnel careers.   
 
d. Personnel Rotation (mutasi) 
Unsuccessful Reform 
Since Law No. 22/1999 was issued, employment business was given 
thoroughly to the region. This transfer of authority in practice has worsened the 
mobility of employees between regions. This is so because coordination between 
regions in receiving or transferring an employee is difficult. In addition, employee 
payments that adhere to DAU create more problems in the process of rotation. Nearly 
80% of the employee questioned answer that after regional autonomy was applied 
employee rotation became very difficult. If this keeps happening, then it is possible for 
an employee, as long as he/she is still working as an active civil servant, to work in 
only one region for the rest of his/her life.  
This is not caused totally by the salary system that attaches to DAU. The 
problem in employment transfer between regions tends to be caused by ethnic and 
regional prejudice. People do not want to accept employees from different ethnic or 
regional backgrounds. In addition, politically, there are many regional bureaucratic 
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elites and personnel who do not want to lose their position to the employees from other 
regions. This is especially true when the coming employee is believed to have more 
capability than the employees in the region.  
Employment transfer between regions actually does not always occur in every 
sector or field. The highest frequency of employment transfer usually occurs in the 
education and the health sectors. There are many teachers and doctors who wish to 
move from an underdevelopment region to a more progressive region. A doctor that 
has just graduated is obligated to work in a state service for one year to three years, 
depending on the desolation criteria of the region. After finishing the work, usually, 
they are given freedom to choose any place to work. At that time, usually, there occurs 
a large number of employment transfers from the underdeveloped regions to the more 
developed regions.  
Different from doctors, there is not obligation for new teachers to work in 
desolate regions. However, for these who are willing to work in these desolate regions, 
the government will facilitate them to become civil servants and provide them with 
some limited facilities. Usually, these teachers cannot stand to work in the desolate 
regions for a long time. This is because the facilities are not as promised and the 
conditions of the region is very underdeveloped or because there is conflict in the 
region. These conditions often force them to move to other regions that are more 
developed, though in these regions the competition is very fierce. The regions that 
become the favorite places for such movement are the regencies/cities in Java that are 
relatively more developed than other regions outside Java. Thus, the underdeveloped 
region will in the end, lack qualified teachers and doctors.  
 All of the six regions that are the subject of this research face the same 
problem: there are more personnel from other regions that want to move in to their 
region than personnel from their regions that want to move out. On average, in each 
region, there are at least 100 people who want to move in. Most of them are teachers 
and medical forces who have finished their duty in other regions outside of Java or 
who want to follow their partners. It is a fact that those regions that are located in Java 
that geographically and economically better developed than other regions outside of 
the island. In addition, in these regions, of the level of the regular personnel, the Native 
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issue is not a sensitive issue that could hinder the mobility of personnel through 
regions.  
 During the time when the centralized system was implemented, a personnel 
mutation from one region to another did not cause much problem because the 
employment system was controlled directly by the Central Government, including 
payment. Thus, when personnel moved to another region, the payment simply 
followed.  
 The following is the conclusion made by the State Personnel Efficiency 
Improvement Ministerial of the Republic of Indonesia, which sustains the analysis of 
the performance of institutional reform, especially of personnel in the regions, during 
the implementation of Constitution No. 22/1999. In the Minister’s view, the prevailing 
government system is considered to have made an efficient and effective bureaucracy 
impossible. The causes for this condition are the follows: 
a. Complex and bulky government organizations. A position in the bureaucracy is not 
established based on necessity but is made to accommodate existing personnel. Job 
division between the Central Government and the Regional Government is not clear 
that job execution often overlaps. All of this results in inefficiency in the usage of 
society’s money. 
b. An excessive number of civil servants who are not spread evenly. Over 60% of 
civil servants work in Java Island. In addition, more than 60% of them have only 
graduated from high school. The composition of the civil service moreover, is not in 
line with necessity. At the moment in, almost every institution, there is a surplus of 
administrative personnel, while specialist personnel, including technicians, are still 
very rare. People tend to work in the big cities nowadays. In the end, the positions in 
the regions that are supposed to be filled by technical personnel are filled by 
administrative personnel. This results in a lack of quality in carrying out governance. 
c. An employment system that is not based on a merit system. The new employee 
provision is based more on funding availability than on the necessity of performing 
duties. The placement of personnel in a position is not based on the competency but on 
the rank of the personnel. Unfortunately, in fact, high rank cannot be necessary 
identified with high competency. This, in the end, wastes the Training and Education 
Program. The working performance assessment is not yet done objectively because it 
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is still based on the behavior of personnel and not of their achievements. Promotion is 
not based on accomplishment but on the working period and the latest diploma 
possessed. It is not surprising that the professionalism of the civil servants in Indonesia 
is still very low.  
d. A payment system that is not fair and proper. The amount of one’s basic salary is 
based on rank. Meanwhile, the rank does not represent the burden of a position (the 
competency needed, responsibility and risk). In the end, two civil servants with the 
same rank might receive the same salary, though one works only as a typist and the 
other works as an analyst. This result in low working-motivation among civil servants. 
In addition, the giving of structural position allowances that are bigger than salaries 
causes civil servants to compete to be placed in structural positions, through both legal 
and illegal ways.  
e. The Honorarium giving allowances in addition to base the salaries makes the 
salary system non-transparent. This causes an economic gap between the employees.  
(Source: the summary of the Republic of Indonesia Government Bureaucracy Strategic Plan/Indonesia’s 
Civil Service Reform, 2001). 
 
3. Financial 
a. Financial Capacity 
 Implementation of Law 25/1999 on the fiscal balance between the central and 
local government has reformed Indonesia’s intergovernmental relations. This law 
changed the transfer system from earmarked grants into general grants. In addition, the 
law has increased the local governments’ share of government resources. According to 
World Bank data (2003), the bulk of regional government spending is financed by 
transfers from the center: over 90 percent of regional revenues come from the 
Balancing Fund (dana perimbangan) that includes a general grant (DAU, dana alokasi 
umum), shared taxes, natural resource revenue shares (see Table 4.12), and a special 
allocation grant channel (DAK, dana alokasi khusus). Local governments have limited 
original revenues (PAD, pendapatan asli daerah), adding up to only 7.4 percent of 
regional revenues. 
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Table 4.12: Revenue Sharing 
(Shares of revenues to central, provincial and regional government) 
Item 
 
Central 
Government 
Provincial 
Government 
Originating 
Local 
Government
Other Local 
Governments 
in the same 
province 
 
All Local 
Governments 
in Indonesia 
(Equal Share) 
Oil (non-tax, 
onshore)  
85 3 6 6 -- 
LNG (non-tax, 
onshore)  
70 6 12 6 -- 
Mining: Land-rent   20 16 64 -- -- 
Mining: Royalty    20 16 32 32 -- 
Forestry: Land-rent     20 16 64 -- -- 
Forestry: Resource 
rent   
20 16 32 32 -- 
Fishery    20   -- 80 
Land and Building 
Tax  
9 a 16.2 64.8 -- 10 b 
Land and Building 
Transfer Fee 
 16 64 -- 20 
Personal Income Tax   80 8 12 -- -- 
Note: 
a. The central government’s share in the Land and Building Tax is supposed to cover administrative 
costs. Not all categories of personal income tax are shared; excluded are taxes on self-employed income, 
dividends, and interest. 
b. According to Government Regulation 104/2000, of the 10 percent, 6.5 percent is shared equally 
among all regions, and 3.5 percent is distributed to those regions that exceeded their revenue target in 
the previous year. 
Source: Law 25/1999, Law 19/2000 (Income Tax), Government Regulation 104/2000, Bambang 
Brodjonegoro (2001), and World Bank 2004 
 
Nationally, from the 150 regencies/cities that are studied, the average 
percentage of PAD to the average income of the regency/Municipality in every 
province in 2001 is 6.6%. In 2002, the percentage stayed almost constant, rising only 
0.1 % to 6.7% (see Table 4.13). The biggest financial source of PAD is commonly 
received from taxes and levies (see Table 4.14). In most regions, the taxes and levies 
are commonly derived sources that are non-economically productive, such as the Street 
Light Tax, and the retribution from Regional Society Hospital Patient admittance. 
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Table 4.13: The Percentage of Provinces PAD to the Budget 
The percentage of the Regional Original Income (PAD) to 
the Regional Income and Expenditure Budget (Income) 
No Province 
2001 2002 
1 North Sumatra 6,81 8,03 
2 West Sumatra 2,86 0,24 
3 Riau 4,72 4,73 
4 South Sumatra 5,37 4,87 
5 Lampung 2,00 1,85 
6 West Java 9,92 10,37 
7 Central Java 7,68 8,08 
8 Special Region of Jogjakarta 10,46 10,18 
9 East Java 5,82 5,51 
10 Bali 33,48 28,80 
11 West Nusa Tenggara 4,59 7,01 
12 East Nusa Tenggara 2,91 3,01 
13 West Kalimantan 2,61 3,79 
14 South Kalimantan 5,76 3,60 
15 East Kalimantan 3,10 6,76 
16 North Sulawesi 7,45 7,86 
17 Central Sulawesi 3,57 4,41 
18 Southeast Sulawesi 7,98 7,56 
19 South Sulawesi 3,66 5,06 
20 Papua 1,04 1,77 
Source: Sistem Informasi Keuangan Daerah (SIKD), the Ministry of Finance, RI, 2002 
Table 4.14: Local Taxes 
Type of Tax Assignment Max Rate Sharing 
Motorized Vehicles  Province 5% 30% to local govt. 
Motor Vehicle 
Transfer Tax  
Province 10% 30% to local govt. 
Motorized Vehicles 
Fuel  
Province 5% 70% to local govt. 
Utilization of Water  Province 20% 70% to local govt. 
Hotel tax  Local 10% 
Restaurant tax  Local 10% 
Entertainment tax  
 
Local 35% 
Advertisement tax  
 
Local 25% 
Street Lighting  Local 10% 
Mining of C-Class 
Minerals  
Local 20% 
Parking tax  Local 20% 
 
 
A minimum of 10% 
of local 
government tax to be 
allocated to the 
relevant village 
Source: Law 34/2000 and Mark Rider, 2002, The Estimated Revenues Yield of a Piggyback Personal Income Tax, 
processed, August., World Bank 2004 
 
The three provinces that hold the top three highest average percentage of PAD 
toward APBD on the income of their regency/Municipality are Bali, West Java, and the 
Special Region of Jogjakarta. In 2001, West Java placed second. The next year, 2002, 
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the Special Region of Jogjakarta overtook West Java. Bali holds the highest average 
number in Indonesia because all of the Regencies/Municipalities in this region rely on 
the tourism sector that has become world famous. West Java, meanwhile, relies more 
on the farming and plantation products.  Of interest is the situation in Jogjakarta. 
Although this province is the second tourist destination in Indonesia after Bali, the 
tourism sector has not become its main financial source. Jogjakarta developed itself as 
a destination for education. This province has become the main destination for students 
because it is filled with a number of the most famous schools and universities in 
Indonesia.   
 Besides the Special Region of Jogjakarta, two other provinces that are the 
location of this research are Central Java and East Java. In 2001, Central Java was 
placed in fourth position and declined to the fifth position in 2003. Meanwhile, East 
Java’s position is still far below several provinces outside of Java. It is important to 
remember that the PAD level cannot be identified as the level of the prosperity of the 
people. However, the number depicts the competency level of the performance of the 
Local Government in managing its finance based on the potential possessed. 
 Comparing finance capacity (percentage of PAD toward APBD) among the six 
research districts, Prajan Municipality and Giri Regency are the two districts that have 
the highest capacity (more than 10%) between 1999 and 2004. Alit Municipality is at 
the medium level (average 10%), whereas Anom Regency, Kulon Regency, and Wetan 
Regency can be categorized into the lowest level (less than 10%). Table 4.15 below 
will compare the financial capacity among these districts (see detail in Chapter 3). 
Table 4.15: Percentage of PAD to APBD in Six Districts 
Percentage of PAD to APBD in budget year Regency/Municipality 
1999/2000 2004 
Giri Regency 13% 12% 
Prajan Municipality 24% 22% 
Anom Regency - 5% 
Kulon Regency 6% 6% 
Alit Municipality - 10% 
Wetan Regency 5% 5% 
Note: - = no data available 
Source: primary data 
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b. Project Inefficiency and Budget Digression 
Unsuccessful Reform 
Table 4.16 shows the data on project implementation inefficiency from several 
respondents. The table demonstrates several different answers from the respondents 
that are categorized into Java-Bali and Outside Java-Bali. The highest mean results 
from the answers of the journalists and NGOs, whether in Java-Bali or outside Java-
Bali. For Java-Bali, the mean of the journalist is 31.1 with 19.4 standard deviation, and 
of the NGOs 34.7 with 21.0 standard deviation. For outside Java-Bali, the mean of the 
journalists is 33.0 with 20.6 standard deviation, and of the NGOs 36.0 with 20.8 
standard deviation. 
Table 4.16: Project Implementation Inefficiency 
Java-Bali Outside Java-Bali Respondent 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Bureaucrats (N=2700 persons) 12,2 5 16,8 11,7 10 13,9 
DPRD (N=600 persons) 17,6 10,5 16,2 22,2 15 20,6 
Health Agency (N=150 institutions) 11,8 6 12,8 11,0 10 13,0 
Education Agency (N=150 institutions) 18,3 5 25,5 17,1 10 20,1 
School Principal (N=900 persons) 23,1 20 18,7 24,0 20 19,8 
Journalist (N=450 persons) 31,1 30 19,4 33,0 30 20,6 
NGO (N=600 organizations) 34,7 30 21,0 36,0 30 20,8 
    Source: GDS I, 2002Primary Data  
 
 The highest average number of answer was given by the actors that come from 
the civil society group (NGOs and journalists) and not from state actors (bureaucrats 
and politicians). This is natural considering the fact that they are outside the system 
that runs the projects and that they always hold a critical point of view in observing the 
policies that are implemented by the state.  Nonetheless, the above table also shows a 
critical answer by School Principals who in practice, are street level bureaucrat who 
have to face society directly. This group of people is predicted to be the group that 
knows exactly how projects are implemented in reality, including their inefficiency. 
 Another crucial problem that has to be faced is fund leakage that often becomes 
the cause of failure in many development programs. In the practice of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (UKM) budgeting, it appears that there is a tendency for the 
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realization of the budget to often be inappropriate with budget availability. Most of the 
respondents from DPRD, mass media and NGOs see that fund leakage is an important 
factor in the failure of programs and that it happens evenly almost in every region in 
Indonesia, whether in Java-Bali or outside Java-Bali (Dwiyanto, et. all, 2002). 
 In the Health sector, according to the Head of the Community Health Center, 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism usually occur in the process of drug provision, 
employee recruitment, service fee determination, and patient admittance. The highest 
instance of these practices is believed to happen in the process of determining service 
fees (the average number rates at 65%), followed by drugs provision (60%), patient 
admittance (50%), and employee recruitment (38%). 
 Viewed from the actor (see Graphic 4.4), it turns that the heads of the projects37 
rank highest concerning the number of bribes received. The next highest ranks are 
filled by Regents/Mayors, Local Development Planning Boards (BAPPEDA), DPRD, 
and etc. It is possible for the head of the project to receive the most bribes because he 
possesses the authority to decide which businessman will be chosen to be the associate 
partner and to decide the outflow of the budget. The head of the project also has the 
greatest access to interaction with businessmen. He plays the role as the distributor of 
the bribes received to all of the bureaucrats and the members of DPRD who are 
involved in the project. The Regent/Mayor is also capable of receiving high bribes 
because the highest authority in the region, besides on the DPRD’s is in their hands. 
There is a tendency for the increase of the authority of DPRD in the decision making 
of a region based on Law No. 22/1999 to result in increased authority digression 
through the practice of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in DPRD. There is a great 
possibility that Bappeda is also involved in the process of deciding the projects that 
will be carried out. The interesting data is that the NGOs and the journalists start to 
appear as new players in corruption in Indonesia. Their involvement in corruption is 
related with their involvement in the practical politics that are always related with 
money and power. 
                                                 
37 Head of the project is a civil servant who is appointed by the Regent/Mayor to lead the realization of a 
government project that is supported by APBD 
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Graphic 4.4
Actors who Receive Bribery (According to the Amount of the Bribe Money):
Businessman's Perception
Source: GDS I,  2002
 
Note: N of businessmen is 600 persons  
Relating to the KKN behavior, GDS I 2002 (see Graphic 4.5) has proved that 
DPRD and the Regent/Mayor have becomes the major perpetrators of KKN in two 
research districts, Anom Regency and Wetan Regency. This is expected because 
both have become the power center at the regional level. We also have an 
interesting finding that the DPRD seems to replace the Regent/Mayor’s position as 
the institution conducting the highest KKN practice at the regional level, followed 
by Regent/Mayor, National Education Office, Public Health Service, and also 
Office of Sub district and Countryside. The fact that DPRD has now become the 
most powerful institution and has used its authority to lift and riff the Regent/Mayor 
allows the members of DPRD greater big access to conduct KKN practice. It proves 
that power tends to corrupt. 
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Graphic 4.5
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Local Government 
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c. Transparency in the Process of APBD Formulation 
Unsuccessful Reform 
 In the process of APBD formulation, transparency can be achieved if, for 
example, society is given the chance to know and to propose the items that are going to 
be placed in the APBD. Graphic 4.6 shows the different answers that were given by 
state actors (bureaucrats and DPRD) and civil society actors (private sectors and 
NGOs). Most of the state actors affirm that the process of budget decision formulation 
has always been done transparently. This answer contradicts the answer from most of 
the civil society actors who state that the process of budget allocation determination 
has never been done transparently. How can the answers become so contradictory? It 
happens because between both groups there is a difference in interpreting the term 
“transparency”. The state actors believe that transparency has been achieved because 
the government always works using “bottom-up” planning, and DPRD always invites 
society to attend the last plenary meeting that certifies APBD. On the contrary, the civil 
society actors argue that the “bottom-up” process done is only a procedural detail that 
does not represent society, and the last plenary meeting is basically only to certify 
APBD and not to discuss the detail of APBD. For society, transparency is interpreted as 
when they are involved in the process, from planning the budget until officially issuing 
it as APBD. 
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The Level of Transparency in Detail of Local Budget Allocation
(According to Stakeholders Perception)
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Source: GDS I, 2002  
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 Several civil society actors, journalists and NGOs, also answer that the 
Local Government never socializes the APBD that has been certified (see Graphic 4.7). 
In contrast, the state actors think that by supplying information on the number of 
APBD in a certain year, they have done their duty. Apparently, for society, this 
information is not adequate because it does not give detailed information on budget 
allocation and its use. The Local Government and DPRD do not provide detailed 
information because in their opinion APBD is supposed to be a State confidential 
document and thus is not for public consumption.  
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 Publication of Local Budget
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Note: N of bureaucrats is 2700, N of the local house of representative members is 600 persons, N of 
journalist is 450, and N of NGOs is 600 
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d. The Performance of Budgeting System 
Unsuccessful Reform 
What was depicted about local government finance nationally above (a-c), begs 
the question of what really happens in the regions. The analysis below will explain this 
and is particularly focused on the new model of the government’s finance system, the 
Performance Budgeting System. This model was implemented by the government 
trough the issue of Government Regulation (PP) No. 105/2002 that basically states that 
APBD is arranged using the performance approach. This PP then is elucidated by the 
Ministerial Decree No. 29/2002 that regulates the Performing Method, Regional 
Finance Responsibility and Supervision with APBD Arrangement Method, Regional 
Finance Management Execution and APBD Calculation Arrangement. 
   The research shows that, actually, reform in the budget system has not managed 
to implement the real purpose of the Performance Budgeting System in all research 
districts. In general, the budget is not composed based on the performance achieved 
with the strategy or the priorities that have been planned. The change that does occur is 
only in the budget entry system, from the line item to performance assessment. An 
example of this is the implementation of the Performance Budgeting System in Giri 
Regency Government. This region is one of the nine Regencies/Cities in Indonesia that 
became pilot project for the implementation of the Performance Budgeting System. 
According to the evaluation of the Building Institution for Good Governance (BIGG), 
a donor institution from the US that funds this project, in the implementation of the 
system, this region was the most successful. The success can be observed in the 
implementation of the system in some of its departments. In the Health Agency for 
example, after the Budget Instruction is made by the Regent/Mayor, budget 
composition is started by the smallest unit in the department since they are the activity 
executor and the front row of the services. Each of these units composes Working-Unit 
Budget Plans (RASK)38.  These documents contain the working-unit budget plan that 
will become the groundwork for APBD composition. After corrected by the charging 
officials in the Health Agency, the RASK of each unit is then discussed at the agency 
level. This discussion will talk about the programs that will be carried out in that year 
budget needed. After the head of the agency approves it, this proposal will be brought 
                                                 
38 Starting from the 2005 budget year, RASK was changed into Regional Working Unit Budget and Working Plan 
(RKASKPD) 
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to the Executive Budget Team that is led by the Regional Secretary and that consists of 
some departments as its members, such as Bappeda and Local Assets and Finance 
Management Bureau (BPKKD). In the team, Bappeda will determine the kind and the 
necessity of an activity, while BPKKD will determine the value of the activity and its 
necessity in Rupiah. After the executives agree, the compilation of the RASK of each 
unit in the agency will be used as the groundwork to compose RAPBD that then will be 
proposed to DPRD.  
  This new system has at least changed the centralized bureaucracy practice in 
the department to become de-centralized. Previously, the authority to compose 
programs was held only by the elite officials in the Agency. With this new system, the 
coordination of each unit can be performed better. The entry system of this new system 
also makes the supervision easier because it enables fund sources and usage to be 
traced. Nonetheless, the basic purpose that was expected to be achieved in 
implementing the budget system, which was to compose programs and their budgets 
based on performance that has been accomplished, has not been achieved at all. There 
are some reasons for this situation: 
(i). Planning System Problem  
 Though formally the regional governance system has been de-centralized, it is 
not easy for Local Government personnel to change their habits in making policy, 
programs, or activities. Most of the Local Government personnel used to depend on 
their superiors in making policies. Thus, since the Central Government has now 
handed authority to the regions, the personnel who cannot have suggestions from their 
superiors anymore tend to only make new policies, programs, and activities by copying 
what had been done in previous years. In other words, the implementation of the local 
autonomy has not been able to encourage the region’s personnel to think more 
creatively and innovatively. As result, almost all of the policies, programs, and 
activities that are composed in the budget plan are only copies from the previous years, 
and are not made based on the performance assessment of the department. In the six 
regions that are the subject of this research, the officials that hold the authority to 
compose the performance budget of their department admit this fact. The following is 
the response from a head of a section of Anom Regency Social Welfare and Health 
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Agency when he was asked whether the policies, programs, and activities are 
composed as in previous years or not: 
 “Yes… we did compose these programs as the previous years.  If 
there is indeed a change, it would only be in the location or the aims. 
Usually for the budget of the program we just add about 10% from the 
previous years’ budget.” 
 
 This kind of planning model is much dispersed. Because it is not made based 
on comprehensive studies of the success of the previous years programs, the plan has 
no clear aim or direction. The following Table 4.17 gives examples of some programs 
and activities of the Anom Regency Health Agency in the 2004 budget year. These 
programs and activities exist in almost every budget year and every region, though 
they often appear under different names.  
Table 4.17: Budget for Health Program in the Anom Regency, 2004 
No. Program Budget (Rp) 
1 Society Health Improvement  
1.1 Village Medical Forces Coaching Meeting         17,201,000 
1.3 Trainee Coaching           6,790000 
1.5 Childlren and Mother Medical Instrument 
Provision  
        49,500,000 
1.6 Village Medical Forces Medical Instrument 
Provision  
        25,500,000 
1.7 Sanitation Week         76,743,000 
2 Health Services  
2.12 First-Aid Endowment           5.055.000 
3 Society Nutrition Improvement  
3.3 Nutrition and Food Viability System         27.167.000 
4 Disease Prevention and Extermination   
4.13 Venereal Disease Extermination            3.008.000 
4.22 Non-contagious Disease Surveillance            2.243.000 
Source: Anom Regency Social Welfare and Health Agency, 2005 
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  There is no doubt that these programs are good for society. However, without 
any comprehensive evaluation on the programs that have been done, it would be very 
difficult to know whether these kinds of programs are still needed and what kind of 
programs are needed as follow ups. As a result, in practice, the execution of the 
programs is done administratively only. The programs are done only as an obligation 
to fulfill the plan that has been made without considering the benefits of the programs 
to society compared to the amount of money spent on the programs.  
 (ii). The basic requirements unavailability problem 
   Ministerial Decree No. 29/2002 explains that a performance-based budget can 
only be composed with the availability of three basic requirements: Expenditure 
Analysis Standard (SAB), Performance Indicator, and Cost Standard. SAB is the 
estimation of the total amount of funds allocation for the working unit, programs, and 
other public services activities that are related with the society’s needs and demands. 
SAB is used to determine the cost appropriateness related with the function and the 
main duty of a working unit, to minimize inefficiency, to avoid overlapping of routine 
and development expenses, to help in determining distinct measurements, and to 
provide more freedom to the working unit in determining its own budget. Performance 
indicators that consist of input, output, benefit, and impact are used to evaluate the 
success of the output compared to the resources that are spent. The Cost Standard is 
the price of the cost unit per item in the form of goods or services that are used in each 
region.  
   From the three requirements, the requirement that is commonly unavailable in 
the region is the Expenditure Analysis Standard (SAB). This is because to determine 
SAB requires complicated and precise economic calculation. However, the problem is 
that in a performance budget, SAB is a must. Without SAB, the budget composition 
would be very ineffective. Without SAB, the personnel who compose performance 
budget would usually base their evaluation on their subjective view, without any 
formal verification. This subjective evaluation results in a significant difference of 
opinion between the department that proposes the RASK and the department that holds 
the authority to amend the proposal. Thus, the process to amend the proposal would 
usually take an exhaustingly long time. This is especially true because in making 
RASK, the department tends to propose budgets larger than the available budget 
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capacity. This strategy is meant to ensure a sufficient budget. However, often after 
being amended, the amount of the budget would decrease to only 50% of the proposal.  
This sizeable decrease often panics the department because then they have to revise 
their working program to suit the budget that is provided by APBD. There is a 
possibility that the department will stall their programs until the next budget year or 
even cancel them. It means that the composition of the performance budget is not 
based on performance anymore.  
   The Performance Indicator that has been developed by each department is also 
very ineffective. The quality of the indicators, whether at the level of input, outcome, 
benefit, or impact, is not good. It is very difficult to evaluate and to predict the success 
of some activities that are carried out. From the three a for mentioned requirements, 
the only requirement that has been fulfilled is the Cost Standard that is determined 
every year by the Mayor/Regent Decree.  
 (iii). The budget politicization vs. budget rationalization problem 
  The problem of budgeting is actually a problem of who gets what, when they get 
it, and how they get it. The process of budget composition is often influenced by 
political interests because there are many people with different interests that try to have 
bigger budget allocations than the others. The same thing also happens in the process 
of RASK composition. Political interest influences the process since RASK is still 
composed by the departments until it is legally included in APBD. Departmental are 
bureaucrats especially involved in this politicization. They are trying to retain the 
programs/projects and activities in their sub-unit as the same as the previous years. The 
result is that every year the budget hardly changes. The same programs appear every 
year without considering their benefit to the target group. The heads of the department 
also often have their own interests in the budgeting process. They are often, with the 
authority that they have, able to impose a project or activity in RASK. Their action can 
sometimes be based on their idealism or on other people’s lobbying.  
   The greatest involvement of political interest happens in the discussion process 
in DPRD that is conducted by the Legislative Budget Committee. In this process, 
DPRD holds the most power since it holds the authority to call on the government 
department to discuss the proposal that is inscribed in RAPBD. In the early period of 
local autonomy implementation, DPRD’s authority was only on the proposal abstract 
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that is made by the Executive Budget Team in RAPBD. However, since the 2004 
budget year, the DPRD holds greater authority. They are now allowed to discuss every 
RASK that is made by local government agencies. Previously, discussion on the RASK 
would end at the Executive Budget Team level, but now, it is discussed by the 
Legislative Budget Committee. This procedure often troubles the government 
department for they now have to face the Representatives directly to discuss every 
detail, including the program, projects and activities. Before 2004, this process used to 
take a long time because the Executive Budget Team would usually want to make 
revisions. Now, the process takes an even longer time. According to a head of one of 
the Bappeda divisions of the Giri Regency that handles various programs, a proposal 
of RASK can be revised seven times or more before it reaches its final draft. The final 
draft is usually significantly different from the proposal that was originally made by 
the department. According to Bappeda officials in all six regions, the percentage of 
difference between the proposal and the final draft could reach up to 50%. The final 
draft would often diverge far from the strategy and the policy that had been previously 
discussed by the executives.  
 The revisions can happen many times because during the legislative budget 
committee discussion, many people, especially the DPRD, groups and individuals, and 
also the head of the region, often interfere in the process. Each member of the DPRD 
would usually try to implement his/her own party’s vision. The members of the Kulon 
Regency DPRD from PKB, for example, strove to insert religious values, especially 
Moslem values, into the Local Government policy. They wanted all alcoholic drinks to 
be banned in the region. Their effort succeeded and it became a Local Regulation. As a 
result of this, the Local Government was forced to allocate funds to oversee the 
implementation of this restriction. In this matter, the Kulon Regency managed to 
become one of the regencies in Central Java Province that succeeded in putting 
pressure on the illegal distribution of alcoholic drinks. In the same region, there was 
also a case where the DPRD interfered for a negative purpose. A DPRD member tried 
to force through a road building project in a sub district (kecamatan) when, according 
to the Kimpraswil (the Public Works Agency) there were many kecamatan that needed 
the program more. As it turned out, the location proposed by the DPRD member was 
the kecamatan where he came from. Cases similar to this occur in almost every region. 
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There are often many DPRD members trying to force a project to be implemented in 
his/her region. This is actually because society still assumes that it is easier to propose 
a program through a member of the DPRD from that particular region than through the 
formal procedure that has been arranged by the government. 
 Another interference that also significantly influences the projects often 
comes from the heads of the regions. The head of a region usually has great ideas for 
massive and often ambitious physical projects. In some ways, these projects do benefit 
the region and society, but the downside is that this kind of project often costs a large 
amount of money. This, in the end would affect the budget allocation for each 
department. This kind of project occurs in every region and is always a controversial 
issue for the DPRD and society (see Table 4.18). 
Table 4.18: Examples of Some Controversial Projects in various Districts 
Regency/Municipality Projects 
Giri Regency International-standard football stadium, Matram Sewer 
revitalization, government offices building 
Kulon Regency Press centre building, Television Station 
Alit Municipality BK Library, Central Market, Tourism Centre 
Wetan Regency Instant “tiwul” plant building 
Source: Primary Data, 2005 
 These kinds of projects, carried out by the DPRD’s members and the heads of 
the regions, are called interferences because the program is often implemented in the 
midst of the discussion process. This action can change the budget plan completely. It 
is very often the case that the ideas of the DPRD members and the heads of the regions 
are very different from the General Policy Direction (AKU) and the Priority Strategy 
that has been agreed upon by both sides. The function of Renstrada, AKU, and 
strategic priority is therefore questionable, because in practice, the decision makers and 
their decisions are often not consistent with the rules and regulations. 
 
4. Planning Methods 
a. Regional Development Planning System in Indonesia 
The planning system referred to in this study looks at the way in which the 
Municipality/Regency Local Government carries out its development planning, from 
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improving the input (input from society and other stakeholders), running the discussion 
process, and deciding where and how the output that is still in the planning stages will 
be carried out. Officially, the government makes policy in the development planning 
system by combining the bottom-up system with top-down planning. The bottom-up 
system starts with a development discussion at the level of the village/kelurahan 
(Musbangdes/kel). The result of this discussion is then brought to the planning process 
at the level of the Sub District (kecamatan) often known as the Development Working 
Regional Unit (UDKP). The result is then carried to the Development Discussion at the 
level of the Regency/Municipality. In this meeting, people from different sector, such 
as NGOs, intellectuals, businessmen, religious leaders, the press and other public 
figures are invited. The result of this meeting then becomes the reference for the Local 
Government to compose the development plan that will, in the end, be written in the 
Regional Development Budget Plan (RAPBD). In practice, the process is often 
different from the planning logic. Political logic often plays a larger role in the process 
since there is a large amount of interest from many groups that are involve. Based on 
Law No. 22/1999, the authority to pass APBD is held fully by the Local Government, 
especially by DPRD. The Central Government, the Internal Affairs Department in 
particular only has the right to receive information the agreed on APBD. Figure 4.2 
explains how the process of composing the APBD is resistant to influence from 
elements outside the Local Government. 
In the figure below, it can be seen that the dominant actors that play 
important roles in composing the APBD are the head of the Region, the DPRD, the 
head of the regional personnel working unit, and some other officials that are 
responsible for the regional financial management. In the DPRD, there are the 
Legislative Budget Committee and the regional financial management officials that are 
both accommodated in the Executive Budgeting Team. This team holds the authority 
to decide whether a development-plan proposal can be included in the APBD or not. In 
this stage of the planning, the team is very resistant to any suggestions from outsiders, 
especially from non-government groups. The regional personnel working unit would 
not have the ability to influence the process, unless they had other forms of influence 
over the planning team. 
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Figure 4.2:  The Process of the APBD Formulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: composed based on the manual book for the Strategic Management and Budgeting/Finance Procedures Technical Training for the 
members of DPRD and Regional Government Official, a cooperation between The Regional Autonomy State Ministry and the 
University Connection Center-Economic Study, UGM, Yogyakarta, 2000 
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Besides Figure 4.2, the obscurity of the development planning process in the 
region can be seen from the excessive number of planning documents in the region. 
The next picture, Figure 4.3, tries to identify some planning documents and to 
understand the relationships and the functions of these documents.  
Figure 4.3 
Steps of Local Planning Process 
According to Local Planning Existed Documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanation of the Figure 4. 3: 
1. POLDAS= Grand Design Document (Macro Politics) 
2. PROPEDA= Managerial Plan Document, attached with indication of cross program finance (APBD 
and APBN) 
3. RENSTRA DAERAH (RENSTRADA)= Strategic Plan Document of APBD and it has function as Annual Report of 
Mayor/Regent (LPJ-KDH)t 
4. RENSTRA DINAS= Annual sector /operational plan document and attached with program plan matrix (activity 
detail) 
5. RAKORBANG= Discussion Forum to elect annual program based on Renstrada and Renstra Dinas. 
6. REPETADA= List of priority program/activity that will be written in plan of APBD based on  availability of Block 
Grant (DAU) + Special Grant (DAK) + Local Original Income (PAD) 
7. Responsibility Report of Mayor/Regent (LPJ-KDH)= it is be delivered in Local House of Representative (DPRD) 
 
Source : Munir, 2002 from Minister of Home Affairs Decree  No. 080/1160/SJ 
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 In the regional planning system, there are some planning documents that are 
related to each other and have a hierarchic relationship (Munir, 2002). These 
documents function as a guide and reference for the regional development plans.  The 
short-term, middle-term, and annual plans all consist of the following: 
1. Master Plan 
2. Comprehensive Managerial Plan 
3. Strategic Technical Plan 
4. Operational Technical Plan 
A Master Plan is a political document that contains the region’s vision and 
mission, the regional development policy aims, and the long and middle-term purposes 
(Munir, 2002). The Master Plan is often called the Grand Design of Local 
Development (POLDAS). POLDAS functions as the foundation and reference for the 
government personnel and society in composing and performing regional development 
programs. Therefore, POLDAS is supposed to be based on the potential, conditions, 
and needs of the region. POLDAS contains the introduction, general conditions of the 
region, vision and mission of the region, aims of the policy, implementation methods, 
and the closing (based on the Home Affair Ministry Regulation No. 4/1998). 
 The Comprehensive Managerial Plan is a plan that thoroughly encompasses 
regional development, whether it be funded by the APBN, APBD, BLN, the private 
sector or society (Munir, 2002). This comprehensive managerial plan document is 
introduced in the form of the Local Development Program (PROPEDA). PROPEDA is 
used as a reference to compose the Local Strategic Plan (RENSTRADA) and the Local 
Annual Development Plan (REPETADA). The complexity of the regional development 
problems that are exemplified in the program description needs to be anticipated and 
considered carefully using indicators such as the following: (1) situation analysis; (2) 
Growth Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) and economic growth forecast; (3) 
regional index; and (4) middle-term national policy that conforms with the Decree 
Letter of the Home Affairs Ministry No. 050/1240/II/Bangda. PROPEDA, consists of 
an introduction, economic growth forecast and the problems that will be faced, vision, 
mission, strategy, policy aim and priority of the region, activity and program plan of 
the region, and the closing.  
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 The Strategic Technical Plan, on the other hand, is more concerned with the 
technical side and focuses on strategic programs and activities. In the regional planning 
system, strategic-technical planning is introduced in the form of Strategic Planning 
(RENSTRA). RENSTRA is divided into two categories: (1) The Local RENSTRA that 
follows the PP No. 1009/2000; and (2) the service RENSTRA that follows the 
President’s Instruction (Inpres) No. 7/1999. Based on the Home Affairs Ministry 
Circular Letter (SE) No. 050/1240/II/Bangda, RENSTRA contains an introduction, the 
economic growth forecast and the problems that will be faced, vision, mission, policy 
aims and priorities of the region, five-year prioritized activities and programs for the 
region, working-performance evaluation and assessment, matrix of the region’s 
activities and program indication list, and the closing. 
 The Operational Technical Plan is often called the Local Annual Development 
Plan (REPETADA). The REPETADA is an operational plan that is presented in the 
form of a project or activity plan complete with a matrix of the action plan, target 
indicator, and performance of every activity. REPETADA functions as an introductory 
document for the composition of the APBD. Every activity needed to fill the 
requirement can be tested using this logical framework (Munir, 2002). 
 
b. Performance of the Regional Planning System 
What are the results from the planning system as explained above? The 
following is a description that describes the performance of the local government 
planning in the Regencies/Municipalities in Indonesia. 
 The first concern is the level of involvement of society in some 
programs/activities held in their village/residential environments. Graphic 4.8 divides 
the involvement into 5 activity categories: environmental sanitation; environmental 
security; water, irrigation, and pollution management; integrated health services 
(posyandu, etc); and street improvement and development (village streets, alleys, 
narrow streets, etc). On average, in relation to those five activities, 40% of the 
respondents answered that they often proposes suggestions during the activity planning 
discussions.  From the same Figure, it can also be seen that most suggestions proposed 
in the discussion concern street improvement and development (Village Streets, 
narrow streets, alleys, etc). On the other hand, the fewest number of suggestions made 
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concerned with the health services (such as Posyandu). This is so because most 
discussions held for the village/residential development concerned with physical issues 
such as the development of streets, sewers, small bridges, and ditches. The discussions 
held at the village/residential level often also discuss security. This is because most 
villages/residential areas are not free of theft. In contrast to this, the amount of 
discussion about the basic needs such as health and education is very small. The 
frequency of the suggestions concerning health services is therefore less those 
concerning street development or security. There are two reasons that can be said to be 
responsible for this phenomenon. Firstly, society still views development as an effort 
to build physical facilities. This view might be caused by limitations of people’s 
abilities or it might also be caused by the fact that physical facilities are actually 
needed. Secondly, it is much easier for the bureaucracy, to measure the results of 
physical development than to measure the results of non-physical development. This 
encourages the bureaucracy to introduce more physical development to society.  
Graphic 4.8 
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Note: N of the community is 9000 households 
 
The question that is used to further understand how society is involved is 
whether or not they were involved in the decision making of certain development 
fields. Graphic 4.9 gives an illustration that strengthens the conclusion of Graphic 4.8, 
that in general, society is suitably involved well in the decision making for security, 
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environmental, sanitary, street development, and water management issues. On the 
other hand, in the health sector, there were more people who responded that they were 
not involved in the decision making. Once again, the data shows the government 
dominance in designing the health development. Health development is a national 
program that is mostly controlled by the Central Government, especially concerning 
financial support and human resources. Though regional autonomy has been applied 
for some time, significant improvement in this matter has not been seen. The reason 
for this is that the Central Government still holds the power to decide how the health 
development is supposed to be designed. The Local Government, not to mention 
society, still often has to comply with the Central Government’s will. The Local 
Government cannot refuse the Central Government because most of the finances still 
come from the Central Government through a de-concentrated fund supply. 
 When further analysis is done to determine which society members have a 
higher level of involvement, the GDS I data shows that those who have a higher socio-
economic status, whether this is due to their income or education level, are more 
actively involved. In addition, people living in Java-Bali, especially men are also 
presumed to be more active. This proves that the processes of policy making in the 
region to this day is more accessible for those who are more prosperous. The level of 
education and the ability to converge with the means that support the process of policy 
making are predicted to be the main factors that cause the well-off to be more active. 
Why then are woman left behind in the process of policy making? This is related to 
Indonesian culture, which is patriarchal and places males as the dominant group in the 
decision making process (political). The process of policy making itself is often 
considered to be political discourse that is male territory. For this reason, it can be 
understood why women are marginalized in the decision making process.  
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Another was the level of involvement of society can be measured is through 
their donations, whether in the form of money, goods or energy. Graphic 4.10 shows 
that people donate more often to activities concerned with the environment sanitation 
and security than those activities concerned with water management, street 
development, and society health services. People prefer to donate more to 
environmental and security programs because these activities require mostly physical 
labor, which is the cheapest form of donation. Nonetheless, in these last couple of 
years, the frequency of donations from society in the form of money and energy has 
increased in many regions, especially in relation to activities that concern street 
improvement and development. However, this trend cannot yet be viewed as actual 
society involvement. This is because the occurrence of these donations is closely 
related to the inducement funds that the Local Government provides in order to place 
gentle pressure on the societies.  
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Note: N of the community is 9000 households 
  
As seen in the Graphic 4.11, the Head of the Local Health Agency and the 
Head of the Community Health Center (N=750) authority admits that there is a lack of 
society involvement in the policy making concerning health issues. The authority also 
admits that the level of involvement of society in deciding project tenders in the 
agency area, determining services fees, arranging programs, and working out the 
budget allocation for the health sector is still very low. This is caused by the fact that 
the authority to decisions making in the public administration is still centralized. 
Moreover, some of these activities are still fully controlled by the Central Government, 
especially the Health Department. The most controlled activities are those related to 
medical equipment and drug provision, building construction, and basic health 
program arrangements. Most activities that are tendered have a high project value and 
provisional network that is linked in an orderly fashion from the national to the 
regional level—such as medical equipment and drug provision. This provisional 
network is a form of collaboration between the public and the private sectors in the 
provision of goods for society. It is therefore not easy to that have a high project value, 
and even more difficult to bypass the provisional networks that have been in use for a 
long time. On the other hand, intervention in the health program in the region, besides 
being a direct result of the national health program, is caused by the strong inherited 
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segmented ideas in the process of development. Technically, this segmented paradigm 
is carried out through the will of several directorates in Ministry of Health to enforce 
their programs in the region.  
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Note: N of the Head of Health Agency and Puskesmas is 750 respondents 
 
The Graphic above explains several phenomena of society’s involvement in 
some development activities—including the acknowledgement from the public 
administration itself concerning the involvement of society in several activities. The 
next Graphic 4.12 explains the involvement of other stakeholders, such as the 
businessmen that are part of the Indonesian Construction Businessman Association 
(Gapensi) or the Indonesian House of Commerce and Industry (Kadinda). This graphic 
shows that the largest percentage of businessmen states that they are never involved in 
the process of development-policy making in their region. 
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Note: N of businessmen is 600 persons 
 
Who then has the influence in the process of development-policy making in 
the region, especially in the health sector? Graphic 4.13 identifies the existence of 
several actors in the region that have important roles in the process of policymaking. 
The Health Agency has the authority to propose promotions for personnel, to 
determine project tenders, and especially to execute health programs. The Local House 
of Representatives (DPRD) has the authority to determine the health services fee in the 
Community Health Centers. This authority is officially held by the Council because 
the service fee is related to the interest of society. The DPRD also has the authority to 
determine budget allocation for the health sector in the Regional Income and 
Expenditure Budget. The Regent/Mayor holds almost the same authority. Nearly all of 
the activities in the region are controlled by the head of the region.  
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What about the street level bureaucracy is in the front line to give services to 
society? Do they play any role in the process of policymaking, especially in the health 
sector? The next Graphic 4.14 shows the role of the Community Health Center in the 
process of policy making. According to the Community Health Center and Health 
Agency personnel, they do not have any authority over determining personnel 
promotion, proposing the health allocation in the Regional Income and Expenditure 
Budget, determining health service fees in Community Health Centers, or conducting 
tenders related to medical equipment and drug provision. Community Health Centers 
only have a minor amount of authority which encompasses organizing health programs 
and training its personnel. This fact illustrates how the level of the bureaucracy which 
is assumed to understand the needs of society does not play an important role in 
determining the services designed for society. 
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Note: N of the Head of Health Agency and the Head of Community Health Center is 750 persons 
  
The process of development planning, especially at the level of decision 
making, is believed to be often infested with digressed practices, such as the lack of 
transparency in the decision making process, which causes corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism to occur. The next Figure will explain to what extent the practice occurs. 
Graphic 4.15 shows that most of the Health Agency and Community Health Center 
personnel admit that the project tenders for medical equipment and drug provision, 
building development and maintenance, and office stationery is never transparent.  
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Note: N of the Head of Health Agency and the Head of Community Health Center is 750 persons 
According to the head of Community Health Center, corruption, collusion, 
and nepotism in the health sector usually occurs in the process of drug provision, 
employee recruitment, determining services fees, and, at the level of practical services, 
patient admittance. The worst level of these practices occurs during the process of 
determining service fees (the average amount is 65%), followed by patient admittance 
(50%), employee recruitment (38%), and drug provision (60%). The discovery also 
demonstrates that corruption, collusion, and nepotism happens evenly in almost every 
region in Indonesia, especially outside Java and Bali. 
 What can be inferred from the discovery? Although Law No. 22/1999 has 
mandated a decentralization of authority from the central government to the regions, in 
practice the authority is denoted as a transfer of authority from the political elite and 
the bureaucrats at the central level to the political elite and bureaucrats at the local 
level. In some cases, particularly with relation to its financial income, the region is still 
ruled by the Central Government. This is in fact far from the aim of Law No. 22/1999, 
which tries to encourage the decentralization of authority in society. There is only a 
small amount of evidence that proves that in the early years of the application of the 
Law, the Local Government gave a high level of opportunity to society to be involved 
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in the process of society-policy making in their owned region.  The authority to make 
decisions was still centralized and controlled by the regional elite, especially the 
DPRD and the Regent/Mayor. Even the street level bureaucracy, such as Community 
Health Centers, which are assumed to understand the needs of society do not play an 
important role in the designing of the services given. The result of this centralization of 
authority is a lack of transparency in the decision-making process that in the end 
results in several digressions in authority such as corruption, collusion, and nepotism 
in some government programs and activities. 
Unsuccessful Reform 
It has been explained above that the procedure for planning a development 
program at the national or local level is complicated and requires a large amount of 
funding, energy, and time. The various kinds of planning documents that are required 
also often result in an inconsistencies in the documents.  These problems occur 
because the procedure that has to be used from the start of the planning process until 
the final draft has been endorsed is ineffective. The following is the rough cost needed 
by the Wetan Regency to fund the overall procedure, from the village level to the 
regency/Municipality level (see Table 4.19).  
Table 4.19: A rough prediction of the funds needed by the Wetan Regency for the 
development planning process 
No. Kind of Activity Cost per item Total 
1 Development Discussions in ± 
120 villages 
Rp 1,000,000.00 Rp   120,000,000.00 
2 Development Discussions in ± 
22 Kecamatan (UDKP) 
Rp 2,000,000.00 Rp     44,000,000.00 
3 Development coordination 
meeting at the Regency level 
Rp 30,000.000.00 Rp     30,000,000.00 
4 Meetings in 37 agency/ bureau/ 
office 
Rp 5,000,000.00 Rp   185,000,000.00 
5 Meeting in the DPRD  
(10 times) 
Rp 5,000,000.00 Rp     50,000,000.00 
6 Coordination Meeting with the 
border regencies/municipalities 
Rp 5,000,000.00 Rp       5,000,000.00 
 Total  ±Rp 434,000,000.00 
(€ 40,000.00) 
Source: composed by the prediction of the author  
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 The total amount, Rp 434 million is a fairly accurate estimation of the money 
that has to be spent by a region that has a fairly large area. The number itself can 
increase or decrease due to expenses that are related to the development planning 
process, such as socialization and publication. These expenses are difficult to calculate. 
Every year from February to December, every government department is busy 
planning the development that will be carried out by the department in the next budget 
year. In other words, the planning process has become a routine activity carried out by 
every government department every year. This fact depicts the working pattern of each 
government department. It is very likely that the department spends 50% of its time on 
the planning process and only 40% on the implementation. 
 This total amount funds for planning process is actually a large number for the 
APBD. It could in fact fund a number of projects that are directly related to public 
interest. The large amount of money that is spent eventually becomes ineffective, 
because the final result of the planning that is endorsed by the executive and the 
legislative committees is often far different from the proposal that was put forward by 
society and other non-government group. A member of the Kulon Regency DPRD 
from the PDIP once tried to trace back the plan that had been endorsed to find out 
what the original proposal was that came from the Kecamatan:  
“I once tried to trace a proposal that came from our Kecamatan. I found 
that the result of the planning is completely different from the proposal 
that is recorded in the Kecamatan” 
 
He suggested that the difference is the result of the discussion at the level of the 
Regency/Municipality. In the process, political interferences from the members of the 
DPRD (either personally or through the party), the head of the region, and also others 
from outside of the government, often have influence. The influences from these 
people in determining a regional policy, program, or project, is far greater than the 
influence of the people that actually wrote the proposal.  
 An example of a project that was the idea of the head of the region is the 
building of the international capacity football stadium in the Giri Regency. The project 
was estimated to cost approximately 60 billion Rupiah. It was planned that 60% of the 
total funding would come from the Central Government while the rest would be paid 
for by the Giri Regency Government. However, the agreement for this funding 
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composition was actually only given orally by the Central Government through the 
Department of the internal Affairs. Thus, when the project was only to 20% finished 
and the funding from the Central Government stopped, the project also stopped. The 
region could not afford to fund the project by itself. Nonetheless, there are some 
programs in the region that were the ideas of the Giri Regent that can be considered a 
success.  One of these programs is the Matram Sewer Revitalization. This program 
started in 2003 and focused on the sewer that is located near a university. This area 
needed to be revitalized because it had started to become a slump neighborhood that 
was crowded with vendors that ignored the beauty and the orderliness of their 
environment. The Regent came up with the idea after he went to several countries—
one of them being Singapore—for a comparative study in the revitalization of regions 
that had the same problem as the Matram Sewer. This policy was at first opposed by 
the vendors and some NGOs because they thought that the vendors would be evicted 
and loose their income. However, after a series of long discussions and after sending 
some of the vendors representatives to Singapore to see the project, the policy was 
finally accepted by most people. Now, the area has become an ideal place for trade and 
the environment is very orderly.  
 The difference between the final result of the planning and the proposal that 
comes from the society is not completely the result of mistakes made by the 
bureaucracy and the political elite. Society themselves tend to follow more on wants 
than their needs in proposing a proposal. This can be seen by the fact that most 
proposals that are proposed are related to physical projects, such as village roads, 
gateways, announcement boards, night-watcher gazebo buildings, and so on. Society 
does not seem to have sufficient abilities to identify their actual needs. This lack of 
ability actually exists because the proposals are made at all levels by the elite that are 
commonly economically prosperous. All of the Bappeda officials from the six regions 
complain about proposals that are considered to be inappropriate needs of society.  
 The inefficiency of the planning process, especially the original proposal, 
increases when the bureaucrats act in the interest of their own group or department and 
not for the public when carrying out the planning. The following is a statement made 
by one of Giri Regency Bappeda staff who is often involved in the program 
composition: 
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 “The strategy and priority composition did not reflect the priority of 
the program and that activity that should be carried out.  It reflects to 
balance the activity of the existed agencies. This related to 
bureaucrats perception that consider more activities is more income” 
 
The statement proves that during the planning of a program, the policy, programs and 
projects chosen are not based on an objective analysis. It is very often the case that the 
planning is a result of a conspiracy among government units. They conspire to get 
money from the projects and activities implemented by their units. It is publicly known 
that the budget allocated to a project is often much larger than the budget that is used 
to fund the project. In addition to this there is often illegal over quotation and reduction 
of the project value so that when the project reaches society the value is very small. 
The research that was conducted by GDS I found that the over quotation could reach 
up to 30% of the total amount. This occurred especially in the projects tendered to 
private companies. The money from the over quotation was then divided among all 
personnel in the Regent’s office, including the typists and the janitors. In this case, the 
largest amount, 10% of the total, was taken by the regent. 
 The fact that a budget allocation is indeed a work and income balancing 
among the government units can be studied from the planning model that is still very 
fragmented. As explained in the previous section, the project and the activities that are 
designed by the government department every year are always almost the same as the 
previous years. The difference is usually only the location, the target and the budget—
the budget is the same as the previous years budget with a 10% rise in costs. Therefore, 
in the planning process, there is not any careful planning done based on the actual 
needs of society. In other words, the planning is based more on the needs of the 
government department units. Therefore, to fulfill those needs activity balancing in the 
planning process has becomes the most effective way. 
 Even though the sectored system had been left since the implementation of the 
regional autonomy, this system is still strongly used in the planning process. The 
simplest proof of this is the organizational structure of the Bappeda that still consists 
of the Physical Sector, the Economic Sector, and the Socio-cultural Sector. The 
division of the structure into those three sectors often means the program and project 
composition is segmented into these three sectors. In the history of Indonesian public 
administration, this segmentation has been worsened by the unwillingness and the 
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incapability of the personnel to coordinate with the other sectors. The planning process 
is therefore still sectored and the result is also segmented based on the division. This 
segmentation occurs from the Kecamatan level up. The following is an example of a 
proposal in 2005 for activities in the socio-cultural sector from the Geka Kecamatan. It 
was proposed to the Prajan Municipality Bappeda (see Table 4.20). 
 196
Table 4.20: An example of a 2005 proposal for activities in the socio-cultural sector from the Geka 
Kecamatan to the Prajan Municipality Bappeda 
Budget Field 
 
Program 
 
Activity 
 
Output/ 
Target 
Location 
 
Municipality 
APBD 
Self-funding 
Explanation 
. 
General 
Administr
ation 
 
1. Government 
Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Public 
security and 
orderliness 
improvement 
1. Development/Coordination 
of RT/RW, LPMK, Karang 
Taruna 
2. Kelurahan profile making 
upgrading 
 
 
Security and orderliness 
development 
 
Departmental 
Empowerment 
 
Departmental 
Empowerment 
Neighborhood 
watch gazebo 
Kelurahan 
Civilian guard 
Kelurahan 
Kotabaru 
 
Kelurahan 
Kotabaru 
 
 
Kelurahan 
Kotabaru 
 
500.000 
 
 
450.000 
 
 
 
3.250.000 
250.000 
 
 
100.000 
 
 
 
- 
Administration 
Division 
 
Administration 
section 
 
 
Orderliness 
Agency 
 
Health 
 
Society health 
development 
recovery 
 
1. Mosquito nest extermination  
 
2. PHBS Socialization 
 
3. Lung TB and PMO 
information giving 
 
4.PMT for the children and the 
elderly 
Society 
 
Society 
 
Society 
 
 
Society 
Kelurahan 
Kotabaru 
Kelurahan 
Kotabaru 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
2.250.000 
 
500.000 
 
3.500.000 
 
 
36.000.000 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Health Agency 
 
Populatio
n Affairs 
Registry and 
population 
services 
improvement 
Birth certificate ownership 
improvement 
Socialization for  
Society 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
 
1.200.000 - Population 
Agency 
Registry office 
 
Social 
 
1. Facility 
improvement 
for Social 
welfare and 
people 
empowerment 
sector 
 
 
 
 
2. Youth 
empowerment 
1. Capital grant and 
development for the elderly 
2. Posyandu APE aid 
 
3. PSM development 
 
4. USEP KM Development 
 
5. PPKBD development 
 
 
Karang Taruna development 
Society 
 
Society 
 
Society 
 
Society 
 
Society 
 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
900.000 
 
1.000.000 
 
3.000.000 
 
- 
 
1.200.000 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
500.000 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
Social welfare 
and people 
empowerment 
agency 
 
Sports 
 
Sports 
Empowerment 
Sports gear aid Society 
 
Kecamatan 
Geka 
- - KP3OR 
Source: Prajan Municipality Bappeda, 2005 
 
 197
 It can be observed in Table 4.20 that the government also divides the socio- 
cultural sector into several fields, these being general administration, health, 
population affairs, social activities, and sport. Almost every region has the same form 
of classification as above. The classification simplifies the budget allocation process 
for the government. However, it results in enormous difficulties because the 
classification unable personnel to organize their programs into one integrated program 
that aims at the policy priorities that have been previously determined. An example of 
this occurred in the health and social fields. The health field runs the health 
development recovery program for society, but the social division also has a facility 
improvement program in the social welfare and people empowerment division. Both 
programs carry out similar activities and could actually be merged into just one 
program.  
 The same thing also happens in the programs that are carried out by agencies. 
The health agency, for example, divides its programs into four parts, the disease 
Prevention and Extermination program, the Society Nutrition Improvement program, 
the Health Services program, and the Society Health Improvement Program. The 
Society Nutrition Improvement Program, which consists of Family Nutrition 
Improvement, Nutrition and Food Viability System, and a Food Supplement 
Improvement for Students, can be merged with the Society Health Improvement 
program, which consists of several activities, such as a Healthy Children Competition, 
Poor Family JPKM, and Posyandu Revitalization.  In addition, the Society Health 
Improvement Program is also similarity to the Health Services program, which 
consists of activities such as Health Services Aid for Poor Families; Drug, Food, and 
Drink Supervision and Developments; Medical Surgery for Harelips, Cataracts, and so 
on.  
 The above examples show that the sectored system is still prevalent in the 
program, project, and activity planning. One of the causes for this condition is the 
organizational design and management of the government department that still 
encourage the sectored system to be practiced. The health agency mentioned above for 
example, consists of four sub-agencies, Disease Prevention and Extermination, the 
Society Nutrition Improvement, the Health Services, and the Society Health 
Improvement. However, it is almost guaranteed that there would be strong resentment 
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from the personnel if the structure of the agency was simplified, through merging the 
sub-agencies that have similar functions. The segmentation of the agency structure 
strongly affects the planning process, because the sub-agencies usually divide the 
activities equally among all of the existing sub-agencies. The division of the activities 
without the consideration of their relationship results in the redundancy of resources, 
because each activity has to be carried out separately even though many of them have 
the same purpose. 
 The analysis of the above data shows that administratively there have been 
inefficiencies in the regional development planning process. The cost, in the form of 
funds, energy, and time, is larger than the results that can be obtained because the final 
result of the planning is possibly completely different from the proposal that came 
from society. This means that there are many aspirations from society that cannot be 
accommodated in the development planning. Nonetheless, on the other hand, this long 
and weary/tiring process is actually a logical consequence of the democratic political 
system. It can be seen that the Local Government is desperately trying to accommodate 
all of the existing interests in the planning process, though unfortunately the results of 
the planning do not indicate these efforts. Nonetheless, the effort can at least be 
understood as an effort to pacify the larger conflict that might occur between the 
government and society. 
 
D. Conclusion 
Comparing the performance of the reform components as explained above, the 
performance of the local public administration reform in the research regions studied 
show some differences, whether in the organization, personnel, finance, or planning 
method (see Table 4.21). Positive institutional reform (successful) was experienced by 
three regions, these being Giri Regency, Prajan Municipality, and Alit Municipality. 
Meanwhile, three other regions, Kulon Regency, Anom Regency, and Wetan Regency, 
showed negative results (failed). In the personnel reform, the Giri Regency and the 
Kulon Regency were the two successful regions; the Prajan Municipality and the Alit 
Municipality had a medium level (+/-) of success; and the Wetan Regency is 
considered to have failed. Compared to the reform components of organization and 
personnel, financial reform was harder and none of the regions managed to perform it 
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successfully. The financial reform success of the regions is only at an intermediate 
level—except for the Anom Regency and the Wetan Regency which are considered to 
have completely failed in the evaluation. From all of the reform components, the 
planning method reform was the most difficult to implement. None of the regions 
succeeded, and only the Alit Municipality was able to perform this reform successfully 
at an intermediate level.  
If the regions are classified into three groups, successful, partially successful, 
and failed, there are three regions that were successful in performing public 
administration reform, the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, and the Alit 
Municipality. The Kulon Regency is considered to have been partially successful while 
the other two regions, the Anom Regency and the Wetan Regency failed in 
implementing all of the reform components. 
Most regions had no difficulties in reforming the public administration with the 
objective of achieving competency. Therefore, they were relatively successful in 
implementing institutional and personnel reforms. On the other hand, they faced 
difficulties in reforming planning methods and financial aspects. Most of them failed 
except the Alit Municipality, which successfully reformed the planning methods (if 
this is measured by increasing community participation in local development). In other 
words, not all regions can reform the public administration if the objective of the 
reform is to make the governance system effective. This is related to the Indonesian 
political system which is still characterized by elitism, primarily in policy making. It is 
therefore difficult to involve non-state actors in the policy making process. 
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Table 4.21: Comparison of the success of local public administration reform in the 6 
research regions 
Public Administration Reform Components  
Districts Organization 
 
Personnel 
 
Finance 
 
Planning 
  
Public 
Administration 
Reform 
Performance 
Giri  + + +/- - Successful 
Prajan  + +/- +/- - Successful 
Kulon  - +/- +/- - Partially Successful 
Anom  - - - - Failed 
Alit  + +/- +/- +/- Successful 
Wetan  - - - - Failed 
Source: Primary data 
Note: + = successful; - = failed; +/- = partially successful 
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CHAPTER V 
Central Government Role  
 
 
This Chapter discusses an independent variable which influences local public 
administration reform. The independent variable is the central government’s role, which 
consists of two major variables, Decentralization as an Architecture Reform Variable and 
the Policy Reform Variable.  
This chapter will first explain what the local administration structure is according 
to Law No.22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 which became a foundation for the 
implementation of local autonomy. The background of the decentralization policy will 
also be explained including a depiction of some actors´ positions and interaction within 
decentralization policy making, and how the central government played their role, 
especially during the initial implementation of the decentralization policy. Secondly, this 
research will use the policy reform in the health and education sectors as explanation 
samples on what the central government’s role and was how policy reform interacted with 
administrative design. Finally, the research will also explain what the influence of two 
variables towards public administration reform in six research regions is.   
 
 A. The Political Configuration that Follows the Formulation and the 
Implementation of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 
 
1. Administration Structure Based on the Law No. 22/1999 
The turning point of the Indonesian administration system was the changing of the 
centralized system into a decentralized one. This system change was legally and formally 
recognized with the legalization of the Law No. 22/1999 on the Local Government and 
Law No. 25/1999 on Intergovernmental Finance. On January 1, 2001, those two laws were 
put into operation. The important thing in those laws was that the central government gave 
the authority to the local government to manage its own region. This meant that there was 
a new paradigm in the regional management system. The local government, which used to 
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only be the executors of programs made by the central government now, had to be able to 
make its own programs and to manage them according to the characteristics of the region.  
 As stated by the Law No. 22/1999, an Autonomous Region is “a unity of legal 
society that has specific borders, has the authority to manage and care for the local people 
with its own initiative that is based on the people’s aspiration inside the nation union of 
the Republic of Indonesia.” Meanwhile, Local Autonomy is defined as “the authority of 
an autonomous region to manage and care for the interests of the local people with its own 
initiative based on the people’s aspiration in accordance with the Constitutional 
Regulations”39. 
In the forming of a region according to the Law No. 22/1999 on Local 
Government, consideration should be given to the following: 
a. The economic ability factor; 
b. The regional potential factor; 
c. The socio-cultural factor; 
d. The socio-political factor; 
e. The number of the inhabitants’ factor, and other factors that could support 
the running of the regional autonomy.40 
The power sharing between the center and the region was implemented with the 
unitary state principle, but with a spirit of federalism. The authority that was handled by 
the center was the same kind as the one handled by the Government in federal countries, 
such as the foreign affairs, security and defense, trials, monetary, religion, and other 
matters that are more efficiently handled centrally such as macro-economic policy, 
national standardization, governmental administration, state business agencies, and human 
resource development. All of the areas that were handled by the center were stated 
explicitly in that law. In the law draft that was proposed by the Government, religion was 
one of the matters that was handed over to the autonomous region as a part of local 
autonomy. However, the MUI (Indonesian Muslim Leader Association) conveyed its 
                                                 
39 Article 1 items h and I Law no. 22 / 1999 
40 Article 5 Law 22 / 1999 
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objections to the Parliament and urged the Parliament and the Government to retain the 
religion matters because it was worried that religion-based regions would soon appear. 
The autonomy given had wide, realistic, and responsible characteristics. It was 
called wide because law only gives the rest of the authority held by the center to local 
governments (as in the federal country); it was called realistic because the authority ran 
lived, developed, grew, and needed by the region; it was called responsible because the 
authority given should be used to achieve the aims of local autonomy, which were the 
improvement of services and people’s welfare, the development of the democracy, 
equality and justice, and the maintenance of the harmonious relationship between the 
center, the regions and between the regions. In addition, the wider autonomy (autonomous 
freedom) in practice also meant a unified and compact authority for planning, execution, 
supervision, controlling, and evaluation. The autonomy that was given to the decentralized 
regions was also followed by the giving or handing over of the finances, means and 
infrastructure, and human resources. Since a province was considered to be an 
autonomous region and was also an administrative region, the authority handled by the 
province or the governor also included authority in the framework of decentralization and 
de-concentration. The authority that was given to the Province as an Autonomous Region 
in the framework of decentralization includes the following:41 
1. Authority run by the Regency and the Municipality, such as authority over public 
services, transportation, forestry, and plantation fields; 
2. Other governmental authority, such as the macro planning and controlling of 
regional development, training in potential human resource allocation fields, 
research within the Province’s territory, management of the regional harbor, 
environmental controlling, trade and culture/tourism promotion, handling of 
contagious diseases, and spatial arrangement planning for the province; 
3. Authority over sea areas including the exploration, exploitation, conservation, and 
management of sea resources; the organization of administrative interests, the 
spatial arrangement, the law enforcement, and assistance for the state’s security 
and independence; 
                                                 
41 Article 9 Law 22 / 1999 
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4. Authority that was not able to be handled by the Regency/Municipality was given 
to the Province with a formal statement from the Regency/Municipality. 
It can be observed that the criteria used in deciding the kind of authority given to 
the autonomous provinces is based on the efficiency of the province. This means that the 
province holds a kind of the authority seemed to be more efficient than that of the center, 
the regency or municipality—certainly with the exception of the authority given to a 
special province.  
Seeing the purpose of the local autonomy (the type and the amount of the 
authority), it appears that the economic growth and infrastructure provision are considered 
to be more important than the improvement of basic needs, public services and people’s 
welfare—unless the economic growth is indeed intended for the creation of work 
opportunities. The improvement of people’s welfare will probably be handled by the 
province, if the autonomous regency/municipality unable to implement autonomy or 
because the center handed it over to the province42. 
The decentralizing of authority to the region is arranged based on the pluralism of 
the autonomous region and the local autonomy. The autonomous region is no longer 
arranged by level (Dati I, Dati II, and the village as the lowest governmental 
administration unit) as in the New Order period, but divided, based on the type into, the 
autonomous region of province, regency, municipality, and the custom-society union (e.g. 
village). The type and the amount of the duties and the authority given to the autonomous 
region (local autonomy) are no longer standardized, except for some specific cases. 
Meanwhile, for the optional authority, the regency and municipality autonomous regions 
are fully authorized to choose the type and the time of execution. The difference between 
each autonomous municipality/regency lies not only in the type of optional authority 
handled, but also in the type of obligatory authority that is able to be handled. If this 
obligatory authority can not yet be handled, the authority will be take over by the 
province, for a period of time. 
Structurally, the governmental hierarchy in Law No. 22/1999 that gives a more 
autonomy to the Region can be described as follows (Figure 5.1): 
                                                 
42 Ramlan Surbakti,– Otonomi Daerah Seluas-luasnya dan Faktor Pendukungnya, working paper, 2000. 
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Figure 5.1: Governmental Hierarchy Based on Law No.22/1999 
 
 
 
             
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
  
  
In the framework of a unitary state, the Central Government still possesses the 
authority to supervise the autonomous region. Nonetheless, the supervision of the center 
over the region is still balanced by the larger amount of authority possessed by the 
autonomous region, and vice-versa. There is therefore a kind of authority balance: the 
supervision is not structural, where the Regent and the Governor act as the representatives 
of the central government and also as the head of the autonomous region is also not 
constitutionally preventative anymore, where each Regional regulation needs the central 
government’s approval to be issued.   
 According to Law No. 22/1999, the Regent/Mayor is the heads of autonomous 
regions who are chosen by and responsible to the DPRD. They can be dismissed by the 
DPRD in the middle of the administration period, although administratively the 
installation or the dismissal of the head of a region (through the issue of a Decision Letter) 
is still under the authority of the President. The governor, on the other hand, still serves 
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region. The Law No. 22/1999 regulates the authority of the Center and the DPRD to 
control the governor. The governor is the supervisor for the Center over the autonomous 
region. This new law was passed based on the law of supremacy. This means that every 
regional regulation made by the DPRD and the head of the region can be issued without 
any approval from the Central Government. Nonetheless, the Center can at any time 
postpone or cancel the regulation if it is considered contradict the Constitution, the 
legislation, or the public interest principles. Some short explanations of Law No.22/1999 
can be seen in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1: Main Points of Law 22/1999: Local Government 
Main Points Explanation 
Principles of 
administration 
Decentralization (Devolution), De-concentration (Administrative), Medebewind (Co-
administrative) 
Kinds of 
Authority 
The local governments have obligatory authorities (sectors) including health, education, 
public works, environment, communications, agriculture, industry and trade, capital 
investment, land, cooperatives, and manpower and infrastructure services (Art.11). In 
the elucidation of this Article: While local governments can hand back functions that 
they cannot perform to the province, this is not permitted in the case of the obligatory 
functions. 
Central 
Government’s 
Role 
Central government remains responsible for national defence, international relations, 
justice, security, religion, and monetary and fiscal policies. With this authority, the 
centre is allowed to maintain its organizations’ branches in local areas. However, the 
centre also has several policy functions for which it can no longer maintain an 
organization in the local area. These include national planning, intergovernmental fiscal 
policies, state administration, human resource development, natural resource utilization 
conservation, and national standardization (Art.7) 
Provincial’s 
Role 
The province is an autonomous region and it has no hierarchical relationship with the 
local government (municipality/regency). It has the function of coordination among 
municipality/regency in performing sectors (authorities). It can also, at the request of 
local governments, take on tasks that the local governments cannot yet perform. The 
main continuous function of the Governor (not the province) is to perform the task of 
de-concentrated. He/she is the central government representative in the province area.  
Head of Local 
Government  
The head of local government and his/her vice is elected by the Local House of 
Representatives (DPRD) for a period of 5 years. The DPRD can discharge him/her for 
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reasons specified by the law, including lack of health, lack of belief in God, death, abuse 
of position for personal wealth, etc (Art. 33 and 49). A head of local government can 
also be discharged for reasons relating to performance if his annual accountability 
speech or his special accountability speech is rejected twice by the DPRD (Art.46). For 
this reason, two thirds of the DPRD members must be present at the meeting to 
discharge the head of local government, and two thirds of them must endorse the 
discharge. 
Local House of 
Representatives 
(DPRD) 
Members of the DPRD are elected through a general election that is held once in 5 
years. They represent political parties that compete in the general election. Political 
parties can recall their members who sit in the DPRD for reasons specified in the 
political party’s policies. Funds for the DPRD’s work are included in the annual local 
budget. 
Local Civil 
Servants 
The local government has the right to manage its civil services, including hiring, firing 
and determining the number of civil servants in the local area. However, this Law 
conflicts with the Civil Service Law (No.43/1999). In this Law, the central government 
still determines to a large extent the civil service wages: base wage, position allowances, 
and family and rice allowances. Development of job classification and accompanying 
qualification standards is still controlled by the civil service agency (BKN). 
Organization The structure of local government organizations was regulated in the Government 
Decree (PP) No.84/2000, and was then changed by PP No.8/2003. This decree regulates 
and limits in detail the number, size and rank of the various agencies in the local 
government in detail. 
Source: Law 22/1999 
 
2. Background of the Local Autonomy Policy 
 The policy to hand over authority to the region through local autonomy, based on 
Law No. 22/1999, is closely relate to the political and economic events that initiated the 
fall of the New Order Regime. The monetary crisis and the economic bankruptcy that 
were experienced by Indonesia in 1997 resulted in a peak of public distrust of the ability 
of the New Order Regime to fulfill the needs of the people. People were starting to get 
impatient, and this was supported by the spread of the democratic and human right issues, 
which put pressure on some of the elite groups that had been Soeharto’s followers to 
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withdraw their support43. The same occurred with the Middle Class in the urban areas that 
had actually benefited from the development that was carried out by the New Order 
Regime: they started to get nervous and prepare for the downfall of the Regime. Most of 
the support in this Middle Class group came from educated people and businesses people 
who had started to feel dissatisfied with the increase in socio-economic disparity, as well 
as with the limitations of the political roles enforced by Soeharto’s circle of authority. 
Some people even dared to point out Soeharto’s family businesses that had earned much 
profit during his ruling period. There were incredible political intrigues among the elite 
and the military that were very unlikely to happen during years of Soeharto’s rule44. The 
fact that he was aging added to the decline of his ability to control the political situation. 
The authority that was previously held by Soeharto now started to break apart and was 
distributed to many actors. It can be inferred that since the economic crisis and the Central 
Government’s bankruptcy, the patronage politic structure that was one of the foundations 
of Soeharto’s rule started to loosen up. 
 Another big thing that occurred was the dissatisfaction of some regions toward the 
Central Government, for under the Regime, most of the natural resources in the regions 
were taken by the Central Government. This dissatisfaction was comparable to the 
PRRI/Permesta (a name of rebellion) mutiny in West Sumatra and South Sulawesi that 
was actually caused by the dissatisfaction of the people towards the natural resource 
sharing between the Central and Local Governments.  A large number of mine, forest, sea, 
and plant products were taken over by the State, and the Central Government took a larger 
share than the regions that owned the natural resources. This profit-sharing model was 
considered to be even more unfair when these natural resource products were then only 
enjoyed by a few people through corruption and collusion. In addition, as a result of the 
development model that tended to profit Java more than areas outside Java, local issues 
occurred. The situation encouraged several local elite to use the issue to gain support in 
                                                 
43  The group came from the military, bureaucracy, and Golongan Karya as the political party (ABG) that had been a 
loyal supporter of Soeharto’s authority for 32 years. 
44  The most interesting rumor that occurred at that time, before the fall of Soeharto, was that Soeharto and his family 
disliked Lieutenant General Prawobo Subianto who was the commander of Kopassus (Special Forces Unit) for he was 
considered disloyal because he joined the pro-reform group. Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto was Soeharto’s son-
in-Law and the son of the Indonesia economic Maestro, Soemitro Djojohadikusumo. 
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their region by putting blame on the Central Government. Some regions even started to 
ask for independence45, or at the very least supported the idea of a federal country as 
proposed by the political figures of that time46. The idea was mostly inspired by the 
success of the East-Timor Province in liberating itself and becoming an independent 
country and by the rebellion of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that started to 
demonstrate its power at that time. Amien Rais wanted to consider federalism as a long 
term objective of Indonesia, the first step of which would be giving broader autonomy to 
the regions. Mar’ie, however, saw the establishment of a federal state as an urgent 
necessity needed to dissolve growing tension and upheaval in the region. A loose federal 
system could accommodate the spirit of regionalism and provide a political solution to 
regional unrest which, unless given an outlet, could lead to unilateral action that would 
break up Indonesia.47 
 The idea to form a federal country was very strongly opposed by people who 
supported the union of the Republic of Indonesia. These people came from the nationalist 
group that were supported by the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), which 
was led by Megawati, and the military group that at that time was under the influence of 
the Minister of Defense, General Wiranto. The nationalist group was very determined to 
oppose the federal system because it was considered to be the beginning of the breakdown 
of the Republic of Indonesia. In order to conform to the public opinion of that time, they 
decided to support the autonomy, even though they actually preferred the centralized 
system that had been used so far. In their opinion, the centralized system was more 
proficient in ensuring the unity and wholeness of the Republic, because the system would 
suppress the potential disintegration that was growing in the regions48. Despite the strong 
nationalist group opposition toward the ideas of federalism and decentralization, they 
could not avoid public opinion that demanded a fair Central-Regional Government 
                                                 
45  Several elite in the regions such as Riau, Aceh, East Kalimantan, and Papua, which have a large quantity of natural 
resources, tended to choose independence over autonomy. In Aceh and Papua, this choice resulted in armed mutiny that 
drained a large amount of money from the government budget. 
46 The idea of a federal country was first proposed by Amien Rais, one of the reform figures that played a large role in 
the fall of Soeharto and then became the head of the MPR. This idea also received support from Mar’ie Muhammad, the 
Minister of Treasury that was considered to be the cleanest Minister in the late period of the New Order Regime. 
47  Ida Mokhsen, 2003. “Decentralization in the New Order Indonesia”, Australian National University dissertation 
48  The tendency of this nationalist group to prefer the centralized governmental system caused Megawati, in her ruling 
period as the fifth president (2001-2004), to often criticize Law No. 22/1999 for its shortcomings.  
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relationship. This was added with the fact that during the 32 years period of the New 
Order Regime, a centralized system caused disparity and inequality among groups and 
regions. In general, it can be inferred that the anxiety and the decline of the region's trust 
toward the Central Government was a threat that possibly weakened the unity of NKRI 
which had always been a symbol of the New Order Regime’s success in its 32 year ruling 
period. According to Pratikno (2003), a combination of public pressure and the lack of 
Central Government legitimacy would play a part in determining the decentralization 
policy after 1999. 
 To stop the increasing demand from some regions for an independence that could 
cause the breakdown of NKRI vessel, the MPR issued TAP MPR No. XV/1998 on Local 
Autonomy, Revenue Sharing, and Intergovernmental Financial. With this decree, the 
region was promised a greater autonomy that was different from the autonomy based on 
Law No. 5/1974 that was only administrative. President BJ. Habibie, the ruling president 
at the time that replaced Soeharto, used this momentum to gain support from the regions 
by trying to speed up the composition of a new constitution based on regional autonomy. 
In 1999, the DPR and the government then agreed on Law No. 22/1999 on Regional 
Government and Law No. 25/1999 on the financial balance between the Central and 
Regional Government. Both laws became a legal foundation for the local autonomy 
implementation policy. Nevertheless, neither was accomplished quickly because the 
government was not prepared to compose the hundreds of Governmental Regulations that 
would be required as a consequence of the implementation of the laws.  
 According to Pratikno (2003), the composition of these two laws was something 
that was done unwillingly by the Central Government under President Habibie at that 
time. As it is widely known, Habibie’s administration inherited the wretched economics, 
morals, and politics of the New Order Regime. One thing, Soeharto the leader of the New 
Order Regime, did not leave for Habibie was amount of the sufficient economic and 
political power which had been the foundation of his authority during his 32 year resign. 
The view that Habibie was a legacy of the New Order Regime was still quite apparent to 
society, especially after he did not manage to take Soeharto, his family and his corrupt 
associates to court. Furthermore, Habibie’s cabinet was still filled with people who were 
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raised and educated under the New Order Regime. Habibie tried to cover this fiasco using 
an egalitarian leadership style and portraying an image of a clean leader, but this did not 
work well. Another way he gained public support was by making bulky pro-reform 
policies. Thus, it is not surprising that Habibie’s government was the shortest lived 
government ever, but produced the largest number of laws, including Law No. 22/1999 
and Law No. 25/1999. Because both laws were made in a hurry, it is reasonable that they 
both had many weaknesses in them. 
 Evidence that the laws were made in hurry can be seen in the fact that they 
contradict other laws. One example is Law No.43/1999 on Civil Servant Management, 
which was issued only a few months after the enactment of Law No.22. This Law gave the 
authority over civil servant management to the President. This Law also required the 
central government’s approval for staff recruitment and promotion in the regions. 
Contrary to this, Law No.22/1999 decentralized the authority over local personnel 
management to the local public administration. This contradiction created tension between 
the central and local governments (Mokhsen, 2003). 
 Another example is Law No.22/2001 on the mining sector, which allowed the 
central government to retain the right to award lucrative mining contracts and set the 
terms, including how the profits and royalties or fees should be shared out. This Law 
conflicted with the Article 8 of Law No.22/1999. This caused disappointment in some 
regions (Mokhsen, 2003). 
 It is possible that the contradiction between one constitution and the other was 
caused by the sectoral characteristics in the Indonesian public administration, where each 
sector tended to work on its own. It was even often the case where many institutions 
handled the same sector but each worked independently. One director in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs explained the situation: 
“There is not only at local level, some officer at central government level 
don’t have capability to see what happened in citizenship/resident does. For 
example is the amount of resident, now what institution should be 
responsible to manage it? The Population Registration (Adminduk) in 
Ministry of Home Affairs namely is the General Director of Adminduk. 
Meanwhile, quality of human resource (resident) is carried out by the 
Ministry of Woman Empowerment. The quality of human resource also 
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carried out by Board of National Prosperity and Family Planning (BKKBN), 
and the Department of Transmigration also manage resident mobility. So, 
resident’s affairs are managed by 4 ministries/departments” 
  
The rush in this constitution composition can also be seen from the large number of 
the Governmental Regulations (more than 200) that had to be made to support the 
implementation of these two laws. Almost all of the articles indicated that to implement 
these laws, Governmental Regulations were needed. The problems that arose from the 
inconsistency of one Governmental Regulation with another has not yet been considered, 
and will be discussed in the next part. 
 Referring to the rush in the process of composing the two laws on local autonomy 
that resulted in unclear authority between government levels, the Director of the Ministry 
of Home Affairs made an interesting comment: 
“For me, it is a discourse which has occurred in early twentieth century in 
America, a debate between politics and public administration. If politics gets 
firstly the power, but politics do not know how to implement. Meanwhile, 
public administration takes the power, but public administration does not 
know how to get finish its duty. I fully understand because the designers of 
Law No. 22/1999, most of them are politicians and political experts” 
  
Most of the people who composed both laws were experts in political science, or 
people still active in a political party. The basic idea of composing these laws was to de-
centralize the authority from the Central Government to the Local Government because 
the Central Government was still in the midst of economic and political decline. With this 
opportunity for authority sharing, an effort was made to facilitate the authority 
transmission to the region through the laws as the legal foundation. 
In spite of their shortcomings, both laws that regulated the Regional Government 
implementation gave a different trend to the autonomy policy. If during the 
implementation of Law No. 5/1974, the autonomy that was given to the region was only 
administrative (elusive autonomy), then with the new laws, autonomy was defined as a 
process of policy making and asset control by the region as written in the laws. The 
emphasis of the autonomy was on the regency/municipality. This was achieved by 
deleting the concept of Second-Level Region and First-Level Region. The consequence of 
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this was that the regency/municipality was no longer under the authority of the province. 
Both now had level positions. The Regent/Major no longer filled the Head of Field 
Administration position, but was the head of the local self-government. A number of 
Department Offices that were branches of the Department in the regency/municipality 
were closed and merged into autonomous agencies, with the exception of the Religious 
and Court Affairs. The new laws on Regional Government did indeed strictly remove the 
administrative field position from the regency/municipality. In other words, the integrated 
Prefectoral System that was centralistic and became the foundation of the Regional 
Government system based on Law No. 5/1974, was replaced with the Functional System. 
The older system was believed to have caused confusion in the understanding of the 
concept of local autonomy during the implementation of Law No. 5/1974 that the region, 
especially the regency/municipality, became less developed and was very dependent to the 
Central Government policy. 
 
3. The initial Implementation of the Local Autonomy Policy and its Impact on Local 
Public Administration Reform 
  
The 1999 General Election resulted in a new political power configuration both in 
parliament and the national leadership. The MPR that was formed in October under the 
leadership of Amien Rais then chose Abdurrahman Wahid as the fourth President 
replacing BJ Habibie49. The same as his predecessor, President Wahid also tried to gain 
public sympathy from the region by supporting regional autonomy. In his cabinet, he 
formed the State Ministry of Regional Autonomy Affairs. This ministry, led by Ryaas 
Rasyid, was responsible for preparing everything related to the implementation of the 
local autonomy policy50. The hardest assignment of this ministry was the coordination of 
the preparation of the Governmental Regulation composition which consisted of more 
than 200 Governmental Regulations. Not only that, the ministry also had to amend other 
                                                 
49  Abdurrahman Wahid was the head of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Moslem Organization in 
Indonesia that has suburban people as its base members. In addition, he was also active in some NGOs that 
voiced democracy and humanity. Physically, Abdurrahman Wahid was limited after his stroke. His vision 
was very bad. 
50  Ryaas Rasyid was an expert on government sciences and one of the people behind the composition of 
Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999. 
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laws to be in line with the laws that on local autonomy. The preparation of the 
Governmental Regulation composition for the implementation of Law No. 25/1999 was 
done mostly by the Ministry of Treasury. The large numbers of Governmental Regulations 
that had to be made, faced many problems, such as coordination problem between the 
departments. This was difficult, especially since politically the State Ministry of Regional 
Autonomy was a new ministry that had not yet been properly established. Until early 
2000, the progress in this preparation was so slow that the regions and the political experts 
protested. They considered the Central Government to be incapable of and unwilling to 
implement the new de-centralized policy. The director of the Home Affairs Ministry 
agreed with this: 
„The problem is a blurred boundary between the Central Government and 
the Local Government. The local government is just like very depressed 
person transformed into a free man. On the other side, the Central 
Government, they have loss a huge amount of authority, and they don’t want 
to lose their authority. So, the local government feels that they aren’t totally 
free because the Central Government is chasing their tail” 
  
In order to pacify the region and due to the pressure of many groups, the Central 
Government announced that the new regional autonomy laws would be implemented from 
April 2000. Not surprisingly, the deadline was not achieved since there were very 
supporting regulations. Thus, as was predicted before, the government had to postpone the 
implementation to, the earliest September and the latest January 2001. 
 During the preparation period, many political and administrative changes occurred. 
In April 2000, President Wahid signed in the action form of a board, as mandated by Law 
No. 22/1999, the Regional Autonomy Consultative Board (DPOD) that was to make 
policy suggestions, whether to the President or the DPR, on the preparation of the 
implementation of local autonomy51. One of the DPOD’s assignments that was performed 
                                                 
51  Article 115 elucidated that the DPOD function was to give consideration to the President on: a) the 
forming, deletion, mergers, and expansion of regions, b) the balancing of Regional and Central Government 
finance, and c) the ability of the regency/municipality to perform certain tasks as stated by Article 11. The 
DPOD was headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Treasury worked as the deputy. 
The members were the Minister of the State Secretary, other Ministers as required, Representatives from the 
Regional Government Association, and Regional Government Representatives that were chosen by the 
DPRD.  
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well was the formation of new autonomous regions. By the end of 2000, four provinces 
and around 40 new regencies/municipalities had been formed52. Meanwhile, the other two 
DPOD assignments were performed very slowly. The success of the DPOD in forming 
new autonomous regions was actually caused more by strong political pressure from the 
regions to form new autonomous regions. The new de-centralized policy had indeed 
changed the political configuration at the local level, especially in the reappearance of the 
local elite that had so far had been unable to fulfill their wishes to control local politics. 
The excessive regional spirit as a response to the repressive attitude of the Central 
Government during the New Order Regime, combined with the occurrence of the native 
issue encouraged the formation of the new autonomous regions.  
 As well as agreeing to the formation of the DPOD, the President also agreed to 
form a Coordination Team to implement Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999. This 
team was headed by the State-Minister of Regional Autonomy Affairs. The team functions 
were to prepare the strategy for autonomy, compose the draft of the supporting 
implementation regulations, and monitor the improvement of the autonomy. However, the 
performance of this institution did not differ greatly from the State Ministry of Regional 
Autonomy Affairs. It lacked the capability to produce supporting regulations that were 
desperately needed by the regions in order to implement the autonomy policy. This 
occurred because the government departments that were under the coordination of the 
State Minister of Regional Autonomy were not serious in wanting to transfer some of the 
authority that had been under their control for years to the regions. This was the reason 
why the composition process of these supporting regulations was always stalled.  
  The first Governmental Regulation that was directly related to the implementation 
of autonomy was PP No. 25/2000 on the Central Government and the Regional 
Government Authority. The Governmental Regulation that was issued around May 2000 
was actually very confusing because Law No. 22/1999 stated that the autonomy was to be 
given to the regency/municipality but the Governmental Regulation only included the 
central and the provincial authority, while the regency/municipality authority was ignored. 
The Central Government’s argument was that the giving of authority must be done step by 
                                                 
52 Ida Mokhsen, 2003, Ibid 
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step, taking into account the abilities of the region. In other words, the Central 
Government was actually still in doubt about the ability of the regency/municipality 
government to take over the authority as mandated by Law No. 22/1999 (Dwiyanto, 
2003). However, according to one of the personnel who also helped compose the 
Government Regulations, the theory that was used to compose the Government 
Regulations was the Residue Theory. Based on this theory, the regency/municipality 
regions only get the leftovers of the authority that was previously distributed to the Central 
and Provincial Government. This proves that the Central Government was indeed still 
reluctant to hand over its authority to the regencies/municipalities. Information from 
another source showed that the Governmental Regulations were made because the Central 
Government did not have any information on the abilities of the regencies/municipalities 
to use its authority (Dwiyanto, 2003). 
 The following is the opinion that was given by one director in the State Ministry 
for State Personnel Empowerment in relation to the performance of PP 25/2000: 
 “Unfortunately, this regulation failed to clarify the division of power 
between the different levels of government. All activities to be performed by 
the central and provincial government are listed in this regulation, but it is 
not clear what powers are actually being devolved to the district level. 
Moreover, responsibility over most sectors is shared. Meanwhile, it is not 
clear how the coordination should be done. As a scholar noted, the 
regulation fails to clarify where the power to govern lies”. 
  
Since this Governmental Regulation was issued, local autonomy became very hazy 
because this regulation did not clarify the authority of the regency/municipality as 
mandated by Law No. 22/1999. The lack of clarity as to where this authority lay then 
affected the implementation performance of each authority. We can look back to the GDS 
I 2002 data on the opinion of the respondents in the region. More than 50% of both 
government and non-government officials felt that the issue on the authority sharing 
between the Central, Provincial, and Regency/municipality Government was the first local 
autonomy problem that had to be solved (Dwiyanto, 2003). There were also many 
government officials in the research region that complained about this authority sharing. 
They argued that the indistinctness and the uncertainty of the problem affected their work 
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performance, because the supporting regulations from the region that were supposed to be 
used as the legal foundation for the authority also became hazy or even not existed. This 
included their activity in performing the public administration reform in the region. 
Responding to this sluggishness, Ryaas Rasyid reasoned that until the local autonomy was 
fully implemented, several central institutions had not yet facilitated the authority giving 
as mandated by PP No. 25/2000. Until this happens, there are still many constitutional 
products (Presidential Decrees mostly) required by the region as a legal foundation to 
perform various government services that are not yet available53. 
 The General Director of Public Administration, from the Department of Internal 
Affairs, admitted that there was friction between the authority of the Central and Regional 
Government. The spacious autonomy as regulated by Article 7 (2) and Article 9 (1) tended 
to be understood “literlijk” and considered every authority beyond the authority of the 
Central Government as the full authority of the region. On the other hand, the sectoral 
department in the Central Government also based their actions on each sectoral law that 
was supposedly adapted to Law No. 22/1999. This had apparently not been done yet54. 
This confession supported the previous statement that there were still indeed many 
sectoral laws that were not synchronic with the laws that regulated regional 
administration.  
 One of the reasons for this indistinctness of authority was the inexistence of a 
hierarchic relationship between the provincial and the regency/municipality governments. 
For most of the regencies/municipalities, this was used as a reason for them not to obey 
the province’s Governor anymore. Ryaas, as the designer of these laws, acknowledged the 
divergence. The concept of the inexistence of level-autonomy was also included in Law 
No. 5/1974, though it was not stated explicitly. Subsequently, Ryaas criticized the 
Governors that still carried on the old bureaucratic culture that tended to be patrimonial 
and accused this culture as being the reason for the governors’ complaints that the 
regency/municipality did not obey them anymore. Furthermore, Ryaas stated that they 
                                                 
53 Ryaas Rasyid. 2002. Otonomi Daerah: Latar Belakang dan Masa Depannya, a paper presented in a National 
Seminar „Setahun Implementasi Kebijakan Otonomi Daerah“that was held by the masters program of Regional 
Autonomy and Local Politics, UGM 
54 Ryaas Rasyid. 2002. ibid 
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who desired the autonomy to be placed in the hands of the province instead of the 
regency/municipality placed the province in an almost equal position to that of the State in 
the Federal System55. 
 While the debate on this hazy authority sharing was not finished, there was 
political turbulence in the Central Government caused by the closure of some Ministries, 
including the State Ministry of Regional Autonomy Affairs in August 2000, President 
Wahid was the one that made these changes56. The Ministry then merged into the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, and its status was changed to be at the same level as the General 
Directorate. Anything that was related to the local autonomy was now automatically 
handed to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which in that period was headed by Surjadi 
Sudirdja57. Besides for budget reductions and simplification of the government institution, 
it is not clear why the government closed the State-Ministry of Regional Autonomy 
Affairs. However, according to the director of the State Ministry for State Personnel 
Empowerment: 
“…the closure of the Ministry of Regional Autonomy indicated that the 
Government did not consider local autonomy a priority. The Central 
Government’s half-hearted approach to local autonomy policy was also 
underlined by the appointment of Surjadi Sudirdja--a retired military officer--
as the Minister of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy because he did not 
seem to support the implementation of local autonomy policy”. 
  
In the above explanation, it was stated that one of the anti-autonomy groups was the 
military that was worried that the implementation of autonomy would result in the 
disintegration of the nation. Surjadi, a former military officer felt that most regions were 
not prepared to implement the autonomy, and that did not even understand autonomy 
(Mokhsen, 2003, see also Media Indonesia, 20 March 2000). 
 Since the Minister of Regional Autonomy was dismissed and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs was controlled by people who were not pro-autonomy, the influence of the 
group that wanted to restore the centralized system was getting stronger. These groups 
                                                 
55  Ryaas Rasyid. 2002. ibid 
56 Ryaas Rasyid then placed the position of the Minister of State Personnel Empowerment. 
57  Surjadi Sudirja was an army retiree. His last rank was General Lieutenant. Before he was appointed as the Minister 
of Internal Affairs, he was the Governor of the Capital the Special Region of Jakarta.  
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were those who lost their authority through the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 and 
Law No. 25/1999, such as the technical departments in the central and provincial 
governments. The pro-autonomy group in the regency/municipality governments showed 
their strength by forming an association that included the DPRD. Ryaas Rasyid once even 
suggested the formation of a kind of a board outside the DPOD consisting of members 
from various departments to speed up the implementation of local autonomy. The council 
would prevent centralistic ambitions in the bureaucracy and cut the red tape to bring about 
concrete and effective changes. Ryaas’s proposal was, however, rejected by President 
Wahid. Instead, he established the Directorate General of Regional Autonomy within the 
Ministry of Home Affairs to take up the tasks previously performed by the State Ministry 
for Regional Autonomy (Mokhsen, 2003)58. 
 Ryaas even suspected that there was a tendency for the Central Government to 
slow down the process of local autonomy using various ways, such as withdrawing the 
authority through Presidential Decrees and Circular Letters from the Minister of Internal 
Affairs/the Head of the Land Agency, a unilateral decision by some departments on the 
decision of authority given to the regions, including the tardiness in the process of making 
hundreds of President’s Decisions on the standard of minimum services that was required 
as a guidance for the regional regulations contained in various fields of government 
services59.  
 Thus, since that moment, the future of local autonomy as mandated by Law No. 22 
and No. 25/1999 became indistinct in every way. The concepts that were developed in 
composing the supporting regulations were often different from the spirit of the laws. An 
example of this is a Governmental Regulation that signed by President Wahid in 
September, PP No. 84/2000 that the structure of the Regional Government personnel. 
Based on Law No. 22/1999, Article 28, it was clear that the arrangement of the Regional 
Government personnel was under the full authority of the region, considering the needs 
and the conditions of each region. However, this Governmental Regulation explicitly 
                                                 
58 The increasing difference between President Wahid and Ryaas Rasyid on the preparation of the implementation of 
the local autonomy, according to Mokhsen, was the reason why Ryaas Rasyid, the initiator of the local autonomy, 
resigned from the cabinet. 
59 Ryaas Rasyid.2002. ibid. 
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withdrew the authority, and the Central Government then tried to make the positional 
structure of the Regional Government uniform. This Governmental Regulation also had 
several weaknesses. The following is the opinion of the director of the State Ministry for 
State Personnel Empowerment: 
„PP 84/2000 introduces a “one size fits all” hierarchy for regional officials. 
At the provincial level, the top position is the Provincial Secretary at echelon 
Ia. Below the Provincial Secretary are the Heads of Provincial Dinas at 
echelon IIa. At the district level, the top position is the District Secretary (City 
Manager), at echelon IIa. Below the Secretary are the heads of District Dinas 
at echelon IIb. This regulation was criticized for it did not take into account 
the different sizes of provinces and districts. For example, the secretaries for 
Mojokerto Municipality with 100 thousands citizens and Surabaya 
Municipality with almost 3 million residents have the same status. Clearly the 
task of the Secretary of the metropolitan city of Surabaya is much more 
complex than that of the Secretary of the town of Mojokerto”. 
 
The echelon uniformity between governmental levels, even between regions with 
different challenges, affected the working motivation of the officials. The officials in the 
complex region would complain that the heavy workload of his/her echelon level was 
considered equal with that of the officials in other region with the same or different 
government levels.  
 Besides its weakness in the ability to determine the echelon structure based on the 
difference in the duties between the regions, this Governmental Regulation was also 
flawed in that it did not have specific indicators as the foundation for the formation of an 
organizational unit in the region. Many regions arranged their organizations without 
considering the needs and conditions of the region. This arrangement was often aimed at 
accommodating the interests of the bureaucratic and the local political elite that wanted to 
retain their positions in the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, on the other hand, there were several 
regions that tried to arrange their organizations to be as compact as possible by merging 
several agencies into one agency. Unfortunately, the mergers often did not calculate the 
similar functions. The result was that the working rhythm of the organization became 
awkward as the duties of several areas no longer worked in synchrony.  
 This Governmental Regulation also proved that the reform effort was only partial 
because the calculations that were done on this Governmental Regulation did not include a 
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regional financial burden. Based on this Governmental Regulation for example, almost all 
that were once echelon V became echelon IV, echelon IV became echelon III, and echelon 
III became echelon II. The officials in the region welcomed the raise happily because the 
structural allowance was also raised. However, the direct result of this was that APBD that 
was used to pay the raise doubled. According to Mokhsen’s calculation (2003), at that 
time the allowance raise was 140.000 Rupiah for the lowest echelon and 3,5 million 
Rupiah for the highest echelon. In addition, there were many regions that in practice did 
not dismiss all of the echelon V, considering the region’s needs and humanity factors. As 
the result, the region’s financial burden was heavier through paying these allowances. The 
excessive amount of structural allowance for the officials is believed to be the main factor 
in the increase of the budget used to finance the bureaucracy. In practice, this budget was 
even larger than the budget for the regional development. According to Mawardi (2002), 
many regions used 80%-90% of its APBD to finance the regional executive or legislative 
overhead expense. 
 In relation to the personnel authority, the government issued Governmental 
Regulation No. 96 to No. 101. According to Mokhsen (2003), these Governmental 
Regulations contradicted PP. No. 84 because they gave full authority to the Head of the 
Region to manage the personnel. PP No. 96, for example, states that: 
„Regional heads are fully responsible for defining formation (size of local 
government), recruiting new personnel, appointing staff, assessing 
performance, promoting staff and paying salaries and allowances“  
  
This contradicted PP No. 84 that implicitly stated that there is still Central 
Government authority over the personnel management in the region. An example of this 
was the determination of the echelon and its structural allowance, which was carried out 
by the Central Government. This contradiction often caused confusion in the region in the 
management of personnel. Some regions raised their personnel levels rapidly to balance 
the echelon raise. On the other hand, there were also some regions that did not do this. For 
the new personnel recruitments in particular, almost every region agreed to carry out a 
recruitment process, though the new recruits were classified as honorary employees. This 
was because the recruitment process affected the remuneration that was to be paid, while 
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at the same time the payment system was still controlled by the Central Government. The 
large desire to recruit coupled with the payment system limitations resulted in a swollen 
number of honorary forces in every region.  
 The region's employees that wanted to move to other regions also complained 
about the payment system policy that was attached to the DAU. It was not easy to move 
salary from the DAU of one region to another region60. Especially for regions that had to 
exclude the salary of personnel that moved to other regions, this condition meant a DAU 
reduction whilst the Regional Government was still trying to increase the amount of the 
DAU through various means61. During the same period, the mobility of personnel from 
one region to another was very low. When personnel had to move to other regions, they 
had to wait for some time before they could receive their salaries again.  
 The fear of the region of having its budget reduced, added to a faulty perception on 
the success of local autonomy that was measured by the success in increasing the tax and 
retribution revenue, had encouraged the regions to create several tax and retribution 
quotation policies that disadvantaged society and the private sector. These conditions were 
also supported by Law No. 18/1997 that handed the full authority to the regions to create 
various kinds of regional taxes and retribution. Even though this Law was then revised 
through Law No. 34/2000 on Regional Tax and Retribution, there was still the impression 
among the regions that freedom through autonomy could mean a way to increase income 
through tax and retribution. Based on the Regional Autonomy Watch, there were many 
regional regulations on regional taxes and retributions that were considered to be a 
problem because they disadvantaged the business world62. The Central Government, 
                                                 
60  Before the DAU system was implemented, the payment for the personnel was done through the Autonomous Region 
Funding (SDO). This was paid directly by the Central Government through the State Treasury Office that was in the 
region.  
61  It had been a public secret in the regions that during the implementation of the local autonomy and DAU system, 
many regions conducted blunt lobbies to the decision makers about the number of the DAU, though there had been 
general guidance for this matter. They often spent hundreds of million of Rupiah just to increase the amount of the DAU 
that would be received by the region.  
62  In the process of transporting fruit and vegetables from North Sumatra Province to Jakarta, for example, an illegal 
tax in every regency/municipality, which the vehicles pass through carrying the fruits and vegetables. As the result, 
when the commodities arrive in at their destination, the price is expensive and it is the consumer who is disadvantaged. 
Another example is what happened in regency in Java. The regency quoted a higher tax for companies that worked over 
time telling that it was for the prosperity of the employees that worked over time. This argument contradicted the 
productivity of the work because the companies that wanted to be productive by working overtime were burdened with 
the tax.  
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through its Department of Internal affairs, withdrew the Regional Regulation and problem 
was solved. 
 Another problem related to the budget that drew public attention was the 
performance-based system that was implemented based on PP No. 105/2000 on Regional 
Accountability and Financial Management. The purposes of the implementation of this 
performance-based budget were as follows: a) to identify the output and the outcomes of 
the Regional Government’s programs and services; b) to determine the targets of the 
output and the outcomes; c) to relate the cost to the desired result and the strategic 
planning that has been decided upon. The implementation model of the performance-
based budget was fully adopted from the performance-based budget of the Regional 
Government in the USA63. For some time, Governmental Regulations could not be 
implemented because there had not been any implementation regulations. They were 
implemented in 2002 through the Minister of Internal Affairs’ Decree No. 29/2002 on the 
Guidance of Management, Responsibility and the Supervision of the Regional Finance, 
the Procedures of Regional Income and Expense Budget composition, the Implementation 
of Regional Finance Management, and the Income and Expense Budget Calculation 
composition. 
 In principal, the new performance-based budget would be effective if the 
composition involved several actors in the region that worked together, such as the 
Regent/Mayor, the Regional Government Officials—especially those responsible for 
financial matters, the DPRD, and society. The head of the region and the DPRD were 
particularly responsible for the composition of the budget policy, including activity 
priorities, while the financial officials are responsible for the composition of the guidance 
for the budget composition process and the budget composition coordination. At the same 
time, society acts as an overseer and has the right to propose the needs that will be 
transformed into the budget. This principle is based on the political and the government 
system in the USA that is relatively stable and disregards the political conditions in 
Indonesia, especially the reform era, during which the cooperation that was expected in 
                                                 
63  The development and the implementation of the performance-based budget model in Indonesia were assisted by the 
Building Institution for Good Governance (BIGG) which is based in the USA. 
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the composition of the performance-based budget could not be performed well. There was 
often collusion between the head of the Region and the DPRD because the DPRD had the 
authority to elect and to dismiss the Regent/Mayor. The uncertainty at the level of the 
policy makers also affected the uncertainty of the Regional Government in composing the 
budget. In the end, they would again use the old system of budget composition. Society, as 
a part of civil society, in many regions in Indonesia often did not have adequate 
bargaining power, that controller function could not be done. 
 Technically, the composition of the performance-based budget required a period of 
time, especially during the transition period from the old budgeting system. According to 
the Center for local Government Innovation (CLGI, 2003), there are some steps that have 
to be performed to compose performance-based budget. The steps are as follows: 
• Conversing frequent budget into operational budget (determining the activity that 
has to be performed by each working unit; every frequent expense is included into 
the operational budget in the form of operational activities of each unit) 
• Composing the performance indicators for the development budget (Each project 
has to become an activity that can be measured and have the indicators for the 
input, output, and outcome performance) 
• Separating projects that are in the development budget into operational expense 
and capital expense (Projects that are recurring are included in the operational 
budget; the projects that are non-recurring are included in the capital expense; the 
activities that can be included in the capital expense are only the activities that are 
in the form of construction, investment, or asset that the nominal number reaches a 
certain number) 
• Preparing the budget in the performance-based form (changing the budgeting 
format into the performance-based budget template) 
 
The complicated mechanism of budget composition, considering the capabilities of 
the limited human resources of the personnel, often created frustration among the 
personnel that composed the performance-based budget. On top of this the reality was that 
the budget composition process was filled with political intrusion/influence that was able 
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to change the composition procedure and the budget substance. Furthermore, according to 
CLGI (2003), the technical weaknesses of the performance-based budget are followings: 
• The unit cost is not always a significant indicator of the success of the target 
achievement of the organization unit. 
• Various activities carried out by the organization unit are not the only determining 
factors of the physical results (output) or the quality of the public services 
(outcome) 
• The total cost is not compiled accurately, therefore the unit cost is not an efficient 
indicator. 
• The funding proposal for each activity only consists of a single estimation, 
therefore it is difficult to compare different funding proposals. 
• Only an annual program is covered, so that the continuity of the program cannot be 
seen in one budget book. 
 The problems of performance-based budget were not only those mentioned above, 
because the budget then had to be related to Law No. 25/1999 on how the Balancing of the 
central and Regional Finance was implemented. One of the Governmental Regulations 
that was issued to implement this Law was PP No. 104/2000, which was on the formula of 
the revenue sharing from natural resources exploitation. In addition, the formula that used 
to calculate the amount of the DAU of each province and regency/municipality was also 
arranged. The DAU used the fiscal gap concept in which the DAU for each region was 
determined by the region’s need (fiscal needs) and potency (fiscal capacity). In other 
words, the DAU was used to cover the gap that might occur when the needs of a region 
exceed the potential of the region’s income. The needs of a region were determined using 
the variables of total population, territory width, geographic conditions, and income level. 
The economic potential of a region was determined by the variable of regional income 
potential, such as industrial potential, Natural resources potential, human resources 
potential, and the PDRB. 
 As it could be predicted, many regions were not satisfied with the calculation of 
the DAU. This resulted in the occurrence of lobbies aimed at raising the amount of the 
DAU. The General Director of Financial Balancing in the Department of Finance admitted 
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that the formulation and the calculation of the 2000 DAU was considered to contain many 
defects, especially in relation to fairness among the regions. This was understandable 
considering that the process was run in the early stages/first year of the implementation of 
the fiscal decentralization64. The regions that protested first were the regions that were rich 
with natural resources. They considered the Central Government to have overlooked the 
natural potential of the region. On the other hand, many regions that did not have adequate 
natural resources often complained about the increasing burden on their APBD as the 
result of the transfer of Central Government personnel to the region. Because of the 
complaints from the regions, in the fiscal year of 2002 there was a commitment between 
the Government and the Budgeting Committee in the DPR to re-calculate the formula for 
the DAU. The next DAU formula was the result of recommendations from four 
universities in Indonesia (UI, UGM, UNAND, and UNHAS) and was legalized through 
PP No. 84/2001 as the replacement for PP No. 104/2000 on Balancing Funds65. 
 The indefinite amount of the DAU affected the composition of the performance-
based budget, in that each region composed its budget based only on predictions. There 
was a tremendous amount of uncertainty among the regional officials that were 
responsible for composing the budget. For this reason they did not have a very high 
expectation for the performance quality, especially in the 2001 fiscal year. At that time, it 
was often the case that in one budgeting year there were budget changes two or three 
times. The process of budget composition at that time was so exhausting, politically and 
administratively, that in the end it affected the quality of the development. A quite large 
problem, for example, once occurred when the President, Abdurrahman Wahid, decided to 
raise the civil servant’s salary and the position allowance in the January 2001. Many 
regions had to borrow up to a billion Rupiah from the Ministry of Treasury just to cover 
the civil servant salary accumulation. This was a consequence of the pay rise policy66. 
                                                 
64  M. Mahfud Sidik, Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah sebagai Pelaksanaan Desentralisasi Fiskal (Antara 
Teori dan Aplikasinya di Indonesia), a paper that was presented in a National Seminar “Setahun Implementasi Kebijakan 
Otonomi Daerah” that was held by the Regional Autonomy and Local Politics Masters Program, UGM 
65  In this replacement DAU formula, there were not any regions that received lower  DAU than in the 2001. The 
government provided an extra 2.054,72 billion in order to achieve those targets. 
66  The Regional Government of Sleman Regency, for example, had to borrow 16.8 billion Rupiah from the Ministry of 
Treasury. 
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These loans drained the budgets of the Regional Government, because they had to pay the 
money back to the Central Government using the following years budget.  
 In the following budgeting years, the uncertainty was still relatively high although 
the DAU had been allocated based more on the needs of the bureaucracy, and there had 
been a formula that in the Central Government’s opinion had given an advantage to the 
region. The reason for this was that the region still experienced some difficulties in 
changing its budget system into a performance-based system, and it was therefore difficult 
to achieve good planning. 
 Another problem in the finance was the regional authority for planning. Law No. 
22/1999 had explicitly stated that with the giving of the autonomy to the 
regency/municipality, full authority over planning policy and development programs was 
held by the region. To compose this planning, the Central Government issued the 
president's instruction (Inpres) No. 7/1999 on the Working Performance Accountability of 
Government Institutions. The Inpres obligated each region and each government 
institution to make a Strategic Planning (Renstra) to guarantee accountability. In addition, 
the Central Government also issued Law No. 25/2000 on the National Development 
Program (Propenas) 2000-2004 that dealt with the planning procedures and priorities of 
the development program that had to be undertaken by the Central and Regional 
Governments. Both regulations did not actually contradict Law No. 22/1999 or Law No. 
25/1999, except for the problem of unclear division of authority between the central, 
provincial, and regency/municipality governments. The weakness of both regulations on 
planning procedure was that the planning process in the region became complicated and 
exhausting. It can be imagined what happened when each region had to make planning 
documents that required much energy and cost. On top of the administrative problems, 
there was the significant matter of political influence. As a result of this, the planning 
documents that were produced using quite a large amount of money became nothing more 
than a stack of paper.  
 Another Governmental Regulation that also weakened the local autonomy policy 
was PP No. 108 that was issued in November 2000 and focused on the responsibility of 
the head of the region to the DPRD. Oddly, this regulation was very different from the 
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previous Governmental Regulation, PP No. 105/2000, on the Management and the 
Responsibility of the Regional Finance, which required the APBD to be reviewed by the 
DPRD every four months. This difference once again showed the feeble coordination in 
the Central Government in the making of the regulations.  
 In addition, one of the evaluation standards for the responsibility, according to PP 
No. 108/2000 was the achievement of the policy and the program based on the Strategic 
Planning that had been previously done. Unfortunately, by the end of 2002, there were 
only a few regions that had Strategic Planning so that the responsibility meant by PP No. 
108/2000 became useless, since there were no evaluation standards that could be used. 
This was where illegal agreements started to occur between the head of the region and the 
DPRD. Constitutionally, the DPRD’s position was stronger because the members were the 
ones elected as the heads of the region. This position was then used to attack the heads of 
the regions that were disliked, using for example the Annual Responsibility Report (LPJ). 
This report could be used to dismiss the heads of the regions, especially when no precise 
evaluation standard existed to make the report a responsible one. So, the game where the 
two main actors in public policy making had their affair started, and much collusion and 
corruption followed and disadvantaged the nation. 
 Responding to this issue, the director of State Ministry for State Personnel 
Empowerment argued that one of the basic elements that Law No. 22/1999 was missing 
was a direct election for the head of the region.  
“Second, Law no. 22 was composed with an assumption that the local Check 
and Balance was available. At that time, the assumption was that the General 
Election would use Direct System. I asked Andi Malarangeng about it due to 
Law no. 22, which the devolution was more political, would only be effective if 
the General Election were direct, both for the executive and legislative levels; 
so people could choose their representative. If it used the proportional system, 
that kind of thing would surely happen: collusion between the legislative and 
executive. By definition, theoretically, that kind of thing would surely 
happen”. 
  
It seemed that what happened was out side the scope of what the writers of the laws 
that regulated the local autonomy had expected. At the same time as the issue of Law No. 
22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, a law for the direct election for the head of the region 
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should also be issued. The purpose was so that the direct election for the head of the 
region could decrease the practice of collusion between the DPRD and the head of the 
region, or so that the head of the region not have any direct responsibility to the DPRD. 
However, the goal that was aimed for by the constitution makers did not get realized 
because the unstable political situation at that time made the making of the law 
impossible. Besides, this attack, from the group that were against local autonomy, 
weakened the effort to write the laws.  
 The attacks against local autonomy were increasing when the national leadership 
was taken over by Megawati who was also a representative of the nationalist group that 
wanted to retain the unity of the NKRI. In their perspective, local autonomy was 
considered a threat to the national unity and wholeness. Megawati even once explicitly 
criticized the concept of local autonomy as being a contradiction of the Constitution 1945, 
the foundation of the Unified Nation of Republic of Indonesia67. As was the case with the 
Minister of Internal Affairs in the previous period, the Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
Megawati era, Lieutenant General Hari Sabarno(Retired), also had a background in the 
military. In one of his statements in the Jakarta post daily newspaper68. Minister for Home 
Affairs said that smoothing over the shaky implementation of local autonomy was one of 
his main priorities, including ensuring that local autonomy would not break up the unitary 
state. Under the lead of Megawati and the Minister for Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno, the 
issue of revising on Law No. 22/1999 was increasing. The Central Government plan to 
conduct this revision received strong opposition from the regency/municipality 
government associations, including the DPRD. Some experts on local autonomy that had 
previously written the Law No. 22/1999 joined in the criticism of the government plan to 
revise the constitution. There were even two large political parties in the DPR, the 
Golongan Karya and the National Mandate Party, which rejected the government plan to 
conduct the revision. However, all of this did not lessen the Central Governments resolve 
to conduct a revision, and in 2004, Law No. 32/2004 was issued as a replacement for Law 
No. 22/1999. As can be predicted, though the decentralization was still a principle of 
                                                 
67  Jakarta Post, 15 May 2001 
68  Jakarta Post, 27 May 2001 
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government practice, there are many articles that implicitly show that the Central 
Government regained its authority over the provinces. 
 Data from GDS I found that the understanding of several actors in region on local 
autonomy was surprising. Approximately 70% of the bureaucrats and the members of the 
DPRD understand local autonomy as a process “to explore maximally the financial 
resource of a region through taxes and retributions”. This answer appears evenly in all of 
the regions, whether it has sufficient natural resources or not. Another disturbing fact is 
that there are some who understand local autonomy as a “fight for the interest of the 
natives in the governance and the development”, and that they had to “employ the existing 
natural resources for only the interests of own region”. 
 Several basic problems inherited from the centralized governance system are still 
often found in many regions. According to the respondents from the government 
personnel (N=2700 persons), the problems faced are incompetent staff (83%), budget 
limitations (82%), facility and infrastructure limitations (82%), indistinct regulations from 
the Central Government (81%), political instability including political euphoria (73%), 
lack of economics resources (72%), public over-demand on the government (66%), etc. 
 Budget limitation is a classical problem that always haunts the relationship 
between the regional and the Central Government. Some political and military conflict 
that have occurred in the region since the Indonesian Independence in 1945 are the 
resulted of an unjust sharing of finances69. This unfairness is caused by the centralization 
of a large amount of financial resources such as oil and gas, mines, forests and plantations, 
land and building taxes, income tax, etc. Before Law No. 22/1999 was issued, there was 
Law No. 25/1999 that fairly arranged the sharing of finances between the regional and the 
Central Government. However, this arrangement did not satisfy many regions, especially 
those rich in natural resources. They considered the Central Government to be acting 
unfairly towards them. The General Allocation Fund, which is supposed to be a mediator 
for the financial relationship between the central and the Local Governments, in the end 
                                                 
69 Such as PRRI/Permesta, Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM), Papua, etc. 
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became a tool for the regions to lobby the Central Government to get more funds70. In the 
meantime, the region’s own resources that come from the Regional Original Income are 
not sufficient because they still depend on the taxes and retributions.  From this fact, it is 
understandable that many regional actors understand regional autonomy as “exploring 
maximally the financial resources of a region through taxes and retributions”. 
Nonetheless, in general, a region still depends on the funds received from the Central 
Government, though the authority to manage the finance now belongs completely to the 
region. Law No. 22/1999 gives full authority to the regions to design projects that are 
suitable with the authority subject given; but the Central Government still controls the 
funds used to finance the authority. In budgeting terminology, there is a saying that 
although the expenditure is fully controlled by the region, the Central Government 
controls most of the income. 
 The same problem also occurs with the human resources of the Local 
Government. Most civil servants do not have a good level of competency; those with high 
levels of competency commonly prefer to join the private sector. When people with good 
competency levels enroll to be a civil servant, they generally prefer to enroll in the central 
department rather than the regional one. The main reason for is the lack, or even non-
existence, of rewards in the civil servant payment system in Indonesia. Though Law No. 
22/1999 gave some of the authority for managing employees to the region, there only a 
small number of regions have a reward policy that is beneficial to the employees. An 
example of a beneficial reward policy is the giving incentives monetary to employees who 
achieve something. There are, however, also some regions that make false reward policy, 
for example giving promotions to some people just because they are loyal to the 
Regent/Mayor. Though Law No. 22/1999 was issued, there is still a grey area concerning 
the sharing of authority over employment between the Central and the Local Government. 
Essentially, there is an article in Law No .22/1999 that contradicts the article in Law No. 
43/1997. Law No. 22/1999 states that the authority over employment has been given to the 
                                                 
70 There are many indications that show that regencies/municipalities have spent up to one billion Rupiah of funds taken 
from the APBD, in order to get another ten to twenty billion Rupiahs for the DAU. This lobbying money is purportedly 
given to the People’s Council, the Ministry of Treasury, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. Some respondents even said 
there are many people in the region who introduce themselves as personnel of the Central Government and offer their 
services to lobby the Central Government to get additions the DAU.  
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region, however, in Law No. 43/1997, the authority over employment is still held by the 
Central Government.  
 Another complex problem found is the indistinct regulations made by the Central 
Government. The basic regulations that often create problems are the regulations on the 
sharing of authority between the central, provincial, and regency/municipality 
government. Law No. 22/1999 with its implementation in the PP 25/2000, does not 
distinctly clarify the sharing of authority.  As a result, there is much authority, for instance 
concerning the ocean, forestry, society, facilities, tourism, mining, and even in the sectors 
that have been arranged, that overlaps between the regional and the central department, as 
well as between the departments themselves. Until 2004, the problem of this authority 
sharing was still a major problem for the relationship between the central and the local 
government. Fifty-five percent of the respondents that came from the bureaucracy 
answered that there was still conflict over authority between the province and the 
regency/municipality71. Another type of authority that is still unclear is the authority to 
control the Local Regulations. Some regions think that the authority to control the Local 
Regulations is theirs only, whereas the Central Government, through the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, argues that they have the authority to supervise it. There are several cases 
in which the Local Regulations made by the Local Government have been withdrawn by 
the Central Government, because they are considered by businessmen to be unfair and a 
threat to economic growth. According to the Regional Autonomy Implementation 
Supervisor Committee72, there were 1006 Local Regulations made by the Local 
Governments in 2001 considered to cause problems because they did not sustain the 
regional economic climate. Local government created these regulations by trespassing the 
commercial charge or non-charge barrier, multiplying charges, ignoring the feedback on 
the subject of retribution, and contradicting the higher regulations (Kompas, 4 September 
2002). Subsequently, by the end of 2001, the Department of Internal Affairs withdrew 
about 68 Local Regulation that it considered to be causing problems. 
                                                 
71 In Law No. 22/1999, the province is placed as the representation of the Central Government in region, but not superior 
to the regency/municipality government. 
72 This committee is an organization formed by the Indonesian House of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) that has the 
specific functions of criticizing policy made by the Local Government that is considered to threaten the economy. 
 233
B. Policy Change  
 Since the beginning of the reformation, the national design for the health policy 
has not been changed. The main policy focus is on four things: health service quality 
improvement, distribution of health services, autonomy of public health centers 
(Puskesmas) and local hospitals, and community health insurance (JPKM). The strategies 
selected to attain the policy are fighting corruption, medicine management improvement, 
health worker placement, health services for poor people, and encouraging health 
insurance. In order to find out the extent of the output of this policy, this research quotes 
data from GDS I, GDS I+, SUSENAS and also some data from surveys conducted by the 
World Bank.  
1. Health 
Table 5.2 shows that more people than not, who live either in rural or urban areas, 
assess health services as performing well. The one exception is the Puskesmas, because 
more people living in Urban assessed Puskesmas as giving bad service. Hence, the 
Puskesmas, in terms of national assessment, is the only one kind of bad health service. 
This is surprising, because more people generally assess services as being good rather than 
bad. In the context of decentralization, it predicts that there is a decrease in the quality of 
health services.       
Table 5.2 : Community Assessment of Health Services (%) 
Rural Urban National Services 
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
Puskesmas 50,8 49,2 37,0 63,0 39,0 61,0 
Doctors in Puskesmas 56,5 43,5 60,2 39,9 58,3 41,7 
Village Maternity Polyclinic 62,7 37,3 66,6 33,4 64,7 35,3 
Village integrated service 67,0 33,0 69,5 30,5 68,2 31,8 
Note: N of community is 9000 households 
Source: GDS I, 2002 
The SUSENAS data also shows that all health service indicators changed for the 
better during 2000-2003. More households attested to improvements in the health status of 
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household members, accessibility to various health services, as well as the quality of 
Puskesmas and private physicians (Overview Report GDS1+, 2005). 
The GDS also asked all respondents about the physical accessibility of health 
services (see Graphic 5.1)72. Four out of five households reported having access to a 
Public Health Center (Puskesmas), and 59 percent had access to a general hospital. More 
than a half of households also reported having private physicians and private 
nurses/paramedics/midwives. The least accessible facilities were the Village Maternity 
Posts (Polindes) and clinics; which were reportedly accessible to only one in eight 
households. This access, as expected, varied across regions and household socio-economic 
conditions. General hospitals, for example, were more accessible to urban residents than 
rural residents. The average distance to a Puskesmas was 2.9 kilometers (1.5 kilometers in 
the urban areas vs. 4.2 km in the rural areas) while the average travel time (using various 
modes of transportation) was 17 minutes (10 minutes in urban areas vs. 23 minutes in 
rural areas) (Overview Report GDS1+, 2005). 
Graphic 5.1 
 
Note: N of households is 1815  
Source: GDS I+, 2005 
                                                 
72 Questions to the household included the distance to the facility, mode of transportation normally taken to the facility 
and travel time 
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Those households that had actually used a health service during the past year (i.e., 
on May 2004) were asked about their last experience. Around 85 percent of the GDS1+ 
sample of 1,815 households attested to direct experiences with health services. One out of 
three claimed that the Puskesmas was their latest experience with health services, 22 
percent went to see private nurse, paramedic or midwife, and another 17 percent to private 
doctors. However, private provision in practice may often be integrally linked to public 
provision in a locality. The same doctors who provide services in public clinics in the 
morning (Puskesmas) will often offer private services in the afternoon. Not surprisingly, 
private health costs more than the Puskesmas visits (Rp 72,000 versus Rp 9,600). 
Households holding health cards paid significantly lower rates (Rp 5,200 vs. Rp 10.500). 
Private Nurses charged almost double that of the Puskesmas for similar treatment (Rp 
17,000). Yet in all cases, 75-80 percent of respondents felt that the cost was reasonable 
(Overview Report GDS1+, 2005). 
The physical conditions of the facilities are also an indicator of the improvement in 
the public health services. Over a quarter (28 percent) of households felt that facilities had 
improved. This improvement was more noticeable among urban residents and households 
living in Java than among residents in other areas. The second largest improvement was 
the responsiveness of health officials (25 percent of households), while tenth selected 
medicine availability as being the biggest improvement in public health facilities. 
Improvement in service charges was felt by 8 percent of households. Civil servants were 
less likely note this (as part of the bureaucracy. Conversely, only a combined total of 15 
percent of households pointed out (as their first pick) the conditions of health facility/staff 
responsiveness as undergoing a major deterioration during that period. Another combined 
14 percent said that the service charges and medicine availability got worse. Only 22 
percent of respondents saw no improvements at all, and over two thirds of respondents 
failed to identify any deterioration (Overview Report GDS1+, 2005). 
The following data quoted from World Bank, will compare health decentralization 
improvement in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. In Indonesia, the principal 
enabling legislative acts were Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999. The Philippines 
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promulgated decentralization through the Local Government Code 1991, which was 
implemented the following year. In Vietnam, the doi moi economic reforms that began in 
1986 and the Public Administration reform of 1995 shaped health decentralization, with 
the implementation based largely on the 1996 and 2002 State Budget Laws (East Asia 
Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005) 
Selected health status, generally, indicators shows improvement among these 
countries (1995-2002). The IMR in Indonesia was 46 in 1995 and then dropped to 1.9 in 
2002. In the same year, Philippines moved from 36 to 1.9, Vietnam went from 32/30 to be 
1.9. Another indicator is Life Expectancy at Birth which indicates a different rate among 
these countries. The trend shows an increase in life expectancy. In Indonesia, the life 
expectancy rose from 64 in 1995 to 66.7 in 2002. In the Philippines it rose from 68 to be 
69.8, and in Vietnam from 67 to be 69.7 in the same year (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Infant Mortality Rate and Life Expectancy at Birth in Southeast Asian 
Countries 
Year Indicators 
1995 2000 2001 2002 
Infant Mortality Rate     
          Indonesia 46 35 33 1.9 
          Philippines 36 30 29 1.9 
          Vietnam 32/30 28/18 30/18 1.9 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth 
    
         Indonesia 64 66 66.3 66.7 
         Philippines 68 69 69.5 69.8 
         Vietnam 67 69 69.4 69.7 
Quoted from: East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005 
The World Bank also reported that the favorable trend in the overall health status 
was arguably due partly to progress in health output and service coverage. In the 
Philippines, for example, the proportion of births attended to by trained health workers, as 
well as the percentage of the population with access to clean water and sanitation services, 
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rose between 1985 and 2000. Similar developments in health status, outputs, and access 
indicators occurred in Indonesia over the same period. The 2002 Demographic Survey and 
Health Survey pointed to a continuation or even an acceleration of favorable trends in 
fertility, contraceptive use, malnutrition, and trained maternal care. Some indicators also 
worsened: immunization rates fell between 1997 and 2002-3 for children under the age of 
two, and the prevalence of childhood illness remained the same as it was in 1997. In 
Vietnam, on the other hand, output and access measures all pointed in a positive direction 
between the mid-1990s and 2002. The countries reported a significant increase in 
childhood vaccination coverage, as well as in the proportions of women receiving prenatal 
care and giving birth attended to by skilled health personnel (East Asia Decentralizes, 
World Bank, 2005). 
There is a division of responsibility for health services between the central and 
local governments of these countries. Local governments have assumed responsibility for 
health functions that are simple to administer and confer localized benefits. The central 
government or higher local governments have assumed responsibility for health functions 
of a large scale or that have inter-jurisdictional spillover. Basic, primary health care 
services in Vietnam, for example, are assigned to communes, including the network of 
village health workers. In Indonesia they are assigned to villages in Indonesia, and in the 
Phillipines to the barangays (villages). Primary-level health facilities are assigned to cities 
and municipalities in the Philippines and to districts in Vietnam. Secondary level hospitals 
are assigned to provinces in the Philippines and Vietnam. Tertiary-level and specialty 
hospitals, on the other hand, are mainly the responsibility of the central government. 
However, in Indonesia decentralization Laws and rules and regulations do not provide 
enough detail on functional and operational responsibilities, resulting in confusion and 
divergence between provinces and districts. For instance, provinces are supposed to 
handle cross-district tasks, but there is nothing definitive to tell them how to apply that 
rule. The Laws and regulations governing decentralization are also often inconsistent with 
other Laws, especially civil service rules. These inconsistencies have limited the ability of 
local governments to correct the size of inherited health bureaucracies and anticipate 
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personnel matters. On top of this, administrative preparation is inadequate. As an example, 
many local officials in the Philippines were unaware of the precise nature and extent of 
their new expenditure responsibilities and powers, and the central Department of Health 
was slow to transform itself structurally and operationally.  Many local governments 
seemed to adopt a wait and see strategy, apparently hoping that the agency would be 
blamed for the breakdown in the public health system and be forced to recentralize health 
functions (East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
 Another problem related to authority sharing is the problem of the decision maker. 
Graphic 5.2 and Graphic 5.3 show that there was a significant change in the decision 
making, especially in the health sector, before and after the local autonomy was applied 
(the Head of Puskesmas perception). Before the local autonomy was applied, many 
institutions were involved in the decision making process. However, the Central 
Government held the largest amount of authority. The authority held by the Central 
Government included the authority to recruit the PTT doctors (honorarium) for the 
Puskesmas and arranging the Puskesmas programs in the region. The Central Government 
was even involved in arranging the Puskesmas budget in the region. This is a logical 
consequence of the centralized- governance model, in which the Central Government has 
authority over strategic policy, even at the street-level bureaucracy. 
 Before the local autonomy implementation, the institutions that were involved in 
the process of decision-making, whether in the capital, province, or regency/municipality, 
played almost equal parts. This does not show the number of institutions that were 
involved in the decision making process for a health programs, but shows the number of 
institutions that had programs and projects in region, ignoring the design similarity and the 
purpose and objectives of the programs and projects. This is a consequence of the 
sectored-development model in which the programs and the projects of each governmental 
level of capital, province, and regency/municipality are divided plainly.  
 Graphic 5.3 clearly shows the institution that plays the most important role in the 
decision-making after autonomy. The graphic shows that the Central Government, through 
the Ministry of Health, still had authority over the PTT (honorarium) doctor recruitment. 
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However, the Central Government is no longer involved preparing the Puskesmas 
programs, this authority has instead been given to the regency/municipality Health 
Agencies. In the same way, in composing the Puskesmas budget, Local Government 
elements such as the Regent/Mayor, Bappeda, Health Agency, Executive Budget Team, 
and Legislative Budget Committee, seem to hold the authority. However, observed 
closely, it can be seen that the Central Government through it’s the Ministry of Health, 
never gives full authority to the region. The reason for this is that the health sector is a 
national priority that requires the direct support of the Central Government. This support 
is in the form of standard policy that is a requirement in every region. In financing the 
health sector, the Central Government even provides de-concentration funds, which are 
distributed through the Provincial Government. Almost 90% of the respondents from the 
bureaucracy and the DPRD answer that they have full authority over the health sector. 
This answer can be justified but only in the level of projects and programs and also on the 
policy level only. This does not mean that the regions cannot use their authority just that 
they have been busy working on the health policy issued by the Central Government.  
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Graphic 5.3 
Decision makers in Puskesmas after autonomy
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Note: N of the head of puskesmas is 600 persons 
Source: GDS I+, 2005 
The health expenditure annually remained more or less a constant proportion of the 
GDP throughout 1997-2001 in the three countries. The average annual proportions were 
2.5 percent in Indonesia, 3.5 percent in the Philippines, and 4.9 percent in Vietnam. In 
per-capita terms, however, total health spending fell in Indonesia from US$26 in 1997 to 
US$16 in 2001, and in the Philippines from US$41 in 1997 to US$30 in 2001 (World 
Bank, 2004). In Vietnam, per capita health spending rose from US$16 in 1997 to US$21 
in 2001. 
 According to the Chairman of the Indonesia Doctors Association (IDI), the central 
government contributes a mere 26.1 percent of health expenditure; the biggest contributor 
is the private sector, which contributes 74.9 percent. The health expenditure from 
government has been mostly put towards medicine and health equipment (48 percent), 
hospitals 39 percent, public health centers 11 percent, and other 2 percent (Republika, 7 
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June 2005). Local governments account for most of the routine spending, while 
development spending at the local level grew fourfold. Central development outlay rose 
almost threefold, and nearly half of development expenditure still came from the central 
budget. It is therefore, understandable that the local government continues to regard the 
Ministry of Health as the key supplier of finance including drugs and health equipment. 
This financial support is known as De-concentrated Funds, and is much more than the 
health expenditure of the local government itself. 
Besides PP No. 104 and 105/2005, PP No. 106/2000 on the de-concentration funds 
was also issued. These kinds of funds were legally controlled by the Central Government 
through the technical departments and the non-department government institutions. Based 
on Law No. 25/1999 Article 17, the distribution of these funds to the regions was carried 
out by the Governor of the province. This is because, based on Law No. 22/1999, the 
province still carried out the de-concentration principles besides decentralization. 
Therefore, the technical department still had its representation, the Territory Office in each 
province. This condition differed from the regency/municipality, which felt that a 
department office as representation of the central technical department was not necessary.  
 The old defects in the budget that used the de-concentrated system, the ego-sector, 
still strongly existed, even though the administrational era had changed. The sector model 
had caused the coordination and integration between each sector to become very fragile, 
including the distribution of funds to the regency/municipality. Many heads of regions 
complained about these de-concentration funds, for it was out of the Regional 
Government’s control, and often spoiled the development plan that had been arranged in 
the APBD. It was even often the case that the development programs overlapped because 
there was not any coordination between the Central, provincial, and regency/municipality 
governments. 
 As the DAU affected the assurance levels of the performance-based budget 
composition, the de-concentration funds also affected the budget composition of every 
institution in the region. In composing the budget, the source and the amount of funding 
were usually mentioned. One of the sources of the budget was the de-concentration fund. 
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However, it was almost certain that there was not anyone within the institution, not even 
the head of the region, who knew the amount of the de-concentration funds that would be 
given to the province by the Central Government. Even the relationship with the province 
was not well coordinated because the sharing of authority between the province and the 
regency/municipality was not clear. In addition, the province often did not know the exact 
amount of the de-concentration funds that would be given by the Central Government. 
Conversely, provinces in Vietnam were already spending more on health than the 
central government. The provinces accounted for 44 percent of the spending, and central 
government for 26 percent of all government outlay in 2000. In this case, provincially 
“controlled” outlay accounted for 76 percent of the total government health spending, up 
from 70 percent in 1996 (East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
The World Bank also reported that decentralization has given local authorities and 
other stakeholders greater leeway to adapt or even replace once-standard methods for 
delivering and financing health services. These greater discretionary powers have led to 
numerous local innovations in health planning, service delivery, and financing. In the 
Philippines, there are provincial health insurance programs in the Bukidnon and 
Guimaras. Vietnam has seen numerous instances of sponsored and spontaneous 
innovation at the province level. An example of the former is the health ministry’s effort 
to encourage a local response towards childhood diseases, including community 
determined indicators. In Indonesia, Yogyakarta showed how to use the country’s still 
immature decentralized framework to introduce health sector reforms and elements of a 
health insurance system. The province used donor funds to secure technical assistance and 
conduct assessments, trials, make benchmarks, hold workshops, give training, and hold 
coordination meetings with districts, as well as holding advocacy events. The province 
established a board of trustees and new fund-holder institutions, as well as a benefit 
package and an insurance premium (East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
The greatest problem for many local governments was the hiring of physicians, 
nurses and medical technicians in order to be competitive with the market. In the 
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Philippines, to appease devolved of health pushed for the Magna Charta for health 
workers in 1992. Among other features, this Law provided more compensation and extra 
benefits and allowances for all health workers, including those devolved to the local 
governments, and required the latter to pay additional compensation. In Indonesia, the 
central government established a contract doctor (PTT) scheme in the early 1990s to 
ensure a flow of doctors to remote locations. Doctors hired after completing their initial 
medical degrees received substantial monetary incentives to practice in more remote areas 
for a period of three years. This policy was strongly supported by political and 
administrative leaders in some provinces. They created master plans to reshape the 
bureaucracy to fit local conditions. These included using downsizing mechanisms such as 
redeployment of staff, early retirement, voluntary resignation with severance payments, 
and retraining to encourage entrepreneurship. However, the implementation of these plans 
depends on full political commitment, facilitating legal steps, and an injection of cash. The 
inability to proceed highlights concerns voiced by district and province decision makers 
about dependence on central government for salary payments and methods for ‘right-
sizing’. Vietnam was faced with personnel issues under decentralization as well, as the 
distribution of health personnel did not occur exactly as planned. Enough doctors and 
other higher-level staff are generally available in cities, but numbers are inadequate in 
rural areas (East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
 In Indonesia, the possibility of re-centralization in 2004 was an interesting issue. 
There had been various programs leading up to a re-centralization phenomenon. As an 
illustration, the health budget from the Ministry of Health and the central government 
increased significantly during the decentralized years. That central government budget for 
poor families was contracted out to PT Askes Indonesia (Indonesian Insurance Company) 
is an obvious sign of an increase in centralization. Besides this, the circular from the 
General Directorate of Medical Service on the hospital licensing shows the phenomenon 
of the desire for re-centralization. The Ministry of Health assumed that local government 
treated hospital licensing as a source of income, and did not care about quality or 
community protection (4th Annual Forum on Health Decentralization, UGM, 2005). 
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 There is, however, no significant change in the organization structure of the 
Ministry of Health. If we compared it with the Ministry of Health in the Philippines, the 
ministry of Health in Indonesia is not an organization that is decentralization-supportive 
(4th Annual Forum on Health Decentralization, UGM, 2005). Besides this, there is an 
increase in the central government budget for local government, but with no 
accompanying systemic change. The activities of the Ministry of Health personnel 
increased sharply in the local government, because the Law 22/1999 abolished the 
branches of the Ministry of Health in the regions (Kanwil in Province and Kandep in 
Municipality/Regency). This Law created Regional Health Offices across the country. 
 The health services delivery, at least, still kept its level of quality during the 
autonomy. However, the quality could be improved if there was a correlation between 
autonomy designs and health policy reform from the central government. The strategy of 
health services, the target groups and budgets that have been arranged by the Ministry of 
Health and local governments should be incorporated into one system so that the different 
levels support each other.    
2. Education 
The Law No.22/1999 decentralized public schools to the local governments. 
Primary schools and junior secondary schools are managed by the regent/municipality 
government and senior secondary schools are managed by the provincial government. The 
central government has retained control over the tertiary level education. By this Law, the 
local government has to pay the salaries of teachers, and also has the right to determine 
school fees, and curriculum content. The central government, however, still finances many 
large education projects which require a lot of money, such building schools, buying 
equipment and buying books. These funds come from The Ministry of National 
Education, which calls the funds ‘de-concentrated funds’. In every region, they have to 
create an Educational Council at regent/municipality level and also have a School 
Committee in each school. The members of both organizations come from the community 
and are also parents of the students.  Their duties are to mediate between community and 
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state interests in local educational policy. Education Law No. 20/2003 strengthened the 
position of schools to the local government, because it took decentralization a step further, 
moving the control of basic education from the districts to the schools. 
In Thailand each school is supposed to have a board composed of parents, 
teachers, community organizations, alumni, and students. Parents’ organizations with 
jurisdiction over the school are to establish a quality assurance system, and communities 
are urged to participate in the provision of education by contributing their experience, 
knowledge, expertise and local wisdom for educational benefits. In Cambodia, recent 
Laws have transferred functions and powers—including the provision of public services—
to communes, and the country plans to boost accountability further by increasing the 
“operational autonomy” of schools and postsecondary institutions (East Asia 
Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
An important aspect of decentralization is who makes decisions. How each state 
assigns the decision making is, in many respects, a more accurate measure of its degree of 
decentralization. World Bank and OECD surveys conducted in 1998 and 2003 examined 
38 decisions pertaining to instructional content, personal management, and resource and 
financing. In 1998, the proportion of decisions related to secondary school made by the 
central government varied widely in East Asia—from about one-third in the Philippines to 
two-thirds in Indonesia. This indicates that the Philippines education system was much 
more decentralized than Indonesia’s. At the same time, the provincial and local 
governments in Philippines were making about one-fifth of such decisions, and schools 
more than one-third, while Indonesia’s provinces made less than one-tenth and schools 
about one-third. After the Law 22/1999, there was an increase in opportunity for the local 
governments in Indonesia to make decisions. The data, quoted from World Bank Report 
2005, shows that in 2003, decisions made by the central government decreased to about 
one-third, while local governments were making more than one-fourth and schools more 
than one-third of these decisions. Conversely, in the Philippines, the proportion of 
decisions made by the central government increased to two-thirds, the proportion of 
decisions made by provincial/local governments dropped to one-fifth, and schools made 
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less than one-fifth of the decisions. It seems there was different direction for the locus of 
decision making in the decentralization of the education system between Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Indonesia is more decentralized than in the Philippines in recent years. A 
similar trend has occurred in Thailand where the central government has more power than 
it did in 1998 (from making half the decisions in 1998 to three-quarters in 2003). The 
provincial/local governments also increased its decision making from 1998 to 2003. The 
proportion of decisions made by schools decreased from 45% in 1998 to 20% in 2003. 
Table 5.4: Percentage of decisions related to lower secondary education at each level of 
government, 1998 and 2003 
Country Central Government State/provincial/local 
government 
School 
 1998 2003 1998 2003 1998 2003 
Indonesia 63 36 7 28 30 35 
Cambodia - 75 - 11 - 14 
Thailand 55 75 0 6 45 20 
Philippines 37 62 24 20 39 18 
Source: quoted from East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005 
Note: --- = not available. Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding 
 It is too early to conclude that decentralization has raised overall public spending 
on education, but early signs have suggested this. Before decentralization, Indonesia was 
spending the smallest amount of its GDP on education of all East Asian countries: only 
1.4 percent. This percentage rose to more than 4 percent in 2002—a significant expansion 
in resources for the sector. In 2001, district governments accounted for about two-thirds of 
the total education spending, whereas the provincial governments only accounted for 4 
percent of that spending (East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005).  
The local governments themselves still face capacity of budget. Most of their 
budget allocation is personnel payment, primarily for teacher’s salaries. Hence, the 
average budget allocation for educational development in each district is 3 percent per 
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annum. Although, the teacher’s salaries have been decentralized to local governments, 
there are many problems stopping the payment system from working effectively. Teachers 
often complained that the local government was late in paying their salaries. For this 
reason, they preferred that the central government controlled the payment system rather 
than the local government (re-centralize). This case, once again, shows that the policy 
reform for education needs an effective administration system. The central government, 
through the Ministry of National Education, wish to take back some of the authority that 
was decentralized to the local government, as a way of solving problem of teacher’s salary 
payment. The Ministry of National Education even wishes to spread the directorates 
general of primary and secondary school. It indicated the desire to take over the local 
government authority in managing primary and secondary schools. 
Like the case with health services, the largest percentage of people, in both rural 
and urban areas, answered that state schools (Primary school, Junior high school, and 
Senior high school) performed well (Table 5.5). This data is surprising, because more 
people assessed the school services as being good than bad. In the context of 
decentralization, it was predicted that there would be a decrease in the quality of education 
services.       
Table 5.5: Community Assessment of Education Services (%)
Rural Urban National Services 
Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
State Primary School (SD) 63,5 36,5 65,2 34,8 64,3 35,7 
Secondary level:       
                        State Junior School (SMP) 65,1 34,9 66,8 33,2 65,9 34,1 
                        State Senior School (SMA) 65,3 34,7 66,9 33,1 66,1 33,9 
Note: N of community is 9000 households 
Source: Data Primer GDS I, 2002 
Answer to the retrospective satisfaction questions from the 2003 SUSENAS 
suggest that on average households are positive about the accessibility of various levels of 
schooling (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary). As the level of 
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schooling increases, the number of people saying that access has improved decreases. 
Concerning the tertiary level, more than twice as many respondents believe that the 
situation has worsened (16.1 versus 7.4 percent, compared to 2.1 versus 14.9 percent for 
primary education) (Overview Report GDS1+, 2005). 
Table 5.6: Perceived Changes 2000-2003 Susenas: Education 
Indicator of Education Outcome Worse Same Better 
Accessibility to entering:    
      Primary 2.1 83.0 14.9 
      Lower secondary 4.3 83.4 12.3 
      Upper secondary 7.9 82.7 9.4 
      Tertiary 16.1 76.5 7.4 
Source: Susenas Module 2003 
Households were optimistic about education services in the sense that they 
identified at least some improvements. More than a third (36 percent) said that school 
facilities had improved during the previous 2 years. Another 20 percent identified the 
quality of teaching as the main improvement. Almost a tenth claimed that there was 
improvement in the overall academic performance. Only 5 percent said that school fees 
had improved, presumably this meant they became cheaper (Overview Report GDS1+, 
2005). 
 Educational achievement (mathematics and science) in Thailand, Indonesia and 
Philippines shows a difference in scores and ranks. Thailand has a relatively higher score 
and rank than Indonesia and the Philippines. In mathematics, Thailand was placed as 
number 27 out of 38 countries in 1999 and in science was number 24 (Data from 2003 is 
not available). Indonesia was at number 34 in mathematics in 1999, and fell into number 
35 of 46 countries in 2003. In 1999, Indonesian’s students ranked 32nd in science and this 
increased to number 27 in 2003. Meanwhile, the Philippines ranked 36th in mathematics in 
1999 and then 42nd in 2003. In science, the Philippines ranked 36th in 1999 and fell to 43rd 
in 2003. 
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Table 5.7: Student performance in Mathematics and Science Tests  
Mathematics score and rank Science score and rank Country 
1999 2003 1999 2003 
Thailand 467 (27) -- 482 (24) -- 
Indonesia 403 (34) 411 (35) 435 (32) 420 (27) 
Philippines 348 (36) 378 (42) 345 (36) 377 (43) 
 Source: quoted from East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005 
 The World Bank reported that: “some Asian countries have achieved high 
enrollment rates. These countries, however, face other educational challenges: The 
emerging economies of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand must 
better manage their education systems to reduce disparities between wealthier and poorer 
regions, and to improve the overall quality of education. Meanwhile, the poorer 
countries—Laos, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea—must expand the number of 
children who enter school, cut the number who drop out at the primary level, ensure that 
the system produces enough talent to support economic growth and development, and 
address difficult problems in financing and managing their education systems” (East Asia 
Decentralizes, World Bank, 2005). 
C. Conclusion: learning from six regions 
 That the making of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 was done in 
haste is a fact. Both laws still often contradict other constitutional regulations. This 
contradiction is not only at the constitutional level, but also in the implementation of the 
regulations. This occurred with both the Governmental Regulations and other 
Implementation Regulations at a lower level. This contradiction occurred because there 
were too many implementation regulations (there were hundreds of them which were 
made to implement both laws. The large number of regulations that had to be made also 
shows that the compositions of the two laws on regional autonomy were made in haste. 
From this fact, it is understandable that the Central Government was actually 
administratively unprepared to implement the decentralization policy. The legal 
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instrument, in the form of constitutional regulations, had not been thoroughly provided 
and the implementation of the decentralization policy was stalled. 
The bottom line is that there was no major difference in terms of government 
intervention in the six research regions. The assumption followed by the Central 
Government since the beginning was that all regions have the same abilities and the same 
characteristics. This manifested in the uniformity of several government regulations that 
governed the implementation of local government, including how the regions should 
enhance their administration as a response to regional autonomy. Based on the regulations 
and the basic characteristics of autonomy given by the Central Government to the region, 
the Central Government has the right to enforce its interests in the region. Nevertheless, in 
these six research regions, there were only three regions in which the Central Government 
relatively lost the control it had previously had because the regions were assumed to be 
more advanced in the implementation of regional autonomy.  One of these three regions 
was the Giri Regency, which had been a pilot project for regional autonomy prior to the 
implementation of Law No. 22/1999. Its experience as a pilot project made the region 
quite independent in making policy. The Central Government even often sent officials 
from the Giri Regency to give training in other regions, and many officials from other 
regions visited and studied the implementation of regional autonomy in Giri. The loose 
control of the Central Government in the Giri Regency is added to by the abilities and 
attitude of the regent, who was brave in expressing his creativity through the making of 
policy which many occasions even contradicted the policy of the Central Government. 
One stirring example was when the Giri Regency Government acquired the Giri National 
Land Bureau, which was still a de facto subdivision of the Central Government institution, 
the National Land Bureau (BPN). Having had experience in implementing regional 
autonomy, and being supported by the competent leadership of the regent, the region had a 
successful public administration reform covering many reform components, especially 
organization and personnel. The financial sector was reformed to some extent particularly 
through the implementation of the performance-based budget system model (see Table 
4.21). Meanwhile, the planning method reform component was not successful because 
although the Central Government gave freedom in the planning process, in practice it does 
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not always submit to the planning rationality: there are more political interests of the 
government personnel, both the bureaucrats and politicians. 
Other regions that were adequately independent in policy making were the Prajan 
and Alit Municipalities. The socio-economic levels, including the availability of city 
facilities, of these two regions is more developed than other region. However, these two 
regions were more cooperative than the Giri Regency towards the Central Government in 
the implementing of policy, and tended to avoid confrontation with the Central 
Government. When there were policies that contradicted regional policy or change, the 
government in those two regions tried to act critically in adjusting them to the region’s 
interests, while at the same time trying to maintain the communication with the Central 
Government to create regulations that would be more beneficial for the region and the 
Central Government. This cooperative attitude did not always benefit the regions because 
in some reform components (personnel finance and planning methods) they were not able 
to achieve the maximum results as expected (see Table 4.21).  
 The Mayor’s policies in both regions were actually highly innovative, but the 
implementation of these policies was often troubled by senior bureaucrats that 
collaborated with politicians to hinder the public administration reform movement 
proposed by the mayor. The public administration reform was then stalled, and the results 
were not maximal. 
 In the other three regions, Kulon, Anom, and Wetan Regencies, there was a 
significant dependency on the Central Government. Socially and economically, the three 
regions still needed help from the Central Government; therefore intervention in various 
policy sectors was still very excessive. Unfortunately, even the Central Government was 
not ready, and the region was confused by unclear policies that tended to contradict each 
other. Reform in the public administration sector became unclear and completely 
undirected. This condition did not occur in the Kulon Regency. Compared to Anom and 
Wetan Regencies, personnel and financial reforms in this regency were considered to be 
successful. The reason is, once again, the attitudes and the policies of the regent who was 
committed to the improvement of the personnel resources, and mad a concerted effort to 
create good governance. Unfortunately, the reform was not maximal because of internal 
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causes, especially a lack managerial skill to support public administration reform and 
severe conflict with politicians in the DPRD and some NGOs. 
The Central Government was administratively unprepared for substantial reform. 
This can be seen in the contradictions in the implementation of the regulation, which were 
reflective of the old defects in the Indonesian bureaucracy, i.e. the retaining of ego-sectors. 
Each sector had its own responsibilities and its own interests, and the integration between 
the sectors, that was very crucial to managing the regional development, was weakened. 
The ego-sector could also be seen from the distribution of the de-concentration fund to the 
regions and it often spoiled the development plans that had been arranged by the 
regency/municipality because there were many overlapping activities in practice. A very 
evident example is the education and the health sectors. The six research regions admitted 
that de-concentration funds for the education and the health sectors were outside their 
control. Even the head of region and the city manager, who are primarily responsible for 
the development management in the two sectors often, did not know exactly what kind of 
project would be funded by the de-concentration funds, or the amount of these funds. 
Every year they accepted projects made by the Central Government, and distributed 
through the provinces. One thing that burdened the region even more was projects with 
de-concentration funds that were received only after the APBD is determined, so there was 
not any integration between the region’s projects and the projects funded by the Central 
Government in the education and the health sectors. The outcome of the policies in those 
sectors would then become ineffective because there were often overlapping programs or 
no programs at all. 
 Only regions that were courageous and innovative were able to handle the 
ineffective development policies, especially in the health and education sectors. In the 
health sector, there were only two regions brave enough to make policy innovations which 
were different from the Central Government policy. One region was the Giri Regency, 
which applied an international standard (ISO) for the health services provided by the 
puskesmas. Although the policy cost a sufficiently large amount of money, it managed to 
force the health personnel to improve the quality of health services. Another region was 
the Alit Municipality, which gladly became the experimental region for the 
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implementation of the Citizens’ Charter (CC) in the puskesmas. This CC policy was not 
yet national policy, but the region was quite innovative in improving health services by 
inviting local society, the bureaucracy and politicians, to think about better health services. 
In this matter, the Central Government allowed these two regions to make health policy 
innovation, because this was considered to be the right of the region. These two regions 
were also considered as being able to take responsibility for the policy making.  
 In the education sector, the Prajan Municipality is a national barometer for 
education implementation, because historically many of the best schools and education 
institutions in Indonesia have been established in this city. The Central Government does 
not intervene much in the education policy in this region. The Kulon Regent once made a 
policy in the education sector that was quite creative, by giving stimulant funds to fix 
damaged school buildings directly to the local community. This policy was very effective 
because it cut out the bureaucracy, which had become the cause for the high cost of school 
building development, and was not very effective. The success of the education sector in 
the Kulon Regency cannot be separated from the commitment of the regent who tried to 
form a high level of effectiveness in the development project, and also placed the 
community as the subject in educational development.  
Meanwhile, in two other regions, Anom and Wetan Regencies, there was not any 
notable policy innovation. They completely followed the policies of the Central 
Government and relied totally on the policies of the Ministry of National Education or the 
Ministry of Health. The result is that the quality of the health and education development 
in these two regions tended to decrease. Once more, these facts show that freedom in 
policy making will motivate a region to be more creative and innovative, and the policy 
made will be more likely to fulfill the region's needs and solve the region's problems. 
Although the Central Government gave freedom to some regions to make policy 
innovations especially in the education and health sectors, in practice, those regions still 
often experienced problems in policy coordination. This is similar with the projects 
funded by the de-concentration funds.  
It can therefore be concluded that generally a looser control of the Central 
Government will provide the freedom for the regions to create innovative policy. This also 
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requires certain conditions in the region that allow the development of policy innovation, 
such as a positive attitude and high level of ability of the Regent/Mayor, as well as support 
and abilities of the bureaucrats and politicians (see Table 5.8).   
Table: 5.8: Correlation between Central Government Role and Public Administration 
Reform Performance in six regions  
District Central Government Role  Public Administration Reform 
Performance 
Giri Regency Loose control Successful 
Prajan Municipality Loose control Successful 
Kulon Regency Tight control Partially successful 
Anom Regency Tight control Failed 
Alit Municipality Loose control Successful 
Wetan Regency Tight control Failed 
Source: primary data 
 
 The Central Government’s role through de-concentrated funds is on the one 
hand a positive thing, because the central government has seriously increased the 
development of basic needs (education and health), while on the other hand the 
implementation of both sectors has not been followed up properly with administrative 
reform in the framework of decentralization policy (see Figure 5.2.a). Although the 
research results showed that education and health showed a good level of performance, the 
quality of both sectors can still be improved if the policy reform and administrative reform 
support each other. From here, we can conclude that substantial policy reform could attain 
its objectives if the administrative reform had a synchronic design to the policy (see 
Figure 5.2.b). Both reforms should be put into the integrative decentralization policy. 
Unfortunately, it seems that each policy is completely separate to the other. The problems 
could be caused by administrative matters and/or political factors.   
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Figure 5.2.a 
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Figure 5.2.b 
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 Politically, the multi dimensional crisis that was experienced by at Indonesia 
that time caused the implementation of the decentralization policy to become difficult. 
There was the concern of those who rejected decentralization (the military and nationalist 
groups) that the policy might cause the state and nation to disintegrate because giving 
autonomy to the regions would encourage the regions to free themselves from Jakarta’s 
control. Central bureaucrat and technocrat groups who gained politically and material 
benefits from the centralized system also accused the local governments of being 
incapable of implementing autonomy. This argument, of course, was not accepted by the 
pro-autonomy groups, because the purpose of giving autonomy to the regions was to 
improve the prosperity of society through closeness between the public service and society 
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that it served. The pro-autonomy groups accused those that disagreed with autonomy of 
being afraid of loosing the authority that had been under their control for years. 
Nonetheless, the political winds seemed to have swung more towards the anti- autonomy 
side, and it seemed that autonomy would be too difficult to realize. In addition, in the 
preparation period, many actors that had designed the laws on regional autonomy were 
excluded from the government arena. When that occurred, the future of local autonomy 
became hazy, and its implementation was stalled. 
 The lack of political support at the Central Government level became obvious 
when the Central Government and the DPR were very reluctant to compose the laws on 
the direct elections for the heads of the regions. This was probably understandable, 
considering that even at a national level, there was no law on the direct election of the 
president. The concentration of the Central Government on making the political 
constitution for the direct election of the president required such a large amount of energy 
that many other constitutional regulations were left ignored. This ruined the basic 
assumption of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 that the local autonomy would run 
as desired when the check and balance mechanism could run effectively. The Head of the 
Region was responsible to the DPRD, but they could not dismiss each other because the 
head of the region was elected directly by the people. Unfortunately, this was not 
supported by the empirical facts of the political system in Indonesia, where the people 
choose the political parties, and the representatives of these political parties sit in the 
DPRD. There was therefore a disparity between the urgency of the public interest and the 
urgency of the party’s interests that often reflected the interests of the political party elites 
more than the interests of the people that they represented. The result of this condition was 
that even the DPRD could often not represent the people’s interests. This unfulfilled basic 
assumption was one of the causes for many disputes on and much manipulation of Local 
Government policy.  
 The implications of this condition for the Local Government were the very 
high level of uncertainty in performing the public administration reform. It is 
understandable that the region performed their policy using a trial and error method, 
because of the uncertainty of the policy that was produced by the Central Government. 
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From here, the decentralization policy that was the background for the public 
administration reform became so hazy that the reforms that were implemented became 
unable to achieve the desired results. The regions that dared to escape this had a greater 
possibility of succeeding in their public administration reform. This was possible because 
one of the advantages for the regions, made possible by Law No. 22/1999, was the 
adequate authority over its own region, including the designing of bureaucracy that suited 
the regions interests and needs. Therefore, only regions that were capable of using this 
autonomy could succeed in performing its public administration reform.  
 Even though both laws on local autonomy had weaknesses and were not 
supported by a conducive political climate at that time, both at least had given “a perfect 
strike” to the centralized government model in Indonesia, that had been proven to be 
unsupportive of increasing peoples prosperity fairly and equally. The character of actors 
that composed both laws, which tended to be political, have defeated the domination of 
Jakarta in the control of the political and economic sources at that time. This was one of 
the successes of the local autonomy policy based on Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 
25/1999. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REACTION AND CHANGES OF THE LOCAL POLITICS  
IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
 
 This chapter will explain several Independent Variables. It will begin with one of 
the main variables at the local level, the Regent/Mayor’s role in determining the success of 
public administration reform during the implementation of Law No. 22/1999. It will begin 
with the social, economic, and political background of the heads of region, before they 
became the Regents/Mayors. This will then be followed by leadership capability matters, 
including the management style of the Regent/Mayor in performing his/her daily task. 
Another discussion will be on accountability, particularly the issues of corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism (KKN) that often affect the leaders of public organizations. The 
explanation will be concluded by looking at the acceptance of the regional government 
personnel and society of the leadership style of the Regent/Mayor. This description will 
not thoroughly explain each aspect of the six heads of the regions; it will only focus on 
several interesting cases that adequately describe the roles of the heads of regions in the 
reform process.  
 The next variable is the reaction of the bureaucrats (civil servants) and politicians 
(DPRD) to public administration reform. An explanation of this variable will begin with 
the historical factor. It will discuss the historical inheritance of the New Order 
bureaucracy that melded into the character of the organizational culture after many years 
in the Local Government. The reactions of the bureaucrats and politicians shows their 
attitudes and the strategy in terms of their collaboration and conflict when the institution 
and the system of public administration had to be changed. Meanwhile, the last variable 
discussed is the dynamics of civil society toward the problems concerning public 
administration reform. How and why they act and the form of their support or refusal will 
be part of the discussion in this variable.  
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A. THE ROLE OF THE REGENT/MAYOR 
1. The Past of the Head of the Region 
 The evaluation of the past of a Regent/Mayor is very important, because from this 
evaluation the way a leader performs his daily administrative tasks can be explained. This 
notion is based on the assumption that persons past is one of the factors that forms the 
leadership characteristics of a person which can be observed from his/her leadership style 
in performing his/her administrative tasks. The six head of the regions that are being 
studied came from different backgrounds. This can be seen in the following table: 
Table 6.1: Background of the heads of regions 
No. The Regent/Mayor Background 
1 Giri Regent Academic 
2 Prajan Mayor Businessman 
3 Anom Regent Businessman 
4 Kulon Regent Politician 
5 Alit Mayor Academic 
6 Wetan Regent Bureaucrat 
Source: Primary Data 
 
Two of the heads of region that came from an academic background were the Giri 
Regent and the Alit Mayor. Giri Regent was formally a lecturer in an economic college in 
the Prajan Province, and the Alit Mayor was a lecturer at a private university in Surabaya 
lecturing in social and political sciences. The Heads of Regions that had previously 
businessmen were the Prajan Mayor and the Anom Regent. The Prajan Mayor was a 
famous garment businessman in Prajan; while Anom Regent was well known as a land 
broker. The other two heads of regions were the Kulon Regent who was a female 
politician from the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), and the Wetan 
Regent who was a pure career bureaucrat that once worked as the head of Religion 
Department Office in Wetan Regency, which is a institution directly under the Ministry of 
Religion. All six Regent/Mayor started their duty as the Regent/Mayor almost at the same 
time, in 2000.  
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 The last position held by the Giri Regent had been the Director of an Economic 
Sciences College located in the Giri Regency. His field of study was accounting. Besides 
working as a lecturer, he was also an active member of the PDIP board in the Giri 
Regency Branch. Because of his educational background, his abilities, and his critical 
attitude, he was nominated as the candidate for the Giri Regent by PDIP. He won 
unanimously and became the Regent through the DPRD voting process in the Giri 
Regency, which at that time was mostly occupied by representatives from PDIP. 
 Differing from the Giri Regent, the Prajan Mayor’s victory in the in DPRD 
election was unanimous because his party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), was not the 
Mayority in the Prajan Municipality DPRD. The internal problems in PDIP, which was 
the prevailing party in Prajan Municipality, were used against them by the Moslem-based 
parties that formed a coalition to support the candidate for Mayor nominated by PAN. The 
support from society towards the candidate from PAN was satisfactory, because at the 
national level, the Prajan Municipality was the ‘base camp’ for PAN devotees. Though the 
mayor was a successful local garment businessman that owned many boutiques in the 
Prajan Municipality, he was not an arrogant person because of his religious character. He 
did not even want to be called a Mayor, he preferred to be called a civil servant.  
 The Kulon Regent is the first woman Regent even, the youngest Regent in the 
history of Indonesian Administration. She came from a middle class family which was 
also active in the nationalist political party. This background encouraged her to be actively 
involved in the political party, until she was eventually elected as the head of the PDIP 
branch in the Kulon Regency. Besides her active political life, she also continued her 
education by taking a Masters program in political sciences at a famous state university in 
Indonesia. She had remarkable political skill that made her an exceptional politician in the 
Indonesian political arena that is dominated by male politicians (for it is a patriarchic 
culture).  This skill meant that she received acknowledgment from the PDIP leader, 
Megawati, and was subsequently placed her position as the Kulon Regent after she was 
formerly elected as a member of the DPRD. 
 The Anom Regency is one of the dominant base regions of PDIP in Central Java 
Province. The Mayority of members the DPRD came from PDIP. The candidate of Regent 
 261
from PDIP which was matched with a deputy Regent candidate from Golkar won the 
election that time. The Regent who previously worked as a land broker among other 
things, was also active in PDIP. In this party, he often interacted with the Paramilitary 
(Satgas) which was mostly funded the Regent’s own money. Many people think that it 
was his closeness with the Paramilitary that enabled him to win the election within the 
PDIP, and in the end win the election in the DPRD. His character as a land broker was 
still very significant and carried over in to his administrative actions. 
 The Alit Municipality is the Mayor base for PDIP devotees at a national level. It 
was in this region that Bung Karno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia and 
the founder of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the early form of PDIP, was buried. 
It was therefore not very difficult for a candidate from PDIP to be placed in the Mayors 
position, as was the case with  the Mayor for the 2000-2005 period. The mayor was 
elected by the members of the DPRD by acclamation. In addition, his background as a 
lecturer with a Masters degree and his knowledge in the field of science increased his 
bargaining power to become Mayor. Because of his abilities and his modest character, he 
attained acknowledgment from national PDIP leaders, especially those from the East Java 
Province, in support of his position as Mayor.  
 The Regent of the Wetan Regency was extremely opposed to the character of the 
Alit Mayor. The Regent, that came from a bureaucratic career background, was deeply 
influenced by a rigid disciplinary style that was the characteristic of conservative 
bureaucrats in Indonesia. Even though he was originally an office head of the Department 
of Religion in the Wetan Regency and was also a Moslem, he had a closer relationship 
with the nationalist group in the PDIP than with the Islamic party. His closeness with the 
PDIP elite, especially those in the DPRD, was then used to support his nomination as 
Regent, which ended in his definitive election as Regent. 
 Almost all of the six Regents/Mayors came from the regions that were under 
their control. They were all natives of the region, except for the Alit Mayor, who was not 
born in the region. Due to his closeness to the local leaders and the support from the PDIP 
political elite at the national level, he was be accepted as a local. 
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2. Leadership Style 
 The evaluation of the leadership style of the Regent/Mayor will be presented by 
contrasting one with the other. This is done to acquire an evaluation description of the 
success of a region in performing its governmental duties and public services. This 
success is always related to the leadership abilities of the Regent/Mayor. The leadership 
style will be observed through the techniques used in decision making, policy selection, 
management strategy, and networking development, including cooperation with the 
DPRD and society acceptance towards the leadership style. From these dimensions, how 
far the Regent/Mayor influences the success of a region in reforming its public 
administration can be identified.  
 
2.1. Giri Regent 
a. Management Skill 
 Law No. 22/1999 did not explicitly differentiate the function of the Regent and 
the deputy.  In the daily administrative management practice in the Giri Regency, the 
difference between the two could not be seen, except on several occasions where the 
deputy Regent replaced the Regent in commencing a number of small projects. These 
projects were funded independently by society, and the Regent was present at these events 
in order to socialize with society. Information obtained from the Regent himself indicates 
that he tended to trust the Regional Secretary more than deputy, because of his educational 
background74. The Regent and his deputy had had an informal agreement to share the 
duties related to decision making in daily administration management. If there was an 
assignment letter not signed by the Regent, the Regional Secretary was therefore freely 
allowed to determine his policy moves. However, if the Regent had writter on the letter, it 
then fell under the Regent’s authority and the Regional Secretary only had to carry it out. 
This informal code was only understood by those two people. This sharing arrangement 
did not mean that the Regent was being irresponsible about the existing problems. As an 
                                                 
74 The deputy Regent used to work as the Head of Economic and Business Development (Kaur Ekbang) in one of the 
villages in the Giri Regency. However, because of his ties with one of the Islamic parties, he was nominated as a 
candidate for a deputy Regent by PDIP. Meanwhile, the Regional Secretary had previously been a career bureaucrat, and 
Bachelors Degree from an overseas university and had previously been a lecturer at a famous college in Prajan. Through 
coincidence, the Regent had been the Regional Secretary’s classmate in high school.  
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economist, he understood about leadership and was able to decide which jobs he had to do 
himself and which job could be delegated. With the informal agreement between them, the 
Regent was still able to control things related to his daily governmental duties, without 
putting adding to his duty as the Regent/Mayor, which was already a heavy burdening. 
 Duty sharing was also used in determining the head position in the Regional 
Government environment.  The determining of the echelon II positions, the head of the 
Bureau, the head of office, and the head of agency, was carried out by the Regent himself, 
using fit and proper tests. It was actually the Baperjakat institution that promoted and 
placed employees in certain positions. The Regent utilized the Baperjakat mostly to 
determine the positions below Echelon II. In the early period of the implementation of 
regional autonomy, the Regent’s role in determining the echelon II positions was quite 
significant, because in the same period, PP No. 84/2000 on the obligation of a region to 
re-structure it organization, especially through merger policy between vertical and 
autonomous institutions, was issued. According to the Regent (Subiyanto, 2005:44-59), a 
merger process that was not well planned would cause the following problems: 
a. Rivalry between the ex-personnel of the vertical institution and the region’s 
original personnel, including the ex-head of the sub district (Camat). 
b. The head of agency position becomes a target for the civil servant personnel that 
have high rank, and the competition becomes unfair. 
c. The personnel that have a low rank but a high level of competency are beaten by 
civil servant personnel that have wider networking or a higher rank. The Regent 
considers this condition to be related to the political actions of the bureaucracy that 
were inherited by the New Order Regime. This is his opinion: 
”The problem that haunts the personnel behavior as the result of bureaucracy 
politicization is so powerful that they act as politicians in the organizational 
structural positions of Regional Government. Usually they earn their positions as a 
reward for their achievements in helping a political party in the past. Sometimes 
they act as if they are heroes, and they force their will as a result of the habits in 
the past that places their bureaucratic position as the winner. I realize that many 
officials of this kind have low level of competency but possess wide networking. 
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Obviously everything that they have done must be appreciated but then it has to be 
understood that basic competency should be the main focus on arranging the 
bureaucracy of the regency government.” 
d. The echelon distinction among regional officials causes a status difference that in 
the end results in an income disparity among regional officials. 
e. Disharmony occurs between the ex-employees of vertical institutions and regional 
local employees. This occursbecause the ex-employee of the Central Government 
usually have a higher rank and feel more capable than the regional employees. 
f. The employees that do not get a higher position in the structure of the Regional 
Government feel that they have been hard done by, and they often create problems, 
ranging from the small problems to large demonstrations. 
To solve these problems, the Regent came up with the following ideas (Subiyanto, 
2005:45): 
a. Downsizing the organization and harmonizing it with region’s needs, so that the 
organizational management reflects the region's strategic interests. The Regent 
downsized the 23 existing Agencies into just 7 agencies. 
b. Determining the size of an institution based on the balance principle and 
considering these criteria: 
i. The number of employees under the authority of an institution. 
ii. The number of the assets that the institution is responsible for. 
iii. The crucial operational level of an institution. 
iv. The size of the budget is controlled by the institution. 
c. Placing personnel in positions based on the merit system, which is concerned more 
with the competency than the seniority of a person, although the group/rank is still 
considered. 
d. Implementing a retirement age as the rule, 56 years old, except for individuals who 
have an extremely-high level of competency and have skills that are still needed. 
e. Giving the opportunity to young employees that have level of high competency to be 
place in structural position to give them assurance that their careers in the Local 
Government have a future. 
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f. Dismissing position exchange by transparently publishing every decision on the 
rank raise of a person in the government structure. Through this move, the superior 
is given the authority to propose/choose the personnel that are considered to be able 
to cooperate with him/her.  
g. Giving incentives or bonuses transparently, based on the working performance of 
each regional official.  
h. Implementing every decision made consistently and placing the full responsibility 
decisions made with the head of the institution.  
i. Giving rewards and punishment consistently. 
 
 Most of the ideas in downsizing, competency, transparency, incentives, rewards 
and punishment in the administration management, especially in the personnel and 
organization arrangement, came purely from the Regent own ideas and were supported by 
the city manager. The regent admitted that the ideas were very difficult to implement, 
especially when they had to overcome seniority matters in the employment. To implement 
the ideas and to suppress the possibility disorder occuring, the Regent made these strategic 
moves (Subiyanto, 2005:47): 
a. Together with the DPRD, the Regent arranged Perda No. 12/2000 that then 
changed into Perda No. 12/2003. These Regional Regulations basically arranged 
the implementation of a merger process of government institutions (vertically and 
autonomously). In the beginning, in 2000, the purpose of this merger process was 
to form exprit de corps in every civil servant employee, whether ex-vertical 
institution employees or regional local employees, so that they would become part 
of the same employee corps unity. The regional autonomous employees must be 
willing to accept the ex-vertical institution employees through the cooperation 
mechanism in each agency/bureau/office. On the other hands the ex-vertical 
institution employees are not supposed to be placed exclusively in an institution 
but must be willing to enter any agency that has been formed.  
b. The first step of the merger process strategy was followed by the second step in 
2004 after considering the interaction between the ex-vertical institute employees 
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and the regional employees. The implementation of this idea was carried out by 
using the merit system, so that only employee with high achievement would earn a 
place in a structural position. The standard of competency was composed by 
Baperjakat with approval from the Regent. The result of this strategic 
implementation was that there were 22 employees that had to leave their structural 
positions because their competency levels were not appropriate for the standards 
that were composed by the leader. Nonetheless, this did not mean that they were 
just thrown out. The Regent made a policy of providing opportunities for some of 
them (5 people from the echelon III and 2 people from echelon II) who were 
considered to still have the potential to improve themselves. They were placed in 
an institution known as the institution for Expert Staff, which was placed in Room 
12. For this reason it is often known as Room 12. Government personnel 
sarcastically called the people who were in this room, the excluded people 
although not all of the people were in there because they did not have sufficient 
levels of competency75. They were palced in Room 12 for a year, and if their work 
performance improved, they would be reassigned to a structural position. Based on 
the Regent Decree No. 46/2003, the duties of the Expert Staff are to examine and 
to give consideration to the Regent in the field of administration, development, and 
public prosperity. In practice, these duties were performed well, although the 
Regent never considered their examination results, because the actual function of 
this institution was for the people in it to have introspection on their own work.  
c. The implementing of the incentive system as a manifestation of the reward and 
punishment system was done by giving incentives in the form of cash to the 
officials who succeeded in achieving something. This policy was inscribed in the 
Regent Decree No. 394/2004. The size of the incentives given was based on the 
work performance indicator that consisted of the Organization Variable (60%), the 
Work Performance Evaluation Variable (30%), and the Regent’s Prerogative 
Variable (10%). Based on the results of the work performance evaluation in 2004, 
                                                 
75 One of the Echelon II officials that entered Room 12 came from the Region-owned hospital. He entered the Room by 
choice and not because he was not competent or had ever made any mistakes in his duties. 
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the size of the incentive varied among officials: the lowest was 847,711.23 Rupiah 
(Cakri Camat) and the highest was 2,166,167.15 (the Head of Health Agency). 
The incentives were paid by the APBD. 
 
 Another idea that also came from the Regent was the improvement of public 
services, particularly the Puskesmas (Public Health Centre). A Puskesmas in Giri Regency 
received appraisal through the ISO 2001 Certificate. However, some people inside the 
Local Government thought that the cost that was needed to get the ISO 2001 Certificate 
was too high compared to the quality of the service that was given; the money that was 
used to invite the people who issued the certificate was quite a large amount, and it could 
actually have been used to improve the services in other Puskesmas. Responding to this 
criticism, the Local Government considered this as a part of the challenge to encourage the 
personnel of the Puskesmas to maintain the quality of service as required by the ISO 2001. 
 The responses of employees toward the Regent’s institutional personnelreform 
strategy was varied. At the beginning, it was difficult to integrate the ex-central institution 
employees with the regional agencies, especially at the echelon II level. There was a 
predisposition among the Central Government employees to fell that they were better than 
the Local Government employees. However, at the same time, they were also worried that 
they would not get structural positions within the agencies. The Local Government 
employees also considered the Central Government employees as being a threat to their 
positions in the institution. This attitude was very obvious in the early period of the local 
autonomy implementation, as it often resulted in unfair rivalry, especially in echelon II 
and III. Below those echelon, almost no significant problems arose. To solve this problem, 
the Regent selected the head of the agency, bureau, or office using a fit and proper testing 
mechanism. Baperjakat functioned to support the Regent in his selection. This method is 
considered to have succeeded in suppressing the possibility of conflict among the groups 
that wanted the structural positions. In addition, the Regent at that time made decisions 
transparently, and emphasized the competency of staff. Due to continuous socialization 
from the officials in the region, open conflict of interest among the groups did not 
seriously affect the performance of the Local Government.  
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 Many officials, especially those that already had senior group and rank, argued 
that the Room 12 system was extremely disadvantaging for them. Their complaints are 
mostly understandable, considering that under the centralized system, they practically 
acted only as executors and were not used to thinking creatively or coping with a great 
amount of responsibility at work.  Their disagreement with the Room 12 system got 
stronger when a rumor spread among the officials that the positions in Room 12 were 
more of a punishment than a learning process for the officials before they could return to 
their positions in the governmental institution. Nonetheless, the image of the position as a 
‘punishment’ also had a positive impact, because the employees became more motivated 
to achieve good results so that they stayed away from Room 12. The employees that were 
still young (45 years old and below) were also motivated to improve their competency 
levels and compete with their seniors. 
 The response of the employees toward the Regent’s third strategy will be cited 
from the results of research done by an employee in the City Manager Office of the Giri 
Regency that studied the response of the employees toward the Regent’s policy on reward 
mechanism. The results of this research were published in a magazine published by the 
Giri Government named Varia Giri (fifth edition, year 2005). Based on the results of the 
research, it was found that most people (60%) thought that the reward policy did not affect 
their working performance. Others (25%) said that they do not know because they tended 
to ‘wait and see’. Thus, only 15% of them explicitly stated their support of the reward 
policy, and considered it to have a positive affect on their working performance (Aminun, 
2005). Despite the validity of the data from the research, the tendency for the employees 
to be pessimistic towards the reward policy in the early period of the policy 
implementation is considered to be natural. There were still many employees who had not 
understood the function of the rewards because there was no distinct indicator that could 
make them understand and accept the policy. In addition, the employees had not 
previously been able to trust the regional leadership and were still suspicious toward any 
concealed interest in the reward giving mechanism, especially the interests that were 
related to the direct election of the Regent. These elections were about to be held in mid 
2005. 
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 The attitude and the policies of  Regent was viewed differently by Local 
Government personnel. Some supported the Regent and his character, others opposed him 
and declared their disagreement. According to an internal source in Giri Bappeda, the 
number of people who opposed the Regent was quite significant. The Regent, who was 
preparing himself for the direct election of Regent, considered this condition as being a 
hindrance that needed to be solved soon. In addition,  there was a rumor at that time that 
there would be another candidate. This candidate was supposedly a senior bureaucrat in 
the Giri Government (the City Manager) and was supported by the Golongan karya Party. 
In order to confuse the Local Government Personnel who did not agree with his policies, 
the Regent introduced the Incentive Policy for the employees with high achievement. 
Even though the idea of giving incentives had already been mentioned since the early in 
his ruling period, strangely it was only realized not long before the next Regent election 
was held. From this, it can be understood that some bureaucrats suspected that the Regent 
had his own interest vested in the reward giving process76. According to those bureaucrats, 
the Regent, who came from PDIP, was still trying to gain support from his personnel that 
so had far been loyal supporters (conservative) of the Golongan karya Party. 
 
 b. Transparency and Accountability 
 The Giri Regent was one of the regents who dared to announce the allocation 
and the amount of the APBD of his region to the mass media. This was one form of 
transparency in budgeting. Even though the announcement was not in detail, the bravery 
itself was a breakthrough in that it viewed the APBD as being not only a document that 
belongs to the government, but also a public document that is allowed to be read, 
understood, and criticized by the public. Starting from the 2004 fiscal year, Giri APBD 
could be read in some local and national newspapers. 
 The publication of the APBD in the mass media was important because the most 
crucial problem in transparency and accountability was in the budget sector. The Regent’s 
argument was as following: 
                                                 
76 In the direct election of Regent/Mayor in 2005, incumbent candidate was re-elected as the Giri Regent. Meanwhile, 
his political enemy that was defeated in the election, senior bureaucrat who previously worked as the Regional 
Secretary, still became the City Manager. 
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“I realized that there are some civil service employees who have the 
bad habit fooling around with the regional expense budget. When they 
have a chance to make a profit, they take it for themselves or collude 
with group. This obviously affects their working performance and their 
informal group”. 
 
This stealing from the budget was suspected to be very high. To solve this problem, the 
Regent did not take any legal action because the legal institution and personnel were not 
effective. In addition, if the problem was dealt with legally, then there would be a new 
case everyday, which drain the Regent’s time and energy solving the problem. The 
strategy chosen by the Regent since the 2001 budget year was to determine that a 
tolerance limit for corruption was 10%. This reduced to 5% in the 2004 budget year. This 
tolerance, according to the Regent, had to be given to avoid more lost. If personnel 
violated this tolerance limit, the Regent would strictly punish them. An example of this is 
an official from the echelon III that had to work in Room 12 because he took a cut of his 
inferior’s lunch money.  
 Since the beginning, the Regent had accepted the fact that there was corruption in 
his government. This fact can be found in his book (Subiyanto: 65, 2005): 
“Since the start, the writer has decided that he does not think of 
eliminating corruption in the Giri administration. However, the writer 
wants to build a strong bureaucratic system in which the 
accountability of the regency government can be relied on. Corruption 
as a form of deviant behavior must be solved through the forming of a 
powerful system, formed by the executor himself and driven by the will 
of the writer himself”. 
 
The statement above can be understood as an ability of the Regent to face the reality of 
corruption in his administration. Nonetheless, the Regent did not dare to make a stern 
policy because he worried that it might cause disorder in the government. Therefore, he 
tried to overcome the problem by: 
a. Introducing the performance based budget; 
b. Using the accounting system program; 
c. Using the work satisfaction payment system; 
d. Using the control and supervision system; 
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e. Increasing transparency and publicity; 
f. Forming a Regional Treasury. 
 
 The Regent also realized that KKN was not only committed by bureaucratic 
personnel but also by non-government people, such as those from the private sector. One 
example of collusion in the private sector is when collaboration is used to win a goods 
provision project that is tendered by the Local Government, such as the provision of 
school books and drugs. Those involved collude secretly to arrange the value of the 
project through the auction bids that are offered. Later on, the winner of the auction will 
share the project with all those involved in the collusion. The effect of this collusion is 
that the quality of the goods received is very low.  
Why does this happen? The Regent explained that initially many companies relied 
on the Local Government’s market share by standing behind the Central Government's 
regulations, such as Government Regulations, Presidential Decisions, and so on. The 
following Table 6.2 shows the comparison between the number of companies that deal in 
goods service and procurement, and the number of companies that deal in services and 
construction, along with the total project values granted in 2002. 
Table 6.2: Comparison between number private company and total project value that was 
granted in the Giri Regency, 2002   
Service type Number of 
Companies 
Giri Budget Allocation 
(APBD) 2002 
Goods Service and Procurement 439            9.227.500.250 
Construction Services Procurement 177          10.536.030.200 
Total 616         19.763.530.450 
Source: Subiyanto, 2005 
 
The table shows that there were many companies that relied on the Local Government’s 
goods and services procurement market share and had to battle it out for a project value 
that was not big. Construction services procurement was also fought over by many 
companies, though the amount is smaller than the former service type. The value of this 
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project was also not large. With these highly competitive conditions, a practice of unfair 
competition is very likely. Collusion is especially likely between businessmen or 
businessman and bureaucrats. 
 In goods procurement, the Local Government was inefficient, since the price 
mechanism was arranged by regulations from the central government. Unfortunately, the 
inefficiency of private companies had to be borne by the Local Government.  According to 
the Regent, health services for society were expensive, because the Local Government had 
to procure medicine from the local medicine grocery partner for the sake of business 
distribution. The result would be different if medicine procurement was announced to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and then the Local Government could negotiate to obtain the 
lowest price with the best quality. The conditions, according to the Regent, forced the 
government to partner with officials in the region. However, because of their lack of 
capabilities, the officials would hand over the authority to private businessman that would 
then collude in arranging the procurement of various services or goods. The regent 
complained that the officials had been stripped of their authority through many higher 
government regulations, but were condemned by the mass media and taken to court when 
they were considered to have violated the regulations. Thus, there were many cases where 
many government officials were afraid to make policies because they were afraid to make 
a mistake and be taken to court. 
 Being aware of this situation, the Giri Regent made a daring move by directly 
appointing the private company that had fulfilled the requirements to act as the project 
executor, even though this was in contradiction with the Presidential Decision on the 
procurement of government goods, which is supposed to be tendered. This policy was 
then attacked by many companies that were disadvantaged. In 2005, one case, the school 
book provision case, was even taken to court. The case indicates that the transparency and 
accountability that are desired in the government sector must also be balanced by 
transparency and accountability in the private sector.  
 The Regent did not only show a stern attitude to the non-government group that 
tried to mess around with the policy that was implemented in the region, but also to the 
Central Government by making contradicting policy. An example of this, that was once 
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exposed at the national level, was when the Regent made a policy that placed the National 
Land Bureau in the Giri Regency as an institution under the authority of the Giri 
Government. In other words, land matters were no longer under Central Government 
authority, but now fell under the Local Government’s authority. The Regent said that he 
does not understand why people who wanted to build factories and other things had to ask 
permission from the BPN. According to him, this did not make any sense. 
 As the result of this policy, the Central Government (BPN) was very upset, 
because land matters were actually still under their authority and had not been yet given to 
the region, even though it had been mandated by the Law No. 22/1999. In the end, after a 
long debate, this land matters authority was withdrawn. This stern attitude of the Regent 
often aroused so much controversy that he was named the Cowboy Regent. Culturally, his 
leadership model diverged from the Javanese culture that tended to favor stability and 
harmony. It was very often that he had to oppose high officials in the Prajan  province 
level that still had a strong Javanese leadership style.  
 Nonetheless, his relationship with the DPRD was relatively harmonious, because 
his party, PDIP, was the Mayority in the Giri DPRD. In addition, the Regent had the 
ability to control the PDIP representatives in the DPRD so that they supported his 
leadership. The following is a comment from a former of the DPRD that also came from 
PDIP: 
“What I see now, during his period, is indeed many changes. Changes are in 
the Local Government and also in the bureaucracy. Well, not like in the old 
days where the budget was probably just made up, at least now the Regent has a 
management background. And he knows how much cement costs today, excuse 
me, how much iron costs. And that was where the leaks used to come from at 
least five years ago” 
 
Even though they came from the same party, as representatives of two State Institutions 
with differing functions, both had strong criticism for the other. The following is a remark 
from the former head of the DPRD on the Regent’s character: 
“Well, let’s see how we can describe him. He never judges people. It is not 
important whether someone is close to him, one of his people, and one of his 
groups. No, he is never concerned about those. When someone does something 
wrong, then he is wrong. Everyone is in the same position. And whenever he has 
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principles, which he considers to be right, he is very critical. He is strict, 
patient. That is what makes me admire him. I think he has strong idealism”  
 
Constitutionally, based on UU No. 22/1999, the Regents position is under the DPRD 
because the Regent is elected, installed, and responsible to the DPRD. However, in the 
case of Giri, there was a balance in the positions. Besides the fact that the Mayority of the 
DPRD was controlled by PDIP, it also occurred because the Regent had the courage to 
discuss and respond directly to all of the questions, or even criticism, from the members of 
the DPRD on his policy and administration management model. This courage also aroused 
discomfort among the members of the DPRD who just criticize without having with a 
strong and necessary argument.  
 
2.2. The Anom Regent 
a. Management Skill 
 The management skill of this Regent in running his administration is very 
different from the Giri Regent. His profession and educational background that is far from 
the administration world seems to be very influential over his daily performance. 
Differing from the Giri Regent that divided his duties with his deputy and his City 
Manager, the Anom Regent handed over all administration matters to his deputy. Many 
inside sources mentioned that the Regent’s job only consisted of signing to formalize 
decisions. The following is a comment from the head of an NGO in Anom that has always 
been critical of the administration, when asked what the Regent had done so far: 
“Well I do not know. In the end, he handed everything over to the executive. He 
only signs. One of the rumors in Anom Regency was that it is easy to handle the 
Regent, just use money, and give he what he wants. He does not understand the 
policies, all he knows is how to sign them. Those lower down in the bureaucracy 
also make of this use.  Since the Regent does not know what is going on, the 
City Manager and others make use of this condition” 
 
Theoretically, in the administration structure, the deputy Regent should also have a 
function but in practice he does not have any function. The biggest role was played by the 
career bureaucrats that in the Local Government hierarchy were headed by the City 
Manager. There were many miscellaneous administration matters that were not understood 
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by the politicians, including the Regent. This fact supports the indication that when the 
leadership of the Regent is weak, there are many policies and much administration 
management that is controlled completely by the career bureaucrat elites in the Local 
Government.  
 The inability of the Regent to handle many policy problems that existed in his 
region is also seen through the fact that when he was supposed to give statements in 
important regional ceremonies, he was seldom or never came. Any occasion where the 
Regent was supposed to give his speech, he was always absent with the excuse what he 
had to attend a more important event. I experienced this personally myself when I had the 
chance to attend the 2005 Regional Development Meeting of the Anom Regency in where 
the Regent did not come. His excuse was that he had another event, related to his party, to 
attend.  
 From those few facts, the managerial skill of the Regent in managing his 
government and region can be inferred. The following is the opinion from an NGO worker 
on his leadership: 
“In my opinion, the Anom Regent’s problem is that he cannot build a system 
and cannot control the regional personnel. He does not understand about 
governmental management, so that he is driven by his inferior. He does not 
know what are the SOT government system, the regional autonomy model 
arrangement, education, and employee placement. He does not have any 
indicator to place an official in a job position. He thought that if you have the 
money and you can give me some, I will place you in a job position regardless 
that person is capable or not, nobody knows” 
 
A similar opinion was also given by one of the deputy heads of the DPRD, that had a 
negative view on the ability of the Regent to carry out the Anom Regency administration: 
“I’m so sorry and I’m asking for permission to say like this, because his 
qualification is less, and he doesn’t have vision” 
 
One of the officials in the financial sector of the Giri Regency implicitly mentioned that as 
a result of the insufficient power and authority of the Regent, the urge to reform the local 
financial management also decreased.  
“The Regent’s role is a motivator for local government  personnel. However, 
when he has insufficient authority he is powerless to influence his personnel. 
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Now, we are moving to reform and we need Regent’s support in order to 
make a faster reform”. 
 
This statement from a financial official seems to point toward the academic incapabilities 
of the Regent, who did not have sufficient knowledge of local financial management and 
was also politically incapable when he had to face the DPRD. In the interview, this 
financial official explicitly stated that he considered the Regent as not having any vision. 
The seats in the Anom DPRD were controlled by PDIP (the Regent’s party). However, 
from the quality, they were far below the other large parties such as Golkar, PAN, and 
PKS. As a consequence, in the DPRD meetings, the arguments from the PDIP 
representatives were often contended. The Regent himself was unable to fully control the 
members of PDIP that in the DPRD because of the friction within his own party77. 
 The statements above can easily be proven in the practice of daily 
administration. Many businesses were handed entirely to the officials under the Regent’s 
authority. This condition made the City Manager extremely powerful for he now acted as 
a “shadow Regent”. There were many regional policies and their implementation that were 
resolved by the City Manager himself. Obviously, this does not mean that the Regent was 
completely unaware of what was happening. According to some regional officials that 
used to be active within the Regent’s circle, as long as the policies did not endanger his 
leadership position, the Regent would just sign anything without understanding what he 
had actually approved.  
 Another thing that can be considered a result of the Regent’s inability to lead is 
the disharmony that occured in the working relationship between institutions. There is a 
strong impression that each of them was working on its own. In the planning process, an 
institution named the Regional Planning Board (Bappeda) is actually responsible. 
However, it seems that the institution did not have the muscle needed to force the 
institutions to implement its planning. Bappeda is supposed to plan everything that is 
related to the administration and not just development. However, in practice this was not 
                                                 
77 A rumor that spread widely said that in the election process, the Regent was able to become a candidate because he 
had strong financial support. It was also often said that the Regent who used to be a commander in the Paramilitary of 
one party was successful in becoming the Regent because of the support from the paramilitary.  
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carried out and the Bappeda, as in other regions, only performed the planning for the 
development.  
In the administration, the Local House of Representatives (DPRD) is more 
powerful than the Regent. However, the Regent and his deputies often misinterpreted the 
DPRD’s ideas in their policies.  Unfortunately, the DPRD itself did not care whether its 
ideas were interpreted correctly by the executives or not. Several intelligent DPRD 
members were desperate and reluctant to impose their ideas so that they would be carried 
out by the government. Most of the DPRD members were only concerned with it when it 
was related to their budget interests, such as their retirement money. Though they realized 
that it contradicted the Law, they all agreed to take the money retirement fund. Finally, in 
2005, the money that had been distributed was returned to the government’s account 
because it violated the Law and they were afraid that the case would be brought to court. 
Concerning this retirement money, the Regent and the other government personnel 
seemed to allow it to be taken. A strong impression that appeared was that the Regent 
used it as a bargaining chip to have the DPRD approves his annual responsibility report 
(LPJ). During his five years period as Regent, every year his LPJ was always approved by 
the DPRD without any complaints, even though the result of the development were 
actually not as planned. 
 
b. Transparency and Accountability 
 The case which is often monitored by NGOs and other non-government 
institutions in Anom is the placement process of an official. In this case, the Regent 
played an important role in determining the person to be placed in a position, especially 
for strategic positions. This was evaluated based on the hierarchic positions in the Local 
Government in the decision making process and the size of the resources, particularly the 
budget of the institution. There was actually an administrative standard for placing a 
person in a certain position, which was based on the standard from the Central 
Government. However, in practice, after several people were chosen, the “business” was 
started. The following is a statement from one of the deputy heads of the DPRD who 
admit the indication of position exchange (collusion) in the Anom Regency: 
 278
“I think that is true, but we can not prove it by the officially data. A rumor is a 
placement of the Head of the National Education Agency. In fact, therapy 
reform sock is nice, but it can not yet change effectively of bureaucrat 
behavior” 
 
The Education Agency is one of the “lucrative” agencies because of the large budget. The 
budget is used to buy books and stationery, build school buildings and finance the 
building maintenance. The large amount of resources is very tempting for the official 
candidates who wanted a position in the institution. The Regent and his comrades 
apparently managed to see this as a business opportunity. The next part of this research 
will explain the amount of business done and its mechanism. This is quoted from a study 
by an NGO activist who has been monitoring the Anom Regency.  
 The amount of the money the candidate who is interested in the position has to 
pay, according to this activist, is varied depending on the position: 
“When a personnel wants to become a head of an agency, he/she has to give 
money more or less Rp 50-100 million (€4.500 - €9.000) to the Regent. The 
most expensive price was the position of the City Manager. That is the answer 
of inexistence of the city manager in Anom Regency until now. The price was 
around Rp 250-400 million (€22.000 – €37.000)78” 
 
and for the position in a lower echelon, echelon IV for example: 
“To become a principal of an elementary school you needed to pay Rp 40 
million (€3.700). This money goes to the Regent” 
 
Another opinion that supports the opinion of the NGO activist above came from officials 
inside the Anom Regency Health and Social Welfare Agency: 
“Everything is based on how much money do you have!!! Yes, that is what 
happening here because money can make a decision. The price for position 
of a head of agency was Rp 75 Million (€7.000), for echelon 2. That is what 
happening in Anom” 
  
                                                 
78 Just as a note, for almost a year (mid of 2004-2005) the Anom regency did not have a definitive City Manager. The 
City Manager position was automatically held by the First Assistant of the City Manager on the administration section 
that became the Job Executor of Anom City Manager. At the end of 2005, based on UU No. 32/2004, Anom got a City 
Manager after carrying out a selection process that was based on the Governor’s Decree.  
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 A commotion once occurred during the election of head of the Anom Regency 
Health and Social Welfare Agency. Most of the doctors and medical profesionals in the 
Anom Regency joined a protest to object to the assignment of a person as the Head of 
Agency because the person did not have any medical background and his competency to 
manage the health matters in the Anom Regency was doubted. Information that was 
received from a head of a Puskesmas in Anom said that the person had been assigned as 
the head of health and social welfare because he was able to pay a sum of money to the 
Regent. In the end, the demand from the protesters was fulfilled and the head of the 
agency was replaced by a person with a medical background. Nonetheless, according to a 
source in a Puskesmas, the current head of the agency is still one of the Regent’s men and 
most people from the health sector do not like him.  
 The rumor that officials had to pay a sum of money not only spread widely 
within the executive and legislative but also among the public. To this day there is no 
official disclaimer from the Regent on the rumor that has obviously confronted his 
credibility and position79. Nonetheless, he did post a disclaimer on the rumor that said that 
the Paramilitary used violence toward NGO activists who tried to uncover the illegal 
transactions in the recruitment of officials in Anom80. 
 In a further explanation on the mechanism of the transaction, the critical NGO 
activist mentioned that people who carried out this act were people from the Paramilitary. 
After several official candidates were identified, people from the Paramilitary would come 
to the candidates offering positions in an institution and asking for a sum of money for the 
Regent. The candidate who was able to give the highest amount would be chosen as the 
head of the institution. It sometimes did not matter if the candidate was not able to give 
money, as long as after he was chosen he is be able to pay the money using money taken 
                                                 
79 I had trouble an interviewing the Regent and the City Manager and direct information from them on the position 
exchange was never obtained. There was a tendency that they avoided academics (including reporters). One of the 
activists from an NGO had once reminded me on this. He said that it was impossible to interview the Anom Regent 
because he would refuse and was not able to answer questions, especially from the academics. According to him, to have 
an interview, the interviewer even had to provide a sum of money.  
80 In mid 2004, an NGO called Anti-Corruption Anom People Alliance went out in the streets to protest the position 
exchange and carried banners. This demonstration then was responded to by several people from paramilitary who 
attacked the houses of the heads of the NGOs. The houses damaged.  
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from the project that is carried out by his institution. The following is the activist’s 
explanation: 
“Well, corruption in local government projects varies, it is based on the size 
of the project budget. I know it, for example, is in the farming agency. It was 
about 10% of the total of the project budget” 
 
in another case: 
“Well, the problem was the education aid (BOP). Each school received 
education aid Rp 700 thousand (€70) and it was curtailed Rp 100 thousand 
(€10). So, the school received around Rp 500-600 thousand (€50-€60), but 
the school principals have to sign a receipt for Rp 700 thousand. It was all 
exposed” 
 
In the kingdom era, this cut could be considered as the same as an offering a nobleman 
paid to the king as a symbol of loyalty. This behavior, cutting 5-10% of the project value, 
often appeared during the New Order Regime era and still exists now. Therefore, it is 
logical that there are many development budget leaks, and the money that reaches the 
society is very little. 
 Despite of the truth of the rumor about the illegal position exchange and the 
cutting of the project value in the Anom Regency, the government had no transparency 
and accountability the current Regent’s period. Different from other regions, the Giri 
Regency for example, the Anom Government did not have a policy of announcing the 
amount of the APBD to the public through the mass media. The problem in finding out the 
amount of money received and spent was getting bigger because those two things were 
handled by two different institutions, the Income Agency (Dispenda) and the Regional 
Financial Management Bureau (BPKD). The management that handled these two different 
institutions had worsened the effort to implement the performance-based budget because it 
was difficult to match the income source and its use with two different institutions. A 
performance-based budget that is able to locate income and expense should be supported 
by an institution that is capable of managing all of the finances. 
 Another issue that added more to the list of the shortcomings of the Regent is the 
public services issue. The One-Stop Services Unit (UPTSA) that was available in many 
regions was not available in the Anom Regency yet. The demography and licensing 
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services units were still spread out across all of the technical institutions. This condition 
caused people and Private Corporation that wanted the services to have to spend extra 
money. This not only occurred in the demography or licensing services sector, but also 
with other public services such as the health sector, where the quality also decreased. The 
Human Development Index from 1999 to 2002 as quoted by the UNDP Indonesia, has 
shown that Anom is still in the lower category. In 1999, it was 65.1 and ranked 121st  out 
of about 350 regencies/municipalities in Indonesia. In 2002, it rose to 67.8 and was in 
116th position. 
 
2.3. The Kulon Regent 
a. Management Skills 
 As a genuine politician that started her career from the bottom, the Kulon Regent 
had seen various political tricks that are always present at the local level. The Kulon 
political configuration is changeable and could cause political friction between groups if 
not managed well. This could in turn cause instability in Kulon and would affect the 
performance of the Local Government. The Regent was fully aware on these condition, 
and she tried to accommodate every existing group into her administration policy. The 
deputy Regent was taken from a religious group, PKB, which has a strong influence in the 
countryside. 
 In the administration management, the Regent depended mostly on the abilities 
of the City Manager, as a senior career bureaucrat, to comprehended the details of the 
administration. In the early period of her administration, the Regent even entirely believed 
the City Manager, a devotee of the Golongan karya Party81. 
 The City Manager, who was almost entering his retirement, was actually not 
liked by several Local Government officials, especially the DPRD. Local Government 
officials disliked him because he often acted over authoritatively and caused problems in 
the relationships between institutions. Meanwhile, the DPRD that was still controlled by 
                                                 
81 During the New Order Regime period, every civil servant automatically became a member of the Golongan Karya 
Party. Rebuking this unofficial rule might cause the civil servant to be dismissed. The support from the civil service for 
Golkar was still strongly felt until the New Order Regime authority collapsed. This support included the officials in the 
region such as the City Manager. 
 282
PDIP thought that he was still a part of the past era, an apprentice of the New Order 
Regime that was controlled by Golkar. They worried that he would controll the Regent. 
Coping with all of the criticism, the Regent stood her ground and kept him as the City 
Manager. Her reason for this was that she learned many things from him on Local 
Government management. Her dependency on the City Manager in managing the 
administration was very significant, much internal business was handed over completely 
to the City Manager.  
 Job division was also done with the City Manager. Many internal business of 
administration management was handed to the City Manager, while the external business 
was still under the full control of the Regent. The fact that she paid more attention to the 
external business in her administration was often criticized by the DPRD and NGO’s. One 
of the NGO activists in Kulon once even said that the Regent acted as if she was a 
celebrity—she was famous while her administration was full of faults. This criticism was 
mostly true because according to DPRD, there were many things in the administration 
management that were supposed to be her responsibility that she abandoned. This 
happened especially during the early period of her administration.  
 The Regent apparently wanted to use her advantage at being the only female 
Regent at that time to lobby some people she considered to be able and willing to help her 
develop Kulon, which was the third poorest region in Central Java Province. Her ability to 
lobby resulted in several financial donations for Kulon. In the early period of her 
administration, she was able to acquire about 50 billion Rupiah of funding to develop 
several sectors in Kulon that were still undeveloped, such as the health and education 
sectors. The funds came not only from national donors but also from foreign donors. With 
regards to her ability to lobby, the Regent tells her secret: 
“Before I ask donor agencies to help us, firstly, I explain the condition of my 
regency. Most of the things that I explained to them were the things that I 
encountered regardless I am as a regent or as a party leader. When I can 
combine the information from both sources, I am able to tell the truth 
condition of my regency. After that, I usually move to the problem that I am 
facing now and the prediction of the future if no aid could be gained” 
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The Regent was fully aware that it was impossible to only depend on the APBD to develop 
Kulon, considering that the budget was small. Therefore, she had to look for alternative 
financial sources outside the APBD that were not too binding and would not burden the 
Kulon APBD.  The aid that was considered to be very helpful for society was in the 
education sector. The funds were used to fix many elementary school buildings that were 
no longer fit for teaching. In 2001, the stimulant funds budget reached 3.3 billion Rupiah, 
and 10.3 billion Rupiah of self-supporting funds was obtained from society.  
 Though male domination in politics was still powerful, her characteristic as a 
female was still apparent in her behavior as a Regent. This characteristic was also seen in 
her administration management. The Regent often considered many things herself before 
making any decisions. This was done so that the policy made was correct and could be 
accountable to society. This was considering the fact that the social system of Kulon was 
still influential, and sometimes small things that affected the culture of the society might 
be ignored. An example of this often happened in the official recruitment. Once an official 
had to be fired from his position for a simple reason, his wife was a person who could not 
keep a secret. According to the Regent, this was dangerous because government’s secrets 
might be exposed to the public. Another example is a case in which the promotion of an 
official that to echelon II was postponed because he did not have the ability to speak in 
public. There was once also a female official that was about to be promoted to be a Camat, 
but this was postponed because her husband was a driver. The reason for this 
postponement was that a Camat is considered to be a ‘parent’ for society that the 
performance of her family must also be considered. Another case was when the Regent 
received an SMS from saying that there was a Civil Servant candidate that was a rapist. 
The Regent conducted an investigation into this matter and it was proven to be untrue.  
 In the personnel recruitment and promotion process, the Regent did not depend 
completely on the Baperjakat. She thought that there much personal employment data that 
was not covered by the Baperjakat. Thus, with the help of a small unofficial team, the 
Regent processed the employment data of a person before they were installed or promoted 
to a certain position. In this matter, the role of Regent in the placement of officials from 
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echelon IV to echelon II was very important. Baperjakat functioned only as the supplier of 
data to support the Regent’s decisions. 
 A Regent’s Decree that was once controvercial was the hat installment of a 
young official to become a Camat Task Executor (PLT). Based on the employment 
regulations, the person had not fulfilled the group and rank requirements to be placed in a 
Camat position. However, the Regent argued that the person had the capability needed 
though his group and rank were not yet appropriate. This policy aroused much protest 
from the senior bureaucrats that had waited for the position for a long time. This case then 
became a reason for the DPRD, which did not like her, to criticize her policy. Their 
argument was that the number of employees who had already fulfilled the requirements 
were quite plentiful, and a new PLT should not be installed. In the end, the controversy 
was over after the National Personnel Board (BKN) disagreed with the installment, and it 
had to be cancelled. From this case, it can be seen that competency in the employee 
promotion was not the main consideration, since it was the seniority, such as the group 
and rank that was considered.  
 Another problem in the bureaucracy occurred when the Regent wanted to 
simplify the organizational structure of the Local Government. This was opposed by the 
senior officials that felt their positions threatened. Usually, the senior officials would ask 
for help from the DPRD, whether personally or through their party, to retain the existence 
of the institution in question. The lobbying from the senior officials often troubled the 
Regent in managing the organization. Eventually, the final decision was often the result of 
bargaining between the executives and the legislative and it often ignored what was 
actually necessary.  
 
b. Transparency and Accountability 
 The Regent also tried to develop Kulon using potential from the outside. The 
Regent collaborated with several national investors that had emotional relationship with 
Kulon. One of these investors was used to build the Dewi Kulon TV Station. This TV 
station received technical aid from a national advertising businessman that came from 
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Kulon. However, there was much criticism of the Regent’s Policy because of the basic 
question that was raised by one of the deputy head’s of the DPRD: 
 “Do the people of Kulon really need this TV station?” 
The answer is obviously no, because as a region that is still classified as a poor region, 
there were still many basic needs, such as in the health and education sectors, of the Kulon 
people that had not yet been fulfilled. In addition, the building of this TV station was not 
in the Regional Strategic Plan (Renstrada). This means that there had not been an 
agreement between all of the actors in Kulon, especially the DPRD. Besides this, in 
practice, a calculation that was done by the consultant estimated that the station would 
create economic profit, which was completely wrong. In practice, every year, the 
operational cost of this TV station burdened the APBD. The following is the opinion of the 
Golkar Party in response to the Regent’s LPJ: 
“Cooperation with the Sun Inc.to develop TV station has shown failure in 
term of the income target from Dewi TV Station. It is nonsense if income in 
second years will reach a large amount money and it will turns the invest”. 
 
The same opinion was also given by the Regent’s own political party, PDIP, which 
considered that the operational expense of the station was too big while the contribution to 
PAD was too small. The Information that was obtained from the National Unity Fraction 
showed that according to its plan, Dewi TV was supposed to make a 3 billion Rupiah 
contribution to the Local Government  every year. In the reality it only made 10 million 
Rupiah per year while the operational expenses reached billions of Rupiah.  
 In response to this criticism, the Regent admitted that economically this TV 
station was a loss. However, the Regent reasoned that through its effectiveness in 
supporting the development of Kulon, this TV station had become a bridge to connect the 
Local Government with society. Through this TV station there had been many aspirations 
of society that were expressed, and many Local Government’s development policies were 
also communicated. Even the APBD was published through this TV station. This success 
was indeed difficult to measure with money, and the critics never considered this as being 
a success. 
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 The biggest political advantage that the Regent achieved with the TV station was 
that her popularity in the society increased drastically, even reaching the remotest villages. 
This was because the frequency of her appearance on TV was very high, in addition to her 
frequent visits to remote villages. In some way, this gave her an advantage in the elections 
for the Regent. She was the only local actor involved in the process who was already 
familiar to society which was dominated by the lower classes82. 
 Her popularity to build her image in society was not only done by building a TV 
station but also by making a luxurious press conference building, including the website 
system, that was opened by the President of the Republic of Indonesia of that time, 
Megawati. The building was very much criticized, especially by the DPRD, which felt that 
Kulon did not need this kind of building yet, as there were still many school buildings that 
needed to be repaired. However, because of this policy, Kulon received a reward from a 
national magazine as the regency who has the best website in the national level.  
 Sometimes the criticism was over the top, using intimidation, but this never 
dampened the Regent’s spirits. As a politician who had already been through many things 
in the political world, the Regent often challenged the critics to prove their criticism. This 
attitude often made her political opponents furious, especially those in the DPRD. In 
during her leadership, there was very often conflict between the Regent, her Local 
Government personnel and the DPRD. The conflict scared many Local Government 
officials that were not used to conflict, for during the New Order Regime era the 
relationship with the DPRD was always harmonious and the Local Government 
constitutionally was above the DPRD. Today, based on Law No. 22/1999, the situation 
has changed. To confront the DPRD, the Regent personally taught her officials how to 
face the DPRD. To protect her officials, the Regent issued the Kulon Regent’s Decree 
Letter No. 130/0091 on 23 February 2003. Through this letter, the investigation of a 
bureaucratic official that was accused of to be involved in a case must be done with the 
Regent’s permission. This letter, according to the National Awakening Party, was a form 
of arrogance from the Regent, an infringement of the law, and an effort to stall the case 
                                                 
82 This has been proven. In the direct election of the Regent that was held in June 2005, the Regent was re-elected with 
Majority vote of approximately 65%. 
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investigation process. Furthermore, the Golkar fraction considered the Regent’s leadership 
style as ego-centric, slightly arrogant—for she liked to get her way, and often made 
policies that showed a “vivere pericoloso” nuance and were colored with strong political 
ingredients and sense.  
 Responding to the criticism in the letter, the Regent once complained that she 
and many of her officials were intimidated: 
“No matter how good a regent is. If nobody backs the Regent administration 
up, he/she will be destroyed. It is a difficult because there is an inexistence of 
such law instrument, the regent would be pressured to practice KKN 
(corruption, collusion, and nepotism). My personnel were intimidated from 
politicians. They were often asked for spending money illegally from the 
budget and they would often respond by creating tactical budget” 
 
Owing to this pressure, according to the Regent, many of her officials were forced to 
conducted KKN in order to avoid legal investigation. The letter was a part of her effort to 
prevent intimidation that would have a negative effect on the performance of the 
bureaucratic personnel.  
 Her conflicts with her political opponents, whether in her party or other parties, 
were usually caused by the problem of uneven resource sharing. The Regent also admitted 
that in her own party there were many people who tried to force her to conduct KKN 
which would benefit her party. Nonetheless the Regent refused, although in practice there 
were many people from her party that tried to make use of the policy from the Local 
Government. An example of this that was often criticized by other parties was the cement 
and asphalt aid that was given to some villages. It was indicated that the giving of this aid 
was intentionally done to gain sympathy from society towards a certain party. 
 A reliable informant from a source in the Kulon Government inferred that the 
Regent’s frequent conflict with the DPRD was caused  by the refusal of the Regent to 
fulfill the DPRD’s demand to give money from the prosperity and retirement funds to the 
members of the DPRD through the APBD. The Regent considered these funds as violating 
the rules, while the members of the DPRD felt that it was proper for their duty. The DPRD 
then focused the issue on the Regent and her deputy’s cars, saying that they were too 
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expensive. This conflict appeared to advance and it influenced the relationship between 
the Regent and the DPRD until the end of the regent’s ruling period. 
 The conflict that originated from the resource sharing also occurred in the private 
sector. When the Regent made a policy to give stimulant aid of 5 million Rupiah directly 
to each class in a school that was considered to be physically unsuitable for learning, the 
developers, members of Gapensi, were angry. They believed that by handing the aid 
directly to the school committee, they would miss their chance to get the school 
renovation or development project. This strong opposition from Gapensi did not abate her 
drive, because she considered this project to be too small for Gapensi. In exchange, the 
Regent found another aid from outside Kulon, that was a larger amount than before, for 
the development of Kulon infrastructure that could be carried out by Gapensi. However, 
this was still unsatisfying for them since not all of the developers had the required 
classifications in the infrastructure development project.  
 Among the bureaucrats, there were also many people who disliked the Regent’s 
popular policies such as handing the aid directly to the people who deserved it. This was 
because for years they had been messing about with the budget for the development 
projects in their region. When this project mentality was about to be eradicated by the 
Regent, the bureaucrats brought up their opposition. The tendency was for the bureaucrats 
to use the DPRD to contradict the Regent’s policies that were considered to be a threat to 
their interests.  
 One of the Regent’s jobs was public services, especially licensing, demography, 
and health. To this day, Kulon does not have a One-Stop Services Unit (UPTSA), only a 
one-doo services office that does not have any authority. The services that are available 
are still spread among the institutions. According to the Regent, one of the reasons for this 
is that the institutions were not willing to hand over the authority of the services to another 
institution. The Regent’s commitment to improve the services was never realized because 
there was not any policy that could force the institutions to hand over the service authority 
to an institution such as UPTSA.  
 The health services problem was especially great in the service quality of the 
Kulon Regional Public Hospital (RSUD). There were many people who preferred to go to 
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another region RSUD than to Kulon RSUD. The following is a response from one of the 
members of Commission E in Kulon DPRD that handled health matter: 
“The problem in the health sector in Kulon is that there has not any 
agreement between the Health Agency and the Public Hospital in 
determining the health program. Each of them still works on its own. The 
society is rarely involved. The health Agency still acts as the sole executor of 
the health policy in Kulon Regency. Many proposals from the board are not 
approved by the executives though they are promising. I do not understand 
why the executives always reject them.” 
 
The Regent had tried to improve it but it seems that as long as the basic problem, i.e. the 
salary of the health force in the RSUD, was not settled, the service quality would not 
improve. The indication that showed that the salary matter was indeed a problem could be 
seen from the fact that there were fewer doctors who wanted to work in Kulon RSUD 
compared to the hospital in other regions. Until now, Kulon RSUD is still lacking doctor 
in all service fields. Meanwhile, the region itself was not able to raise their salary because 
the budget in APBD was limited. 
 
2.4. The Prajan Mayor 
a. Management Skill (s) 
 Compared to the other head of regions, Prajan Mayor was very strong in 
popularizing the importance of quality improvement in the public services. He was not 
embarrassed to call himself the head of the public servants. Many policies were made to 
increase the quality of public services. One of the policies that were considered to have a 
direct effect on society was the revitalization of street lamps that occurred in every corner 
of the city. The cleanliness and the beauty of the city parks were also re-managed, 
including the arrangement of street vendors. The services in the demographic and 
licensing fields were also re-arranged, through the implementation on of One-Stop 
Services Unit (UPTSA). The arrangement was not only in the system and the procedures 
of the UPTSA that were relatively simple, but also in the improvement of the supporting 
human resources.  
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 The Mayor’s commitment to improve public services was indeed strong. 
However, it was unfortunately not accompanied by a sufficient internal management 
arrangement. The following is the opinion of an official in the Prajan City Manager 
Office: 
“Yes, the public service must be improved, we must do this and that. But 
the Mayor forgot that to support public service reform, ‘vitamin’ must be 
given. The bureaucracy was never been lashed from behind to carry out the 
reform. So I suppose the hungry and untrained ‘dog’ (bureaucracy) will 
always limp chasing the bone. That is how the analogy actually is.” 
 
The analogy that was by the official describes the ignorance of the Mayor in making his 
policies, saying that he tended to pay more attention to the services and forgot about the 
the system and the people who run the services.  The main concern was with the official 
recruitment and institutional arrangement. There were many officials recruited who were 
not competent, since the evaluation was based on seniority and the group and the rank 
level. It was even indicated that there were some officials who were installed based on 
nepotism. In the institutional arrangement, even though there was downsizing and 
rightsizing, there was still collusion which was often ignored. There was once a case in 
which the existence of an office was retained because a family member wanted to keep his 
position as the head of the office.  
 The Mayor observed all of these flaws. This was shown in his answer when he 
was asked about his policy that tended to be more concerned with the services than the 
reform of his public administration: 
“Well, that is true. Someone sent me a letter. This guy told me not to use the 
fourth gear first, but to use it in order, started from the smallest one. It is not 
easy. This concerns the corporate culture, the culture of the organization” 
 
In this matter, the Mayor was not unaware that he was dependent on the bureaucracy, 
especially the senior bureaucrats, to run his administration. These bureaucrats were the 
officials who were already familiar with the details of the administration. His strategic 
decision to concentrate more on public services was in fact appropriate. However, to hand 
over the management completely to the senior bureaucrats was not a wise thing to do. The 
Mayor should understand this: 
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 “It is true in the past (the New Order regime), everything was too strict 
with the line. Decisions and suggestions always came from the top leader 
(mayor). Thus, in the staff level, there was no culture to express, to make an 
opinion, to argue, and to discuss” 
 
The Mayor also often complained that his inferiors did not dare to make decisions because 
they were afraid to take the risk. This condition was in great contradiction with his 
business spirit which liked to take a risk in decision making. The cultural aspects were 
also still a problem: 
“Yes, it is still our problem. It is also very difficult to change. If I said 
something, no body dared to argue. That is actually very dangerous for a 
leader. I always remind my officials in discussions about that. They should 
consider my opinion to be equal with them, although at the end it is I who 
make the decision” 
 
All of this behavior from the senior bureaucrats became a main problem in the public 
administration reform. Looking at the history, almost every Mayor in this region came 
from a military background. This military leadership model made the behavior of the 
personnel relatively rigid. Democratic attitudes in the leadership and administration 
management developed very poorly. Behavior like this was believed to increase because 
of the culture of this region, which was very much influenced by the culture of the Kraton 
that always had unggah-ungguh (politeness rules) and patrons as the values that had to be 
obeyed. The effect of this that was very obvious was in the employment hierarchy, where 
first place in official placement was to the given bureaucrats that were senior and had a 
closeness with the patrons, instead of the competent employees. The arrangements in the 
decision making process also tended to be prolonged because it had to go through some 
actors before it was finally handed over to the highest senior bureaucrats.  
 These senior bureaucrats were of course not neutral. They had a very strong 
interest in retaining the status quo. Therefore, they could not be expected to come up with 
reform decisions. Usually, the noteworthy decisions came from the Mayor. The disparity 
between these two official groups was actually very apparent. An official in the City 
Manager Office said that they could be analogized as water and oil. The upper layer was 
the Mayor that moved with a political perspective and had his thoughts far ahead, 
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orienting the public services. Meanwhile, the lower layer was the City Manager and his 
staff. They were the heritage of the previous era, and were very slow, had significant 
inertia, and had a large focus on position. They were not supported by an appropriate level 
of competency, they very often contradicted changes and also often tried to make new 
ideas fail. The deputy Regent once wanted to arrange the organization differently from the 
Central Government regulations. However, his staff unfortunately did not want to execute 
this idea any further and preferred to follow the regulations than to fulfill the region’s 
needs.  
 From this, it can be seen that the Mayor was unable to do anything when he was 
faced with senior bureaucrats who knew more about the government management. This 
helplessness was seen in the fact that he never acted strictly against the people who tried 
to make use of the administration performance. His helplessness in management is 
suspected to be caused by his helplessness in politics. A rumor spread that said that the 
recent City Manager was “the choice” of one of the heads of the DPRD that came from 
one of the big parties in the 1999 General Election. The number of seats controlled by this 
party was larger than the Mayor’s party, and he was therefore not able to control the City 
Manager83.  
 
b. Transparency and Accountability 
 Among the officials in the Prajan Province, the Prajan Mayor and his deputy 
were famously known as Mr. Clean for their honesty and commitment in wiping out KKN 
from the bureaucracy. The APBD was published every year through the local mass media, 
and could also be accessed through the government’s website. The government’s policies 
could be easily accessed by the people who needed them.  
 To smooth over the communication with society, the Mayor opened a direct 
complaint line service that was managed by the Complaint and Information Service Unit 
(UPIK). This unit was arguably the most complete complaint service at the level of 
Municipality Government in Indonesia. It was the most complete because the UPIK used 
                                                 
83 During the implementation of Law No. 22/1999, political interference in the bureaucracy, especially in the placement 
of career official, often occurred in many regions in Indonesia, though legally this was not allowed. The interference 
also influenced the authority in the bureaucracy, and it affected the performance as a whole.   
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many forms of media to communicate, such as SMS, email, telephone, a website, and the 
direct services of a data officer. The response of society the UPIK was incredible, for 
every day there were tens of complaints, questions, information request, and suggestions 
received by UPIK. Most of them were received by SMS. The examples of complaint that 
were received by UPIK between January 2004 and February 2005 are as follows: 
Table 6.3: Number of complaints to the Prajan Municipality, January 2004-February 2005 
No Complaints Number 
1 Orderliness 176 
2 Transportation 127 
3 Public Services 118 
4 Industry and Commerce 68 
5 Education and culture 65 
6 Employment 51 
7 Social 43 
8 Public Relation and Information 41 
9 Settlement 38 
10 Other 165 
 Total 892 
 Source: Unit Pelayanan Informasi Kota, Prajan, 2005 
 
 From the types of complaints show in the table above, it is discovered that the 
Orderliness Agency was the institution that received many complains about its 
performance. This Agency was indeed the most troubled institution because in carrying 
out its duties it always had to face street vendors that usually liked to disobey the regional 
regulations on the arrangement of the selling locations. The excessive numbers of the 
vendors and the limited locations forced them to violate the regulations. The Mayor 
actually showed a responsive attitude in responding to the complaints by localizing 
vendors into several particular areas for their business. However, the vendors often did not 
agree with the government on the location. That felt the locations to be too far away and 
they often conflicted with the Local Government.  
 The executives tried to respond to almost every complaint and suggestion from 
society that was made through the UPIK. However, the excessive number of complaints 
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made many institutions confused in dealing with the problems put forward by society. On 
the other hand, in the legislative, according to information from a former member of the 
DPRD, in the 1999-2004 period, there were many complaints and suggestions received by 
the UPIK that were never used as input for the board meetings. The board was not very 
responsive towards input from society. They were busy with their private interest and the 
interest of their parties.  
 Once a week the mayor held a talk show that was broadcast live by a private 
radio station in Prajan. Through this show, society could have a direct conversation with 
the Mayor. 
 The Mayor’s commitment to fulfill society’s needs was very strong. This is 
shown through his habit of changing the budget allocation without the approval from the 
DPRD as long as it was in the public’s interest. Some board members that were very strict 
on following procedure sometimes protested this move. In one case, during the 
composition of the Demographic Management Information System, the Mayor was forced 
to bow to the board’s will to return the budget allocation to its previous condition. 
However, in some other cases, there were times when even the DPRD had to respect the 
Mayor’s changes.  
 According to the views of a member of the DPRD, the Mayor was a person who 
was far removed from formality and bureaucracy. This attitude was very different to his 
predecessors that came from a military background, in which procedure and rules were 
something that could not be changed. His background as a businessman seemed to make 
flexibility in his administration become very important. Rules were important but action in 
the field was much more important. Through this way of thinking, many fresh ideas came 
to him, especially concerning the public services. 
 The problem that was faced by the Mayor when he tried to encourage 
transparency and accountability in his administration was that he had to content with the 
DPRD’s interests, personally and institutionally. There were many occurences in the 
DPRD which had been proven to violate the law, such as the retirement allowance sharing 
for the members of the DPRD from 1999-2004. The result of this is that today most of the 
members of the DPRD from that period have had to got to court. In addition, some 
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members of the DPRD without hesitating personally put pressure on the Local 
Government to hand over several development projects to them without going through 
tender procedure as is required.  Some of those cases were tried and the court punished 
those that were proven guilty. There were once a tender process for Local Government 
personnel uniform provision that did not follow procedures, and was won by high up 
members in the DPRD. It was believed that it was impossible that the Regent and his staff 
did not know about it. However, his weak position in relation to the DPRD made him 
unable to do anything but to obey their wishes. That fact that there were not any Local 
Government officials involved in this case was due to the fact that they were clever 
enough to avoid getting caught. This is understandable considering that they had managed 
development projects for years and knew all the ins and outs of the process. This is 
different from the DPRD members that were mostly new to the field and did not have any 
experience. They were easily trapped with a legal problems when they thoughtlessly broke 
the law. The Mayor did not do anything about this because he probably wanted to avoid 
any political conflict that might have arose between the executive and legislative. In 
practice,  political intensity between the two was relatively rarely exposed to that time. 
 
2.5. The Alit Mayor 
a. Management Skill (s) 
 The Alit Mayor had a strong commitment to reform in the public administration. 
This can be seen through his publishing a book that described his reform strategy and 
various problems faced. Among the six Regent/Mayor that are the subjects of this study, 
the Alit Mayor was the only one that had a district commitment to reform his public 
administration. The following were the moves that he made to reform his public 
administration: 
1) Implementing a visionary leadership style 
Through this style, his leadership was always oriented towards performance and 
achievement based on the visions and predictions of possibilities that could be 
achieved in the future. This leadership style was chosen because Indonesian 
society was so deeply affected with primordial bonds and a patrimonial culture.  
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2) Developing communication in every direction 
The implementation was done by developing working networks vertically, 
horizontally, and diagonally, whether in the bureaucracy itself or the government 
with other stakeholders.  
3) Changing the mindset of the Local Government bureaucracy 
The mindset was changed from the pangrehpraja pattern that tended to be 
authoritative and wanted to be served, to the abdipraja pattern that gave services to 
the society.  
4) Implementing the reward and punishment system consistently 
This was implemented in the form of selective reward, incentives, and income 
improvement allowances. For those who violated this, there would be punishment 
in accordance with the mistakes made based on the employment regulations and 
the law nationally.  
5) Carrying the duty based on the function. 
One of the reasons for the job confusion was the inconsistent, overlapping, and 
non-systematic job and function implementation. Therefore, the Mayor tried to 
organize these conditions by drawing a clear line between the role, duty, position, 
and function of the City Manager, Regional Agency, and Regional Technical 
Institution. The working mechanism and the relationship pattern between the 
internal and external Local Government institutions were then determined.  
 The public administration reform did not work entirelysmoothly. There were 
many obstacles that had to be overcome. The Mayor mentioned several obstacles, both 
internal and external. This was understandable considering that the senior officials had 
already settled into their positions and were hesitant towards or even totally unspportive of 
the effort to improve the conditions, especially if the changes were done fundamentally 
and in a relatively short period of time. To deal with this, the Regent used a psychological 
approach to the senior officials accompanied by a two-way learning process, both for the 
leaders and society. As in the Giri Regency, the Alit Mayor also placed senior bureaucrats 
that did not have any abilities as ‘Expert Staff’. The purpose was to learn. If they then 
gained their abilities back, they were allowed to take up their positions again. However, if 
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they did not, they would have to stay in that position until their retirement. This human 
resource problem was acknowledged by the Head of Bappeda: 
“Well, it goes back to personals because they enjoy to be settled and dislike 
reform. This is not only at the lower level but also in the top level—middle 
management. They even exist in surrounding the Mayor. They try to find an 
opportunity to reverse the situation to the old administration system”. 
 
When he was asked further on how they put back the old administration system, the Head 
of Bappeda answered as follows: 
“They influence people who have similar idea with them, especially people 
who have inability to follow the reform, because lack of capability and 
threatened by the young employee. They often try to influence those people 
who are disappointed with the policy. There is actually no policy that shoves 
those people asides. They have already been given a chance to join the 
reform process, but they chose to step aside or just to stop due to they are 
unable to follow the speed of the reform process” 
 
According to a source in the City Manager Office, this senior officials, in the early period 
of the reform era was from the City Manager Office, which was indeed filled with senior 
career officials. To reduce the possibility of this pro-status quo power cluster, the Mayor 
made a policy of rotating the officials. In 2001-2002, the frequency of the rotations was 
very high, and it was possible for an official to be rotated twice in a year. Information 
received from an NGO said that the high frequency of the rotation made many officials 
stressed, and made the working climate less conducive.  
 Another problem faced was the immaturity of young bureaucrats. This problem 
was inherited from the old bureaucracy system that gave more priority to seniority than to 
the competency. The young bureaucrats had to wait a long time to reach the suitable 
position and rank requirements. The Mayor made a breakthrough by prioritizing the young 
employees who had the competency to be place in certain positions. If the young 
employees had not reached the rank requirement, they would first be placed as Duty 
Executors (PLT) until they were able to show that they performed well. Conflict would 
usually occur between the young officials and the senior officials which disturbed the 
administrative performance. The young employees were usually far more progressive in 
making policy than their seniors, who usually would place themselves in settled place and 
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harmony. To manage this problem, the Mayor gave technical instructions, had emotion 
control and created the reward and punishment mechanism. 
 A problem that was difficult to solve came from the external parties, especially 
the DPRD, that did not support the government proportionally. On paper, the DPRD was 
very supportive and even demanded that the Local Government perform various 
rejuvenations in the government and regional development system and mechanism. 
However, in practice, the support was only maximized when it concerned with the 
working mechanism in the Local Government. When it concerned the working mechanism 
in the DPRD, the support would suddenly vanish. The result was that the relationship 
between the institutions was in poor shape. The two institutions did not have level 
positions, but had sub ordinate positions. The statement from the Mayor seemed to be 
pointed at the arrogance of the DPRD which did not want to reform itself, especially 
considering their obedience to the political etiquette in the administration. It was difficult 
for the public administration reform to succeed when the people inside were using the 
bureaucracy for their own interests. Usually, when the executive was in a trouble position, 
they would use society to help them criticize the DPRD so that the bad problems could be 
solved. The mayor did not have any trouble in gathering community’s support, because 
there were many NGOs and activists that were active in criticizing the DPRD and 
cooperating with the Local Government. In addition, the participative mechanism in this 
city worked extremely well. 
 The Mayor’s strategy in sustaining the public administration reform had at least 
smoothed the move to run the administration.  The Mayor’s vision to make the Alit 
Municipality a city of trade and tourism could be executed relatively well by his inferiors 
who were mostly young bureaucratic employees. The institutions functioned properly. The 
Mayor also never forgot about public services even though he was busy organizing his 
bureaucracy. One of his successes was that in 2005, the Alit Municipality was proclaimed 
as the city in East Java with the second-highest Human Development Index (HDI).  
 
 
 
 299
a. Transparency and accountability 
 The Mayor’s commitment to sustain transparency and accountability was realized 
by encouraging society to actively participate in city development. One of the initial 
programs in encouraging community participation was the City Development Strategy 
(CDS) that was approved by the Local Government and funded by the UNDP and the 
World Bank through the Department of Internal Affairs and the Department of Settlement 
and Territory Infrastructure. The program started in 2001 and had a positive effect in that 
society’s concern over development was increasing. This condition never appeared in the 
previous Mayor’s era. The power of many groups in society that formerly spreads now it 
can be managed by CDS without cutting their critical attitude toward Local Government. 
The success was also supported by the mayor’s attitude that was very open and did not 
carry the formal bureaucratic attitude that often stalled communication between the Local 
Government and society. It was never difficult to meet with him. Sometimes, the Mayor 
himself even came down to talk to people. This populous attitude made him be easily 
accepted by society. 
 Many representatives from different groups of people such as academics, NGO’s, 
religion groups, art and culture groups, farmers, merchants, and even politicians, which 
were part of the CDS worked together to find a perfect way to build the Alit Municipality. 
This forum was also often used by the Local Government to introduce the government’s 
development program plans. The critical attitude towards government was also lessened 
because the Mayor often preferred to have dialog rahter than give a speech. The Chief of 
Bapeda admitted that in the early period of the CDS program, there were still many Local 
Government personnel that were uncomfortable with the criticism and the suggestion from 
the people in the CDS. It is understandable because previously the planning process was 
under the full authority of the Local Government, and society only acted as a receiver. 
This time, they jointly listened to and discussed the development planning with society. In 
the end, with the support of the Mayor and the tolerant attitudes of the young bureaucrats 
placed in certain positions, the situation became acceptable. The bureaucrats did not 
consider society as a threat anymore, but instead as a partner in the development process.  
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 The access of society to the APBD was widened extensively, and it could now be 
accessed through the Local Government website. However, society still often complained 
that it was a pity that the DPRD was not transparent. The DPRD still sometimes concealed 
itself from the policy that concerned with the regional finance, especially when it 
concerned the DPRD finance. Due to this, the executives would usually hand over the 
matter completely to society to encourage transparency in the DPRD. In the beginning, 
DPRD members considered the CDS as exaggerating, because it often did work that was 
supposed to be done by the DPRD, particularly in representing society’s aspirations. 
Nonetheless, continuous pressure and solidarity from the CDS made the DPRD open itself 
up and accept the CDS as its partner. Some of the members of the DPRD even often 
happily came and were involved in discussion with CDS. 
 To speed up the development process at the level of Kecamatan and Kelurahan, 
the Local Government provided incentives in the form of Block Grants, which in the 2004 
budget year used about 4.5 billion Rupiah from the APBD funds. Each kecamatan in the 
region received at least 1.5 billion Rupiah. If in one kecamatan there were 8 kelurahan, 
then each kelurahan would receive at least 187 million Rupiah. Each kelurahan was 
responsible for using its own money. 
 There were many development policies made by the Mayor to improve the Alit 
Municipality, both in its physical condition and through the public services. The most 
significant physical improvement was aimed at the tourism and trade sectors. In this town, 
the biggest tourism attraction is the graveyard of the one president of the Republic of 
Indonesia. This was also supported by several other tourist destinations such as a national 
library, the East Java art and culture centre, etc. To support the trade sector, a market that 
used to be traditional has been renovated and now has the quality of a modern market 
place. Infrastructure was also built progressively with the target of making the Alit 
Municipality a middle class city. This goal is almost achieved. In the public service sector, 
the main commitment was focused on the health sector service. Several Puskesmas were 
improved using national standards. Some of them received help from the University of 
Gadjah Mada through the Citizens’ Charter Program to improve the quality of service. 
Through this program, the Puskesmas and society had discussions discussed to find  a way 
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to develop a better service model. In the beginning, this program made the employee in 
the Puskesmas feel uncomfortable because they had to plan the program together with 
society; this was a very new thing for them. Nonetheless, because of the continuous 
support and encouragement from the Mayor, in the end they were willing to accept the 
involvement of society in the planning process of the Puskesmas services. The results 
were quite positive because this Puskesmas eventually became a model for the 
improvement of public services in other sectors.  
 
2. 6. Wetan Regent 
a. Management Skill (s) 
 Even though he came from bureaucratic background, the Regent did not have 
much experience in managing the administration. This was proven by his high 
dependency on some of his employees that were under the City Manager’s authority, 
particularly in the matters related to regional finance. This authority circle was apparently 
quite effective in influencing the Regent’s policy on regional finance. For almost three 
years, it could almost be assured that there was not any adequate control in regional 
finance management. This did not mean that the Regent did not have the ability to control 
it, he simply did not have the wish to control it. Without having any control, he could earn 
many financial and material benefits.  
 His bad management was added to by the bad mark he got after he made 
discriminative policy toward his personnel. The people who had been loyal to him by 
giving him many bribes, for example, were given a special rank raise. This policy was not 
only discriminative but also infringed on the Employment Law because the Regent did not 
have the authority to give a special rank raise, especially when the requirement for the 
raise had not been fulfilled. This disgraceful policy then encouraged the BKN to interfere 
in the process and remove the special rank raise.  
 The Regent also did not have a clear vision in managing his administration. Some 
policies were even stalled because of the mistakes in the policy making and mis- 
management. One of the reasonably fatal mistakes was made when the Regent canceled 
the forming of the Unified Services Unit (UPT) through the Regent’s Decree No. 
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494/2003. The Regent canceled the UPT because the One-Services Management 
Information System (SIMTAP) was to be available in every agency, which would provide 
public services was about to be implemented. The implementation of SIMTAP then failed 
because of the inability of the region to provide a sufficient computer network and a lack 
of human resources to handle it. In the end, public services, especially those related to 
licensing and demography, were neglected because on onehand, SIMTAP had failed to be 
implemented while on the other, the UPT had already been cancelled. This case obviously 
shows the inability of the Regent to make policy and implement it. The Regent did not 
calculate his resources with respect to reality. 
 The Regent’s leadership style was considered as being an exaggeration by his 
inferiors. On every occasion, the Regent always used formal attributes as if he was a 
military officer, including the baton. The Regent also obligated his personnel to use the 
attributes that he wore at all times. Those who violated this would be punished. The 
Regent thought that by using the full uniform, the discipline of the personnel would 
increase. In every ceremony, a phrase that was always used and became famous among 
the personnel was “being loyal to the State”. In order to enforce his way of discipline, the 
Regent put his ideas into the Regent’s Instruction No. 1/2004 on the Implementation of 
‘Plus Discipline’ in the Wetan Regency. 2003 was even declared as the discipline year by 
the Regent. Unfortunately, this discipline was only lip service since in practice even the 
Regent was not able to show any actual discipline. This was proven by the fact that he 
himself made many management mistakes and the fact that he was corrupt.  
 
b. Transparency and Accountability 
The public already knew that the Regent was involved in a tens of millions of 
Rupiah corruption case and was now doing his detention. The same was also happening to 
his personnels that used to be inside his authority circle84. The sentence clearly proved that 
transparency and accountability were absent from his administration. The following 
information on the infringements of the Regent and his personnel were obtained from one 
                                                 
84 The people who once received the special rank raise from the Regent, which was in the end cancelled by BKN.  
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of the officials who was involved in uncovering the corruption that existed in the Wetan 
Regency, as well as from many newspapers that published the case. 
 Various infringements of the Regent and some of his staff that were revealed are 
as follows: a) giving a full salary to employees that had actually retired; b) committing 
corruption in several projects; c) recruiting and promoting employee through KKN; d) 
performing defiance in tax submission; e) trading the region’s assets. 
 The data on the number of employee in the Local Finance Bureau and in the 
Employment Bureau were presumably not the same. There was an intentional effort to 
mark up the number of the employees, for example, by putting employees that were 
already retired or even deceased on the payroll to receive a full salary. However, in 
practice, those people still received their usual retirement money without any additions. 
Usually, the agencies with a large number of employees would mark up the number of the 
employees. This kind of thing was common in many regions in Indonesia. The purpose 
was to increase the amount of the DAU, for one of the components of the DAU was the 
employee’s salary. This effort to mark up the amount was intended to fulfill the interests 
of the personnel instead of the region. According to data from a Wetan official, there was 
around 27 billion Rupiah of the DAU that was not traced. Besides this, the habit of cutting 
the project value still existed. The data from Radar Tulungagung Daily newspaper (12 
May 2004) provided an example of a project that was corrupted. This was the Kelurahan 
and Village Development Supporter Program (P3DK) in 2003-2004, which was valued at 
3.1 billion Rupiah. The plan was to give each village aid valued at 60 million Rupiah. 
However, in reality, the villages only received 54 million Rupiah. This continued in 2004 
where the funds that should have been 20 million Rupiah per village only reached 10.7 
million Rupiah. In the matter of employment, several officials in the Wetan Regency 
suspected that there had been illegal position exchange. To be a Camat for example, an 
official had to pay 30 million Rupiah. The competency and professionalism consideration 
in the promotion and recruitment process were often neglected. It was suspected that 
anyone who was close and able to pay the decision maker would get the appealing 
position. Another infringement occurred when the amount of tax that had to be paid was 
different from the amount that was received. PPh article 21, for example, which was 
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supposed to be 1.8 billion, was only 0.8 billion Rupiah. It was also suspected that there 
had been an infringement in the exchange between the local government land and the 
Perhutani Land. The Local Government unfortunately did not act transparently, for the 
land was handed over to a developer saying that it was for the Local Government 
personnel settlement. Based on data from the Wetan State Court, the total amount of 
money that was misused by the bureaucratic elite of the Wetan Regency was 97 billion 
Rupiah. This figure was a remarkable amount for a regency. Many of the infringements 
were tried by the court, and some of them had been sentenced. 
 In many of these infringements, the Regent was not alone. There were some 
personnel in strategic positions that were involved. It was presumed by an official in the 
Wetan Regency that there were some cases in which the main actors were the senior 
official of the Wetan Regency. This was because the senior officials were already familiar 
with the details and the implementation in the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, without the 
approval of the Regent, the infringements would have not happened. This collusion 
eventually brought several bureaucratic elites of the Wetan Regency to the court room.  
 According to an official in the Wetan Regency, the rapid growth of KKN inside 
the bureaucracy was closely related to the inability of the DPRD to carry out its function 
as an overseer. This was not because the DPRD did not know about the infringements, but 
because the DPRD also enjoyed the results of the corruption, and therefore ignored it. The 
following is a statement from an official in Blitar that evaluated the attitude of the head of 
DPRD: 
“When the public attorney spells out the head of the DPRD, the head of the 
DPRD answer:  "What do you think Sir, the Mayor ordered me to sign this, 
and then he gave me some money.  So what’s wrong?" This is humorous in 
politics, isn’t it? You know that the head of the DPRD had been arrested for 
diverting a land and building tax. After freed, he is in a political party. Now, 
he becomes the head of the DPRD due to his charisma among the political 
party members” 
 
The above statement indicates that they actually knew about the infringements then 
pretended that they did not know. The infringements that were becoming unmanageable 
were also caused by the fact that the deputy Regent came from the same party as the 
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Regent. In other words, there was not any check and balance mechanism between the 
bureaucratic elites, and this in turn weakened the check and balance mechanism at the 
DPRD level. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 In this research, the role of the Regent/Mayor is categorized into two groups: 
those that encouraged the reform (Progressive); and those that were pro–status quo. From 
the six heads of region looked at, there were four who were progressive and only two who 
were pro-status quo (see Table 6.4). Those that were progressive were the Giri Regent, the 
Kulon Regent, the Prajan Mayor, and the Alit Mayor. The Wetan Regent and the Anom 
Regent are pro-status quo. To judge whether a Regent/Mayor is progressive or not is seen 
by studying his/her policy. This indicator also includes the regent/mayor’s policy to 
“oppose” Central Government policy that is considered to be unbeneficial for the region.  
All of the four heads of region that considered to be progressive made innovative 
policies, such as the policy made by the Giri Regent to give rewards and punishments to 
his employees and to increase the quality of the public health services. The Prajan Mayor 
was also innovative in making a more accurate employee achievement evaluation and 
implementing more conducive urban services. The Alit Mayor succeeded in accelerating 
economic growth through the improvement of city facilities and encouraging public 
participation in the planning and implementation. The Kulon Regent was also highly 
concerned with basic education, and building communication networks with sophisticated 
information and telecommunication infrastructure for her society. While those that were 
progressive were able to create innovative and courageous policies, those that were pro-
status quo never made any productive policies for their regions. The Wetan Regent was 
once recorded as trying to establish a quite prospective factory. However, this was only a 
cunning effort to create a positive image for society and the Central Government. The 
administration model was not any different from the centralized administration model of 
the New Order regime, because they just waited for the policies made by the Central 
Government.  They were very passive in responding to public issues but extremely 
reactive to any criticism that they considered would ruin their good name. An example of 
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this is the Anom Regent who used his paramilitary to respond to criticism from the NGOs. 
Administration management in both regions was very rigid and not dynamic, and there 
were often coordination mishaps in the institutions that in the end resulted in mistakes in 
policy making.  
Table 6.4:  Correlation between Role of Mayor/Regent and Public Administration Reform 
Performance 
Districts Role of Mayor/Regent 
(reform promoter/progressive or 
reform resistant/status quo) 
Public Administration 
Reform performance 
Giri Regency Progressive Successful 
Prajan Municipality Progressive Successful 
Kulon Regency Progressive Partially successful 
Anom Regency Status Quo Failed 
Alit Municipality Progressive Successful 
Wetan Regency Status Quo Failed 
Source: primary data 
 
 
B. COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN BUREAUCRATS AND 
POLITICIANS 
 
In this research, the response of bureaucrats and politicians to local public 
administration reform is categorized into two categories, collaboration and conflict. Data 
from the regencies/municipalities that were studied in this research will be used as sample 
cases to analyze how the historical factors and behavior of politicians and bureaucrats 
affect their attitudes and actions towards creating a qualified public administration. Other 
sample cases from other regions are also included because these cases commonly 
occurred in every region. The analysis will start with the historical factor of the 
bureaucracy in Indonesia in order to have an understanding of the attitudes of politicians 
and bureaucrats. 
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1. Historical Factor 
One of the periods that formed bureaucratic characteristic Indonesia was the 
period when the New Order regime ruled. The Regime’s influence was so powerful that 
the bureaucracy at that time was called the New Order regime model bureaucracy. The 
feature that was most apparent was the hierarchic characteristic, which was very rigid, 
with all of the administrative levels having to be passed in every decision making 
process. This model resembles the military administration that is also very hierarchic in 
which every operation has to be approved by several levels of commands. This 
resemblance is obviously caused by the fact that the New Order Regime was established 
by the military using a model that was similar to the military principle of one command 
and obedience to create stability. Another characteristic was that it put more stress on the 
procedure than the achievement.  The excessive obedience to the procedure was seen 
when bureaucracy tended to be overwhelmed with routine administration management 
rather than achieving targets. Sometimes, the obedience to following procedure even 
became the purpose of their job. Another characteristic of the bureaucracy in Indonesia is 
the lack of a distinct feature to differentiate between public and private possession. 
Resources that are a mixed of bureaucratic and private possession often encourages an 
abuse of power.  The concrete forms of this are corruption, collusion, and nepotism 
(KKN) that many still practice to this day. These three characteristics then created the 
next characteristic, a procedural and red tape bureaucracy. This characteristic is enhanced 
by the excessive number of employees, which encouraged the creation of unnecessary 
divisions. This lengthened procedure is also believed to be an attempt to parcel out the 
bureaucracy’s resources. The effect is that the resources that are finally received by 
society are less because they are blocked by the various stages and divisions in 
bureaucracy. 
Politically, the New Order regime was influenced by the ruling political party of 
the time that, the Golongan Karya (Golkar) Party. Bureaucracy was never free from 
political influence, and it was legitimate for Golkar and PDIP to control the bureaucracy 
using the platform of its party. An actual example of this was when every Civil Servant 
was obligated to be a member of the party. When it was in power, Golkar was not alone, 
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it worked together with the military to select and place people who were prepared to 
follow the party’s policies and the military’s interest as Governor and Regent/Mayor. At 
that time, almost seventy percent of the heads of the region positions (province and 
regency/municipality) were held by the military. The argument that was often proposed to 
legitimate military involvement in administration was that it was to maintain the stability 
and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. This policy was stating part of the 
Development Trilogy of the New Order, which was stability, growth, and equality. 
Golkar mostly consisted of technocrats that were oriented towards economic growth.  
This also influenced the bureaucracy that has a popular jargon, ‘Development’. Thus, in 
order to maintain stability for economic growth, the bureaucracy was controlled by the 
Central Government. Bureaucracy in the regions followed the policy of the Central 
Government, and the regions did not have the courage to make their own policy, even 
though it was explicitly written in Law No. 5/1974 on Local Government that one of the 
main principles of the Regional Government is de-centralization. In practice, the regional 
autonomy was never implemented as it should have been. To control the region, the 
Central Government tended to prefer to have a military officer place as the head of 
region, for they were already accustomed to a chain of command. The power Golkar had 
among the bureaucrats up until the reform was considered to be powerful, especially 
considering that failure in the reform agenda, particularly in relation to economic 
development, brought a romantic feeling to people about a return to the past conditions.  
This characteristic of the New Order model bureaucracy was closely related to the 
cultural values in which it existed. The value that was often debated was the Javanese 
value that holds patrimony and harmony in high regard. The negative aspect of 
patrimony, which is the most obvious, is excessive obedience to the leader. Sometimes, 
rules would even be violated in order to obey the superior. A leader in the Indonesian 
bureaucracy structure has a very respectable position, since he controls his inferiors’ 
future through the DP3 (Performance Evaluation Form).  Thus, the leader becomes a 
small ruler within his/her institution. Offerings are still given to the leaders though 
sometimes in a different form. In many cases of corruption committed in projects and 
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institution budget manipulation, the earnings were handed to the superior. These offerings 
were a part of what was given to superiors in order to get a lucrative position. 
Therefore, a collusion is often created to avoid conflict in duty. An example of 
this is the creation of equal resource distribution for every person and division in the 
organization in order to avoid jealousy. The practice of budget composition that focuses 
more on equal distribution in institution than on the purpose that the institution is 
supposed to achieve is an example of the efforts made to avoid conflict.  
There are two regions studied in the research that are appealing to compare in 
terms of their historical aspects and the culture of the society that became their 
foundation. These regions are the Giri Regency and the Prajan Municipality, which are 
both in the Province of the Prajan Special Region. These regions in are located in one of 
the oldest kingdoms which still exists today. Therefore, Prajan is known as a centre for 
the Javanese culture, and many Javanese values and norms come from this area. Though 
both are located close to one another, they have a different administrational history. The 
difference is mainly in the history of the leadership, especially the Regent/Mayor under 
the New Order regime. The Giri Regency is one of the few types of regency that has 
never had a Regent from the military. Conversely, the Prajan Mayors mostly came from 
the military. The difference in the history of leadership of the Regent/Mayor resulted in 
different bureaucratic behavior, both at a personal and organizational level. The following 
section will reveal these differences. To make it comprehensive, cases will be compared 
to other similar cases in other regions. 
The significant behavior of the bureaucracy in the Prajan Municipality is the 
excessive formal politeness that exists in the relationship between officials, vertically and 
horizontally. In a relationship between a superior and an inferior, it is very inappropriate 
for the inferior to make his own decision without the acknowledgement of the superior. 
Worse, it is a sin for an inferior to take the initiative to propose a policy. Thus, policy 
innovation in the bureaucracy is very rare, as everyone is waiting for the superior's order. 
This lack of innovation was experienced by the Mayor who ruled after the reform era. It 
was present even at the lowest degree, i.e. proposing idea or opinion. In a working 
meeting attended by the Mayor and the elite bureaucrats, almost everyone always acted 
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passively. They considered it to be inappropriate to give their opinion to their superiors. 
Therefore, they were surprised when the Mayor gave them unlimited freedom to propose 
a policy or give their opinion. This is one thing that they never did during the New Order 
Regime era.   
The same thing was also experienced by a Regent in one of the regencies in the 
Prajan province. During his early time as Regent, he was astonished by the attitude of his 
officials, who tended to be passive and even afraid to express their opinion in working 
meetings. This occurred even though the Regent had given them infinite freedom to 
express their opinion. The Regent even showed a great deal of respect to every policy 
proposed by his inferiors.  His astonishment increased when he found that their working 
ethos was very weak, and there was low productivity and limited working hours. The 
Regent, who was also a businessman, always compared his personnel to the private 
sector. An official admitted that what the Regent did was very surprising, considering that 
so far their Regents had always come from the military and tended to be repressive. 
Therefore, when the Regent gave them the freedom to express their opinions, they were 
surprised, and at the same time challenged to act pro-actively. The change took a 
considerable amount of time because there were still many positions in the bureaucracy 
filled by people (conservatives) that still enjoyed the New Order regime administration 
model. 
 
2. Collaboration between Bureaucrats and Politicians 
 Bureaucrats will be divided into two groups, senior bureaucrats that have a high 
rank and degree and are placed in certain positions within the bureaucracy, and junior 
bureaucrats who are still relatively young and have a lower rank and degree. This 
grouping is intended to sharpen the analysis to reveal which groups in the bureaucracy do 
not encounter significant problem in making a political relationship with local politicians. 
As well as this, the research will look at what encourages them to make contact that may 
affect the bureaucratic reform process. The analysis on the collaboration between 
bureaucrats and politicians will be done using the context of several local issues that have 
occurred since the implementation of regional autonomy. 
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 One of the political issues that occurred during the implementation of regional 
autonomy was the “indigenous" issue which occurred as a manifestation of primordial 
issue. This jargon was created to differentiate people, politicians and bureaucrats, who 
came from the region and from outside the region. However, there was not any distinct 
and certain definition of local, such as who should be called indigenous, does an 
indigenous person have to be born and raised in the region, should some one be called 
indigenous if his ancestors were from the region but was not born in the region, should 
some one be called indigenous if he/she had lived in the region for a long time but had not 
been born there, should some one be called indigenous because of their ethnic group, and 
so on. One thing that is certain is that this jargon was created by local political elite and 
bureaucrats. The issue affected the decision on who would fill the political and 
bureaucratic positions in the region. 
 Rasyid (2002), as the initiator of Law no. 22/1999, also admitted the occurrence of 
this issue. However, in his opinion, the issue had existed before the implementation of 
Law no. 22/1999, especially with relation to political positions in the region, such as 
governor and Regent/Mayor.  In his opinion, Law no. 22/1999 should not be to blame for 
this issue. Moreover, he said that national politicians in Jakarta were the ones that should 
be responsible, because they did not properly direct their followers in the region. Now, 
they become political elites in the region, to not sacrifice nation interest, especially nation 
bond in the region, by promoting primordial behavior and orientation.  
 In opposition to Rasyid’s opinion, one of the Directorate-General in the Ministry 
of Home Affairs indicated that the increase of “indigenous” fanaticism has result the 
mistaken loyalty and the absence of tour of area. This fanaticism has also limited the 
regional personnel career. At the same time Civil Servant were expected to act as unifier 
of the Republic of Indonesia Unified Nation is a logic consequence of the implementation 
of Law No. 22/1999 (Mawardi, 200).   
 It is obvious that the Central Government’s "bankruptcy", economically and 
politically, has weakened the Central Government’s control over the region. The local 
bureaucracy and political elite who had been strangled during the new order regime 
suddenly regained the power to control the region. This was reinforced by the regional 
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autonomy based on Law No. 22/1999. The revival of these local elite occurred in the 
political position distribution (elected officials) and also the reached career position 
(appointed officials). To make this position acquisition work well, the trend was that 
politicians and bureaucrats elite would collaborate to secure strategic positions in the 
region. The following example is taken from the conflict that occurred in the Regent’s 
election in the Sampang regency, Madura, which in East Java Province. 
The Conflict of Sampang Regent Election 
This conflict was started by the Sampang Regent Election in 2000 that chose Fadilah 
Budiono for the second times as Regent. Fadilah was supported by PPP, Group Fraction, 
PDIP, and TNI/Polri, while his opponent, Fachrur Rozi was supported by KKB. However, 
unpredictably, the election result then was claimed by many parties, especially those who 
are anti-Fadilah that the installation was postponed until about one year. Worse, it caused 
lengthened political dispute in this regency. During that period, it could be said that 
administration activity was nearly vacuum. Regional Government carried out the 
administration based on the previous year APBD since the 2001 RAPBD was stuck and 
DAU could not be cashed in. There were 20 Regional Regulation Drafts that were left un-
discussed. The personal and institutional re-structurization process was also postponed.  
The claim from the anti-Fadhilah group was based on the election process that was 
considered to be illegitimate since there was a member of DPRD who actually had retired 
but made a vote in the election. As a note, Fadhilah defeated his opponent only in one 
number, i.e. one vote. It was 23 votes versus 22 votes. The claimant then demanded a re-
election because that one determining vote was considered to be illegitimate that both 
candidates should have same votes. 
The conflict, according to Karim, was actually resulted from an old issue that appeared in 
several aspects as followings: First, the shift on political focus from bureaucratic 
government to party government has encouraged the rise of conflict of interest between 
political parties. In general election during the New Order era, the conflict that happened 
in Sampang to fight for public position was between Golkar (which represented 
government’s interest) and PPP (which represented Religious Leader's interest). In the 
1999 General Election, Golkar that used to be PPP’s opponent became its partner and the 
conflict then happened between PPP (which was controlled by senior politician) and PKB, 
one of PPP’s fragments, which was navigated by young generation. Until today it is 
difficult to resolve the conflict since both have the same base of people, the NU group. 
PPP was determined to support Fadhilah for the Regent for if their were not, the Regent 
would come from PKB, their opponent. Second, the indigenous issue was raised by PKB 
through the nomination of Fachrur Rozi Farouq, the chief of PKB who was an indigenous 
of Sampang, as Regent candidate. On the contrary, PPP nominated a non- party figure 
(Fadhilah was a police veteran) for they considered that it would bring them good. 
The conflict that fought for Regent position did not happen between the parties only. The 
conflict also involved bureaucrats, especially Head of Village that so far was a loyal 
supporter of PPP. When Fadilah installment was postponed by Central Government, they 
all withdrew from their position as the head of village that then public services in the 
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village/sub district level were paralyzed. Support to Fadhilah was also given by the 
executives because they had been advantaged by Fadhilah position as the Regent in the 
previous period. The support, among others, was shown by their action to refuse to come 
to FKB invitation in DPRD to hold a meeting and discussion on several administration 
duties. According to the executives, they did not come to the meeting because they 
considered DPRD to have been in a vacuum state that it did not have the right to carry out 
its functions. However, through a scrutinization, it could be seen that the relationship 
pattern between the executives and Fadilah’s supporters in DPRD is actually ambiguous. 
Officially, they stated their support to the Fadilah’s supporters in DPRD. However, at the 
same time, they were actually disadvantaged by FPP decision to make the 
administration’s activity vacuum since some administration reforms, such as position 
echelon rise which had been Central Government’s decision, were delayed. It should be 
noted that the echelon rise will raise their salary also. It seems that their position that was 
under the DPRD made the administrative interest to be outmatched by political interest.  
 
Source: Karim, 2003, dalam Jalan Terjal Reformasi Lokal: Dinamika Politik di Indonesia, Politik Lokal UGM 
 
 From the case of the Sampang Regent Election conflict, it is clear that the 
bureaucracy cannot be detached entirely from political intervention. Primordial bonds that 
determined to trail the interests of the party that one the general election could not be 
avoided. In this condition, collaboration between both parties was formed though it was 
very obvious that the collaboration was not based solely on motional reasons, but more on 
each own interest. In the above case, the collaboration occurred at the lowest executive 
level, that of the head of the village, which is indeed founded upon the primordial bonds, 
especially religious uniformity, which were promoted by a certain party. However, at the 
upper level of the senior officials, the support that was given to the former Regent was 
because of their fear for less of their positions within the bureaucracy when a new Regent 
rules (status quo).  
 So one hand, the executives supported the Regent but on the other they were 
disadvantaged, because the public administration reform that might have given them 
benefit was not be implemented. Nonetheless, they were forced to follow political 
interests instead of administrative interests. This ambiguous attitude was a strategy of the 
senior executives to grasp any chance they could during the political changes in the 
region. The collaboration between executives and legislatives in this case was very weak 
because it was not based on same interests. 
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 Very strong friction occurred among the senior bureaucrats themselves when the 
Central Government demanded an organizational rearrangement of the Local Government 
along with the implementation of a new local autonomy policy. The friction occurred 
because there was rivalry for the positions of new heads of institutions that became open 
as a result of the institutional arrangement. This kind of thing often happened in the 
institutions, for example in the institution that manages the region’s finances. The central 
government demanded that these regional financial institutions, such as the Income 
Agency, the Regional Treasury, and the Financial Division, which were under the City 
Manager Office, be merged into one institution. However, there were still many regions 
that kept these institutions, arguing that the merging of those institutions would increase 
the amount of KKN, since the income and expenses were merged into just one institution. 
This argument is actually not right since, KKN occurred not because of mergers of those 
two different functions, but because of a lack of control. Moreover, if those two functions 
were separated, it would stall the implementation of the Performance Budgeting System. 
The separation of the functions was a problem for the coordination, and as a result the 
composition of the performance based budget was not effective. The motive for this 
function separation was actually concerned more with an effort to retain the positions of 
senior bureaucrats as the heads of those institutions. In order to preserve status quo, senior 
bureaucrats would usually ask for help from DPRD members that were responsible for the 
regional institutional arrangement. 
 Another example of collaboration occurred in the Giri Regency when the 
Agricultural, Watering, and Forestry Agencies were going to be merged into one 
institution. In the discussion of the Regional Regulation Draft on Administration 
Organization Structure (SOP), the meeting became deadlocked several times. One of the 
fractions in the Giri DPRD persistently argued that the Forestry Agency should not be 
merged with the Agricultural and Watering Agencies.  When the head of the Giri DPRD 
investigated the deadlock, it was found that the former head of the Forestry Agency had 
lobbied fractions in the DPRD so that Forestry Agency could still be an independent 
institution and not merged with other agencies. According to the head of the DPRD, the 
lobbying was done so that the person could keep his position as the head of the agency. 
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Eventually, these three agencies were merged, and after the Regent himself performed a 
selection, the former head of the forestry agency was elected as the new head of the 
agency, and no significant problems arose.  
 Collaboration commonly occurs in a region when executives and legislatives make 
an official agreement to give retirement money to every member of the board, the funds 
coming from the APBD. This has occurred in the Kulon Regency, the Anom Regency, the 
Prajan Municipality, and the Wetan Regency. The amount of this retirement money is 
different in every region depending on the agreement. However, it is predicted that each 
person received tens or even hundreds of millions in a wealthy region, and that it uses tens 
of billions of the APBD budget. Meanwhile, therefore DPRD members received various 
facilities from the Local Government. It was therefore common for a member of the 
DPRD to become rich suddenly. A person, who had previously worked as a parking 
attendant or small trader with a small income and a rented house could suddenly have his 
own luxurious house and several cars after becoming a member of the DPRD. 
Surprisingly, though the giving of this retirement money is against the Law, the parties 
involved did not feel morally responsible. The following is a statement from a head of the 
financial division of regency in North Sumatra (Dwiyanto, 2003): 
A bureaucratic position allowance should only be given to officials 
who hold structural position in bureaucracy. However, the members 
of DPRD persistently argued that they were also officials and hold a 
position. They said that if a head of section in bureaucracy can get 
the position allowance, why can't we. I think BPK should find out 
about this infringement, we'll deal with it later".  
 
The budget for the DPRD was already arranged in the Government Regulation 
No. 110/2000 that stated that the number of board member is counted based on a certain 
percentage of the amount of the PAD of each region. However, as a result of these 
shameful actions, there were almost no regions that followed the regulations, and the 
amount of the budget exceeded the regulated amount. In a region in the Riau Province for 
example, the amount of the budget for the DPRD reached almost 80% of the total PAD of 
the region. In several other regions, it was found that the budget for the DPRD had been 
equal to the PAD or even exceeded it (Dwiyanto, 2003). This also occurred in the Wetan 
 316
Regency, where the size of the budget for the DPRD reached almost 70% of the PAD. 
From these facts, it is presumed that there were many DPRD members that automatically 
approved the executives’ plan to raise the PAD by issuing several Regional Regulations 
on new taxes and retributions in order to raise the PAD income. Unfortunately, these 
Regional Regulations on taxes and retributions often collided with society’s economic 
interests. 
 Collaboration also occurred in the formulation of Regional Regulations. As if it 
was an exchange process, a Regional Regulation proposed by Local Government could 
instantly be accepted and approved for the Local Government, and its related technical 
institution would pay an amount of money and provide certain facilities. The following 
statement was stated by a Local Government official in a regency in Central Java 
(Dwiyanto, 2003): 
"When a Regional Regulation Draft on retribution was proposed to the 
DPRD, the members of the DPRD asked for amount money, more or less two 
million Rupiah, and also a dinner in the most expensive restaurant in this city. 
After their request was granted, the Regional Regulation Draft was 
approved.”   
 
 Another type of collusion that often occurred was the determination of tender 
project winners. Data from the GDS I 2002 shows that the highest amount of KKN that 
occurred in the region, according to NGOs and Journalists, was in the project tenders, 
followed by personnel recruitment, APBD composition, and Regional Regulation 
composition (See Graphic 6.1).  From the data, it was also found that KKN in project 
tenders happened more often in the city than in the regency. It is quite possible that this is 
related to the large number of projects that were tendered in the municipality facility 
development. For example, in the Prajan Municipality, there were some projects that were 
won by members of the DPRD and their cronies. This project bidding was unfair, and the 
court proved that it broke the government project bidding regulations. Then, the court 
sentenced members of the DPRD to jail. The bureaucrats succeed in avoiding the sentence 
because they had a greater understanding of the bidding process.   
 A similar case of government project bidding also took place in the Anom 
Regency. Members of the DPRD who owned companies cooperated with decision makers 
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in the bureaucracy to win the project bidding for politicians in the DPRD. They hired their 
cronies to do the projects. This can decrease the quality of the projects because the project 
budget has to be shared among the implementers, including members of the DPRD.       
Graphic 6.1
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KKN in the project tender was carried out by members of the board who personally 
became the contractors for the project, or sold it to the company that paid the highest 
price. GDS I 2002 found that the average project corruption of the total value of the 
project that is picked up from the businessmen varied in every province in Indonesia. The 
lowest quotation was in the Lampung Province (Outside Java-Bali, in the west of 
Indonesia), with approximately 1.4%. The highest corruption is in the East Sumatra 
Province (Outside Java-Bali in west Indonesia), with approximately 11 %. In Java, it was 
around 4.7% in Jogjakarta Province, 6.5% in Central Java, and 4% in East Java. The 
corruption was done by both Local Government personnel and members of the DPRD. As 
the result of this high cost economy, the quality of the project could not be guaranteed and 
there were many projects that had problems and some even stopped. The following is 
information from a Deputy Regent in a region in West Borneo Province: 
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“KKN in APBD formulation was often occurred because there were many 
DPRD members who were involved in the APBD projects implementation. 
One of the projects was a bridge construction that was worked by the head of 
DPRD. The Head of DPRD put a pressure on Regency Government to win one 
of his construction companies, but at the end the bridge project did not 
finished well.  
  
The question that then a rises is why this retirement money case and many others, so 
that it seems as if they are Local Government’s policy. The obvious reason is that the 
transformation of the administration from a bureaucratic government to party government 
has not yet been followed by a powerful control system, so that political parties are 
encouraged to make policy that benefits them. Executives become weak and tend to just 
accept the politician's will. This was mentioned by a head of a financial division in a 
region in North Sumatra Province (Dwiyanto, 2003): 
“Local Government have no choice, we have to accept DPRD’s demand. This 
is a join decision of DPRD and the executive” 
 
Wit many other things, bureaucrats also accept this pseudo-cooperation with politicians 
because they also get some benefit either material or a good position in the bureaucracy.  
Another argument offered is that this retirement fund is a result of a bargain between 
the DPRD and the Regent/Mayor, so that the Responsibility Report that is given every 
year could be approved by the DPRD without any problems. According to the Head of the 
Financial division, 30% of the 2001 APBD routine budget was given to the DPRD, which 
consisted of 45 members. Compare that number to the number of Civil Servants in the 
region that reached thousands of people, who received only 70% of the routine budget. 
This budget was also used for routine daily Local Government activities. The Local 
Government was forced to approve it because according to related officials, the board 
would not approve the Regent’s Responsibility Report, if the budget was not approved.  
Those forms of collaboration are also politics of paying-debt of a Regent/Mayor 
toward people who had supported him to be Regent/Mayor. This was indicated clearly by 
the fact that the executives distributed project tenders to political parties. The researcher 
himself once saw with his own eyes a copy of a letter from a Regent in the Central Java 
Province that was distributed to the political party management. In the letter, the share of 
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project value from the 2002 budget that was distributed to each political party was written 
was billions of Rupiah and the amount was based on the number of seats of the party in 
the DPRD. The Regent, who came from a small party, was able to get his position as 
Regent with the support of the large parties. Since the large parties were not able to 
nominate their own candidates dye to internal conflicts, they found a replacement 
candidate from one of the small parties. In order to obtain support from the large parties, 
the Regent had to have a strong bargaining position. This bargaining position was 
obtained by distributing money from the project to the parties in the DPRD.  
Collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats, either in the Giri Regency, the 
Prajan Municipality, the Anom Regency, and the Wetan Regency, did not allow outsiders 
including civil society, to influence them. There was almost no outside power that could 
influence the coalition, since they shut the outsiders out. As a result of this closed attitude, 
conflict with the outsiders would usually arise when policies were implemented. On the 
contrary, in the Alit Municipality, the coalition parties gave the opportunity to outsiders to 
participate and give suggestions. The final decision was still held by the members of the 
coalition. In this region, the coalition gave freedom to the society and NGOs to access 
certain policies that were being discussed. The input from the outside also became a 
consideration for the members of the coalition to make policy, but the final decision 
making was still held by the coalition. This meant that a loose collaboration between 
politicians and bureaucrats opened up the opportunity for community participation. For 
this reason the community participation in the Alit Municipality can be categorized as 
high level.   
 
3. Conflict between Bureaucrats and Politicians: 
Besides collaboration, in several regions, there was conflict between the executives 
and the legislatives. The conflict often occurred, for example, in the installment process of 
the City Manager of the Regency/Municipality. According to the regulations, the City 
Manager is a career position and not a political one, and the installment does not have to 
be approved by the DPRD, but only by the Regent/Mayor. However, in the regency in the 
Bali Province, it was the opposite. In this region, the installment of the City Manager must 
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be approved by the DPRD. The same thing happened in several other regions. The DPRD 
had a hidden agenda to interfere with the career position in the bureaucracy. This position 
was indeed very strategic considering that it was second to the Regent/Mayor and it was 
the highest bureaucratic career position in the region. This strategic position encouraged 
the DPRD to try to control the City Manager Position. The assumption was that 
controlling the City Manager meant controlling the bureaucracy.  
Another conflict that haunted a Regent through almost her entire ruling period 
occurred in the Kulon Regency. On the surface, the conflict appeared to be a conflict of 
vision between the executive and legislative in the process of formulation the Strategic 
Planning (Renstra). The executives focused on a vision which was oriented towards the 
economy, while the legislatives insisted on inserting religious elements. This difference in 
vision resulted in a difference in policies and strategies that were to be implemented. This 
disagreement happened for about 3 years, during which the Regent's responsibility report 
that was supposed to be based on the Renstra became unclear. In every meeting on the 
responsibility report, the discussion was always heated with arguments that had no logical 
reasoning. However, in the end, the DPRD approved the LPJ with several notes. 
Another conflict arose when the legislative assembly proposed a Regional Regulation 
that on the Liquor trade prohibition85. The executive considered that they should not 
prohibit the liquor trade but only limit the maximum amount of alcohol. However, the 
legislatives, especially those from religious groups, strongly demanded this prohibition. 
Their view was that the PAD should not be earned from the selling of things that are 
forbidden by certain religions. In the end, after going through a long process, this 
Regional Regulation was finally approved by both parties. 
Strife also occurred when the executives planned to buy an official car for the Regent 
and his deputy. In the DPRD's opinion, the budget that was to be used to buy the car, 
reaching billions of Rupiah, was unfair to society, which was still in crisis. The executives 
on the other hand, considered the vehicle to meet the standards of official vehicles for 
                                                 
85 This Regional Regulation on Liquor was the first regional regulation in Indonesia in the regency level that was 
proposed directly by the DPRD instead of the executives as formerly occurred in other regional regulations. This 
Regional regulation was also considered to be controversial since it prohibited any kind of liquor to be sold to people in 
Kulon.  
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Regent/Mayor, and said it was appropriate for the conditions in Kulon condition. The car 
was eventually bought as planned without any strong opposition from the DPRD.  
In the daily administration management, there was often also conflict between the 
DPRD and the Local Government. A fierce debate often took place in official meetings 
that made the executives reluctant and afraid to come. This condition forced the Regent to 
teach his personnel about dealing with the politicians in the DPRD. According to some of 
the executives, this endless conflict was actually based on the will of several politicians in 
the DPRD to have some extra facilities, which had not been regulated by the prevailing 
rules, such as retirement money, an allowance rise, and so on. However, the executives 
persisted that they should follow the prevailing rules adding that the current budget was 
insufficient. Even the dominant political party often tried to influence the Regent to use 
the budget for the party's interests86. This hidden agenda was then what made the 
relationship between executives and legislatives tense. 
 This strained relationship was generally caused by the distrust among both parties 
as a result of historical factors. The legislatives still considered the bureaucracy as being 
as it was in the new Order era, a place of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Moreover, 
the bureaucracy was identified as being the tool of the party that ruled during the New 
Order regime, Golkar. This party was considered to be most responsible for the multi 
dimensional crisis that occurred in Indonesia and the bureaucracy, as a part of the party, 
was still filled with people from the past that were responsible for the crisis.  The 
executives on the other hand, felt that since the reform era, there were many politicians 
that were incapable and most of them were only political adventurers. Coincidentally, the 
party that won the General Election and succeeded in defeating Golkar was indeed filled 
with politicians that did not have the sufficient capabilities to consider the administration 
and development problems, especially at the regional level. Those people were supported 
by society, but it was widely known that many of them were instant politicians that did not 
have sufficient education or knowledge on administrational matters. Moreover, their 
behavior which often considered their own interests as being most important made the 
                                                 
86 The Regent was often upset since his party often criticized him as being a Regent that was not able to build an office 
building for his party. They compared him with the Regents in other regions were able to build an office for their party 
by using money from the APBD.  
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bureaucracy questions their intentions in becoming a representative. This distrustful 
behavior towards other increased the tension among them. 
 Another factor that was suspected to have also caused the tense relationship was 
the vagueness of the definition of the relationship between the executives and the 
legislatives in Law No. 22/1999. The following is a statement from a Regent in West Java 
Province on the issue (Dwiyanto, 2003): 
“The purpose of partnership between the Regent and the DPRD was to give a 
clear parameter, especially regarding the supervision matter in order to avoid 
overlapping with the existing technical supervision agency. The Regent’s 
Accountability Report that supposed to be monitoring mechanism, but it was 
also used for practicing of money politics. DPRD should used the Strategic 
Planning parameter to evaluate the Regent’s performance, while the 
realization of target in the APBD was used as an annual parameter. So it 
should not have been mixed up.” 
 
The vagueness of the institutional relationship between executives and legislatives was 
also complained about by a Regent in North Sumatra Province. In his opinion, the DPRD's 
authority in performing a supervisory function was not proportional anymore, since the 
members of the DPRD could employ a head of agency without any acknowledgement or 
approval from the Regent as his direct superior. The following is his opinion (Dwiyanto, 
2003): 
Disregarding of anything, members of the DPRD should respect the Regent. It 
is not because the members of the DPRD have the power to impede the 
Regent’s Accountability Report, they can do whatever they want to do. This is 
a DPRD’s arrogance and it might disturb the stability of the administration in 
the region”. 
 
The stability of the administration in the region referred to was when the DPRD 
refused to approve the Regional Regulation draft on the APBD in 2002. The effect of this 
was that there were many administrational and development activities that were hindered. 
According to various sources, this was a strategy of the members of the DPRD to stall the 
process, hoping that there would first be a political agreement between the DPRD and the 
Regent, which would certainly involve money. The following is a statement from the 
Regent (Dwiyanto, 2003): 
 323
…You can imagine Sir, from the total of PAD was around 10 billion Rupiah, 4 
million was for DPRD's routine budget. They demanded the executive to 
approve it. They threaten to bring the Regent’s Accountability Report up if the 
executive refused. The discussion on the RAPBD then ran as if it was a price 
of goods negotiation. The relationship between the executives and the 
legislatives can not be called as partnership. Why are they allowed to 
supervise the executive’s budget, while we can not supervise the DPRD’s 
budget? When we asked that question, DPRD will answer: There is an 
agreement between the Regent and us. If this situation is always under way, I 
prefer that we just use Law N., 5/1974, after fixing some of it flaws."  
 
The former Law No. 5/1974, placed the executives and especially the Regent as the 
sole rulers, and the DPRD was beneath this control. This condition would certainly not be 
supportive of the development of democracy. Nonetheless, the Regent’s response toward 
the DPRD's behavior showed that the relationship between the executives and legislatives 
was not conducive under the administrational practice that had not been based on a 
distinct law that regulated the relationship between the two. In addition, the reform era 
seemed not to be able to detach the bureaucracy from the historical bond that both elite 
institutions in the region were forced not to trust each other. In other words, the conflict 
that occurred during this transformational era was a continuation of the conflict that 
existed under the New Order Regime. During that time, the conflict could be subdued by 
an ironfisted political and economic system under Soeharto. Therefore, the conflict that 
happened after that era was open conflict that was filled with vengeance among the elite. 
During the former regime period they had had to surrender their political and economic to 
those who during that period received facilities and power from their patrons. 
 
4. The influence of collaboration and conflict on the reform success 
The question that then arose was whether the collaboration and conflict helped the 
public administration reform or affected the quality of the public administration reform. A 
reliable conclusion that can be inferred is that there is not any proof that shows that 
collaboration with the DPRD makes the reform process easier. The reform performance 
actually becomes more negative, this being marked by various form of defiance of 
authority. In addition to the collaboration process that made the public administration 
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reform negative, the conflict that occurred between the parties worsened the conditions 
and made the public administration reform move in a vague direction.  
A form of collaboration that often occurred was in the financial sector. The budget 
allocation in the APBD could be changed for personal or group interests. This was done by 
allocating funds officially for the DPRD's interest disregarding any prevailing rules. 
Examples of this are adding facilities for the members of the DPRD and his family, giving 
retirement money that exceeded the budget capacity and ignoring the needs of society 
making more comparative studies to other regions and even abroad without any clear 
purpose and so on. One way used to avoid criticism from outsiders was to conceal the 
DPRD's budget in several institutions that belonged to the Local Government. This was 
usually done by inserting the budget into the performance based budget of each 
government institution. For example, working visits and comparative studies were inserted 
into a local government institution. 
The Local Government institution that was inserted with the budget could usually 
not refuse, since politically they were under the DPRD and they had to accept any 
decisions even though they were in contradiction to the regulations. Nonetheless, it is 
believed that institutional acceptance was a part of the strategy to make their project 
proposals is approved by the DPRD without any problems. In other words, bureaucracy 
actually used the DPRD’s power to approve project proposals by providing them with 
space to conceal their budgets in the Local Government institution budget.  This was a 
part of a budget political trick which was carried out so smoothly that the DPRD members 
were not aware of it. Moreover, this was actually a political trap since if it was taken to 
court, those prosecuted would be those that approved the budget, the DPRD, and not the 
planners. This was because the planners never put the budget in their plan proposal. This 
was proven by several cases exposed in which the members of the DPRD were always 
accused as being the main actors since they were considered to be the most responsible 
party in the budget allocation. 
This DPRD budget insertion, for the Local Government institution, was obviously 
considered to have ruined the performance based budget plan which had been made for 
one fiscal year. Thus, the institution would find any argument to excuse the insertion of 
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the DPRD's budget. This condition would ruin the vision and the mission of the 
institution. This sizeable political intervention from the DPRD members was one of the 
reasons why the performance based budget model could never be implemented effectively 
in government institutions. In other words, the budget problems were not only 
administrative problems, but also political. 
The other problem, retirement money, also reflected the hefty authority that the 
legislators had over the executors. Even though the giving of this kind of money was in 
contradiction with the regulations, many Local Governments were unable to refuse. The 
main reason for this was that the Local Government did not have the ability to, or did not 
want to, be under pressure from the DPRD, because the DPRD still approved the Regent's 
responsibility report. This responsibility report was often used by the DPRD as a weapon 
to pressure the executives to accept their policies and their interests. This budget 
allocation also ruined the Strategic Plan and the General Policy Direction (AKU) that was 
going to be translated into the APBD. The amount of money for the retirement fund, 
which was not small forced the executives to recalculate the budget by reducing the 
funding of other programs (including the budget for public interest) in order to cover the 
retirement fund expenses. A budget that had been composed with excellent planning could 
fall apart with political intervention. This obviously ruined the effort to have an 
accountability budget. Moreover, the performance based budget could not be 
implemented. 
 Project distribution to the members of the DPRD, either personally or through 
their party, was another strategy of the executives to have their policies approved by the 
DPRD. This case also shows the lack of transparency in the policy making process. The 
following Graphic 6.2 shows the level of transparency in the project tender procedures 
according to NGO: 
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       Note: N of NGO is 600 organization  
Source: GDS I data, 2002 
 
This graphic shows that there are more NGOs that consider the project tender 
procedure so far not to be transparent. Comparing the results in Java-Bali with the results 
from outside Java-Bali, it is found that in Java-Bali the level of transparency is higher than 
outside Java-Bali. Such is the case in West Indonesia and East Indonesia; it is found that 
in East Indonesia the level of transparency is lower. An explanation for this is the critical 
attitude of society towards the policies made by the Local Government. Both regions, 
Java-Bali and West Indonesia, are regions which historically have a higher social-
economic level. This is the main reason why they had the courage to criticize the 
government. There were so many businessmen in these regions that applied for the project 
tender, that the fierce competition impeded the Local Government and the DPRD in 
deception in the tender process. This courageous attitude in giving criticism at the least 
made the Local Government and the DPRD think twice before committing any 
infringements, including in the project tender procedure. Nonetheless, this project tender 
that is not transparent had detained the effort to create a good governance. 
An interesting collaboration occurred when a group of senior bureaucrats tried to 
keep their positions in the midst of institutional rearrangement by personally lobbying a 
number of the board members. In the early period of the autonomy implementation, the 
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lobbying was done not only by the personnel of the Local Government, but also by 
personnel from the vertical institutions that were about to be merged with the Local 
Government. Many regions, especially outside Java-Bali, failed to reduce a number of 
institutions that it did not comply with the region’s needs. This was presumably caused by 
the inability of the executives and legislatives to control the personal interests of the elite 
bureaucrats or politicians who were interested in a place in the bureaucratic structure. For 
some reason, the Regent/Mayor purposely allowed this kind of thing to happen because he 
was hoping to gain support from the bureaucracy, especially the senior officials that up to 
that time had build a strong management network in the Regional Administration. In 
addition, the DPRD members were also hoping to earn some political rewards from the 
bureaucrats that they supported. The control was easier when there were many bureaucrats 
that politically owed the board members.  This eventually damaged the institutional order 
in the region because it became ineffective and inefficient. The purpose of an institution 
that was less structured and more functional made was getting indistinct. 
In several regions, the Regent/Mayor made a positive attempt to counter the senior 
bureaucrat’s actions, such as by introducing young competent bureaucrats to be placed in 
structural positions in the bureaucracy. Many of these young bureaucrats were 
administratively unqualified to meet the employment rank requirements, and the 
Regent/Mayor gave them an instant raise in rank in order to meet the requirements. This 
move caused vertical conflict between senior bureaucrats and young bureaucrats. In some 
cases, where young bureaucrats were acknowledged and protected directly by the 
Regent/Mayor, senior bureaucrats could not put any significant pressure on them. 
Unfortunately, the conflict between had a negative effect, proven by the occurrence of 
many factions in the bureaucracy. These factions had a negative impact on the working 
coordination issue between institutions. Usually, when the Regent/Mayor was protecting 
young bureaucrats, senior bureaucrats would look for protection from politicians in the 
DPRD. If the Regent/Mayor could manage this conflict, pressure from the senior 
bureaucrats would not have any importance. As a matter of fact, they could use the 
conflict to motivate the personnel, both senior and junior bureaucrats, to have achieved 
better results. Therefore, the influence of internal conflict in the bureaucracy towards 
 328
public administration reform would highly depend on the ability of the Regent/Mayor to 
manage the conflict. Only a Regent/Mayor with a strong vision and good managerial skills 
could survive this test. On the other hand, a weak Regent/Mayor would become a target 
for the senior bureaucrats and politicians in the DPRD. 
As mentioned above, if the collaboration between the bureaucracy and the DPRD 
results in a feeble public administration reform process, conflict between the two would 
weaken the reform process. An identification of various forms of conflict found that 
conflict originates from dissatisfaction with regards to the resource allocation that is 
considered by the executive or legislatives to be insufficient. On the surface, the conflict 
appears as a result of various things, such as a difference in Vision, disapproval of the 
Regional Regulation draft concept, a deadlock in the Responsibility Report discussion, 
and daily administrational issues which were actually outside the legislature’s jurisdiction.  
In the context of the Indonesian bureaucracy and political history, resource 
allocation issues have always been a main issue because of distrust among the bureaucracy 
and the politicians. The New Order Regime used a bureaucratic government system that 
placed the bureaucracy above the political party. This position caused the bureaucracy to 
have full authority over the resource distribution. This authority was often used 
wrongfully for the interests of the person or group. The political party that was supposed 
to have a controlling role, Golkar, was actually one of the actors that were involved in the 
growth of many kinds of infringements. Meanwhile, other political parties were not able 
to carry out their function as a representative of their constituents. The successive power 
of the bureaucracy and Golkar was increased with the support of the military in the 
economic and political system at that time. Various arbitrary ways of using this power 
increased the hatred that was deeply felt by the political elite that were excluded, including 
groups of people that were economically and politically ruled out. They nurtured their 
distrust towards anyone that had any relation to the New Order regime. This was proven 
when the 1998 Reform took place. The distrust was expressed in many forms, from 
violence to sophisticated ways of expression. Under these conditions, it is understandable 
that after the reform, many politicians could not still trust the bureaucrats considered as 
being corrupt. On the other hand, the bureaucrats considers that politicians who appeared 
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after the reform as being instant politicians that did not have an adequate Human Resource 
abilities. 
 
5. Comparison cases among the six districts 
Based on the kind of collaborations explained above and their influence on local 
public administration reform, it can be concluded that those five regions had different 
variations, which can be grouped into two different models, the Tight Collaboration and 
the Loose Collaboration model (see Table 6.5). Tight Collaboration is when those who 
form a coalition do not allow outsiders, including civil society, to influence them. This 
model is similar to the Village Life Model by B. Guy Peters. The Regions that have Tight 
Collaboration are the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, the Anom Regency, and the 
Wetan Regency. There was almost no outside power that could influence the coalition 
since they shut outsiders out. As a result of this closed attitude, conflict with outsiders 
would usually arise when policy was implemented. Meanwhile, the model that is similar 
to the Functional Village Life is the Loose Collaboration, in which the parties that form a 
coalition give the opportunity to outsiders to participate by making suggestions, although 
the final decision is still made by the members of the coalition—an example of this is 
found in the Alit Municipality. In the Alit Municipality, bureaucrats and politicians gave 
freedom to society and NGOs to access certain policies that were being discussed, but the 
decision making was still carried out by the coalition.  
In correlation with the performance of the local public administration reform, there 
were two regions where the politicians and bureaucrats had in Tight Collaboration but still 
had successful local public administration reform. Those two regions were the Giri 
Regency and the Prajan Municipality. In two other regions, the Anom Regency and the 
Wetan Regency, there was tight Collaboration but the local public administration reform 
did not result in the expected outcome (failed). One region that showed Loose 
Collaboration characteristics, the Alit Municipality, was indeed successful in performing 
local public administration reform. 
Beside collaborative responses, the research also found other responses of the 
bureaucrats and politicians to reform. That response that shows conflict between 
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bureaucrats and politicians is primarily budget allocation. There is an interesting 
phenomenon experienced in the Kulon Regency. In the region, the level of conflict 
between the politicians and the bureaucrats is high, but the reform did not completely fail 
(rather successful). From this fact, it can be inferred that the response of the bureaucrats 
and the politicians, whether characterized by Tight Collaboration, Loose Collaboration, or 
Conflict, does not have a direct influence on the success of local public administration 
reform. Nonetheless, as with other variables, it is presumable that this variable affects the 
success of a local public administration reform. 
Table 6.5: Correlation between Responses of Politicians-Bureaucrats and Public 
Administration Reform performance 
Districts Response of Politicians-Bureaucrats 
(collaboration or conflict) 
Public Administration 
Reform performance 
Giri Regency Tight Collaboration Successful 
Prajan Municipality Tight Collaboration Successful 
Kulon Regency Conflict Partially successful 
Anom Regency Tight Collaboration Failed 
Alit Municipality Loose Collaboration Successful 
Wetan Regency Tight Collaboration Failed 
Source: primary data 
 
 
C. CIVIL SOCIETY DYNAMICS IN RESPONDING TO PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
 
This writing does not mean to dispute the concept of civil society. The use of the term 
in this context is to exemplify the existence of other groups outside the state, i.e. common 
society (households), NGOs, and journalists that have their own commitments to local 
public administration reform. These three elements are chosen and their response toward 
the success of the reform is studied, for these three groups are the consumers of the goods 
and services provided by the state, and they have the potential to influence the state’s 
policies. In the context of institutional governance, they are one of the backbones that 
support the creation of good or bad governance. The following analysis will investigate 
how each civil society actor responds to the public administration reform process to create 
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good governance. The response meant is especially related to position improvement (in 
dealing with the state) and role enhancement issues, i.e. policy making access and 
planning. 
 
1. Community 
Data from the GDS I 2002 (see Graphic 6.3) reveals that the community is not 
adequately involved in the societal activity planning87. This tendency can be seen, for 
example, in the fact that the level of individual presence in societal activity planning is 
low. In regions outside Java and Bali, the level of societal presence in activity planning 
meetings is relatively lower than in the regions of Java and Bali. The level is also 
relatively lower in regencies than in municipalities (Dwiyanto, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: N of community is 9.000 households                    
 Source: GDS I, 2002 
 
However, those that attended the meetings showed a sufficiently high level of activity. 
42.3 percent of them admitted that they often put forward their suggestion, 24.6 percent 
                                                 
87 Specifically, 5 kinds of social activities that were looked at in the 2002 GDS I include making or improving physical 
transportation infrastructure (road), health (including posyandu, and others), water management (both for farming 
irrigation and sanitary water provision), environmental security (such as Neighborhood security systems (Siskamling), 
neighborhood watch, and others), and sanitation.  
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said that they always proposed their ideas in the meetings, and only 16 percent said that 
they never proposes any suggestions. 
 The data from GDS I 2002 revealed that health field gained sufficiently high 
concern from society (93.9%) while water management gained the lowest concern 
(39.8%). Supporting the data from GDS I, data from IRDA 4 in the Kulon Regency shows 
relevant results, as show by the following quote: 
Community’s participation in determine Mother and Children Health (KIA) services 
in the Public Health Centre (puskesmas) is very low.  It means that every policy 
always come from the local health agency. Meanwhile, the participation of 
community is quite significant in determination of program in Posyandu. It means 
that community determines every activity, especially time and cost services in 
Posyandu. In Tembo Posyandu, Kulon District, the cost is decided by a communal 
agreement, the cost is Rp. 300. Every baby or toddler will be provided with 
supplementary food, such as soya bean, papaya, or banana. Moreover, every RT 
(neighborhood) in the neighborhood is obligated to donate Rp. 1500-2000 to the 
Posyandu according to communal agreement. Each Posyandu personnel also give 
Rp. 1000 donation for the operational fund of the Posyandu. (Source: IRDA 4 Kulon 
Regency Research Report, 2003) 
 
In other fields, access of community to the decision making is very limited, as seen 
in the case of the rise in the fee for identity documents (identification card and birth 
certificate) which was determined by the Local Government with the DPRD in Kulon 
Regency. 
The community position was weak when the DPRD itself decided the amount of 
retribution income of resident registration in order to raise PAD in APBD. There 
was almost no criticism expressed when the DPRD determined that the target for 
the total income from this sector is Rp. 1.25 billion, which consisted of Rp. 350 
million from the Birth Certificate, Rp. 850 million from identification card, and 
Rp. 75 million from the family card. People did not express any criticism since 
they did not have adequate information about the target. The target was a result 
from a bargaining between the DPRD and KKCS. This decision may produce 
bad effect due to Local Government will seek only to achieve the target than to 
serve the society. 
Source: IRDA 4 Kulon Regency Research Report, 2003 
Even though there was a tendency for public participation to increase in certain 
fields, the GDS I 2002 generally inferred that the individual participation level of the 
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Indonesian people was still low. The participation composite index88 shows that only 3.4 
percent of the households can be categorized as having a high participation level, and only 
5.2 percent as having an “average” participation level. Meanwhile, 91.4 percent of the 
respondents belong to the categories that have a low participation level. As has been 
assumed, the characteristics of the households that have a low level of involvement in the 
decision making have a lower income level, living mostly outside Java-Bali, have a 
relatively lower education level, and are predominantly female (Dwiyanto, 2003). These 
characteristics are general features of society in many developing countries which have 
little access to development planning and products. 
 The writer himself, when involved in the Citizens’ Charter (CC) project 
management to improve the public service quality in three regencies/municipalities in 
Java, experienced difficulty in encouraging the society to be actively involved in the 
movement. In the process of introducing the consumer-based service model, inviting the 
society to be a part of the team, and encouraging society to be actively involved in the 
team discussions, it was obvious that society still lived in the past and was afraid to act 
critically, and tended to accept any policy made by the government.  It was lucky that the 
team consisted of many actors from civil society, such as NGOs and Journalists that were 
able to balance the involvement of bureaucrats and politicians. Nonetheless, this did not 
happen in the CC Project in the Alit Municipality. There, it was the involvement of 
common people and not the NGOs and journalist that was the generator for public service 
                                                 
88 The participation level is considered to be ‘high’ when respondents answer: (1) they ‘more often come than not’ or 
“always come’ about their attendence in planning programs/activities; (2) they ‘more often propose suggestions than 
not’ or ‘always propose suggestions’ in the program/activity planning meetings; (3) answer ‘yes’ to the question about 
their involvement in decision making; (4) answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether they also donated to the 
program/activity or not; (5) answer ‘it is an obligation to contribute’ or ‘it is their intention to contribute’ to the question 
about their reason to donate to the programs/activities. The participation level is defined as ‘average’ when the 
respondents answer that: (1) idem; (2) ‘more often say nothing’ in the program/activity planning meeting; (3) ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ on the question about their involvement in the program/activity planning meeting; (4) answer ‘yes’ or no’ to the 
question about whether they also donate to the program/activity or not; (5) answer ‘it is an obligation since it is the 
meetings decision’ or ‘they are forced to since no one else gives’ to the question about their reasons to donate to the 
program/activity. Last, the participation level is defined as being ‘low’ when the respondents answer: (1) ‘never’ to the 
question about their attendence in planning programs/activities; (2) answer ‘never’ to the question about their activities 
in the program/activity planning meetings; (3) answer ‘no’ to the question about their involvement in the decision 
making process; (4) answer ’no’ to the question whether they also donate to the programs/activities or not; (5) answer 
‘they are forced to since it has been determined by the government’ to the question about their reason to donate to the 
program/activity. (Dwiyanto, 2003). 
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improvement. The reason for this was that the mayor had the ability to provide many 
opportunities for society to participate, and there was not any distance between the 
government and society. 
 Even though society showed a passive attitude in the planning process, this does 
not mean that they did not care about their environment. Much data shows that society is 
the biggest donator in every government project. Society’s donation in the Giri Regency in 
2004, for example, reached 100 billion Rupiah, while the local government only provided 
12 billion Rupiah to build physical infrastructure such as roads and bridges (source: Giri 
Regency website, 2004). In other regions, the ratio of society’s donations and the fund 
from the local government in physical development ranges is 60:40 to 80:20.  
The size of community’s donations on one hand shows a positive image of 
community’s concern towards development in their region. However, on the other hand, it 
shows a negative image of the government policy that does not differ much from the 
previous administration. The increase in society’s self-supporting abilities cannot always 
be understood as an increase in society’s participation if the process does not involve 
society’s sincerity. There is a tendency that when the government’s funds for public 
interest are running low, funds are then gathered from society itself. To sustain the funds, 
the local government provides stimulant/assistant fund, but the amount is often 
insignificant compared to the amount of funds needed for the project. The question is 
whether the Local Government really lacks the money. If we compare the amount of 
funding used for legislative and executive interests, the amount of funds used for the 
public interest was far less. This deficiency is then covered by society. With these 
conditions, society has an unwillingness to fulfill the needs of the project. In other words, 
the participation element in the project vanishes since it happens on the contrary, as a 
mobilization of society’s funds and force.  This was not far different from the 
development planning model that carried out by the New Order in which society is 
positioned as the object of development through the mobilization of their resources. 
Compared to recent conditions, it is different in that now there is such a strong control of 
society over fund inclusion in the development that there is reduced the opportunity for 
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the misuse of funds to occur.  An example of this occurred in the Kulon Regency when the 
Local Government gave stimulant funds to society to restore a damaged elementary school 
building. Funds misuse was avoided since the restoration project was done directly by 
society without the involvement any of building contractors. The results proved to be 
effective because in only one year hundreds of damaged elementary school buildings were 
restored and able to be used again for teaching and learning. 
Another unfortunate fact is that there are people who give bribes (uang rokok) to 
the service personnel when asked (see Graphic 6.4). GDS I 2002 data found that about 
48% of the respondents from society considered the bribery to be a normal thing, and said 
that they would give it when asked by the services personnel. Sometimes, people still paid 
the bribes that the personnel asked even though they were actually unwilling (20%). 
Meanwhile, there 18% of the respondents said that they are “glad because it solves their 
problems”. Only 15% strictly refused to pay the bribes. The last group was the people who 
said that bribery was a normal thing, but they refused to pay (5%). 
This case shows that society is unable to do anything about the defiance committed 
by the public service bureaucracy. They are helpless in the face of the red tape and the 
pressure from the personnel who use complicated procedures to for their own gain. This 
hopeless attitude can be seen in society saying that defiance is a normal thing since the 
system has been run and accepted as a part of the services process for years.  If this 
condition is allowed, injustice in the public service will occur since those that have money 
will get better and faster service than those who do not have enough money.  
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Note: N of community is 9000 households 
Source: GDS 2002 
Though in general the participation levels of society in the planning process is still 
low, society’s political orientation in many political events in this country is high. GDS I 
2002 found that society’s attention towards political processes at the national level, as has 
been predicted, is much higher than the attention given to the same process at the 
provincial or regency/municipality level. Data shows that most of society (85.9%) gave 
their attention to the president/vice-president election process, while only 40.2% and 56% 
respectively gave their attention to the election of the governor and the regent/mayor. The 
difference in responding to these political occurrences is, among other things, caused by 
the difference in mass media exposure on the political issues, especially the electronic and 
printed media. The tendency is that electronic media becomes the dominant media source 
for the political process at the national level (presidential and vice presidential elections). 
Meanwhile, electronic and printed media play an important role as the information source 
for the political process at the provincial level (governor election) On the other hand, mass 
media exposure that becomes the information source for the political process at the 
regency or municipality level (regent/mayor election) tends to be low. Mass media 
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Graphic 6.4
The Reaction of the Service Users (community) when asked for bribers (uang rokok)
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exposure for the political process at the village level (BPD members or village head 
elections) is very low (below 1 percent on average, for both electronic and printed media)  
There are many events that occurred at the Local government level that were 
unnoticed by society. Meanwhile, events that occur at a national level always get people’s 
attention. As a result, public administration reform in a region often goes unnoticed by the 
lowest level of society.  This condition is very dangerous since a certain group of people 
could manipulate political events at a local level for their own interests, using common 
people as their shield. There are many political and bureaucratic elite in the region, 
sometimes even in NGOs, which use society’s ignorance to attack other groups that are 
hated or considered to be a threat to their interests. There are many protests in the name of 
society that do not express any clear mission, and only condemn other groups that are 
considered to be guilty.  
2. Non-Government Organizations (NGO) 
NGOs exist in the democratic context as a balance of power for the state power 
elements that are monopolized by the executives and legislatives. In the public services, 
the NGO’s aim is to cover the weaknesses of the government and private institutions in 
providing public services. Therefore, it is important to study the NGO’s position and role 
in relation to the state’s authority and services, especially after the 1998 reform provided 
much opportunity for society to establish NGOs.  
There are differences in the form of the NGO and the response towards the 
governance process. GDS I 2002 found that NGOs concerned with advocating activities, 
such as legal assistance, government program evaluation and supervision, regional 
regulation implementation evaluation, and development project implementation 
monitoring, tended to be more concerned with bad governance practice. Data shows that 
advocating-type NGOs often exposed their findings in the mass media when they found 
out about unprocessed legal cases (50%), and about indistinct APBD composition and 
unpublished audit results (57%). On the contrary, NGOs that often worked on 
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organizational networking were the NGOs what seldom exposed their findings to the mass 
media. 
NGOs that worked on advocating areas commonly consisted of activists that were 
critical of the government’s policies. They consisted of academics and university students, 
politicians, religious leaders and society, artists, journalists, and groups that positioned 
themselves as opponents during the New Order. When the opportunity to express their 
opinions and establish organizations was given after the 1998 Reform, they established 
NGOs that worked at the national and local level. It was often the case that they started at 
local level and then increased to a national level.  
GDS I 2002 data shows that 43.9% of NGOs are never involved in any way in 
public policy formulation. Among those who admit that they have been involved in public 
policy formulation in the region, most of them were only involved one to three times a 
year (see Graphic 6.5). This fact shows that NGOs only played a minimal role in the 
determination of public policy composed by the local government and the DPRD. 
Considering the large number of public policies issued every year in the region, the 
involvement of most NGOs (only 1-3 times a year) was far from sufficient. The fact that 
there were many regional regulations that did not conform to society’s aspirations can be 
considered as an indication of the lack of society’s involvement (including NGOs) in the 
formulation of those regulations (Dwiyanto, 2003). 
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Graphic 6.5 
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The minor role of the NGOs and the fact that only those that work in the advocating 
field were critical of government policy should be understood in the context of NGOs 
after the 1998 reform was carried out. Just like fungi that spread in the wet season, many 
NGOs were established after the reform. Data from the Statistic Center Agency (BPS) 
shows that in 1996 the number of NGOs was 10,000 and increased to 70,000 in 2000 
(Kompas, 17 April, 2004). The motivation for this was varied, from seeking a job to 
sincere idealism. Some people classify them into government and business NGOs. 
Government NGOs referred to NGOs that cooperated with the government or become 
tools of the government, while business NGOs referred to NGOs who were filled with 
people only looking for a job. The result of this condition was that many local 
governments distrusted them, as most NGOs had negative attitudes, and did things such as 
force the local government to give some of the development projects to them. In addition, 
the critical attitudes of the people from the idealist NGOs made the local government 
dislike them even more. Thus, both grew to distrust each other, suspecting one another. 
The government considered NGOs as only wanting to gain profit for themselves in the 
name of society as well as only trying to find the government’s mistakes. The following is 
an example of a case that occurred in a city in the Central Java Province: 
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In a city in Central Java, there is an NGO that carry out law enforcement 
monitoring. However this NGO also commit KKN and sometimes send 
blackmails. If an official is willing to cooperate with this NGO, his/her case 
would not be published in media mass, but if he/she refuses to cooperate, 
he/she would be brought to the court (Dwiyanto, 2003) 
On the other hand, many NGOs do not trust the government because they consider the 
current government to be the same as the previous one, full of KKN. This distrust in the 
end weakened the NGO’s position to the government89. It is therefore not surprising that 
there are only a few NGOs who play their roles in public policy composition, especially in 
the regions. 
 The following opinion from a NGO leader in the province of NTB supports the 
fact that there is a gap in the relationship between the NGOs and the government: 
“The relationship between NGO and the government today is still almost 
similar with in the past. The relationship is not very close but not very far 
separated. There are some NGOs, which try to cooperate in many projects 
with the local government. There are negative and positive sides in this 
cooperation. Sometimes, there are NGOs that are willing to cooperate with the 
government and then commit corruption, especially NGOs from outside NTB 
province were so aggressive to have the government project. There is another 
thing that is more interesting lately. In many government meetings, NGO is 
always invited to come. Unfortunately, only a few opinions from NGO were 
adopted. Basically, the current local government has not yet changed very 
much. Therefore, NGOs should keep their distance from the government. NGO 
must stay critical toward the government’s actions due to DPRD has not 
shown as a political representation of community. Many members of DPRD 
still commit money politics”. (Source: Dahlan, in Wawasan tentang LSM Indonesia: 
sejarah, perkembangan dan prospeknya, proceeding seminar, 2000)   
                                                 
89 Bob S. Hadiwinata (2003) notes that during the 1990s, the relationship between the government and NGOs worsened. 
The main accusation was that NGOs were against the state’s ideology and national interest. However, the main factor 
that worsened the relationship was actually the occurrence of a new generation of radical-oriented NGOs that opposed 
many government policies. NGOs were accused of politicking and organizing poor society. Open confrontation between 
the government and NGOs that was exposed to public was known as the “Brussel incident’ in 1989, where President 
Soeharto was insulted in his visit to Brussels, Belgium, and which resulted in the chasing down and arrest of NGO 
activists. The peak of the regime’s fury was in April 1992 when Soeharto closed IGGI. However, NGOs also changed, 
from only helping poor people in the short term to demanding changes in norms, values, structure, and institutions that 
created the injustice and oppression. Since that point, NGOs increased their resistance towards Soeharto’s regime by 
emphasizing their activities on popular collective action that related to grassroots groups and organization (Kompas, 17 
April 2004).  
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There are many Local Governments that officially invite NGOs to every discussion related 
to public interest. Some invite NGOs using a tight selection process, and only invite 
NGOs who are considered to be able to cooperate with the government. However, some of 
the Local Governments allowed anyone, including radical NGOs, to come to the meetings. 
Unfortunately, as stated by Dahlan above, very few or none of the thoughts and opinions 
of the NGOs were used as input in the decision making. How could this be? It is presumed 
that the invitation to the NGOs was a strategy of the Local Government to show that the 
meeting was democratically legitimate, since it was attended by elements of civil society. 
This democratic formality is a phenomenon where enormous political pressure was put 
upon the state to acknowledge the existence of NGOs in the governance system. This was 
not accompanied by a readiness of the government with its institutional instruments and 
personnel to acknowledge the existence of NGOs. 
 It is said that only the advocating-type NGO was critical toward government’s 
policy. The experience of the writer in managing the CC project in the Semarang Regency 
sustains this conclusion. When the CC project was being carried out, the DPRD and the 
executives were still discussing the plan to raise the fee for making ID cards from 1,500 to 
10,000 Rupiah. The raise was to cover the rise in the price of paper and printing, which 
rose sharply after the economic crisis in Indonesia in 1997. The NGO’s that were 
members of the CC team did not agree with the price rise, quoting the Law on the 
Citizenship which states that any product issued by the state to indicate the identity of its 
citizens must be financed by the state and not by the citizens. The Local Government in 
one of the districts that became a pilot project for the CC project insisted that they would 
follow the rules if ‘raise’ plan was issued in the form of a Regional Regulation. Both sides 
argued their own reasons why they refused or accepted this raise. A good thing was that 
after both parties discussed this problem they agreed to accept the objections proposed of 
each party. Thus, in the end, there was bargaining as to the amount of the raise in the ID 
card fee, and it was accepted by both parties. 
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3. Journalists 
The 1998 Reform had a great amount of influence on the freedom for the press. In 
the new order era, freedom for the press was a luxury prohibited by the government. 
However, the reform era guaranteed freedom of press. This is indicated by the increase in 
the amount of printed and electronic mass media both at the national and local level. This 
condition was supposed to have a positive affect by encouraging the creation of qualified 
public administration performance in accordance with the control function, especially in 
terms of information that related to the public interest, such as education, health, and 
poverty.    
The GDS I 2002 data shows that the majority of the press answered that news on 
the issue of poverty was plentiful (32%) and was considered to be sufficient (54%). The 
majority also stated that the news on education was sufficient (53%). The news on health 
was also considered to be sufficient (45%). From this data, it can be inferred that from the 
press’ view these three issues are adequately covered. 
Nonetheless, considering the percentage of the press (30% on average) that admit 
that the press coverage on these three issues is still lacking or insufficient, it can be 
assumed that problems in education, health, and poverty have not been thoroughly 
exposed. Regarding the main function of the press as an institution that forms public 
opinion, which affects public policies that are going to be made, incomplete press 
coverage on the three above issues would also affect significantly the responsiveness of 
the local government, particularly capturing and managing issues that are important to the 
public for the interest of the composition of the policies that are about to be implemented 
(Dwiyanto, 2003). 
Different from the three issues mentioned above, news on defiance of authority 
committed by government officials and the DPRD received wide coverage from the local 
mass media. An example of news that received wide coverage in the mass media was the 
KKN in government programs and projects. With intensive research, it was found that 
there was not any local mass media in Indonesia that did not cover the KKN in its region. 
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There were almost no KKN issues that escaped from the mass media coverage, whether it 
happened in the government institution and the DPRD or if it was related to the misuse of 
public funds allocated for implementation in development programs and projects.  
Interesting news that is always covered by the press is anything that is related to 
conflict, whether between groups in society (horizontal conflict) or between society and 
the government and the DPRD.  Horizontal conflict that often occurs is conflict between 
ethnic groups and between political party supporters. Meanwhile, vertical conflict that is 
often covered by the press is land ownership conflict between the government or private 
groups and society. In the early period of reform, this kind of conflict often occurred in the 
region and resulted in physical violence. Labor conflict also increased after the reform 
with an increase in the awareness of laborers of their rights at work. In some cases, the 
mass media was able to play its role as an intermediary by encouraging the parties that 
were in conflict to step forward into negotiations or to bring the case to court. This 
happened in many labor dismissal cases. However, in other cases, the mass media 
coverage of the conflict worsened the situation as one of the parties in the conflict would 
consider the news as being subjective and felt it came from only one source without any 
cross-checking with other sources. The tendency for the mass media to back the weak and 
oppressed party often became an obstacle for the settlement of cases through negotiation. 
The two kinds of news just mentioned, KKN and conflict issues, which were often 
covered boldly by the mass media are a gift from the reform process that provides freedom 
of expression and the freedom to have an opinion. If this is true, the press freedom must 
have been used by the mass media to perform their function of social control and as a 
creator of public opinion. However, considering the amount of mass media that was 
published after the reform and the poor quality of this media, it was doubtful that mass 
media could perform their function well. Both issues are extremely attractive to expose for 
they have a great selling point. From these facts, it is predicted that some of mass media 
reporting that occurred during the reform era was a reflection of a capitalist way of 
thinking. This was because the emphasis was on how to gain a profit without considering 
the quality and its effect on the public. 
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After the implementation of local autonomy, news that was also appealing for the 
mass media was that related to the Regional Regulation composition carried out in many 
regions. The coverage focused especially on the problematic Regional Regulations, for it 
was considered to be a disadvantage to public interest, especially in the business world. In 
East Java Province, for example, several forms of local media spotlighted some 
problematic Regional Regulations, for instance Regional Regulation No/2001 on Road 
Usage Retribution in the Jombang Regency, Regional Regulation No. 24/2000 on the 
examination of meat from other regions in the Wetan Regency, Regional Regulation No. 
81/2001 on Livestock Retribution in the Pasuruan Regency, Regional Regulation No. 
6/2001 on the City Entrance Permit Retribution in the Jombang Regency, and several 
other Regional Regulations. Through the coverage, the mass media acted as a public 
opinion creator and also pressure on the Local Government and DPRD’s policies which 
were considered to be disadvantaging for the public.  
Press coverage that was sometimes very critical toward the government often 
caused fear for the bureaucratic officials and politicians in the DPRD. Many of them felt 
humiliated by the news. The result was that there was a hostile attitude among the officials 
and politicians towards the press. The officials and politicians accused the press of only 
trying to find mistakes or exaggerate news and was therefore not objective. On the other 
hand, the mass media very seldom or never covered the success achieved by the Local 
Government. In response, several Local Governments applied a “one source” policy for 
the output of information, as happened in regency in the East Java Province. With this 
policy, the output of information was controlled only by an authorized official, the Public 
Relation Division (Dwiyanto, 2003). This resulted in the mass media finding it difficult to 
get actual news since the information received had already been sorted.  
Another strategy used by the Local Government to lessen the critical attitude of the 
reporters was lobbying. The following example of a case that occurred in Central Java 
Province is an example of how the Local Government was very troubled by the mass 
media coverage of their illegal actions: 
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Political pressure accepted by the Media 
Press in the region has not been able to effectively run their social control. 
Sometimes, Local Government themselves implicitly intimidated the reporter. 
They came to the reporter’s office and asked to have “dialog” which basically 
meant that they asked the press not to write negative news about Local 
Government. This happened in Tegal Regency, Middle Java. 
   Source: Dwiyanto, 2003, Teladan dan Pantangan dalam Penyelenggaran Pemerintahan dan Otonomi 
Daerah 
Implicit bribery was also often done by the Regional Government the reporters that were 
assigned to cover the Local Government’s activities. They did this by giving a Religious 
Celebration Day Allowance (THR) to the reporters though legally it was only for the 
bureaucrats. The THR for the reporters was usually officially allocated by the Local 
Government in the APBD. In a Municipality Government in West Java Province, the 
purpose of the special fund for the reporters was to promote the Local Government, and 
was used as an incentive for writing the news (Dwiyanto, 2003). This method proved to be 
effective since it did not create too much suspicion and was able to reduce the strong 
criticism that was often thrown by the reporters.  
 The common practice was that when the Local Government had the intention to 
invite reporters to a press conference or to cover an event, the Local Government would 
prepare several envelopes that contained money for the reporters. The following is an 
example of the practice: 
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“Envelope” for the reporters 
In regency in East Java, the Local Government always provides special fund 
for the reporters. This fund is usually provided when the government holds an 
activity and invites reporters to cover it. Some are used to pay the transport 
and lunch expense of the reporters, while the others are used to provide the 
“envelope” for the reporters who cover it. Sometimes, this fund is used when 
the government wants to “reserve” a spot for news in certain media. The 
money spent depends on how large the news wants to be covered and where 
the news wants to be putted.  
      Source: Dwiyanto, 2003, Teladan dan Pantangan dalam Penyelenggaran Pemerintahan dan Otonomi 
Daerah 
What was the reaction of the reporters to the “bribery” effort by the Local 
Government? Some reporters accepted it gladly and considered it as a normal practice. 
Some refused it and argued that it broke the journalism ethic code, as it affected their 
independence as reporters. It was very often the case that the reporters who held onto this 
idealism tightly faced some pressure, both mental and physical, which possibly threatened 
their safety. Violence action towards reporters very often happened because their critical 
attitude was expressed through writing that might offended certain officials in the Local 
Government or politicians in the DPRD. 
Unfortunately, the reporter’s idealism was often spoiled by some reporters who 
blackmailed regional officials and politicians. Their purpose was to force certain officials 
or politicians to give them money so that they would not write negative news about the 
official, politician, or the Local Government as a whole. The following two cases show 
how those reporters acted: 
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“Sopoi” Reporters 
There are many reporters that actually do not belong to any official media or 
“illegal reporter”. These illegal reporters usually blackmail bureaucracy or 
certain institution officials that are still in trouble.  There are many cases where 
the reporter asked for a bribe to institutions so that a problem that was faced by 
an official or an institution was not spread out to the public. This information is 
confirmed by a deputy regent in regency in West Kalimantan. 
Reporters blackmailing officials 
There were many complains from officials in a municipality government in 
North Sumatra that stated that reporters often disregard press idealism and aim 
only for money. To become a member of the Indonesian Journalist Union 
(PWI), someone only requires having identification card and does not have to 
join journalism course since in this city there are many press company. The 
Local Government often had to subscribe more than 5 different newspapers 
since if they did not, the reporters of the newspapers would be very critical to 
them.  
      Source: Dwiyanto, 2003, Teladan dan Pantangan dalam Penyelenggaran Pemerintahan dan Otonomi 
Daerah 
The above two cases are the reason why the Local Government could not 
completely trust the intentions of the reporters to objectively cover various events that 
happened in their region. This prudent attitude toward the reporters was present in almost 
every region. It is not surprising that we could find writing on the walls of Local 
Government institutions that reminded people to be on guard towards “fake” reporters 
who often blackmailed the Local Government. On the other hand, some reporters, 
especially those who still held on firmly to their idealism, cannot trust the Local 
Government and the DPRD’s intentions to create good governance in their institutions. 
For some reporters, the bureaucracy and the politician never changed, for they were still 
filled with KKN. This distrusting attitude towards each other in the end weakened the 
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effort to create a qualified bureaucracy. However, the critical attitude of the reporters and 
their intensive attention towards the Local Government and the DPRD encourage the two 
institutions to be more careful so that they could suppress any possibility of larger 
authority defiance. 
4. Comparison cases among six districts 
In the Kulon and Anom Regencies, society, especially those in the urban areas and 
NGOs, were often in disagreement with the Local Government. Their critical attitude was 
often shown through protests opposing a policies considered to be inappropriate for public 
interest. They even dared to bring the case to the mass media or court of law. In those two 
regions, the civil society movement seemed to be more dynamic than in other regions 
because the society’s characteristics were formed by its historical factors, and people acted 
critically. The history shows that the “defying” factor towards the ruling government in 
society was not an uncommon thing. In addition, friction between groups in the civil 
society itself was quite frequent in these two regions. From these conditions, critical 
attitudes toward policies that are considered not to be in line with their interests appear, 
especially when the policies come from the ruler. However, it needs to be admitted that 
their critical attitude was often driven by the interest of certain elite in the region, and their 
intention to fight for the public interest was less sincere. Suspecting that there was a 
certain elite political interest, the Regent and the bureaucrats, and sometimes the political 
elite often stepped forward to face all of the protests that of the NGOs. In the Kulon 
Regency, the executives and the politicians in the DPRD even suspected each other 
(conflict), accusing each other of using the NGO’s to criticize the other. Such as the case 
in the Anom Regency, the Local Government (Regent, bureaucrats, and the DPRD) and 
the NGOs did not trust each other any longer. Eventually, the NGO’s position in these two 
regions became secluded.  
 In relation to the local public administration reform, the critical characteristics of 
civil society in the Kulon Regency were more successful compared to the Anom Regency 
(failed). The reason for this difference is apparently related to the capabilities of the 
Regent in managing conflict that occurs between the Local Government, society and the 
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NGOs. The Kulon Regent that came from a politician group and grew up in the 
community knew exactly the political situation in her region. This advantage was useful to 
respond to the criticism and protests that were often conducted by the NGOs. She 
indirectly used them to support the local public administration reform. Different from the 
Kulon Regent, the Anom Regent came from a business background and did not have 
adequate knowledge about political situation in his region. He also did not have the ability 
to manage conflict. The result is that the conflict worsened and the atmosphere between 
the Local Government and civil society affected badly the local public administration 
reform process. Therefore, the civil society response variable apparently did not work 
alone in affecting the local public administration reform. This variable could only be 
effective when the head of the region was pro-reform, or the other way around. 
 In the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, and the Alit Municipality, the 
response of civil society toward the local public administration reform was more 
cooperative. The groups in the civil society and the Local Government were willing to sit 
together to discuss certain policy issues. In some programs and projects, the Local 
Government involved society and the NGOs. Nonetheless, this policy is also often 
criticized by the NGOs who considered it as an effort of the Local Government to get rid 
of their critical attitude. Although they were willing to cooperate with the Local 
Government, some NGOs in these regions always showed a critical attitude when the 
Local Government was considered to have deviated from the existing policy. When the 
Giri Regency Government made the policy to directly appoint a private company to carry 
out several projects on education and health, for example, some NGOs then pressed 
charges on the Local Government because the policy was considered to violate regulations 
that required certain goods provision to be done through an open tender mechanism. Such 
was the case in the Prajan Municipality, when NGOs pressed charges in court, and several 
members of the DPRD were convicted. Meanwhile, in the Alit Municipality, the existing 
NGOs tended to be more cooperative than in the Giri Regency and the Prajan 
Municipality. There was once an NGO who dared to criticize a mayor’s policy. However, 
in the end, it was prove that the NGO, which often changed its name, was never with the 
people. It was then naturally excluded by the other NGOs. 
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 In these three regions, local public administration reform is considered to have 
been successful. Nonetheless, the cooperative role of society did not directly affect the 
success, considering their position as outsiders of the administration. In the Giri Regency 
and the Prajan Municipality, although the NGO groups were able to put pressure on the 
Local Government when there was deviation, their role was extremely limited to decision 
making. They were often late and only knew about the policy after it was implemented. 
This indicates that they did not have strong bargaining power in the decision making 
process, and only in supervision process. Nonetheless, this position is believed to have 
already played a certain role in accelerating the reform pace. One key variable that cannot 
be separated from the role of the Regent/Mayor is “his blessing” that highly affects the 
relationship between the Local Government, the bureaucracy especially, and the NGOs. 
When the Regent/Mayor had more power than the politicians in the DPRD, he was even 
able to force his policy so that the politicians had to face the NGOs. The three 
Regents/Mayors basically had populist characteristics and were used to facing the groups 
in society. They were also very open to criticism from the outsiders.  
The biggest civil society issue in these regions, except in the Alit Municipality, 
was the tight collaboration between the bureaucratic elite and politician. The Giri Regency 
and the Prajan Municipality were two regions that had a high average educational rate 
compared to other regions in Indonesia. NGOs and society in these regions were 
commonly aware, and had political education. Therefore, when political conflict occurred 
between the bureaucrats, the political elite and civil society, it did not have negative effect 
on the general administration task, especially on the process of public administration 
reform. It is a fact that in this matter, once again, the Regent/Mayor played his role in 
managing the conflict so that it supported the public administration reform process. They 
often came to the front line to hear about the complaints and the problems of society far 
before the DPRD and the elite bureaucrats. Their popularity also often came in handy to 
settle conflict between the NGOs and the Local Government.  
Meanwhile, in the Alit Municipality, there were almost no problems in the 
relationship between the bureaucrats, the political elite and the civil society. The 
bureaucrats and the politicians who had loose collaboration were used to interacting with 
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the NGOs and the common people. The leadership and the managerial abilities of the 
Mayor in the bureaucracy and his ability to politically control the politicians in the DPRD 
that mostly come from his party increased the possibility of dialog between the Local 
Government and society. Although the decision making was still done by the local 
government, civil society was also involved in giving input. 
 This condition is far different from the neighboring regency, Wetan. The passive 
attitude of civil society made the administrational elite, the Regent, the bureaucrat elite, 
and some politicians, uncontrollable. Tight collaboration between bureaucrats and the 
political elite and the anti-reform attitude of the regent made it harder for the public to 
have access to the policy making process that was obscured and unpopular. Nonetheless, it 
is interesting that in this region, the critical bureaucrat elites that were excluded from the 
key power circle dared to take the risk to reveal the collusion of the Regent with the 
bureaucrats and political elite. This is a quite interesting case because the motivation to 
change came from inside the bureaucracy itself. This has not been a common thing, and so 
far the bureaucracy has always been so identical with elitism and bureaucratism that it 
was unimaginable to see them change themselves. Through further investigation, it was 
found that the bureaucrat elite who dared to reveal the case of abuse of authority were not 
a group of bureaucrats that were disappointed because they did not have “lucrative” 
positions in the bureaucracy. Most of them even ad strong positions within the hierarchy. 
The strong reform spirit movement that occurred at the time inspired them to act bravely 
and reveal the abuse of authority of their own colleagues. In addition, they were tired of 
the arrogance of their colleagues who often violated the prevailing procedures. In the end 
it troubled those that who really wanted to do their tasks correctly and properly. 
Based on the description of civil society in response to those districts, the regions 
can be classified into three groups. The regions that belong to the critical response group 
are the Kulon Regency, and the Anom Regency. Meanwhile, the Giri Regency, the Prajan 
Municipality and the Alit Municipality belong to Cooperative group. The other region, the 
Wetan Regency, is the only region where civil society responds passively (see Table 6.6) 
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Table 6.6: Correlation between Response of Civil Society and Public Administration 
Reform Performance 
Districts Response of Civil Society 
(cooperative, critical, passive) 
Public Administration 
Reform performance 
Giri Regency Cooperative Successful 
Prajan Municipality Cooperative Successful 
Kulon Regency Critical Partially successful 
Anom Regency Critical Failed 
Alit Municipality Cooperative Successful 
Wetan Regency Passive Failed 
Source: primary data 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION  
PROPOSED THEORITICAL AND MODEL REVIEW OF LOCAL PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION REFORM  
 
A. Picture of the performance of local public administration reform 
1. General comparison among six research districts 
The implementation period of regional autonomy, based on Law No. 22/1999 
and Law No. 25/1999, was considered by both Central and Local Government as being 
a difficult one. It was a time of significant transformation from a long existing and 
built up centralized administration system, into a new decentralized system. The 
transformation required a large amount of energy, not only with regards to systems 
such as finance, personnel, organization, procedures, planning methods, evaluation 
systems, etc, but also regarding the values such as innovation and creativity, 
competency, pro-poor, accountability, participation, etc. The former changes without 
the latter changes would be useless. In several cases this happened at a local level, with 
a high frequency of KKN and a lack of innovation in creating qualified policy. This 
was the result of changes in the ‘hardware’ that are not accompanied by changes in the 
‘software’.  
Though there is the belief that in the early period of local autonomy there were 
many problems, this does not mean that in that period there was not any effort made to 
create good governance. The spirit that grew at that time was the spirit of change. This 
affected many state officials, from the Central to the Local Government, as well as 
civil society groups. Although not everyone agreed with decentralization, enormous 
pressure from the outside government and politicians to embrace democracy powered 
the decentralization of the administration system progress. This study makes the basic 
assumption that the economic and political reform that occurred in 1998 in Indonesia 
also encouraged the reform in public administration at the local levels. This notion will 
be studied using several research samples from some regency and cities in Java, as 
well as several other regions, taken from a number of other research references. 
In general, the performance of local public administration reform in the regions 
studied shows some differences, whether in the organization, personnel, finance, or 
planning method (See Table 7.1). Positive institutional reform (successful) was 
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experienced by the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, and the Alit Municipality. 
Meanwhile, three other regions, the Kulon Regency, the Anom Regency, and the 
Wetan Regency, showed negative results (failed). In regards to personnel reform, the 
Giri and the Kulon Regencies were the two successful regions. Prajan and Alit 
Municipalities had a medium level (+/-) of success, and the Wetan Regency is 
considered to have failed. Financial reform was the one of the hardest components, and 
none of the regions managed to achieve it with a high level of success. The success of 
the financial reform the regions was only at an intermediate level--except for the 
Anom and Wetan Regencies, which are considered to have completely failed in the 
evaluation. Of all the reform components, the planning method reform was the most 
difficult to implement. None of the regions succeeded and only the Alit Municipality 
was able to perform it successfully at an intermediate level. The three regions those 
were relatively successful in performing public administration reform were the Giri 
Regency, the Prajan Municipality, and the Alit Municipality. The Kulon Regency is 
considered to have been less successful, while the other two regions, the Anom and 
Wetan Regencies failed to implement the reform in all of the reform components.  
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Table 7.1: Comparison of the success of local public administration reform in the 6 research regions 
Public Administration Reform Components  
Districts Organization 
• Number of institutions 
and subordinates 
• Congruity between the 
function of the 
institution and the need 
and the potency of the 
region 
• Number of structural 
positions (echelon) 
Personnel 
• Personnel recruitment and 
promotion assessment: system 
of merits (competency) or 
spoils (collusion and nepotism)  
• Number of regional contract 
employees 
• Performance of the personnel in 
providing services to the society 
• Transferring personnel systems 
among regions 
Finance 
• The percentage of the 
Local Original Income 
(PAD) put towards the 
Local Budget  
• Bribery and Corruption 
• Transparency in the 
Process of the APBD 
Formulation  
• Effectiveness of 
performance of budgeting 
systems 
Planning 
• Steps of local planning 
processes and effectiveness 
of project proposals from 
society 
• Public participation in local 
development project planning 
and implementation  
• Decentralization in policy 
making  
 
Conclusion 
Giri  + + +/- - Successful 
Prajan  + +/- +/- - Successful 
Kulon  - +/- +/- - Partially 
Successful 
Anom  - - - - Failed 
Alit  + +/- +/- +/- Successful 
Wetan  - - - - Failed 
Source: Primary data 
Note: + = successful; - = failed; +/- = less successful 
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The three above mentioned regions that were successful in their reform are 
relatively more advanced socially and economically than the three regions that failed. 
Two of these three successful regions are municipalities, which in the Indonesian 
administration arrangement are usually more advanced than regencies in terms of 
social and economic conditions and physical infrastructure. Financially, for instance, 
these three regions, especially the Prajan Municipality and the Giri Regency, had an 
average Local Original Income (PAD) 10% above the APBD and almost 10% in the 
Alit Municipality from 1994-2004. This is far higher than the other three regions, 
which only achieved 5 percent above the average APBD in the same period. The 
Growth Domestic Product of those three regions was also relatively higher, at 3.5% 
during 2000-2003. The Wetan Regency was also above 3.5%. However, because the 
Wetan Regency has always focused on the agricultural sector, it is reasonable that the 
sector contributes the biggest share in GDRP growth. 
In the Human Development Index (HDI), those three regions also managed to 
achieve a higher HDI rate in comparison to the other three regions. The HDI average 
of the three successful regions was above 70.00, while the regions that failed were 
under 70.00. The HDI of the Alit Municipality in 2005 was the second highest of all 
the districts in the East Java Province. The important contribution of HDI, for example, 
can be observed through the illiteracy and life expectancy rates of the societies as an 
indication of their socio-economic prosperity levels. 
For the record, although the Giri is regency, its social economic development is 
quite fast, due to its strategic position in the Prajan Province. In addition, this region 
was once appointed, by the Central Government, during the New Order regime, to be 
the pilot project for local autonomy implementation. With this experience, Giri has 
more advanced empirical experience in implementing local autonomy compared to 
other regions. 
 
2. Institutional Reform 
In each research region there is a difference in the success levels achieved in 
the four public administration reform components. The institutional reform is the 
easiest factor to reform. This is indicated by the fact that there are three regions that 
were successful in making institutional changes. The indication of changes is shown 
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especially in their success in reducing the number (scale) of institutions in the agency. 
Under the previous administration, this number was considered to be excessive and not 
suitable to the regional conditions and needs. This was not done by deleting entire 
institutions from the institutional official structure of the Local Government, but by 
reducing their status into sub-institutions in an agency, bureau, or office. In other 
words, the model that is generally applied is an organizational merger between 
organizations that are considered to have a similar function. In practice, organizations 
that were merged often had different functions and it is an unlikely conclusion that 
since the implementation of local autonomy there has been specialization in the 
organization. Many agencies that merged have different functions and even opposite 
missions.  
 However, this action was quite positive, since in many other regions the 
number of institutions increased, but was not suitable for the regions conditions and 
needs. It is often the case that an institution is established only as a formality, with 
only a small number of personnel and without any definite task. For Local 
Government, reducing the status of an institution is a strategic action implemented to 
avoid conflict that can possibly occur between officials as a result of the deletion of an 
institution. Enormous pressure from the bureaucratic elites with the support from local 
political elites to maintain the existence of an organization is believed to be 
responsible for the local bureaucracy’s failure to reduce numbers of institutions. It is 
often the case that this becomes a ‘free-market’ to be bargained by the head of a region 
and the career official elites supported by local politician in making political 
compromises. 
 Reform in institutions deserves to be noticed when the government is able to 
reduce the number of structural positions by more than half. Efficiency in this matter 
has meant an increase in the official structural allowance. This raise has somewhat 
quieted the strong criticism that has been made so far saying that the low prosperity 
levels of government personnel is caused by their low structural allowance. With this 
policy, it has been proven that a raise in salary, including structural allowance, does 
not always have a positive correlation with the decrease in the amount of KKN of the 
officials. Data has proven that compared to the previous period the KKN rate in the 
transformation period did not change; some even said that it increased.  
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With all of those benefits, officials are reluctant to hand their authority over to 
officials below their position. There are many institutions that directly relate to public 
services (street level bureaucracy), such as educational and health institutions, that do 
not have adequate authority to make their own policies and are still authorized by their 
superiors. 
 The institutional management reform that is still a problem for the Local 
Government is the inability to coordinate institutions, both at the planning and 
implementation level, though there is coordination through a hierarchic mechanism. 
This problem is a long standing one that is related to the budgeting process that is still 
sectored that in decision making the bureaucracy is also sectored. This change requires 
time since it is related to the way the officials think which is still sectored.  
  
3. Personnel Reform 
The Giri Regency was the only region that was successful in carrying out 
personnel reform. An extreme personnel reform in the Giri Regency was due to the 
policy of the Regent/Mayor. Rewards and punishments were given to the employees. 
The rewards given were money incentives every year to those that had made 
achievements, while punishment was given by placing those that were considered to 
have neglected or failed their duties in Room 12. Although officially people in Room 
12 are called there to give assistance, rumor spread among the officials that this 
position was actually a form of punishment for those who were incapable. This policy 
is quite spectacular because it was able to motivate officials to work their hardest, so 
that they could save themselves from “the punishment” given by the Regent/Mayor. 
 Other regions in which personnel performance reform was less successful are 
the Prajan Municipality, the Kulon Regency, and the Alit Municipality, while the other 
two failed. In these regions, there was innovative action to improve the quality of 
personnel performance, such as installing younger personnel, using a more accurate 
working capability assessment system, giving promotion based on competency, among 
other things. However, some of these actions were stopped by several internal and 
external factors. In the Prajan Municipality, strong cultural traditions affected the 
working relationship in the Local Government institutions, especially between 
superiors and subordinates. This is shown in a patron-client relationship that holds 
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high respect for seniors and in some behavioral rules that are not to be violated. Its 
biggest influence is in the communication between the personnel (in vertical and 
horizontal positions) and between institutions (in vertical and horizontal positions) that 
tends to be lengthy and complex. In this study, culture is considered to be the main 
cause, but it is the aim of the officials to maintain status quo, which is considered as 
the reason why there are still many unprofessional attitudes found in task performance. 
Excessive obedience of the subordinate toward the superior is an example of the 
efforts in maintaining status quo. 
 In the Kulon Regency, efforts to improve the performance of the personnel 
were often blocked by external factors, i.e. maneuvers by politicians in the DPRD to 
tackle the Regent’s strategy to carry out his administration. The officials were often so 
frustrated by this that they forgot about the innovation and creativity that they had 
wanted to implement. It was also often the case that politicians interfered by 
influencing policy and placing an official in an institution. This could result in illegal 
agreements in the government institution. Illegal agreements in the administration once 
occurred in the Alit Municipality when the Mayor was tried to reform the official 
placement pattern so that it would be based on competency. These cases show that 
bureaucracy has become an arena for the bureaucrats and politicians to fight for their 
interests. Bureaucrats are often motivated to maintain their positions by economic 
reasons, while politicians usually use the bureaucracy to support their efforts to realize 
their political policies. There are also many politicians that use the bureaucracy to earn 
the same economic privileges as enjoyed by the bureaucrats. 
 In the two other regions that failed in their personnel reform (The Anom and 
Wetan Regencies), it can be said that the quality of personnel performance stalled. 
There were many reform policies that could not be carried out because the 
Regent/Mayor was not able to positively encourage the implementation of the policies. 
In addition, the Regent/Mayor had to face internal problems, such as KKN and internal 
conflict in political parties.  
 
4. Financial Reform 
Reform in the financial sector seems to be one of the reform components that is 
most difficult to implement. None of the six research regions succeed in performing 
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this reform. Four regions (the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, the Kulon 
Regency, and the Alit Municipality) only succeeded at an intermediate level and the 
rest (the Anom and Wetan Regencies) are considered to have failed. Financial sector is 
a sector that is highly sensitive to change, not only at the region level, but also in the 
Central Government. The failure was especially high when the Central Government 
obligated every governmental institution to apply a Performance-based Budget. The 
change only took place in the budgeting system administration, from line item 
budgeting to performance budgeting. However, this change was apparently not 
followed by change which according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004:69) is more 
ambitious,  
“to change the procedure of budgeting itself, for example, by altering 
the incentives to key budget actors or by fundamentally changing the 
structure or timing of the budget discussion, or even by attempting to 
alter the role of the legislature in the budget process” (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004:69).  
 
There are many countries, such as Australia, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden, 
and the UK, which according to these two writers, failed to implement this quite 
ambitious financial management reform. In many cases in Indonesia, there are still 
many mistakes in the performance budget composition, especially in the strategic 
planning composition pattern, since the budget planning still depends on the number of 
subsidies that will be given by the Central Government. If there have been many 
mistakes in the budget planning and implementation steps, it is almost certain that the 
auditing step will also result in confusion. As a result of this failure, financial 
controversy and misuse still often occur in the APBD formulation and implementation. 
This is because the Performance-based Budget model completely neglects the fact that 
the budgeting process is a political process so filled with political interest and conflict 
between people with different interests, that it ignores the ideal basic concept of the 
model. 
 None of the bureaucrats and the politicians who sit in the DPRD, who are 
supposed to be responsible for the success of the management reform in the financial 
sector, are being serious in supporting reform in this sector. The Regent/Mayor, who is 
supposedly the main motor in the bureaucracy, is often barren in producing ideas that 
could improve the budgeting system so that it is accountable and transparent. 
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Politicians that are supposed to be responsible for watching over the reform process 
have also joined in this “game” so that the budgeting and the development financing 
process in the region have worsened. Both elite groups usually only make moral 
suggestions, but very seldom take any legal action to cleanse their financial system. 
This fact confirms the conclusion that has existed so far that bureaucrats and the 
political elite are not able to create accountability in the regional financial sector, and 
in some cases they are even a part of the corruption. In other words, the bureaucracy 
has evolved into an organism that has its own interest at heart and tries hard to retain 
these interests in order to fulfill the needs of those involved in it. One of the main 
criticisms of the public choice theory is that bureaucrats and political actors behave as 
rational utility maximisers, i.e., in a given situation these actors choose alternatives 
that are most compatible with their self-interest (preferences) and produce the largest 
payoffs. 
  
5. Planning Method Reform 
The last reform component, planning method, was the hardest reform to 
implement. Of the six research regions, only the Alit Municipality was able to 
implement it, though only at an intermediate level. This is because the area was not too 
wide so that communication between groups in society was easy and supported by an 
open attitude from the government personnel that was driven by the Mayor. The 
sufficiently high civil society changes in this region also encouraged the forming of a 
harmonic relationship between society and the Local Government. The problem was 
that the planning mechanism that was proposed was often trapped within a planning 
procedure that in practice required a lot of energy with ineffective results.  
 The difficulty that the region has to face to create participative planning is a 
reflection of the anti-democracy attitude that still strongly influences governance 
practice in Indonesia, even though political reform was vigorously implemented in 
1999-2004 to achieve a more democratic system. In this matter, the bureaucracy was 
one of the institutions that were very slow in responding to the development of 
democracy. Moreover, as noted before, a bureaucracy as an organism benefits much 
from the centralized system that is a derivation of authoritarian system. From this 
point, it is reasonable that a bureaucracy would automatically refuse any pressure from 
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the outside that tried to interfere with its interests. This character of bureaucracy is 
often used by politicians that try to include their own interests in policies issued by the 
bureaucracy. The politicians never admit that their policies are not democratic, because 
they are afraid that their voters will leave them. This hidden support of the politicians 
pushes the bureaucracy to only allow partial participation from society in the 
administration and development practices. 
  
6. Combination Model of Public Administration Reform 
Various reform components above describe the similarities among the regions 
in implementing the model. This confirms that although Law No.22/1999 has been 
passed which certifies regional autonomy, in practice, control from Central 
Government is still so powerful that it controls the Local Governments activities, 
including the administration reform. The implementation of all of the reform 
components mentioned above is regulated by regulations issued by the Central 
Government. This is different from public management reform in other countries, 
where the administration system is decentralized as revealed by Pollitt and Bouckaert. 
According to them: 
 “All other things being equal, reforms in highly decentralized states 
(whether they be unitary or federal) are likely to be less broad in 
scope and less uniform in practice than in centralized states. In 
decentralized states different entities are likely to want and to be able 
to go in different directions, or at least not all in the same direction at 
the same time” (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004:43) 
  
Pollit and Bouckaert (2004) grouped the regions that perform their 
administration reform as follows:  
“the first and best known grouping is that of the NPM marketizers---
Australia, New Zealand, the UK and, in words if not always in deeds, 
the USA. We will call this the core NPM group---they all see a large 
role for private sector forms and techniques in the process of 
restructuring the public sector. The second grouping is the Continental 
European modernizers—Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and Sweden (and Germany, if one goes below the federal level” 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004:98).  
 
It seems that the public administration reform model at the local level (or even 
the national level) that is being applied in Indonesia is a combination between the first 
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and the second models. Although the first model is not used absolutely as a reference, 
the idea of improving the quality of administration management by adopting private 
management such as Total Quality Management (TQM), has been around since the 
mid 1990s, and more recently efforts to introduce Citizens’ Charter model has 
increased, especially to improve public services. However, the idea to adopt 
privatization by selling public assets to the private sector faces many problems and is 
unpopular amongst politicians and most of society. Meanwhile, the idea to modernize 
bureaucratic management (European Continental) seems to be considered more secure 
politically since change is done to minimize the loss that so far has been the 
government’s burden, as well as to provide direct benefits for the society. This second 
model by the end is often used by the government as a reference to perform public 
administration, particularly since Indonesian administrative culture is similar to that of 
the countries in Continental Europe that choose Rechtsstaat form. On one hand, the 
absence of a clear public administration framework is advantageous because all of the 
ideas from those two management reform schools can be involved and inspire the 
decision maker to determine the best design. However, on the other hand, the change 
loses its direction and tends to be incremental, simply to cover the dirt of the 
bureaucratic management.  
 Regions that are highly dependent on Central Government innovation are 
usually left behind in creating qualified reforms, while regions that are bold enough to 
be innovative in their reforms are more likely to succeed in performing public 
administrative reforms. Although entire models proposed are often incremental and 
sometimes only fulfill the political needs of the head of the region before those of his 
voters. 
 If this combination model of public administrative reform is to create 
competency and governance, various strategies that have been carried out so far are 
relevant to the achievement of these goals. The strategy basically on the one hand has 
improved the quality of bureaucratic management by updating the tools used to be 
more modern, but on the other hand, needs to be better in line with democratic 
principles in welcoming public participation in administrative processes. Competency 
is built to make bureaucracy able to respond to society’s needs which are continuously 
evolving. On the contrary, governance, besides being a supportive tool to enhance 
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competency, is also a part of the effort to educate society to take more responsibility in 
being involved in the process of fulfilling their owned needs. Considering the above 
bureaucratic reform cases are at the local level, this kind of reform purpose still has to 
be achieved. Several regions that sufficiently succeeded in performing public 
administration reform, though only in some reform components have the tendency to 
succeed in achieving the competency and governance ideas. Fact also proves that 
compared to the centralized era, the autonomous era, based on Law No. 22/1999, 
provides adequately large opportunity for regions to be creative and innovative in 
improving their administration. This confirms that regional autonomy is one of the 
elemental requirements to successfully implement public administrative reform at a 
local level. In other words, decentralization has enhanced local public administration 
reform although it is only in some of its components. This is also mentioned by some 
experts, such as Orlansky (2000:193) who stated that “Decentralization in public 
administration is an important issue under New Public Management”. High 
dependency on the Central Government apparently does not make local bureaucracy 
better this is because in practice the Central Government often becomes a part of the 
problem itself. From here, it can be inferred that public administration reform is a 
complex, conflict-ridden process. Most items on the policy agenda raise issues that are 
important to the interest of powerful political and bureaucratic actors and the dilemmas 
of reform show themselves in continuing divisions over both policy strategies and 
implementation on the ground. 
 The success of some regions in performing reform, among other reasons, is 
caused by their courage to not always depend on the Central Government’s will; in 
many cases, they even dare to “fight” Central Government intervention that is 
considered to be irrelevant to the regional problem and its solution as well as the 
regional long term interest. Since there has been freedom granted in making innovative 
policy, it is now up to each region to manage its potency in supporting public 
administration reform processes that are beneficial to the regions. The following 
section will conclude several variables that affect the success of a reform.  
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B. Central Government Intervention and Dynamic Local Administration and 
Politics  
 
Table 7.2 provides a short description of the causal relationship between some 
variables studied. The success of local public administration reform is influenced by 
two main variables, the Role of Central Government at a national level, and various 
Local Administrations and Political Liveliness at a local level. At the national level, 
the variable is the role of Central Government both in administration reform through 
decentralized design and in substance or policy reform. Meanwhile, at the local level, 
there are several variables that influence the success level of public administration 
reform, such as the Role of Regent/Mayor, Politician and Bureaucrat Response 
towards reform, and Civil Society response toward reform.  
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Table 7.2: Independent and Dependent Variables Relationship 
Independent Variable  
Districts Central 
Government’ 
Role 
Role of Mayor/Regent  
(reform 
promoter/progressive or 
reform resistance/status quo)
Response of Politician-Bureaucrat 
(collaboration or conflict) 
Response of Civil Society 
(cooperative, critical, passive) 
Public 
Administration 
Reform 
performance* 
Giri 
Regency 
 
 
 
 
 
Loose control 
Progressive 
Reform promoters are able to: 
a. make innovative policy (public 
services and institutional 
building) 
b. divide authority in making 
decision with subordinate 
(democratic) 
c. criticize and oppose (radical 
change) against central 
government’s policy and 
adapted to local’s needs  
d. fight corruption and make local 
budget transparent  
Tight Collaboration 
a. Bureaucrats and politicians do not 
allow outsiders, including civil 
society, to influence them in: 
  -Formulating local budget policy 
  -Bidding government projects 
  -Personnel placement 
  -Restructuring organization 
b. The bureaucrats who have knowledge 
and experience are more cunning 
(clever and deceitful) than the 
politicians who only depended on their 
constitutional position. 
Cooperative 
a. Civil society and the local 
government sit together to discuss  
certain policy issues.  
b. Civil society cooperates with the 
local government to carry out 
projects concerning public 
interest. 
c. Even though public administration 
reform is successful, the 
cooperative role of the society 
does not directly affect the 
success, considering their position 
as outsiders to the administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Successful 
Prajan 
Municipal
ity 
 
 
 
 
Loose control 
Progressive 
Reform promoters are able to: 
a. make innovative policy (public 
services) 
b. divide authority in making 
decision with subordinate 
(democratic) 
c. criticize central government’s 
policy and adapt it to local’s 
needs  
d. fight corruption and make local 
budget transparent  
Tight Collaboration 
a. Neither bureaucrat nor politician allow 
outsiders, including civil society, to 
influence them in: 
  - Formulating local budget policy 
  -Formulating budget for Local House  
   of Representatives 
  -Bidding government projects 
  -Personnel placement 
  -Restructuring organization  
b.The bureaucrats who owned 
knowledge and experience were more 
cunning (clever and deceitful) than the 
Cooperative 
a. Civil society and the local 
government sit together to discuss 
certain policy issues. 
b. Civil society cooperates with the 
local government to carry out 
projects concerning public 
interest. 
c. Although public administration 
reform is successful, the 
cooperative role of the society 
does not directly affect the 
success, considering their position 
as outsiders to the administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Successful 
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politicians who only depended on their 
constitutional position. 
Kulon 
Regency 
 
 
 
 
Tight control 
Progressive 
Reform promoters are able to: 
a. make innovative policy 
(education) 
b. divide authority in making 
decision with subordinate 
(democratic) 
c. fight corruption and make local 
budget transparent  
Conflict 
a. Bureaucrats and politicians have 
different interests and different actions 
in dealing with certain issues in terms 
of: 
    -Formulating local budget policy 
    -Formulating budget for Local House    
     of Representatives 
    -Formulating regional regulations 
    -Personnel placement 
    -Restructuring organization 
b. The resolution of the conflict will very 
much depend on the power possessed 
by each conflicting party 
Critical 
a. The civil society is generally 
involved actively in monitoring 
and accessing the policy, but they 
also act critically by making 
protests opposing a policy that is 
considered to be inappropriate to 
public interest. They even dare to 
bring the case to the mass media 
or court of law 
b. The executives and the politicians 
in DPRD even suspect each other 
(conflict), accusing each other of 
using NGOs to criticize the 
institution. 
c. Regent has a role to manage 
conflict among them  
Partially 
successful 
Anom 
Regency 
 
 
 
 
Tight control 
Status quo 
Resistant to reformation due to: 
a. simply following all central 
government policies without 
having reservations as to 
whether those policies are 
unbeneficial for the region 
b. lack of ability to make 
innovative policy 
c. authoritative attitude in making 
decisions  
d. abuse of power (such as 
corruption and collusion) 
Tight Collaboration 
a. Neither bureaucrat nor politician allow 
outsiders, including civil society, to 
influence them in: 
    -Formulating local budget policy 
    -Formulating budget for Local House  
     of Representatives 
    -Bidding government projects 
    -Placement personnel  
    -Restructuring organization 
b. The bureaucrats who have knowledge 
and experience are more cunning 
(clever and deceitful) than the 
politicians who only depended on their 
constitutional position. 
Critical 
a. The civil society is generally 
involved actively in monitoring 
and accessing the policy, but they 
also act critically by making 
protests opposing a policy that is 
considered to be inappropriate to 
public interest. They even dare to 
bring the case to the mass media 
or court of law  
b. The Local Government (Regent, 
bureaucrats, and DPRD) and the 
NGO no longer trust each other 
c. No effort is made to manage 
conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failed 
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Alit 
Municipal
ity 
 
 
 
Loose control 
Progressive 
Reform promoters are able to: 
a. make innovative policy (public 
services, economics, tourism ) 
b. divide authority in making 
decision with subordinate 
(democratic) 
c. criticize central government 
policy and adapt it to local 
needs  
d. fight corruption and make local 
budget transparent 
Loose Collaboration 
a. Bureaucrats and politicians give 
outsiders, including civil society, the 
opportunity to participate in: 
    -Formulating local budget policy 
    -Formulating regional regulation 
      via means of giving suggestion. 
However, the final decision rests with 
members of the coalition 
b. The bureaucrats, who have knowledge 
and experience, are more cunning 
(clever and deceitful) than the 
politicians who only depended on their 
constitutional position. 
Cooperative 
There is almost no problem in the 
relationship between bureaucrats and 
political elites and the civil society. 
Civil society responds actively in 
local development processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Successful 
Wetan 
Regency 
 
 
 
Tight control 
Status quo 
Resistant to reformation due to: 
a. simply following all central 
government policies without 
reservation as to whether those 
policies are unbeneficial for 
region 
b. lack of ability to make 
innovative policy 
c. authoritative attitude in making 
decisions  
d. abuse of power (such as 
corruption and collusion) 
Tight Collaboration 
a. Neither bureaucrat nor politician allow 
outsiders, including civil society, to 
influence them in: 
    -Formulating local budget policy 
    -Formulating budget for Local House  
     of Representative 
    -Formulating regional regulation 
    -Bidding government projects 
    -Personnel placement 
    -Restructuring organization 
b. The bureaucrats who owned 
knowledge and experience were more 
cunning (clever and deceitful) than the 
politicians who only depended on their 
constitutional position. 
Passive 
Most of the groups in the civil 
society do not have any concern 
with the policy issue that is related 
to government and public interest. 
They just accept every policy, 
program, and project without 
criticizing its usefulness on its 
implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failed 
Note: 
* See Public Administration reform performance indicators (successful, less successful, and failed) in Table 7.1 
 
   Sources: primary data 
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1. State Failure 
Local autonomy policy in Indonesia is a result of extremely strong political 
pressure from several actors outside the government (especially academics, NGOs, and 
several politicians), as well as undoubtedly a result of the Central Government’s 
‘bankruptcy’ in dealing with the 1997 Indonesian economic and monetary crisis. The 
Central Government reluctantly handed some of its authority to the regions and was 
forced to change the previous centralized system into decentralized system. Thus, 
autonomy was a gift from Central Government to the regions that still came with many 
policies concerning the implementation of local autonomy. This intervention was an 
inseparable part of the Central Government’s unwillingness to hand over its authority 
to the regions. 
This also happened in public administration reforms at local levels that followed 
the autonomy policy; almost every regulation is issued by Central Government, 
whether in the form of Government Regulation, Presidential Decree, and even 
Ministerial regulation. This condition is actually quite similar to the regional autonomy 
policy in the Philippines (Padila, 1992, Zhijian, Guzman, Reforma, 1992) and in Japan 
(Morita, 1992, Zhijian, Guzman, Reforma, 1992). From those facts, it is reasonable 
that Central Government makes the same policy for all regions, both in administrative 
reform (decentralization) and substantial reform in areas such as education and health 
that are national priorities. 
 Decentralization policy during the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 is a 
picture of the state’s failure to create a design that could positively encourage 
administration reform at the local level. The unwillingness of government officials in 
central level to give full authority to the region in reforming its administration had 
created anxiety among policy makers in the region. This was also because they were 
confused with the existences of many rules that tended to oppose each other. There 
were many Central Government ministries that produced regulation without first 
making accurate policy analysis and ignored its interrelation and integration with 
policies produced by other departments. This is because each department still carried 
the trait of ego-sectored, that they liked to work alone. Many of them created policy 
just for the sake of not being called anti-decentralization, a very unpopular jargon in 
the era of political reform, where “freedom” was worshiped as popular rhetoric by 
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many politicians and society. However, it needs to be noted that decentralization was 
designed in a rush, which confused many ministerial at the central level in issuing 
policy that was supposed to be in line with the constitution.  
 Evidence that this composition of legal basic for decentralization was done in a 
rush also can be seen by the fact that at the local level political reform did not result in 
a direct Regent/Mayor election. There is a possibility that the local autonomy design at 
the regency/municipality level that gives sufficient freedom but without being 
balanced by a proper control weakens the autonomy itself. The case of autonomy 
during the implementation of Law No.22/1999 proves that when controlling elements 
in the government hierarchy, from the central to province (top-down control 
mechanism), are gone, while on the other hand the society (bottom-up control 
mechanism) has not been given a clear access base into the administration, political 
and bureaucracy elites at the local level use the power they have excessively. Regional 
leaders had a lot of freedom to determine every aspect of regional policy.  
 Thus, the condition during in that time was bizarre since autonomy was given 
by the Central Government to local government, and then the Central Government 
issued many policies to regulate the autonomy. However it seems that the Central 
Government was not able to control the region anymore in policy making as mandated 
by the autonomy. As previously explained, this was caused by the autonomy design 
that did not provide clarity for the region, this forced the region to interpret various 
policies created by the Central Government to fit with their interests and in some cases 
the leader’s interest. On the other hand, the atmosphere of freedom became the spirit of 
reform and affected regional officials to ‘fight’ against Central Government arrogance 
that for more than three decades (centralized era during the New Order regime) had 
milked regions of their resources. 
Although the Central Government appeared to be helpless, actually it still held 
the financial sector, which motorized the regional administration and economy. 
Around eighty percent of the income source in the APBD comes from Central 
Government given through General Allocation Fund (DAU), while the rest comes from 
the Local Original Income (PAD). In most cases regional contribution along with the 
PAD is even less than 10 percent of the APBD that it strengthens Central Government 
dominancy to determine the region’s policy.  
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Regions have the freedom to plan development projects. This can be seen from 
the planning process of projects and the programs that are then budgeted for through 
the APBD. However, looking deeply at the budget of the APBD, it is observed that the 
freedom is partial because though the expense part (project and program 
determination) is handed over to the region, the income part is still controlled by the 
Central Government. In the end, the region does not have total freedom to make plans 
for itself. In addition, so far the development funds given by the Central Government 
to the regional governments are much larger than the deconcentration funds that are 
completely out of the regency/municipality government’s control. Deconcentration 
funds are provided by the technical department and distributed through the provincial 
government. 
 Educational and health sectors are two examples of sectors where 
deconcentration funds are given in large amount by Central Government while the 
local government as the executor, depends on Central Government policy. The 
problem is not only who holds the money, but also who determines the policy within 
the region. Education and health policies are indeed priorities for the Central 
Government. However, by only letting the local government act as spectators in the 
process, the future concern is that the quality of service of both sectors will decrease. 
Concerning the quality, both sectors so far do not have any problems. However, 
conflict between the Central Government and the local governments will result in 
overlapping policies and thus be ineffective.  
 Policy reform in the education and health sectors and administrative design 
framed by decentralization policy do not support each other. Most policy regarding 
education and health sectors are issued by the Central Government and often neglect 
the rules that are created by the Central Government itself in decentralization, whether 
in the context of planning, budgeting, personnel selection, or structure of the executor 
organization from the Central Government to the local government. On the contrary, 
the administrative concept of decentralization does not consider the fact that local 
government control of both policy sectors is still so weak that the region could be 
imagined as a toothless tiger. The result is that each reform moves in its own way and 
there is no convergence to save the resources allocated for running the education and 
health policies. This is one example that shows how ineffective the government sectors 
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run their administrative tasks. Government should be able to save the budget by 
minimizing planning duplication that is not supposed to happen between Central and 
Local Governments, avoiding mistakes in personnel selection, creating a flat 
organizational structure, and avoiding unnecessary administrative procedure.  
This phenomenon shows that the welfare-state has created a big role for state 
administration. This big role, in practice, is not well defined so it blurs the definition of 
institutions’ roles in public administration. When decentralization policy is 
implemented, substantial reform to the policy tends to focus on administrative reform 
and ignores public sector programs. The state, in term of technical ministries, 
considers that those programs in the public sector are their ‘holy-duty’ and it would be 
irresponsible to delegate them to their subordinates, including the local government. 
They even consider it immoral to hand the duty over to non-state institutions, such as 
private companies or NGOs. This state moral theory is rarely contradicted by public 
choice theory proponents who consider that the state with, and its public 
administration (bureaucracy) behaves as a rational utility maximizer. They believe 
they will eventually loss their power to allocate state resources (budget), position 
within the bureaucratic structure, as well as their social status if the authority is 
delegated to another group. Therefore, they are not willing to totally reform the public 
sector even though it would create efficiency and increase government savings. Total 
public administration reform can not be achieved if decentralization processes only 
include administrative issues. It is like building a house, administrative design is the 
frame of the house, if the house is empty without activity in such a way that the house 
seems not alive. Therefore, there needs to be synchronization between the building 
design, the equipment as well as what kind activities will operate in the building. In 
other words, unsynchronized relations between these elements have resulted in an 
inefficient administration. In the end, it could become burden some on the government 
budget itself. This statement also confirms the First Thesis: 
In a condition where bureaucracy is considered the main agent of social change, local 
public administration reform performance is determined by the convergence of 
administrative reform and substantial policy reform.  
 This is a general conclusion and only from a single viewpoint, top-down, since 
Central Government policy for all regions is the same (given). The outcome in each 
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region is possibly different as seen in the reform performance in the six research 
regions: three regions are considered to be successful; one is partially successful; and 
two other regions are considered to fail to perform their administration reform. In this 
case, it means that there are other variables that have possibly affected the success of 
public administration reform in a region. Those variables presumably come, as a 
matter of fact, from the region itself. In other words, although the autonomy design is 
still messy, the effectiveness in promoting freedom of speech in every region is 
considered to be successful. In addition, autonomy is considered to trigger the growth 
of policy innovation that is beneficial for the region.  
 
2. Dynamic Administration and Local Politics  
a. Mayor/Regent as reform promoter 
Even though Central Government control is still powerful, the atmosphere at 
that time, which was overwhelmed by the spirit of liberation from the authoritative 
regime, also influenced the bureaucracy and political elites to stand and “fight” Central 
Government will. They based their move on the legal basis of Law No.22/1999 that 
defines autonomy as originating from the region and not given by the Central 
Government. This means that the region has the right to do anything in order to 
manage its region as long as it is still under the unitary state of Indonesia. This is why 
in many regions there is quite radical reform and it supports the effectiveness of the 
reform itself. This radical change is promoted by the Regent/Mayor, whom must be 
committed and very courageous in reforming, as well possessing the knowledge and 
political capacity required. 
The first variable that significantly influences local politics and administrative 
liveliness is the role of the Regent/Mayor, because the Central Government is unable 
to ensure clarity of policy and certainty in administrative or substantial policy reform. 
Therefore, the Central Government is unable to effectively control 
regency/municipality’s policies. It seems that the implementation of Law Nr.22/1999 
has broken the hierarchic relationship between central and local government. However, 
local political actors (DPRD), have so far been unable to become good legislators and 
supervisors of executive. In addition, local civil societies have not established 
themselves yet, hence they can not effectively control local government attitudes.  
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In this research, the roles of the Regent/Mayor are categorized into two groups: 
those who encourage the reform process (Progressive); and those who are pro–status 
quo. This categorization is based on the policy made to speed up the reform, including 
the Regent/Mayor’s courage to ‘oppose’ Central Government policy that is considered 
to be unbeneficial for the region, their style of decision making, and their role in the 
creation of clean government. 
From the six heads of regional government, four are progressive and two are 
pro-status quo. Those who are progressive are the Giri Regent, the Kulon Regent, the 
Prajan Mayor, and the Alit Mayor. It is extremely difficult to draw a conclusion from 
the data based on socio-economic and political backgrounds, such as education, job, 
and political affiliation, which may have influence on the character of the 
Regents/Mayors. However, it is a coincidence that two of them are college lecturers, 
while another is a businessman, and the other is a local politician. Those who are pro-
status quo (Anom and Wetan Regencies) are a businessman and a career bureaucrat, 
respectively. With this variation, it is difficult to conclude whether socio-economic and 
politic backgrounds have an effect on their attitude toward reform during their time as 
the Regent/Mayor. However, to some extent, background also influences the character 
of people in dealing with administration and public affairs. Those who have a 
background as a college lecturer, for instance, are often more critical in responding to 
public concern and have a wider scope of knowledge. Meanwhile, politicians tend to 
act critically and be more open to criticism. On the contrary, data shows that the 
character of a Regent/Mayor will how they govern, such as the Wetan Regent who was 
proved guilty of corruption. This was because of old bureaucratic habits of tending to 
lack the strength to control authority infringement. A similar case occurred in the 
Anom Regency where the previous occupation of the Mayor affected the way he run 
his government. 
It seems that the most accurate way to judge whether a Regent/Mayor is 
progressive or not is by studying their policy. All of the four heads of region that are 
considered to be progressive have made innovative policies. They have similar 
characteristics to those outlined in entrepreneurial and stewardship theories of 
leadership, for example, policy was made by the Giri Regent to reward or punish his 
employees and to increase the quality of public health services. The Prajan Mayor is 
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also considered to be innovative for making a more accurate employee achievement 
evaluation and more conducive urban services. The Alit Mayor during his period 
succeeded in accelerating economic growth through the improvement of city facilities 
and public participation in planning and implementation. The Kulon Regent was very 
concerned with the basic education and building a communication network through 
sophisticated information and telecommunication infrastructures to better enable the 
community. Sometimes, policies may be considered controversial because they are 
risky and even unbeneficial for the region. However, the uncertainness created by the 
Central Government in giving policy autonomy has initiated innovation and advanced 
bureaucrats’ ways of thinking and politicians’ effectiveness in administration and 
development issues. 
While those considered progressive were able to create innovative and 
courageous policy, those considered pro-status quo never made any productive policy 
for their region throughout their time in power. They tended to emphasize the 
attributes of individuals rather than collective behavior. They did not pay attention to 
the changing nature of this relationship, but merely focused on relationships between 
the leader and subordinates.  
It is recorded that the Wetan Regent once tried to make policy to establish a 
food manufacturing factory. However, in fact, it was only his cunning effort to create a 
positive image for the society and the Central Government. The administrative model 
of the Wetan Regency was not different from the administration model during the New 
Order regime era that was centralized, because they rather to wait for policy to be 
made by the Central Government. The Wetan administration was very passive in 
responding to public issues but extremely reactive toward criticism that it considered 
could ruin its image, such as was done by the Anom Regent who used his paramilitary 
institution to respond to criticisms from NGOs. Administrative management in both 
regions is considerably rigid and lack dynamism. Because of these factors, 
coordination problems among institutions occurred often and resulted in mistakes in 
making policy. The Wetan Regency, for instance, carelessly dismissed a certain 
institution in order to improve public services because they thought that they were able 
to provide the services through the internet. However, in practice, they were totally 
unprepared, both in their software and hardware, to provide the services through the e-
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government system. In the end, this ruined public services that had been running 
before. 
 In order to be progressive, the Regent/Mayor requires strength of character 
among other things and the courage to “oppose” Central Government policy that is 
considered to be unbeneficial for the region. The argument that is being used to 
counter government policy usually is Law No.22/1999 that de jure gives autonomy to 
the region and gives opportunity to interpret policy freely. Such figure heads are not 
afraid of the “threat” from Central Government concerning their policies. In practice, 
there was no case where a Regent/Mayor was sacked by the Central Government for 
making policy considered to be in opposition with the Central Government. It could be 
said that in that era, the Central Government did not have adequate power to control 
every policy made by the Regent/Mayor. The reasons for this condition are that there 
was a political euphoria surrounding the new “freedom from the Central Government” 
and the law that outlined the relationship between Central Government and region was 
unclear. What Central Government did at that time was to use the litigation line, which 
reserves its right to examine every regulation made in the region. This method indeed 
worked since then there were hundreds of regional regulations that were withdrawn 
because they were considered to be in opposition to the law and in conflict with the 
public interest, especially private sector interests that was often affected by those 
policies.  
 However, it was often that the Regent/Mayor who insisted on the 
implementation of a policy, as happened in the Giri Regency in which the bureau that 
regulates land was turned into a local autonomous institution, based on the Law that 
mandates the region to handle land matters. Strangely, this Law was overruled by 
regulation beneath it that was issued by the president, which mentions that land matters 
are under the Central Government’s authority. Nonetheless, the Giri Regent studs to 
his opinion though he was rebuked by Central Government and provincial officials. 
This example shows that the Regent/Mayor attitude is an important factor in managing 
regional policy in the mid of political and administrative uncertainty. For the 
Regent/Mayor, the important thing is to have something that would be beneficial for 
the region. 
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 Such strong will is rarely possessed by the Regents/Mayors who are passive 
and tend to be pro-status quo. Without such courage, these figures heads lacked the 
will to implement innovative policy that could accelerate public administration reform. 
Most of them just followed Central Government policies and regulations that tended to 
be contradictive. In the end, they were confused by how to implement the policies. In 
such cases, the Regent/Mayor should play an important role to determine the policy 
and even to make their own policy that would be beneficial for the region. However, 
there were many pro-status quo Regents/Mayors who did not like progressive policy 
and tended to wait for decision to come from the top. When they made their own 
policy, most of the time, they just copied it from other regions without assessing its 
relevance to their own region’s needs and problems. Such policy was not very 
effective and tended to only waste energy and resources. 
 In regards to the style of decision making, it is difficult to see the difference 
between those who are progressive and who are pro-status quo, whether they act 
democratically or authoritarian. If democratic attitude is defined as the willingness to 
open themselves up and to involve others (both from inside or outside its institution) in 
decision making, and authoritarian is the opposite, facts point out that those considered 
progressive also often made authoritative policy. On the contrary, those considered 
pro-status quo also often made policy using a democratic approach. The result of an 
authoritative policy is not always negative, while democratic policy does not always 
result in positive performance of administration reform. This is an evidence of a law in 
public policy theories that a good policy does not result outcomes, if the policy 
implementation process is not carried out properly.  
 To determine whether a Regent/Mayor supports democratic or authoritative 
attitude in making decision, study can be done on the type of policy made and the 
situation faced when the policy was made. Considering the types of policy, such as 
regulative, distributive, redistributive, and incentive, there seems to be no correlation 
between the type of a policy and the way it is made, authoritatively or democratically. 
When the Giri Regency created ‘Room 12’88, for example, it was completely of the 
                                                 
88 A room, which has by chance number 12, is used for Regent’s assistance. Government personnel 
sarcastically called the people who were in it as an excluded people though actually not all of the people 
were in there because they did not have sufficient competency. They were rested in the Room 12 for a 
year; and then when their working performance was improved, they would be reassigned in the 
structural position. 
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Regent’s initiative. Such was the case when the Kulon Regency established a TV 
station, it was completely of the regent’s initiative and thus, no one could reject it. On 
the contrary, it is common that when the Regent/Mayor makes a policy about giving 
incentive to the members of DPRD, there are many parties that intervene to enforce the 
implementation of the policy, especially the politicians themselves. Thus, the policy 
results in much criticism since the chances of KKN occurring are very high. Many 
Regents/mayors have made the mistake of welcoming the suggestion of someone 
outside their administration to place an employee in certain position, and then 
eventually it is proved that the employee’s performance is not good.  
 It is very likely that democratic attitude in decision making highly depends on 
the political climate when the policy is made. The period of implementation of Law 
22/1999 was a remarkable period of autonomy for local governments because of the 
lack of clarity of the Central Government policies, as well as the local political 
situation that tended to oppose the Central Government interests. Local ‘radicalism’ 
that emerged in the form of local leadership often resulted in increasing political 
frictions. The opportunity for local government to make decision was increasing but at 
the same it created an increasingly political and administrative uncertainty. This 
mostly affected the performance of bureaucracy, as the execution agent, and eventually 
the public services provided. In this kind of political condition, only a smart and brave 
the Regent/Mayor could use their position for their own interest or the society’s 
interest. In this uncertain situation policy was usually made in an authoritarian way by 
the Regent/Mayor, seeing as they faced many urgent administrative management and 
public problems. Furthermore, it is presumable that in that situation at that time there 
were many politicians that tried to make use the situation for their own and their 
group’s interests. The Regents/Mayors, many of whom coincidentally had populist 
attitude, populist policy though the decision making was done in authoritarian way. On 
the contrary, those who were pro-status quo tended to make elitist policy. 
 Democratic decision making processes were usually only applied to policies 
that were considered sensitive issues. Many policies that were made by the Alit 
Municipality resulted from compromise with the civil society, whether on the behalf of 
the society, mass organization, or mass media. The increasing contribution from the 
civil society in social and economic changes in Alit Municipality was closely related to 
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the role of the mayor who invited broad public participation. Although in some cases, 
there are NGOs that always oppose any Local Government policy (waton suloyo), 
society itself is critical and will eventually suppress the existence of the NGOs that do 
not have a clear mission. 
 Another way to see whether a Regent/Mayor is progressive or pro-status quo is 
to see their effort in creating good governance. Those who are progressive promote 
transparency and accountability. Four of the heads of region that are progressive do not 
hesitate in giving the public the opportunities to access the budget allocation in APBD. 
They do this by announcing the budget allocation of APBD in mass media. In many 
other regions, there have even been efforts to announce publicly the head, the type, and 
the budget of the projects that are handled by the agency and earn money from APBD. 
This is to avoid slander and so that society can have direct control on who leads the 
projects89.  
 On the contrary, the Regent/Mayor who is pro-status quo tends to cover up the 
policy that they have made. It is almost definite that there is no any transparency in the 
process or the result of a policy. This closed attitude is suspected to be a part of the 
conspiracy between political and bureaucratic elites who use public resources for their 
own or their group’s interest. This point shows that there are heads of region, 
bureaucrats and political elites that are corrupt or receive money because of their 
position. This means that they are unable to create accountability whatsoever.  
  In correlation with local public administration reform, those two heads of 
region that are pro-status quo do not succeed at all in performing each required reform 
component. On the other hand, from four of the heads of region that are progressive, 
three of them are considered to succeed in public administration reform. The other one 
is considered to be less successful. This conclusion proves that one of the key 
requirements of a successful public administration reform at the local level is the 
Regent/Mayor character. In this case, the progressive character of a Regent/Mayor 
becomes the main factor that supports every effort to create a successful local public 
administration reform. This progressive character then must be shown in several areas, 
particularly high leadership skills and qualified managerial ability. The data shows that 
                                                 
89 In the New Order era, the position of project leader is lucrative and fought over by many employees 
because those who sit in this position are able to use the project budget for their own interests without 
any tight control from supervisory institutions or their superiors. 
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the Regent/Mayor that has these qualifications has managed to perform a successful 
public administration reform. Their contribution is to ensure that the reform process is 
in accordance with regional needs. 
Thus, this conclusion confirms the Second thesis: 
The performance of local public administration reform depends mostly on the role of 
the Regent/Mayor. The role in fact becomes very apparent when on one hand, the 
Central Government is unable to create clear and certain policy administrative or 
substantial policy reform. On the other hand, political actors (DPRD) do not have the 
ability to supervise bureaucracy effectively. 
 
b. Cunning Bureaucrats and Conceited Politicians  
The performance of local public administration reform would be more 
interesting if viewed from the response of the bureaucratic and political elite involved 
in the process. These two roles are very important because they often have to deal with 
the impact of the reform. It is very likely that a reform process would affect many 
aspects such as job position, budget allocation for the institution, relationships with 
other institutions, personnel recruitment, and public access to the planning made by the 
institution. The bureaucrat that holds an important role is the City Manager. This is the 
highest bureaucratic position in the region. The collaboration or conflict between city 
managers in responding to the reform makes the administration and political liveliness 
at the local level interesting. Therefore, in this research, the responses of the two roles 
are categorized into collaboration and conflict. Collaboration occurs when the 
bureaucrat and political elite make an agreement whether it is secretly or openly, to 
make a policy that would be beneficial for both parties. Meanwhile there is conflict 
when both parties have differing interests and actions when dealing with certain issues 
in reform. 
 From those six regions, there is only one that has a high rate of conflict 
between the bureaucracy and the politicians in implementing the reform. The region is 
the Kulon Regency. An extremely high political friction between those two institutions 
is a portrait of a conflict between the nationalist group elites and religious group elites 
which traditionally have different views on many public and administrative matters. 
Furthermore, because the regent was coincidentally a woman from the nationalist 
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group, the religious groups were determined to oppose the regent and her personnel90. 
Considering this condition, political friction between the two groups worsened when 
politicians, regardless of their political party, were dissatisfied with the regent’s policy, 
because she did not fulfill their request for an increase of welfare budget for the 
members of the DPRD. The regent refused this request because it would violate 
regulation from the Central Government on the allocation of the DPRD budget. In 
addition, many politicians that came from the nationalist group that did not like the 
City Manager that was considered to be a product of the Golkar party, the previous 
prevailing party that is considered to be the ringleader of KKN in the New Order era. 
The regent, however, was still willing to keep him because he had experience 
managing the administration that was very much needed by the region. 
 Conceptually, the model of conflict that happened in the Kulon Regency is 
similar to the Adversarial Model by B. Guy Peters (1987). The resolution of the 
conflict very much depends on the power possessed by each conflicting party. The 
power could be in form of strategic position in public position or a party’s special skill. 
Thus, to determine the possibility of a person or a group to be the winner, we must 
consider the case and its relation to the individual’s position and skill. In the case of 
the Kulon Regency, although de jure Regent’s position is bellow the DPRD, in 
practice the close relationship between regents with the Indonesian President at that 
time, who was coincidentally also a woman and from the same party, firmed her 
political position in the region. Regarding some policy issues, the Regent along with 
her bureaucracy personnel managed to retain her position in front of the board. 
Nonetheless, sometimes conflict resolution was required through policy bargaining 
between them both. This means that each party agreed on the policy proposed by its 
political opponent if each interest could be accommodated. 
 There are many regions that managed to suppress conflict between bureaucrats 
and politicians through collaboration. Could everybody’s interest be fulfilled? The 
answer to that question actually lies on the quality of the collaboration. In this case, 
there was no actually collaboration between them that aimed to fulfill the interests of 
the region and its society. Rather, the bargaining between them was in order to fulfill 
their interests through policy made collaboratively. The bureaucrats need the 
                                                 
90 There are still opinions among some religious leaders that women are not supposed to be leaders  
(patriarchy) 
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politicians to legitimize their policy, while the politicians need the bureaucrats to 
support their efforts in implementing the policy. They were each being defensive of 
their own interests, afraid that the reform would threaten these. However, they did not 
want to show this explicitly because it may have ruined the image of the bureaucracy 
that was no longer positive in the eyes of the society and the politicians, and they did 
not want to have their voter support decrease. The safest act was to collaborate with 
each other. It could be said that public administration reform very much threatened 
their interests, both institutionally and personally. That is why almost no political party 
has promoted local public administration themes in its campaign. This fact proves the 
Third Thesis: 
There is no evidence that the success of local public administration reform is 
supported by local politicians since they are not interested in placing local public 
administration reform on their political agenda.  
 
The characters of the collaboration in the five regions studied have different 
variations, which can be grouped into two different models, the Tight Collaboration 
and the Loose Collaboration. Tight Collaboration is when those who form a coalition 
do not allow outsiders, including civil society, to influence them. This model is similar 
to the Village Life Model by B Guy Peters. The Regions that conform to the Tight 
Collaboration category are the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, the Anom 
Regency, and the Wetan Regency. While the Loose Collaboration model is similar to 
the Functional Village Life, in which the parties that form a coalition give an 
opportunity to outsiders to participate in giving suggestion, though the final decision is 
still held by the members of the coalition—an example of this region is the Alit 
Municipality. In the Alit Municipality, bureaucrats and politicians gave freedom to the 
society and NGOs to access certain policy that was being discussed. The input from 
the outside also became a consideration for the members of the coalition to make 
policy, but the decision was made by the coalition. On the contrary, in the regions with 
tight collaborative characteristics, almost no outsiders had any influence on the 
coalition since they shut outsiders out. As a result of this closed attitude, conflict with 
outsider would usually arise when the policy was implemented.  
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Constitutionally, politicians who sit in the DPRD hold a higher position than 
the bureaucrats. However, bureaucrats are people who have been educated and trained 
for years in performing administrative tasks. In other words, although bureaucratic 
position is constitutionally below the members of the Board, they have power in the 
form of knowledge that the politicians do not have. Coincidentally, in that period most 
of the politicians were instant politicians that did not have much capability and did not 
have the ability to understand the administration and public problems in any way. As a 
result, although on the surface level there seemed to be tight collaboration, the 
bureaucrats were actually the play makers of the coalition. Unconsciously, the 
politicians were carried away with the game rhythm played by the bureaucrats who 
were experts in administration and public matters. This can be seen by the fact that 
there were many politicians in the DPRD that were convicted in APBD budget misuse 
cases that they had to stay in prison. On the contrary, few bureaucrats were arrested for 
the same cases. Whereas the budgeting process for example involves both the 
legislative and the executive, the bureaucrats were presumably involved in the same 
cases. In this matter, the bureaucrats that were experts because they possessed 
knowledge and experience, and were more cunning (clever and deceitful) than the 
politicians who only had their constitutional positions to depend on.  
In the administrative practices of that time, it was apparent that knowledge 
domination was able to defeat constitutional domination when it was not supported by 
power of knowledge. Looking at the history of the New Order bureaucracy, besides 
having constitutional power with its position that was above the politicians 
(legislative), they also dominated knowledge since they were supported by the 
technocrats. Thus, it is reasonable that in that time, the New Order bureaucracy 
became one of the main political powers in Indonesia besides Golkar (the ruling party) 
and military. 
One of the actors that are worth noting in the public administration reform is 
the City Manager. As the highest career official in the region, he has adequate 
knowledge and experience in managing the administration. His managerial ability is 
very much needed by the Regent/Mayor who does not have sufficient administrative 
knowledge. Many Regents/Mayors completely depend on the City Manager for 
internal administration management matters. The pattern of the relationship between 
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the bureaucrats and the politicians is mostly determined by the ability of the City 
Manager to control the game rhythm that he would not be easily trapped into political 
tricks that are often made by politicians in the DPRD. Therefore, the facts as revealed 
above prove the Fourth Thesis: 
Collaboration between the bureaucrats and politicians (DPRD) is artificial because 
what really happens is that they are exploiting each other to maintain each of their 
own interests. In this collaboration, the bureaucrats are more cunning than the 
politicians at avoiding political tricks in public policy that could bring them into 
authority misuse.  
 
In correlation with the performance of the local public administration reform, 
there are two regions where the politicians and bureaucrats engage in Tight 
Collaboration and still have successful local public administration reform. Those two 
regions are the Giri Regency and the Prajan Municipality. On the contrary, in the two 
other regions, the Anom Regency and the Wetan Regency, politicians and bureaucrats 
engage in tight Collaboration but the local public administration reform does not result 
in the expected outcome (fail). One region that shows Loose Collaboration 
characteristics, the Alit Municipality, is indeed successful in performing local public 
administration reform. There is an interesting phenomenon experienced by the Kulon 
Regency. The rate of conflict between the politicians and the bureaucrats is high, but 
the reform does not completely fail (less successful). From this fact, it can be inferred 
that the response of the bureaucrats and the politicians, whether characterized by Tight 
Collaboration, Loose Collaboration, or Conflict, does not have a direct influence on 
the success of local public administration reform. Nonetheless, with other variables, it 
is presumable that this variable affects the success of a local public administration 
reform. 
 
c. Civil Society 
 One variable outside the state that is assumed to play an important role in the 
local public administration reform process is the response of Civil Society. The role is 
classified into three groups, which are Critical, Cooperative, and Passive. Critical role 
is when civil society is actively involved in monitoring and accessing the policy, but 
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they also act critically toward the policy models, programs, and projects made by the 
government. Disagreement is expressed in various forms of protest and even in 
lawsuit. Cooperative role when the civil society is willing to cooperate with the Local 
Government in carrying out programs and projects concerning public interests. Usually 
this kind of civil society only accepts policy models and implementation designed by 
the Local Government. Meanwhile, passive role takes place when civil society groups 
do not have any concern with the policy issues that relate to government and public 
interests. They simply accept all policies, programs, and projects without criticizing 
their use and implementation. 
The data on the participation and political orientation of society generally 
shows that the 1998 reform has not yet been able to provide sufficient room for society 
to participate or actively access the policy planning process though it directly relates to 
their interest. On the contrary, society participates actively in political celebrity shows, 
especially political at the national level that is glamorous, such as president/vice-
president elections. This phenomenon in fact is not very supportive of democratic 
development because society tends to act more as political commodity consumer than 
as an actor in the political process. This can also be seen in the public administration 
reform process at the local level since society’s influence has not been able to 
encourage the creation of a qualified bureaucracy. Thus, society’s role and position in 
facing bureaucracy in many regions has not shown any positive changes. 
Some cases show the position and the role of NGO in the composition of public 
policy. Despite the criticisms that NGOs only function for their own benefit, there are 
still NGOs that sincerely fight for public interests. Another interesting thing is that 
both parties bargain on the fee for making identification cards as if they are sellers and 
buyers. The important thing is that the result satisfies both parties. Market mechanisms 
in formulation of public policy at the very least reduce the suspicion from each party 
and at the same time build trust between both. In other words, elitism in the 
formulation of public policy could be reduced over time when the process is performed 
transparently and public access is opened. 
The 1998 Reform has given great freedom to the press. In the new order era, 
freedom of the press was a luxury since government strapped it firmly. However, the 
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reform era guarantees freedom of the press. This is indicated by the increase in the 
number of printed and electronic mass media both at the national and local levels. This 
condition is supposed to positively affect administration reform by encouraging a 
creation of qualified public administration performance in accordance with the control 
function owned, especially in information that relates to public interests, such as 
education, health, and poverty. However, it has been predicted that some of the mass 
media that exists is a reflection of a capitalist way of thinking, and emphasizes how to 
gain profit without considering the quality and its effects on the public. Besides, the 
attitude of distrust between the mass media and the government in the end weakens the 
effort to create a qualified public administration. However, at least, critical attitudes of 
reporters and their intensive attention to the Local Government and DPRD encourage 
the two institutions to be careful, and this, could potentially prevent more extensive 
authority defiance. 
Based on the classification of civil society responses, the Kulon Regency, and 
the Anom Regency showed critical responses. Meanwhile, the Giri Regency, the 
Prajan Municipality and the Alit Municipality showed Cooperative responses group. 
The other region, the Wetan Regency, is the only region in which the civil society 
responded passively. In the Kulon and the Anom Regencies, the civil society is often 
in opposition to the Local Government. Their critical attitude is often shown by 
making protests opposing policy that is considered contradict public interests. 
However, it needs to be admitted that their critical attitude is often driven by the 
interests of certain elites in the region that their intention to fight for public interest 
becomes less sincere. In the Giri Regency, the Prajan Municipality, and the Alit 
Municipality, civil society and Local Government are willing to sit together to discuss 
a certain policy issue. Nonetheless, this policy is also often criticized by the NGOs 
who consider it as an effort of the Local Government to stifle their critical attitude. 
However, their role is extremely limited in decision making. They do not have strong 
bargaining power in the decision making process and only perform supervision 
process. In the Wetan Regency, the passive attitude of the civil society makes the 
administrative elites, Regent, bureaucrat elites, and some politicians, uncontrollable. 
Therefore, local public administration reform in this region can be inferred 
unsuccessful.  
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The only factor that could explain a weak of civil society phenomenon is the 
historical heritage of the new order regime which is very repressive. In that time, the 
civil society was politically silenced by reducing their role in political party and on the 
contrary leading them into organization with various kinds of working units that were 
created by the ruling government regime. The purpose was to control civil society 
activities. It was also often that people who opposed the regime were punished with 
terror and prison. Planning mechanisms, both from the institutional and the substantial 
sides, had been carefully designed that it was impossible for an idea to break through 
the platform that had been blueprinted by the government. The condition during that 
period was very effective to make the civil society act passively and accept every 
policy made by the government. It seems the 1998 Reform has not be enable to 
encourage changes in civil society attitudes though now the opportunity to participate 
is wide opened. There is possibility that the trauma of a very repressive past still 
haunts the society so that they still act passively now. 
Thus, generally, it can be inferred that in general, the role of civil society in 
policy making process is still limited, particularly in public administration reform. 
Thus, this conclusion confirms the Fifth thesis: 
Civil society access to policy that relates to public administration reform is limited. 
Both the bureaucracy and the politicians often use the existence of civil society, 
especially the NGOs, to give pressure to each other when the friction of interest 
between them worsens. 
 
C. Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, the following conclusion answers the research questions 
proposed in the Chapter One Introduction: 
1. Among the administration and political experts in Indonesia, there has been a 
pessimistic attitude in responding to the success of the public administration 
reform, both at the national and local levels. However, this research has proved 
that at the local level, there are some regions that are considered to be 
successful in performing the reform. Considering the reform components of 
organization, personnel, financial, and planning method, and the success of 
each region in achieving the reform is varied. In comparison, there is no 
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component of reform that is easy to perform, except the organizational 
structure reform in some regions. Meanwhile, other reform components are 
considered to be not very (partially) successful. The most difficult reform 
component that appears in most regions is planning method. Only one region is 
considered not to be very (partially) successful in performing the planning 
reform to become transparent and beneficial for the region. Financial reform is 
the reform component that its success is only in the level of administration 
model changes but it has not been able to change the process and the substance. 
Meanwhile, personnel reform is considered to be less successful and there are 
regions that are even successful in implementing it. In general, from the six 
regions researched, three are successful, one not is very (partially) successful, 
and two completely fail. In the two regions that failed, all of the reform 
components failed to be implemented. If the success of local public 
administration reform in each of those reform components is to be judged from 
the competency level achieved and the ability to make use the values of good 
governance in administration, those three regions can be considered to be 
successful in fulfilling those two criteria. 
2. At the macro level, the variable of the Central Government Role is the same in 
all regions, with its policy that is in the form of Government Regulation, 
Presidential Decree, Ministerial Decree, and its implementation in arranging 
public administration in region. This is a logical consequence of the regional 
autonomy model that considers autonomy as given by the Central Government 
to the Local Government. Data shows that it is indeed the Central Government 
is unprepared to perform the reform since it often makes contradictive policy. 
The policy is both in administrative reform (decentralized) and substantial 
policy reform. The administrative design that is described in the architecture of 
decentralization is very fuzzy and confusing for the region. This 
decentralization policy does not show a synergy with the policy reform 
(education and health for instance) that many resources that could be used to 
make the Local Government more competent are wasted. This is a picture of 
the states failure in creating a clear and certain legal basis for the region. The 
State is reluctant to hand over some of its authority to the region. It argues that 
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the region is not yet capable and it is afraid that the region will separate itself 
from the Unitary State of Indonesia. However, the central department is 
actually reluctant to give authority to the region because it is afraid that it may 
reduce its own power in the control of the region’s resources. Although the 
policy comes from the Central Government, not every region accepts it 
completely. Some regions revise it so that it becomes in accordance with the 
regions interests and some regions even reject it. Therefore, it is very difficult 
to see that the Central Government makes any contribution to the success of 
local public administration reform in those regions. 
3. One of the key variables that determine the success of local public 
administration reform is the role of the Regent/Mayor. The Regent/Mayor who 
has a progressive mind will tend to succeed in implementing the public 
administration reform. On the contrary, those that are pro-status quo are much 
less likely to be able to perform public administration reform. Nonetheless, the 
progressive will not be able to achieve the reform’s purpose unless they are 
supported by some other variables. Affirmative attitude is the main factor that 
enables the Regent/Mayor to create reform during times of policy uncertainty 
from the Central Government and political turbulence at the local and national 
level. Their courage to “oppose” the Central Government policy that is not in 
the interest of the region has supported the growth of advantageous policy 
innovation. In addition, political uncertainty continuously encourages them to 
improvise in making smart policies. Supported by their ability to manage 
internal bureaucratic management conflict, they are able to use the conflict with 
politicians and civil society groups as a support to perform public 
administration reform. On the contrary, those that have always been pro-status 
quo do not have the requirements which make their administration changes 
very slow or even retarded. Their dependency on the policy from the Central 
Government is very high and they do not make any effort to innovative policy. 
As a result of the uncertainty of the Central Government policy, the 
development of regional administration is in total confusion and it may well be 
said that public administration reform does not exist.  
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4. There are two different responses from the politicians and the bureaucrats in 
responding to the public administration reform, i.e. Collaboration and Conflict. 
Collaboration happens when bureaucracy and political elites make an 
agreement, secretly or openly, to make a policy that would be beneficial for 
both parties. Meanwhile, conflict happens when both parties have different 
interests and actions in dealing with certain reform issues. Collaboration is 
classified into two groups: tight Collaboration and Loose collaboration. Tight 
Collaboration is when the two parties do not allow outsiders to influence their 
interest, while Loose Collaboration is when those in the coalition allow 
outsiders to give suggestion, although the final decision is still held by the 
members of the coalition. In all of the research regions, whether characterized 
by collaboration or conflict, there is not any politician who is interested in 
making public administration reform into a policy issue. This is a political re-
production of what happens at the national level since there is not any political 
party that is interested in using the issue of public administration in its political 
campaign. They are not interested in the issue because it is highly sensitive and 
could possibly decrease their number of voters, considering that it contains 
downsizing, rightsizing and privatization issues which are unpopular to the 
society.  
5. During the implementation of Law No.22/1999, de jure politician position 
(legislative) is above the executive (constitutional power). However, in 
practice, the knowledge and experience of the bureaucrat (knowledge powers) 
play a more important role in avoiding political tricks that are made by the 
politicians which saves the bureaucrat from any punishment for misusing 
authority. This also shows that the coalition between the bureaucrat and the 
politician is very fragile. There is much potential for conflict to arise because 
each of them has their own interests, and each notably is suspicious of the 
other. Data shows that Tight Collaboration in a region does not guarantee the 
success of public administration reform, and neither does Loose Collaboration. 
On the contrary, the region that has conflict will not necessarily to fail. The 
impact of the variable of the bureaucrat and the politician’s response is largely 
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affected by the role of the Regent/Mayor in managing the conflict or the 
collaboration and use it to support the reform. 
6. The role of civil society in public administration reform process is still limited, 
both for the cooperative civil society and the critical civil society. Their role is 
usually determined by the politician and the bureaucrat who often use them to 
pressure other when their relationship is worsened. In correlation with the 
reform performance, the region that has cooperative civil society is more 
successful. Meanwhile, there are two possible conditions that could happen in 
the region with a critical society: failure and partially successful in reform. On 
the contrary, it is found that in the region with a passive civil society, the public 
administration fails. This conclusion shows that the role of civil society does 
influence public administration reform but in a limited way, considering that 
there are other variables that influence it. 
7. The success of local public administration reform is mostly determined by the 
factors that come from inside the region itself rather than the factors coming 
from the Central Government. In other words, regional autonomy is an absolute 
requirement for local public administration reform to achieve its required 
result. Local factors that influence the success of local public administration 
reform are the role of the Regent/Mayor, the response of the bureaucrat and the 
politician towards the reform, and the response of civil society toward the 
reform. Among those three factors, the role of the Regent/Mayor plays the most 
dominant role in determining the success of the reform. The Regent/Mayor that 
is progressive tends to be more successful in performing the reform than the 
Regent/Mayor who tries to maintain the status-quo. Nonetheless, the role will 
only be effective when it interacts with two other variables. In the area with a 
progressive the Regent/Mayor, collaboration between bureaucrats and 
politicians (both loose and tight), and cooperative civil society, the local public 
administration reform tends to be successful. Meanwhile, in regions with 
progressive the Regent/Mayor, conflicting politicians, and critical society, the 
level of success decreases (partially successful). In a region with tight 
collaboration between the politicians and the bureaucrats, passive civil society, 
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and pro-status quo the Regent/Mayor, the local public administration reform 
most certainly fails.  
 
D. Reviewing the Concept and Theory 
The key theory that becomes the background of this study is the theory on 
Public Administration Reform. The theory, including New Public Management, 
bureaucracy, and decentralization, will be re-evaluated, based on the result of this 
study.  
 
1. Cause for weak Public Administration Reform 
Public Administration (PA) reform in Indonesia has actually been performed 
since the New Order era by introducing various models, such as the scientific 
management model that dominated since the early period of Indonesian independence 
until the mid 1980s, PBBS and Policy analysis during the end 1980s, Reinventing 
Government and New Public Management that was first introduced in the early 90s, to 
the E-Government, Modern Government, and Good Governance that was starting to 
stand out early in the 21st Century. However, all of those reforms were moving so 
slowly that if there were indeed changes, it was only on the surface. From the practical 
point of view, the weakness has several causes: 
a. Bias in Public Administration (PA) definition 
In its development, the study on PA in Indonesia tends to be understood as a 
study on the State’s institution. This definition in practice has brought the domination 
of public administration through its primary institution (bureaucracy) in the 
governance system of Indonesia to become powerful and disrespectful toward the 
public. This is due to the governance culture in Indonesia which since the kingdom era 
has been elitist. Moreover, since it was first introduced in the early independence 
period until the early development of New Order regime construction which was 
authoritarian, study on PA was aimed more at the enhancement of state institutions and 
the relationship between them. Simplistically, this can be observed from the translation 
of the term “Public Administration” in Indonesian which is translated as Administrasi 
Negara (State Administration) instead of Administrasi Publik (Public Administration). 
During the New Order era, this study also did not improve much considering that it 
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was not affected by the values of democracy; thus it can be concluded that the study on 
PA tends to be a study that concentrates on the enhancement of the state's power 
instruments (centrifugal). It is therefore understandable that during that time, reform 
on PA which was proposed by PA experts only dealt with technical and procedural 
issues (scientific management) in the daily administration implementation process and 
was never able to touch the substance, especially in the relationship between PA and 
the public. Change started to take place after the 1998 reform, marked by the 
occurrence of many studies on PA which asserted the one sidedness of the state's 
institution functions toward the public. Then issues that questioned the neutrality of the 
bureaucracy came up.  
Considering the change in the Indonesian political system from one single 
authority to multi-party (pluralism), it is assumed that PA in Indonesia will be more 
qualified and pro-democracy. However, after nine years, the reform on PA shows 
almost no significant changes. This study found that political parties are completely 
uninterested in making it a political agenda. Why? Because change in PA, which they 
define as change on the state's power instrument, presumably will threaten the interests 
of the political parties and their politicians that have so far have received benefits from 
the existence of the PA system. 
Another finding from this study even shows that as a result of PA reform, both 
bureaucrats and politicians are repositioning their power. They are involved in several 
collaborations in the reform process. However, those collaborations are fake because 
they are actually exploiting each other to empower their own positions. This hidden 
conflict phenomena in the reform process once again shows that the development in 
the study on PA is closely connected with the way the power is defined, which means 
that study on PA is a study on the State's institution and how authority inside of it is 
used.  
From the finding of the hidden conflict between bureaucrats and politicians, it 
is also possible to make a conclusion on the importance of the bureaucratic role 
because in those cases, they are cleverer than the politicians in escaping from political 
tricks in the making of public policy that may cause them to be entrapped in the abuse 
of power.  
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b. Ideology incompatibility 
As it is known, Indonesia is a Country that follows the Rechtsstaat system 
which puts the State as the dominant party in the process of social change 
(development). In addition, law becomes the basic consideration for the administrator 
in making every decision. Compliance with the law which in practice is manifested in 
compliance to the superior usually encourages the administrator to make decision that 
tends to be pro-institution rather than in the publics interest. This is different from the 
Anglo-Saxon model, the administrative culture of which is concerned with public 
interests that this system tends to be more open toward other models, including from 
the private sector which may also be implemented in the PA system. 
 There are many PA reform models which have tried to be implemented in 
Indonesia, including the latest models that introduce NPM and Governance. Those two 
models generally come from the countries which have a strong Anglo Saxon basis, 
such as the UK and the USA. Therefore, it is understandable that PA reform that has 
taken place so far often experiences stagnancy because of 'ideology incompatibility', 
i.e. between the PA system in Indonesia (legalistic-formal) and the theoretical concept 
that becomes the basis for PA reform model (market oriented). Several cases found in 
this study, such as the failure of Citizens’ Charter implementation and other models 
which are similar in some regions in Indonesia, are proof of the ideology 
incompatibility. Similarly, this study also found that in the governance context the role 
of civil society in reforming PA at the local level is still very limited. Moreover, they 
are used by the bureaucratic and political elites to retain their interest by acting on the 
behalf of PA reform. 
Nonetheless, it does not indicate that the PA reform model that arises from the 
Rechtsstaat has managed to be implemented in Indonesia which has the same 
administrative culture. Though the Constitution states that Indonesia is Rechtsstaat and 
Welfare State, in practice it is very difficult to conclude that both are fully 
implemented. There are also many influences from outside the system that become a 
reference for the administration and state affairs process. This ambivalence causes the 
emergence of the conclusion that Indonesia is in the grey area, and this in the end 
creates confusion in PA reform. 
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c. Historical factor 
History has proven that the Public Administration system in Indonesia, 
especially bureaucracy as the main institution, does not have a record as “servant” but 
mostly as “ruler”. The long history of Indonesia since the kingdoms era until the early 
1998 reform era, which overthrew the authoritarian New Order regime, still suggests 
that bureaucracy is a ruler. This is indicated by several aspects, such as in public 
services where in practice it is the society who serves the bureaucracy and not the 
other way around. The same condition happens in the power sharing between politics 
and bureaucracy: it is a fact that there are many constitutional regulations, such as 
Presidential Decree, Minister’s Decree, and in the local level The Regent/Mayor 
Decree, which are made by the executives are more powerful than the higher 
constitutional regulations which are produced by the legislatives (DPR/DPRD) which 
supposedly become the foundation for the subordinate regulations.  
This study has proven that it is very difficult for various civil society groups to 
have access to the decision making process which so far has become an authority 
domain, sacralized by people from the executives and legislatives. As a consequence, 
public participation often has to face a wall of authority which is built by those who 
rule. 
The Regent/Mayor factor, which is one of the main variables in the PA reform 
process in the local level, once again indicates that the ruler factor has a big role in 
every reform. If a region has a Regent/Mayor who is qualified and commits to the 
reform, it is very likely that the reform will achieve a desirable result. Conversely, 
when a region has a Regent/Mayor who is unqualified and anti-reform, it is very likely 
that the reform will be failed.  
 
d. Development strategy mistakes 
For decades, the New Order regime implemented the development strategy by 
dividing it into several sectors. The mistake was that each sector was left separated and 
developed independently, without anyone able to construct them in one working 
network. This also occurred in the PA reform implementation which was left separated 
from other development sectors. This study found that decentralization is still a part of 
PA reform. The formulation neglects its relationship with other sector reforms which 
 396
in this study is called ‘policy reform’ or 'public sector reform', such as education and 
health sector. The influence of sectoralism in the administration system of Indonesia 
from the national to the local level has made the administration system incapable of 
supporting the implementation of the development sectors. Reform in those public 
sectors does not take into consideration the administration design that has been 
constructed within a decentralization framework. The result is then implementation 
mess caused by the inexistence of well made connective concepts between both sides. 
The incapability of the Ministry of State Personnel Empowerment (PAN) which 
is supposed to be the motor for PA reform is a proof on how sectoral strategy has 
weakened reform efforts. That there is no political and administrative support for PA 
reform in the form of policy priority scale causes this ministry to be powerless in 
making other ministries obey the reform policy that is issued by the ministry. Other 
technical ministries try to make their own reform concept on public sectors that 
become their responsibility and do not try to relate it with the administrative design 
that is being reformed by the State Ministry of PAN. 
 
2. Reformulating Public Administration Reform concept 
Criticism regarding the practical perspective as mentioned above signifies the 
existence of criticism toward PA building which so far has been a selected model in 
Indonesia. However, it must be noted that there is no specific Indonesian PA building, 
except one reproduced and collaborated from various PA systems from around the 
world, such as Europe Continental and Anglo-Saxon. It is nonetheless important for 
Indonesia to implement a model which is in accordance with its own culture 
administrative and political structures that the desired reform will be more applicative.  
 Almost all of the PA reform models developed comes from the experience of 
developed countries, both which have Rechtsstaat-centric and Anglo-Saxon-centric 
culture. Since they are made from practical assumption which is in accordance with 
their political, economic, and cultural systems, it is very likely that there will be 
problems in the implementation if the system is different. One thing that has to be 
considered is that Indonesia, since independence until today, has not experienced 
linear social changes with clear stage as experienced by developed countries. Even 
today, in the mid of a complex global situation with fluctuating social-economic and 
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political changes, it is very difficult to properly formulate a PA reform model that is 
suitable with the conditions faced. 
One weakness that is apparent from all of the existing models, from scientific 
management, PPBS and Policy Analysis, Reinventing Government, New Public 
Management to E-Government model, Modern Government and Good Governance, is 
that they are too rationality-centric because they stand on an established system with a 
series of mathematic calculation which has more certain probability of goal 
achievement. This is a characteristic of the developmentalism (modernism) model 
which spread vastly from the West Country to the developing country during the-60s 
decade. Modernism theory moves from an assumption that modernization and 
economic growth will create a more rational bureaucracy and that on the same time 
political participation will increase and then democracy will develop. This assumption 
is then supported by several analyses that state that certain political authoritarianism 
does not oppose modern capitalist culture. The supporters of the dependency theory 
nonetheless criticize that in truth modernism has a hidden agenda to put developing 
countries under the control of developed countries. With this agenda, PA reform that is 
offered is often related with the effort to keep the capital invested in developing 
countries safe without considering the political and economic system that exists in the 
developing countries.  
Shamelessly, the supporters of modernism also neglect the political behavior of 
the main institution in PA, the bureaucracy, as an organism that has its own interest. 
This bureaucracy’s behavior is often deviant from the term "bureaucracy pathology". 
This kind of bureaucracy is usually so powerful because it is supported by other state 
power institution, such as military and political party, and in several cases collaborates 
with National or International Corporation, as criticized by the supporters of 
dependency theory. It is even able to reduce and to depoliticize the political life of the 
society. Political institutions, which used to be places for the society to channel their 
political aspiration and participation, now have been subordinated by the bureaucracy, 
which makes them parts of the State corporatism and changes their function into 
instruments to control the society.  
In Rechtsstaat system, bureaucracy power is increasingly solid because 
bureaucracy demands loyalty from the personnel and the institution inside toward laws 
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that have been agreed upon by everyone. Other political powers meanwhile need 
bureaucracy because bureaucracy is the only one that has a complete administrative 
instrument and a legitimatization to be in every part of the society’s life. This 
extensive network of bureaucracy is what makes other institutions greatly need the 
existence of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has a strong bargaining position that it despises 
any effort that tries to reform itself, particularly the effort that changes its position that 
has existed for long.  
 The symptom of bureaucratic dominance brings depicts that since so far 
bureaucracy is not neutral, to solve PA reform stagnancy, bureaucracy should be 
neutral. However, it would not be that easy since the concept of bureaucracy neutrality 
as proposed by Hegel is still very abstract. In a homogeneous societal condition with 
similar social-economic and cultural level, it is possible to apply the Hegel’s concept 
of bureaucracy neutrality. It would be very difficult however to find such societal 
condition, especially considering that viewed from any aspect (socio-cultural, 
economics, politics, religion, geography), Indonesia is very complex. Bureaucracy 
cannot avoid taking sides, and because it exists in a specific environment, bureaucracy 
will be value loaded.  
This one-sidedness has to be clarified: to whom or to what bureaucracy takes 
side with. There are two possibilities, whether it is to the law as a political agreement 
that is used as common reference or it is to the public interest. Both actually are not a 
dichotomy but a continuum line which is able to move between two poles, according 
to the need and the challenge faced. One-sidedness, to the law, is necessary when the 
problem is obvious and the policy choice is correct. Meanwhile, one sidedness, to the 
public interest, often happens when the problem faced deals with society's sense of 
justice and it is not possible to be handled by existing law; in some cases, the law does 
not even provide a policy option. In this situation, bureaucracy should be on public 
interest side, with appropriate calculation and acting speed. The implication is that PA 
reform model which is supposed to create professionalism (law) has to consider 
justness values, and in which PA is a part of them.  
Bureaucracy’s one-sidedness as explained above also clarifies that 
administration cannot be separated from politics. Overlapping relationship which so 
far happens is usually resulted from the pathologic bureaucracy and has nothing to do 
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with the conceptual truth that there is a relationship between both.  The most important 
thing to note is the relationship line on which both interact with each other. It is very 
often that political decision is made highly abstractly that it could give opportunity for 
the administrator to interpret the decision according to its interest. This phenomenon 
often occurred in Indonesia, especially in the New Order regime era where legal power 
of a Presidential Decree for example is often higher than constitutional regulation 
which is produced by the legislatives. Besides caused by the pathologic characteristic 
of bureaucracy, which is signified by the size of the power possessed, it is also caused 
by the weakness of constitutional regulation produced by the legislatives which gives 
executives too much freedom to interpret the policy (discretionary power) in its 
implementation. Thus, despite the model of PA reform, to be successful two things that 
need to be considered are the extent to which law has its power to bond both which is 
produced by the legislatives and the executives, and the legal relationship between 
both. 
Rationality-centric which becomes a weakness of the PA reform models has 
caused the potency of the groups outside the State, such as civil society, to be left out. 
The sophisticated model which is being developed, i.e. governance, actually attempts 
to anticipate this weakness because this concept is understood as an administration 
system which involves many actors, networks, and institutions outside the government 
(the market and civil society) to manage problems and public needs. The concept of 
governance is neutral because it only dictates the way economic, political, social, and 
cultural problems are managed by the government, civil society, and market. Good 
management creates good governance, and on the contrary bad management creates 
bad governance. Nevertheless, this concept is actually a reproduction of the 
modernism model (developmentalism) which tries to be friendlier to the bureaucracy 
and the public. It would be very difficult to implement it when the political system is 
still authoritarian and the market has not been perfectly formed that the monopolistic 
market may wins and the role of the society in the view of the State is minor. This 
study also found a symptom of bad governance, where the market at the local level 
spoke in the name of good governance and accuse the regional government of being 
unjust for appointing a specific private company without a tender process in 
conducting a government project. Local government was forced to do this because the 
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private company also cheated by conspiring with other businessmen to share its 
projects (sub-contracting) which it resulted in lower quality. However, in the name of 
good governance, a private company manages to bring the government to the court 
room and eventually the government was found to be guilty. In this kind of case, the 
society as a pillar in the governance and as the consumer has to be the victim of an 
administrative process which speaks in the name of good governance. 
This important role of the state in the governance concept has to be properly 
defined. It is no longer dominant but adjusted to its function when the market and the 
civil society are considered to be incapable to replace the role of the state. Thus, 
balance position between those three governance pillars should be adjusted to each 
role, which previously has to be clearly defined and agreed. One of the best strategies 
to balance the role is through the state's willingness to decentralize its authorities to the 
institutions underneath, market, and civil society. Decentralization here refers to 
political decentralization, the authority to make decision and implement it. Between 
the governments, decentralization should not end only on the political elites and 
bureaucrat level but should also flow until reaching the street-level bureaucrat. In this 
way, deregulation and de-bureaucratization become meaningful. Meanwhile, 
decentralization to the institution outside the state can be manifested through the 
implementation of privatization and participation concept. 
Lastly, as a final note on the reformulation of PA reform concept, it should 
always be remembered that reform cannot be separated from the political reform. 
Findings in this study show that the condition of local government with a progressive 
leadership configuration, supported by a collaborative relationship between 
bureaucrats and politicians, supports the argument that political and administrative 
reform should be performed coincidently. Nine years of reform in Indonesia (since 
1998) shows that there is almost no harmony between the bureaucrats and the 
politicians and that the PA reform is running extremely slow. The disharmony of the 
reform is getting apparent when there is not any political party which is interested to 
place the issue of PA reform as policy agenda that needs to be handled soon. In the 
end, the success in reforming administration in local level mostly depends on the 
person who leads the region. If the society manages to elect a proper leader, it is very 
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likely that the reform will achieve the desired result, and on the contrary, if they fail, it 
is certain that the reform will also fail.  
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